Matter of Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d 433 (1975)

Indigent parties in divorce actions do not have a constitutional right to assigned counsel at public expense; the provision of such counsel is a matter for the legislature, not the courts.

Summary

This case addresses whether indigent parties in divorce actions are constitutionally entitled to publicly-funded legal representation. Two indigent wives, one a plaintiff and one a defendant in separate divorce actions, sought court orders compelling Tompkins County to provide them with counsel or compensate counsel they retained. The New York Court of Appeals held that no such constitutional right exists. The court emphasized that while counsel is desirable, it is not a legal condition to access the courts in divorce cases. The appropriation of public funds for such purposes is a legislative function.

Facts

Two indigent women were involved in separate divorce actions in Tompkins County. One was a plaintiff, and the other was a defendant. Both sought court orders requiring the county to provide them with legal representation at public expense, arguing they could not afford counsel themselves. The trial court granted the relief sought, but the Appellate Division reversed.

Procedural History

The Supreme Court granted the wives’ requests for counsel. The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s decision, holding that absent statutory authority, the courts cannot direct the provision of counsel or compensation of retained counsel for indigent wives using public funds. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s order.

Issue(s)

Whether an indigent plaintiff wife in a divorce action and an indigent defendant wife in a similar action are entitled, as a matter of constitutional right, to have the County of Tompkins provide them with counsel or compensate counsel retained by them.

Holding

No, because the appropriation and provision of authority for the expenditure of public funds is a legislative and not a judicial function, both in the Nation and in the State.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals distinguished between criminal and civil cases, noting that the right to assigned counsel in criminal cases stems from constitutional provisions safeguarding liberty and due process. In contrast, no similar constitutional or statutory provision applies to private litigation like divorce. The court acknowledged the inherent power of courts to assign uncompensated counsel in civil cases under CPLR 1102(a), but emphasized this is discretionary, not an absolute right.

The court addressed the argument that Boddie v. Connecticut supports a constitutional right to counsel in matrimonial matters. It clarified that Boddie only prohibited states from denying access to courts by imposing fees indigents could not afford. Representation by counsel is not a legal condition to accessing the courts in divorce cases. “On no view of the matter is counsel required in a matrimonial action as a condition to access to the court.”

The court recognized the practical recourse available to indigent litigants through legal aid societies, federally-funded programs, and discretionary assignments of uncompensated counsel. It also noted the possibility of counsel fees being awarded to the wife against the husband and the availability of conditional fee arrangements. The court concluded that the problem of providing counsel to indigent matrimonial litigants is a matter for the legislature, which has the power to appropriate the necessary funds. The court stated, “The fundamental is that the courts constitute but one branch of government. The absence of appropriated funds and legislation to raise taxes under our State constitutional system, as in the rest of the Union, is not a judicially-fillable gap.”