New York Law Review

Tag: indigency

  • People v. Post, 23 N.Y.2d 157 (1968): Admissibility of Confession Absent Indigency Warning

    People v. Post, 23 N.Y.2d 157 (1968)

    A confession is admissible, despite the omission of an explicit warning about appointed counsel for indigent defendants, if there is no evidence the defendant was indigent at the time of interrogation.

    Summary

    Kenneth Post was convicted of manslaughter after confessing to hitting his six-week-old child. Prior to his confession, police advised Post of his Miranda rights but did not explicitly state that counsel would be appointed if he was indigent. At trial, Post testified to being employed and owning a car. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, holding that the omission of the indigency warning was harmless error because Post presented no evidence of indigency at the time of the interrogation. The court reasoned that the Miranda warning regarding appointed counsel is only relevant when a defendant’s indigency is at issue.

    Facts

    Kenneth Post was asked to come to police headquarters to discuss the death of his six-week-old child. Before questioning, police informed Post of his right to remain silent, that anything he said could be used against him, and that he had the right to an attorney. Post stated he didn’t want a lawyer and wanted to tell what happened. He made general remarks and confessed to hitting the baby. The police again warned him of his rights, placed him under arrest, and Post reiterated he didn’t want an attorney. He then gave a written confession. The police never explicitly told Post that if he was indigent, counsel would be appointed. At trial, Post testified he attended college, was employed, owned a car, and had debts of $800.

    Procedural History

    Post was convicted of manslaughter in the second degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of conviction without opinion. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a confession is inadmissible solely because the police failed to explicitly inform the defendant that counsel would be appointed if he was indigent, even when there is no evidence the defendant was, in fact, indigent at the time of the interrogation?

    Holding

    No, because where a defendant is not told that counsel will be furnished if he cannot afford one, his confession will not be excluded unless there is some evidence that the defendant was indigent at the time of the interrogation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the Miranda warning regarding the right to appointed counsel is specifically aimed at protecting indigent defendants. The Court noted, “A suspect is not required to inform the police of his indigency in order to come within the purview of Miranda.” However, the Court continued that, “where a defendant is not told that counsel will be furnished if he cannot afford one, his confession will not be excluded unless there is some evidence that the defendant was indigent at the time of the interrogation.” Here, the defendant presented no evidence of indigency. In fact, Post’s testimony at trial indicated he had been employed, attended college, and owned a car. The court considered the lack of an explicit indigency warning a harmless error under these circumstances. The court cited Miranda v. Arizona, noting that the warning’s applicability hinged on the suspect’s indigency. The Court also pointed to the fact that a police officer said that they would ask Post’s parents to get an attorney for him if he wanted one, and his parents were in the station house at the time of questioning.

  • People v. Tennyson, 21 N.Y.2d 573 (1968): Sufficiency of Hearsay Information for Arrest

    People v. Tennyson, 21 N.Y.2d 573 (1968)

    An information based on hearsay is sufficient for an arrest if it sets forth the source of the affiant’s knowledge and grounds for belief, particularly when the source is the victim of the alleged crime, creating a reasonable inference that the defendant was accused of the crime.

    Summary

    Tennyson was convicted of assault based on an information sworn by a police officer who relied on a conversation with the victim. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the information was sufficient because it indicated the source of the officer’s knowledge (the victim). The court reasoned that referencing the victim as the source implies the victim accused Tennyson of the crime, subject to perjury if false. The court also addressed the issue of sentencing, noting that imposing imprisonment exceeding one year for a misdemeanor due to indigency violates equal protection and constitutional bans against excessive fines, but allowed Tennyson to apply for resentencing based on indigency.

    Facts

    In the early morning, Tennyson allegedly opened the car door of a parked vehicle, shined a light inside, and ordered the male occupant out. He then threatened the occupant with a knife. When another car approached, Tennyson fled. The victim flagged down the passing car, which was a police vehicle, leading to Tennyson’s arrest. The arresting officer swore to an information for third-degree assault based on “conversations had” with the victim.

    Procedural History

    Tennyson was convicted of misdemeanor assault in the third degree. He was sentenced to a year in prison and a $500 fine, with additional imprisonment possible for non-payment of the fine. Tennyson appealed the conviction. While the appeal was pending, the Court of Appeals decided People v. Saffore, concerning excessive imprisonment for indigents unable to pay fines.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an information based on hearsay is sufficient when the source is identified as the victim of the alleged crime.
    2. Whether a sentence imposing imprisonment exceeding one year for a misdemeanor, due to the defendant’s indigency and inability to pay a fine, violates equal protection and the constitutional ban against excessive fines.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because referencing the victim as the source of the information creates a reasonable inference that the victim accused the defendant of committing the crime.
    2. The court did not directly rule on this, but indicated that if Tennyson could prove indigency, he would be entitled to modification of the sentence based on the precedent set in People v. Saffore.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court distinguished this case from People v. Jeffries, where the hearsay source was vague. Here, the source was the victim, leading to the inference that the victim accused Tennyson. The court stated that the information sworn to by the police officer sufficiently sets forth the sources of his knowledge, as well as the grounds for his belief, that the defendant had committed a crime. The court reasoned that “the source of the hearsay was the very victim of the assault and the only possible inference is that, during the conversation described, the defendant was accused of having committed the crime.” The court emphasized that a false statement by the officer about the conversation with the victim would amount to perjury. Regarding the sentence, the court cited People v. Saffore, stating that “imprisonment to work out the fine, if it results in a total imprisonment of more than a year for a misdemeanor, is unauthorized… and violates the defendant’s right to equal protection of the law, and the constitutional ban against excessive fines.” Therefore, Tennyson’s conviction was affirmed, but he was given leave to apply for resentencing based on indigency. Judges Burke, Scileppi, and Breitel concurred in the result based on the reasoning in the dissenting opinion in People v. Jeffries.

  • People v. Jaglom, 17 N.Y.2d 162 (1966): Defendant Must Pay Transcription Costs for Grand Jury Testimony Absent Indigency

    People v. Jaglom, 17 N.Y.2d 162 (1966)

    A non-indigent defendant seeking to examine grand jury minutes that have not yet been transcribed may be required to bear the cost of transcription as a reasonable condition of exercising that right.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the prosecution must provide a free transcript of grand jury testimony to a non-indigent defendant when the testimony is in stenographic form. The defendants, Gregory and Jaglom, requested access to grand jury minutes before their trials. The District Attorney made the minutes available but required the defendants to pay for transcription. The Court of Appeals held that requiring a non-indigent defendant to pay for the transcription of grand jury testimony is a reasonable condition and does not violate the defendant’s right to examine prior statements of witnesses.

    Facts

    Defendant Gregory was adjudged a youthful offender, and defendant Jaglom was found guilty of a misdemeanor. Both defendants requested to examine the grand jury minutes of witnesses before their trials. The minutes were in stenographic form. The District Attorney offered access but required the defendants to pay for transcription of the testimony.

    Procedural History

    The defendants refused to pay for the transcription, and the trial court denied their requests to instruct the District Attorney to purchase the minutes. The Appellate Term affirmed these denials. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the People are required to have grand jury testimony transcribed for use by the defense free of charge in every case, including when the defendant is not indigent.

    Holding

    No, because imposing the reasonable condition that a non-indigent defendant pay for the transcription of grand jury minutes does not prevent the exercise of the right to examine those minutes.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while defendants have a right to examine prior statements of the People’s witnesses, including grand jury testimony under the rule established in People v. Rosario, this right is not absolute. The court analogized the right to examine prior statements to the right to appeal or the right to counsel, where defendants bear the expense unless indigent. The court distinguished the case from Rosario and Jencks v. United States, where there was a direct and unqualified refusal by the prosecutor to provide the statements. Here, the minutes were made available, and only the cost of transcription was at issue. The court emphasized that non-indigent defendants routinely pay for various legal expenses, such as attorneys, investigators, and appeal costs. Section 952-t of the Code of Criminal Procedure obligates the Grand Jury stenographer to furnish transcripts only to the District Attorney “as [he] shall require.” When the People secure typewritten minutes for prosecution purposes, they must make those available to the defense. The court concluded that requiring a solvent defendant to pay for transcription when the minutes are not already transcribed is a reasonable condition. The dissenting judges argued that the prosecution has a duty to turn over grand jury testimony whenever requested for cross-examination and may not condition production upon payment by the defendant. They pointed out that the stenographer’s fees are a public charge.