New York Law Review

Tag: indictment

  • People v. Calbud, Inc., 49 N.Y.2d 389 (1980): Grand Jury’s Role in Assessing Legal Sufficiency of Evidence

    49 N.Y.2d 389 (1980)

    A prosecutor’s instruction to a grand jury that the legal sufficiency of evidence is solely the prosecutor’s determination impairs the grand jury’s function, as the grand jury must itself determine whether the evidence establishes each element of the crime.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a prosecutor can instruct a grand jury that the legal sufficiency of evidence is solely the prosecutor’s concern, not the grand jury’s. The Court of Appeals held that such instructions are erroneous and impair the integrity of the grand jury proceeding, requiring dismissal of the indictment. The court reasoned that the grand jury has a fundamental responsibility to assess whether the evidence presented establishes each element of the crime charged, and the prosecutor cannot preempt this function by declaring the evidence legally sufficient.

    Facts

    An Assistant District Attorney (ADA) presented evidence to a grand jury regarding a charge of second-degree grand larceny against the defendant. During deliberations, grand jurors asked about the standard for voting on an indictment and the elements of the crime. The ADA responded by instructing the grand jurors that determining the legal sufficiency of the evidence was a matter of law for the ADA to decide, and that the ADA had already determined the evidence to be legally sufficient.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was indicted for second-degree grand larceny. The trial court dismissed the indictment, finding that the ADA’s instructions to the grand jury concerning the sufficiency of the evidence were erroneous and tainted the integrity of the proceeding. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal. The People appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a prosecutor’s instruction to a grand jury, stating that the legal sufficiency of the evidence is solely the prosecutor’s determination, impairs the integrity of the grand jury proceeding and requires dismissal of the indictment.

    Holding

    Yes, because the grand jury has a fundamental responsibility to assess whether the evidence presented establishes each element of the crime charged, and the prosecutor cannot preempt this function.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the instructions given by the ADA were erroneous and required dismissal of the indictment. While CPL 190.65(1) authorizes a grand jury to indict only when the evidence is legally sufficient and provides reasonable cause, it does not specify who determines whether each standard has been met. The Court acknowledged that legal sufficiency (defined in CPL 70.10 as competent evidence that, if accepted as true, would establish every element of an offense) is analytically distinct from reasonable cause. However, the Court rejected the People’s argument that sufficiency is a purely legal question for the prosecutor. The Court stated, “It is simply not permissible for a District Attorney to inform grand jurors, who by statute and Constitution, have the unique responsibility to decide whether to vote an indictment, that as a matter of law the prosecutor has already determined that there is enough evidence to warrant that action.” Such instructions carry an unacceptably high risk that grand jurors might undervalue their own role in reviewing the evidence. The Court emphasized that the question of whether there is sufficient evidence of each element of a crime lies at the very heart of the decision to vote an indictment. Allowing the prosecutor to unilaterally decide legal sufficiency would infringe upon a defendant’s right not to be held to answer for a felony charge except upon a Grand Jury’s indictment. The Court noted that it is, of course, proper for the District Attorney to evaluate a matter for legal sufficiency before commencing, or continuing, a prosecution.

  • People v. Williams, 73 N.Y.2d 250 (1989): Validity of Indictment When Fewer Than 16 Jurors Hear All Evidence

    People v. Williams, 73 N.Y.2d 250 (1989)

    An indictment is valid if at least 12 grand jurors who voted to indict heard all the essential and critical evidence, even if fewer than the full 16-juror quorum were present for all of the evidence.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether an indictment was valid when some grand jurors did not hear all the critical evidence presented. The defendant argued that CPL 210.35(2) requires that a minimum of 16 grand jurors must be present and hear all critical evidence to participate in deliberations and vote for an indictment. The Court of Appeals held that as long as at least 12 grand jurors who voted to indict heard all the essential and critical evidence, the indictment is valid, even if fewer than 16 jurors heard all the evidence. The court emphasized the historical separation of quorum and voting requirements.

    Facts

    Defendant was arrested for allegedly robbing a Kansas Fried Chicken store with accomplices. Evidence was presented to the Grand Jury over four days. The grand jurors were instructed that they could not vote unless they heard all the evidence. After a poll, it was revealed only 12 jurors heard all the evidence. A juror expressed reservations about deliberating with fewer than 16 jurors present who heard all evidence. Ultimately, the jurors decided to deliberate and voted to indict the defendant.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment for insufficient evidence and unspecified defects. The trial court dismissed the indictment, concluding that CPL 210.35(2) requires 16 jurors who heard all critical evidence be available for deliberations. The Appellate Division reversed and reinstated the indictment, relying on prior precedent that at least 12 jurors who voted to indict heard all essential and critical evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a Grand Jury proceeding is defective under CPL 210.35(2) when fewer than 16 jurors who heard all the critical evidence are available to participate in deliberations and vote on an indictment.

    Holding

    No, because CPL 190.25(1) requires that at least 16 members be present during grand jury proceedings, but only 12 members need to concur to find an indictment; the statute does not require all 16 members to have heard all the critical and essential evidence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on the precedent set by People v. Brinkman and People v. Saperstein, which held that an indictment is valid as long as at least 12 grand jurors who voted to indict heard all the essential and critical evidence. The court reasoned that the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) did not materially alter the requirements from the predecessor statute, the Code of Criminal Procedure, which contained separate quorum and voting requirements. The court stated: “The language is hardly — and, we conclude, not materially — different. Indeed, had the Legislature intended to change such a basic provision of the Criminal Procedure Law after nearly a century, surely it would have said so.” CPL 190.25(1) combines the quorum and voting requirements into a single subdivision but does not explicitly require all 16 jurors to have heard all essential evidence. The court dismissed the argument that the quorum requirement becomes meaningless if some jurors are idle observers. It suggested those jurors still contribute by providing protection against malicious prosecution. The court concluded the defendant’s protection through grand jury indictment was not diminished because at least 12 jurors who heard the evidence were required to be convinced for a true bill.

  • People v. Deegan, 69 N.Y.2d 976 (1987): Standard for Evidence Sufficiency to Support an Indictment

    People v. Deegan, 69 N.Y.2d 976 (1987)

    The standard for reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to support an indictment is whether the evidence is legally sufficient, meaning competent evidence that, if accepted as true, would establish every element of the offense charged; it requires a prima facie showing, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

    Summary

    Defendant, an elected official, was indicted for allegedly changing his vote on a waste removal rate increase in exchange for promised campaign contributions. The lower courts dismissed the indictment, finding the evidence insufficient by applying an incorrect standard requiring exclusion of every hypothesis but guilt to a moral certainty. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the proper standard for an indictment is legal sufficiency, meaning a prima facie case. The Court emphasized that it is the Grand Jury’s role to determine reasonable cause, and the ‘moral certainty’ standard applies only at trial.

    Facts

    The defendant, an elected official, allegedly changed his vote on a proposed rate increase for waste removal services. This change purportedly occurred after a promise of future campaign contributions from members of the waste removal industry. The Grand Jury subsequently indicted the defendant based on this evidence, including declarations of an alleged co-conspirator.

    Procedural History

    The trial court dismissed the indictment, deeming the evidence insufficient. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, reinstated the indictment, and remitted the matter to the trial court for further proceedings.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence presented to the Grand Jury was legally sufficient to support the indictment against the defendant for changing his vote in exchange for promised campaign contributions.

    Holding

    Yes, because the evidence before the Grand Jury was legally sufficient, meaning it constituted competent evidence that, if accepted as true, would establish every element of the offense charged, thereby meeting the prima facie standard for an indictment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the lower courts erred by applying an incorrect standard of proof for evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the indictment. The lower courts had relied on a standard requiring the exclusion of every hypothesis but guilt to a moral certainty, which is not the standard for evaluating indictments. The Court explicitly stated, “As we held in People v Jennings (supra, at 114-116), the proper standard for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support an indictment is ‘legal sufficiency,’ which is defined in CPL 70.10 (1) as ‘competent evidence which, if accepted as true, would establish every element of an offense charged’ (see, CPL 190.65 [1]).” The court further clarified that “legally sufficient means prima facie, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt” (quoting People v Mayo, 36 NY2d 1002, 1004). The Court emphasized that the Grand Jury is responsible for determining whether there is reasonable cause to believe a crime was committed and that the ‘moral certainty’ standard is applicable only to the trier of fact at trial. The court found that even excluding the alleged coconspirator’s declarations, the remaining evidence was sufficient to infer the defendant changed his vote for a promise of future campaign contributions. The Court declined to rule on the admissibility of other disputed evidence, deeming it premature. Because the inquiry on a motion to dismiss an indictment for insufficient evidence is purely legal, the court rejected remitting the appeal to the Appellate Division for further factual review, since the Grand Jury evidence met the legal sufficiency standard.

  • People v. Ford, 57 N.Y.2d 262 (1982): Waiver of Objection to Improper Lesser Included Offense

    People v. Ford, 57 N.Y.2d 262 (1982)

    A defendant waives the right to object to a trial court’s error in considering or submitting a lesser crime that is not a lesser included offense if the defendant fails to make a timely objection.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a defendant waives the right to object to the trial court’s consideration or submission of a lesser crime that is not a lesser included offense of the indicted crime if the defendant does not make a timely objection. The Court reasoned that the constitutional right to be tried only upon indictment is not a limitation on the courts, but on the State, and that failing to object to an improper lesser included offense submission is a waivable defect, not a jurisdictional one. Therefore, convictions for crimes that are technically not lesser included offenses can stand if the defendant did not object at trial.

    Facts

    Raymond Ford was indicted for robbery. The trial court indicated it would consider grand larceny as a lesser included offense. Ford did not object and was convicted of grand larceny. Gordon Simpson was indicted for manslaughter. The prosecution requested the court to consider assault as a lesser included offense, and Simpson did not object. He was convicted of assault. James Williams was indicted for robbery. He requested the court submit assault and grand larceny as lesser included offenses to the jury, which it did. He was convicted of assault. In each case, the offense of which the defendant was convicted was conceded to be neither the crime for which he was indicted nor a proper lesser included offense under People v. Glover.

    Procedural History

    In Ford’s case, the Appellate Division reversed the conviction and dismissed the indictment, holding that grand larceny was not a lesser included offense and the defect was a non-waivable jurisdictional error. In Simpson’s case, the Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. In Williams’ case, the Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals to address the common issue of waiver.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant, by failing to object to the trial court’s consideration or submission of a crime that is not a lesser included offense of the indicted crime, waives the right to challenge the conviction on that basis.

    Holding

    Yes, because an error by the trial court in submitting or considering a lesser crime arising out of the same transaction that is not a lesser included offense does not affect the court’s competence to entertain the action; it affects only its authority to enter a judgment on the merits against the defendant on that specific charge, and such an error can be waived.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while the New York Constitution requires indictment by a grand jury for infamous crimes, this is a limitation on the State, not a jurisdictional bar to the courts if the defendant fails to object. The court had both personal and subject matter jurisdiction over the offenses due to the initial valid indictment. CPL 300.50(1) provides that any error in submitting a lesser included offense is waived if no timely objection is made. The court emphasized that “a valid and sufficient accusatory instrument is a non waivable jurisdictional prerequisite to a criminal prosecution” (People v Harper, 37 NY2d 96, 99), and “[u]ntil the grand jury shall act, no court can acquire jurisdiction to try” (People ex rel. Battista v Christian, 249 NY 314, 319), but that in each case before them, a valid indictment was returned. The court distinguished cases where no indictment was returned, or where the indictment was inherently defective. The court stated that the constitutional function is to ensure that “before an individual may be publicly accused of crime and put to the onerous task of defending himself from such accusations, the State must convince a Grand Jury composed of the accused’s peers that there exists sufficient evidence and legal reason to believe the accused guilty” (People v Iannone, 45 NY2d 589, 594). Because the Grand Jury had acted by issuing an indictment, the court reasoned that the purpose of the constitutional provision had been satisfied. Therefore, the failure to object constituted a waiver. Chief Judge Cooke wrote a concurring opinion noting that this decision effectively overruled People ex rel. Gray v. Tekben, 57 NY2d 651.

  • People v. Rooney, 57 N.Y.2d 822 (1982): Sufficiency of Proof for Criminally Negligent Homicide

    57 N.Y.2d 822 (1982)

    A defendant can be convicted of criminally negligent homicide even if the jury does not find them guilty of every act alleged in the indictment, provided the remaining proven acts are sufficient to establish criminal negligence.

    Summary

    Michael Rooney was charged with criminally negligent homicide for causing a death while driving intoxicated, speeding, and driving on the wrong side of the road. The jury acquitted him of driving under the influence but convicted him of criminally negligent homicide. Rooney argued that the jury had to find him guilty of all the acts mentioned in the indictment to convict him of criminally negligent homicide. The Court of Appeals held that the prosecution did not need to prove every act alleged in the indictment, as long as the remaining proven acts sufficiently established criminal negligence. This case clarifies that not all factual allegations in an indictment are essential for conviction.

    Facts

    Michael Rooney was driving a motor vehicle. He drove at an excessive rate of speed. He drove on the wrong side of the road. Rooney struck another vehicle. The collision resulted in the death of another person. Rooney was alleged to have been intoxicated while driving. The indictment charged Rooney with criminally negligent homicide based on the above actions.

    Procedural History

    Rooney was tried in the trial court on an indictment for criminally negligent homicide and driving under the influence of alcohol. Rooney requested a jury instruction that required proof of all acts alleged in the indictment to convict him of criminally negligent homicide. The trial court refused the instruction. The jury found Rooney not guilty of driving under the influence but guilty of criminally negligent homicide. Rooney appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Rooney appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant can be found guilty of criminally negligent homicide if the jury does not find them guilty of all the acts mentioned in the indictment related to the charge.

    Holding

    No, because not every fact mentioned in an indictment is essential to establish the defendant’s guilt of the crime charged; it is not necessary that the People prove all acts alleged when the remaining acts are sufficient to sustain a conviction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that not every fact mentioned in an indictment is essential to establish the defendant’s guilt. The court stated that it is not necessary for the prosecution to prove all the acts alleged in the indictment, as long as the remaining acts are sufficient to sustain a conviction. In this case, the jury could find that Rooney was criminally negligent when he drove on the wrong side of the road while speeding, even if he was not intoxicated at the time. The court emphasized that the essential element was whether Rooney’s conduct, considered as a whole or in part, constituted criminal negligence. The court concluded that the trial court did not err in refusing to charge the jury as requested by Rooney, affirming the lower court’s decision. The court, in essence, found that the jury could reasonably conclude that driving on the wrong side of the road at an excessive speed, even without intoxication, constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care and therefore, criminal negligence.

  • People v. Potwora, 48 N.Y.2d 91 (1979): Discretion to Modify Conspiracy Conviction

    48 N.Y.2d 91 (1979)

    A trial court has discretion to refuse to consider a motion to dismiss a defective indictment made after the commencement of the trial, and an appellate court has broad discretion to modify a conviction.

    Summary

    Defendants were convicted of conspiracy, and on appeal, they argued that the indictment was defective. The Court of Appeals held that the lower courts acted within their discretion in refusing to consider the motion to dismiss because it was not made before the trial began. Further, the court found that the Appellate Division’s modification of the conspiracy conviction to a lesser degree was within its discretion under CPL 470.15, which provides broad authority for appellate modifications.

    Facts

    The appellants were convicted of conspiracy in the third degree. The indictment specified grand larceny by extortion, bribery, and two minor charges of official misconduct as underlying counts to the conspiracy charge. The trial court dismissed the two minor charges. The jury returned a verdict of conspiracy in the second degree. The Appellate Division modified the conviction to conspiracy in the third degree.

    Procedural History

    The appellants were convicted of conspiracy. They appealed, arguing a defective indictment. The Appellate Division modified the conviction. The Court of Appeals reviewed the lower court decisions.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the lower courts erred in refusing to consider the motion to dismiss the indictment given its alleged defects when that motion was made after the trial commenced.
    2. Whether the Appellate Division exceeded its authority when it modified the conviction to conspiracy in the third degree.

    Holding

    1. No, because CPL 210.20(2) gives the court discretion to refuse motions made after trial commencement.
    2. No, because CPL 470.15 authorizes the appellate court to make modifications in situations that “include, but are not limited to” the listed conditions.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPL 210.20(2) grants discretion to the lower courts to refuse to consider motions to dismiss indictments made after the start of the trial. The Court found no abuse of that discretion. The court also pointed out that the actual charge to the jury made it clear that the conspiracy count related only to the conspiracy to commit grand larceny by extortion, which arguably supported even the verdict of conspiracy in the second degree returned by the jury. As to the modification, the Court of Appeals cited People v. Graham, 36 NY2d 633, 640, emphasizing that CPL 470.15 grants the appellate court broad authority to make such modifications in situations which “include, but are not limited to” the conditions listed therein. The court emphasized the breadth of appellate modification power.

  • People v. Graham, 6 Park. Crim. Rep. 135 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1867): Sufficiency of Forgery Indictment Without Addressee

    People v. Graham, 6 Park. Crim. Rep. 135 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1867)

    An indictment for forgery is sufficient even if the forged instrument lacks a specific addressee, provided the instrument on its face demonstrates the potential to injure or affect the rights or property of another.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of forgery for uttering a false instrument purporting to be a request from Daily & Co. for the delivery of goods. The instrument was not addressed to any specific person. The defendant argued that the indictment was deficient because the instrument lacked an addressee and because the Meriden Cutlery Company, the entity defrauded, was improperly identified. The court upheld the conviction, reasoning that the statute covered any instrument affecting property rights and that the indictment sufficiently identified the intended victim of the fraud.

    Facts

    The defendant was indicted for forging an instrument purporting to be a request from Daily & Co. for the delivery of certain goods. The instrument was presented to the Meriden Cutlery Company, and the defendant obtained goods using it. The instrument was not addressed to any specific person or entity. The Meriden Cutlery Company was located in Connecticut and had an agency in New York City where the instrument was presented and the goods were obtained. The indictment charged the defendant with intent to defraud the Meriden Cutlery Company.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. The defendant appealed the conviction, arguing that the indictment was insufficient because the forged instrument lacked a specific addressee and because the Meriden Cutlery Company was improperly identified. The Supreme Court reviewed the conviction on a writ of error.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an instrument lacking a specific addressee can be the subject of forgery under the statute.

    2. Whether the Meriden Cutlery Company could properly be regarded as the subject of an intended fraud.

    3. Whether the indictment was defective because it charged the defendant with intent to defraud persons unknown to the jury, when the grand jury and petit jury allegedly knew who was defrauded.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the statute covers any instrument that affects property rights and aims to prevent any question of whether the specific paper forged is embraced by or specially enumerated in the statute.

    2. Yes, because the evidence showed the existence of the company, its property, and the fact that it was defrauded, thus making it a capable subject of fraud, or because, even if the company did not legally exist, the indictment was sufficiently broad to reach its individual members or agent.

    3. No, because the knowledge of the petit jury is irrelevant to the validity of the indictment, and it is not necessary for the indictment to particularly designate the party meant to be defrauded if the indictment indicates a real person or entity that was defrauded or intended to be defrauded.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the statute (2 R.S., p. 673, § 33) was broad enough to cover any instrument in writing that purported to be the act of another and by which a pecuniary demand or obligation was created, or by which property rights were transferred, conveyed, discharged, or diminished. The court emphasized the revisers’ intent to create a sweeping provision that embraces every forgery of a writing that could injure an individual or body politic in person or estate. The court distinguished English cases that required a specific addressee, noting that New York’s statute omits the enumeration of specific instruments, instead using the general designation “any instrument.” The court stated, “It is sufficient that the paper or instrument be of such a character that, by its use, another may be deprived of his property, or by which a pecuniary liability might be created.”

    Regarding the identity of the defrauded party, the court held that the Meriden Cutlery Company could be the subject of fraud, whether it was a corporation or a copartnership. Even if the company did not legally exist, the indictment was sufficient because it charged an intent to defraud “divers other persons to the jury unknown,” which could include the company’s members or agent. The court emphasized that the proof showed the existence of the company, its property, and the fact that it was defrauded.

    Regarding the third exception, the court found no error in the refusal to charge that the indictment must be disregarded if the grand jury and petit jury knew who was defrauded. The court reasoned that the knowledge of the petit jury was irrelevant, and it was not necessary for the indictment to particularly designate the party meant to be defrauded. The court cited Lowel’s case (1 Leach, 248; 2 East. P.C., p. 990, § 60) to support the proposition that it is sufficient if any person could be indicated from the words used in the indictment, and whether that person was the meditated object of the fraud is a matter for the jury to consider at trial. The court stated that “it is essential to aver that some real person or existent body was defrauded, or that the intent existed to defraud some such.”