New York Law Review

Tag: indictment

  • People v. Brown, 41 N.Y.3d 998 (2024): Duplicity in Indictments and Continuing Crimes

    People v. Brown, 41 N.Y.3d 998 (2024)

    An indictment is not duplicitous if it charges a defendant with a crime that can be committed through multiple acts, as long as the acts are part of a continuing course of conduct, even if the indictment uses conjunctive language.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether an indictment charging a defendant with assault and reckless endangerment was duplicitous. The defendant argued that the indictment was flawed because it alleged he committed the crimes with two weapons (a handgun and a rifle), while the statutes did not require proof of both weapons. The Court held that the indictment was not duplicitous because the statutes at issue permitted the offenses to be committed by multiple acts, and the defendant’s actions constituted a single incident, an uninterrupted course of conduct directed at a single victim, driven by one impulse. The Court affirmed the conviction.

    Facts

    The defendant, after an argument involving his sister and the victim’s fiancée, shot the victim with a handgun and then a rifle. The indictment charged him with attempted murder, assault in the first degree, criminal possession of a weapon, and reckless endangerment. The assault and reckless endangerment charges specified both weapons. The trial court instructed the jury that they did not need to find that the defendant used both weapons to convict on those counts. The jury convicted the defendant on all counts.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted in the trial court of attempted murder, assault, criminal possession of a weapon, and reckless endangerment. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals also affirmed the conviction.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court’s instruction to the jury regarding the assault and reckless endangerment counts, which allowed conviction even if the jury believed the defendant used only one of the weapons, rendered the indictment duplicitous.

    2. Whether the evidence presented at trial rendered the indictment duplicitous.

    Holding

    1. No, because the statutes defining assault in the first degree and reckless endangerment did not require proof of both weapons, and a single act could satisfy the statutory requirements.

    2. No, because the defendant’s actions were part of a single incident and uninterrupted course of conduct, driven by a single impulse to seek revenge, thus constituting a single crime despite the use of multiple weapons.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on CPL 200.30(1), which states that each count of an indictment must charge only one offense. The Court referenced People v. Shack, which established that whether multiple acts can be charged as a continuing crime depends on the statutory definition of the crime. The Penal Law § 120.10(1) for assault in the first degree does not require that both weapons were used to cause injury, and neither does Penal Law § 120.25 for reckless endangerment. The Court cited People v. Charles, where the use of the conjunctive “and” in the indictment did not bind the prosecution to prove all acts. The Court reasoned that the use of two guns in the assault and reckless endangerment did not make the indictment duplicitous because the offenses could be committed by doing any one of several things. Furthermore, the Court cited People v. Alonzo, where a defendant’s actions directed at a single victim in an uninterrupted course of conduct constitutes a single crime. The use of two guns was part of the single incident with one impulse to seek revenge.

    Practical Implications

    Prosecutors must carefully consider the language of penal statutes when drafting indictments. The use of conjunctive language in an indictment does not necessarily bind the prosecution to prove all elements if the statute allows for the offense to be committed by different acts. Defense attorneys should analyze whether the elements of the crimes can be satisfied by various actions, making an indictment alleging multiple acts less vulnerable to a duplicity challenge. This case emphasizes the importance of determining whether a defendant’s actions constitute a single incident, or a series of distinct crimes. This has implications for sentencing and the evaluation of prosecutorial charging decisions. This case provides guidance on how to analyze whether an indictment is duplicitous based on the elements of the crime and the actions of the defendant.

  • People v. Wisdom, 23 N.Y.3d 971 (2014): Correcting Unsworn Grand Jury Testimony

    People v. Wisdom, 23 N.Y.3d 971 (2014)

    An isolated procedural error in a grand jury proceeding, such as the failure to administer an oath during a witness’s initial testimony, does not automatically warrant dismissal of the indictment if the error is promptly corrected and does not prejudice the defendant.

    Summary

    Sidney Wisdom was indicted for burglary and attempted murder after a grand jury viewed a videotaped interview of a victim, Jane, who identified him as her assailant. Jane was not initially sworn in before the recording. The prosecution, realizing the error, obtained a second recording where Jane swore to the truth of her prior statements. The New York Court of Appeals held that the initial failure to administer an oath, although a procedural error, did not compromise the integrity of the grand jury proceeding because the error was rectified, and the defendant did not demonstrate prejudice.

    Facts

    Sidney Wisdom was accused of attempting to kill a four-year-old girl and her grandmother, Jane, during a burglary. Due to the severity of Jane’s injuries, the People videotaped her testimony for grand jury presentation. In the initial recording, Jane identified Wisdom as the assailant, stating she knew him. However, she was not administered an oath. The prosecutor, realizing the error, obtained a second recording where Jane swore to the truth and accuracy of her prior statements. The grand jury viewed both videos before indicting Wisdom.

    Procedural History

    Wisdom moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing the unsworn testimony compromised the grand jury’s integrity. The Supreme Court denied the motion, and a jury convicted Wisdom. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the grand jury proceeding defective. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the failure to administer an oath to a witness before their initial grand jury testimony, later corrected by a sworn affirmation of the prior statements, constitutes a defect impairing the integrity of the grand jury proceedings, warranting dismissal of the indictment.

    Holding

    No, because the lack of an oath was an oversight that was corrected, and the defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice, the grand jury proceeding was not fundamentally impaired.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that an oath should have been administered during the first recording. However, the court emphasized that not every procedural error warrants dismissal of an indictment. The court applied the statutory standard requiring a “very precise and very high” showing of impairment to the grand jury proceedings (People v. Darby, 75 N.Y.2d 449, 455 [1990]). The court noted the absence of any nefarious intent to unfairly prejudice the defendant. Instead, the prosecution proactively sought to correct the error by obtaining a second, sworn statement from Jane, which the grand jury reviewed along with instructions regarding the initial omission. The Court determined that the defendant failed to establish a possibility of prejudice that would justify dismissing the indictment. The court emphasized that corrective measures were taken, and there was no evidence that the initial lack of oath substantially influenced the grand jury’s decision to indict. The court cited precedent, including People v. Adessa, 89 N.Y.2d 677, 686 (1997), underscoring that dismissal is an exceptional remedy reserved for cases where the integrity of the grand jury process is genuinely compromised. The Court reasoned that the purpose of the oath is to ensure truthfulness, and Jane’s subsequent sworn affirmation of her initial statements served this purpose, mitigating any potential prejudice to the defendant.

  • People v. Alonzo, 16 N.Y.3d 267 (2011): Defining Single vs. Multiple Counts of Sexual Abuse

    People v. Alonzo, 16 N.Y.3d 267 (2011)

    When a sexual assault involves a single, uninterrupted attack with multiple instances of touching, it constitutes one count of sexual abuse, not multiple counts for each individual touch.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a defendant could be charged with multiple counts of sexual abuse for a single, continuous attack where the defendant groped different parts of the victim’s body. The Court held that the defendant could only be charged with one count of sexual abuse per victim. The Court reasoned that the continuous nature of the attack, directed at a single victim, constituted a single crime, even though it involved multiple instances of “sexual contact.” Allowing multiple charges would be inconsistent with the Legislature’s intent and create a risk of over-punishment. The Court emphasized that in determining the number of crimes, the focus should be on legislative intent.

    Facts

    The defendant lured two women to an apartment. When the women attempted to leave, they found the door locked, and the defendant had hidden the key. Following an argument and intervention by another person in the apartment, the women left. The defendant followed them, attacked one woman by knocking her down and groping her breasts and buttocks. When the second woman intervened, the defendant attacked her in the same manner. The first woman then helped the second, and they managed to escape.

    Procedural History

    The grand jury indicted the defendant on two counts of unlawful imprisonment and four counts of sexual abuse (two counts per victim, alleging hand-to-breast and hand-to-buttocks contact). The County Court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss two of the sexual abuse counts as multiplicitous. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant can be charged with multiple counts of sexual abuse when the evidence shows a single, uninterrupted attack involving multiple instances of touching a victim’s intimate body parts.

    Holding

    No, because where the evidence before a grand jury shows a single, uninterrupted attack in which the attacker gropes several parts of a victim’s body, the attacker may be charged with only one count of sexual abuse.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the distinction between duplicity and multiplicity in indictments. While duplicity involves charging multiple offenses in a single count, multiplicity involves charging a single offense in multiple counts. The Court stated, “There is no infallible formula for deciding how many crimes are committed in a particular sequence of events. In each case, the ultimate question is which result is more consistent with the Legislature’s intention.” The Court reasoned that the defendant’s actions constituted a single, uninterrupted course of conduct directed at each victim. The Court stated that “where a defendant, in an uninterrupted course of conduct directed at a single victim, violates a single provision of the Penal Law, he commits but a single crime.” Although there were multiple instances of “sexual contact,” the continuous nature of the attack indicated a single criminal act. The Court used the analogy of a physical assault, stating that multiple swings of a fist would still constitute one assault, not multiple assaults for each swing. To hold otherwise would create the possibility of prosecutorial abuse by multiplying charges based on the same continuous conduct. The Court distinguished its prior cases regarding duplicity, noting that those cases involved separate acts occurring on distinct occasions, unlike the single, uninterrupted act in this case. The court stated “the indictment as returned by the grand jury was multiplicitous”. The Court acknowledged that other cases might not be so clear, but the evidence in this case supported only a single count of sexual abuse for each victim.

  • People v. Aarons, 2 N.Y.3d 547 (2004): Requires 12 Grand Jurors to Vote for Dismissal

    2 N.Y.3d 547 (2004)

    A grand jury’s dismissal of criminal charges requires a formal vote with the concurrence of at least 12 grand jurors; a failure to indict does not automatically constitute a dismissal.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a formal vote of 12 grand jurors is necessary to dismiss a charge. After hearing testimony, a grand jury deliberated on charges against Aarons but couldn’t reach a decision. The prosecutor then presented more evidence. Aarons moved to dismiss, arguing the initial failure to indict constituted a dismissal, requiring court approval to re-present the case. The Court of Appeals held that a formal vote with at least 12 concurring jurors is required for a dismissal, affirming the Appellate Division’s reinstatement of the indictment. The court reasoned that inferring a dismissal undermines the grand jury’s explicit power to dismiss charges.

    Facts

    Lenworth Aarons was accused of burglary and related crimes. On March 19, 1999, a Bronx County grand jury heard testimony from witnesses, including Aarons. The grand jury deliberated but informed the prosecutor they were having difficulty reaching a decision regarding the proposed charges. The prosecutor then asked the grand jury to cease deliberations to present additional evidence. The prosecutor reconvened the grand jury the following week, presented another witness, and asked the jurors to vote. The grand jury then indicted Aarons.

    Procedural History

    Aarons moved to dismiss the indictment. Supreme Court granted the motion and dismissed the indictment. The Appellate Division reversed, reinstating the indictment, holding that a dismissal requires a concurrence of 12 grand jurors. A Justice of the Appellate Division granted Aarons leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a formal vote of 12 grand jurors is necessary to effectuate a dismissal of charges by a grand jury, or whether a failure to indict can be interpreted as a de facto dismissal.

    Holding

    Yes, because a dismissal of a charge constitutes an affirmative official action or decision of the grand jury, requiring the concurrence of at least 12 members as stipulated in CPL 190.25(1).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPL 190.25(1) requires a concurrence of at least 12 grand jurors for any affirmative official action or decision. The court determined that dismissing charges is an affirmative action. The court examined the legislative history of grand jury procedure, noting that even under the former Code of Criminal Procedure, a dismissal required an express communication to the court, not a mere inference. The Court cited CPL 190.60 and 190.75, which outline the grand jury’s power to dismiss charges, file an information, remove the case to Family Court, or submit a report, arguing that failure to indict doesn’t automatically equate to dismissal. The court distinguished the case from People v. Montanez, where 12 grand jurors voted to dismiss before the prosecutor improperly influenced a reconsideration. The court emphasized that allowing prosecutors to resubmit charges after a failure to indict, without judicial oversight, would undermine the grand jury’s independence. The dissent argued that dismissal is not an “affirmative official action” requiring 12 votes, as it ends proceedings rather than advancing them. The dissent contended that a failure to indict should automatically trigger a dismissal, subject to the requirement that the finding of dismissal is filed with the court. The Court stated that inferring a dismissal from a failure to indict would subvert the power conferred upon the grand jury and disregard the statute’s intent. As the Court stated, “For the court to infer a dismissal of a charge from the grand jury’s inability to make a decision as to what action it should take undermines this clear legislative intent and effectively eliminates one of the enumerated powers of the grand jury.”

  • People v. Adessa, 89 N.Y.2d 910 (1996): Limits on Resubmitting Charges to Grand Juries After Dismissal

    People v. Adessa, 89 N.Y.2d 910 (1996)

    When a court dismisses an indictment due to insufficient evidence, the prosecution is not limited in the number of times it can resubmit the charges to a grand jury, unlike when a grand jury itself dismisses the charges.

    Summary

    The defendant was initially indicted on robbery charges, but the court dismissed the indictment due to insufficient evidence. After a second grand jury declined to indict, the prosecution obtained permission to present the case to a third grand jury, which then indicted the defendant. The defendant argued that this third presentation violated CPL 190.75(3), which limits resubmissions after a grand jury dismissal. The New York Court of Appeals held that CPL 190.75(3) applies only to grand jury dismissals, not to court-ordered dismissals based on insufficient evidence under CPL 210.20. Therefore, the prosecution was permitted to resubmit the charges.

    Facts

    The defendant was initially charged with two counts of robbery in the second degree.

    The Supreme Court dismissed the initial indictment because the evidence presented to the Grand Jury was legally insufficient.

    The court granted leave to resubmit the charges to another Grand Jury.

    A second Grand Jury considered the charges, including two additional charges for attempted robbery, but voted “no true bill” (declined to indict).

    The People moved for leave to resubmit to a third Grand Jury, stating that the defendant’s friend, who had already pleaded guilty in connection with the crimes, would be willing to testify.

    The court granted leave, and the third Grand Jury indicted the defendant on all charges.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially dismissed the indictment due to insufficient evidence.

    After the third grand jury indicted the defendant, the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the presentation to a third grand jury violated CPL 190.75(3).

    The Supreme Court rejected this argument.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision.

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether CPL 190.75(3), which limits resubmissions to a grand jury after a grand jury dismissal, applies when a court dismisses an indictment due to insufficient evidence under CPL 210.20.

    Holding

    No, because CPL 190.75(3) applies only to Grand Jury dismissals, not court-ordered dismissals based on insufficiency of evidence under CPL 210.20.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that at common law, a prosecutor could repeatedly resubmit charges to Grand Juries until an indictment was obtained. The Legislature enacted provisions in the Criminal Procedure Law to prevent prosecutorial abuse, including CPL 190.75, which governs Grand Jury dismissals, limiting the number of times the People can resubmit after a Grand Jury has dismissed charges. Specifically, CPL 190.75(3) states that if a Grand Jury dismisses a charge, the People can resubmit only after obtaining permission from the court, and if the charge “is again dismissed, it may not again be submitted to a grand jury.”

    By contrast, CPL 210.20, governing judicial dismissals, provides without qualification that where a court dismisses an indictment based on insufficiency of the evidence, it “may, upon application of the people, in its discretion authorize the people to submit the charge or charges to the same or another grand jury” (CPL 210.20[4]).

    The court emphasized that “discretionary judicial dismissals do not present the same potential for prosecutorial abuse, and are subject to their own check of appellate review,” thus the provision for judicial dismissals does not limit the number of resubmissions.

    The court concluded that CPL 190.75(3) and 210.20 are separate statutory provisions addressing separate legislative concerns. The dismissal of the first indictment was court-ordered pursuant to CPL 210.20, not a Grand Jury dismissal that implicates the limitations imposed on resubmission pursuant to CPL 190.75(3). Thus, the People’s single resubmission after the Grand Jury dismissed the charges was consistent with the law.

    The court also addressed the defendant’s reliance on language in People v. Cade, clarifying that CPL 190.75(3) applies solely to Grand Jury dismissals, not court-ordered dismissals.

  • People v. Rivera, 84 N.Y.2d 766 (1995): Acting-in-Concert Theory Allowed Even When Indictment Charges Only Principal Action

    People v. Rivera, 84 N.Y.2d 766 (1995)

    A defendant indicted as a principal can be convicted based on an acting-in-concert theory, even if the indictment does not explicitly allege accessorial conduct, because there is no legal distinction between liability as a principal and criminal culpability as an accomplice.

    Summary

    Rivera was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree for the shooting death of Daniels. The indictment charged Rivera as the principal actor, making no mention of accomplices. At trial, the prosecution presented evidence suggesting Rivera acted in concert with others, and the judge instructed the jury on accessorial liability. Rivera argued this violated his right to be tried only on charges the grand jury deemed appropriate and that he lacked fair notice. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that introducing proof and instructing the jury on acting-in-concert when the indictment charges only principal action does not impermissibly broaden the defendant’s liability.

    Facts

    Rivera was in his apartment with Daniels and others. An argument ensued between Rivera and Daniels. A shot was fired, and Daniels exclaimed, “You shot me,” while facing Rivera, who was holding a gun. Daniels fell to the floor. Rivera and others removed Daniels from the apartment.

    Procedural History

    The grand jury indicted Rivera for second-degree murder and weapons possession. The prosecution’s pre-trial motion to amend the indictment to include an acting-in-concert theory was denied. At trial, over Rivera’s objection, the prosecution presented evidence of acting-in-concert, and the court instructed the jury on accessorial liability. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Rivera appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in permitting the prosecution to pursue an accessorial liability theory at trial and in charging the jury on that theory when the indictment charged defendant only as the principal actor.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because there is no legal distinction between liability as a principal and criminal culpability as an accomplice, and the status for which the defendant is convicted has no bearing upon the theory of the prosecution.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that it has traditionally been permissible to charge and admit evidence convicting a defendant as an accessory where an indictment charges only conduct as a principal. The Court cited People v. Duncan, stating, “There is no distinction between liability as a principal and criminal culpability as an accessory and the status for which the defendant is convicted has no bearing upon the theory of the prosecution.” The court distinguished People v. Roberts, where the prosecution’s theory at trial (strangulation) differed materially from the facts alleged in the indictment (striking with a fist), prejudicing the defendant. Here, the underlying crime and the theory of liability remained consistent: Rivera caused Daniels’ death. The court noted that Penal Law § 20.00 makes a person criminally liable as a principal even if they intentionally aid another to engage in such conduct, emphasizing that “[t]he key to understanding accessorial liability is that whether one is the actual perpetrator of the offense or an accomplice is, with respect to criminal liability for the offense, irrelevant.” The Court also referenced People v. Guidice, which stated, “The People are not required to specify in an indictment whether a defendant is being charged as a principal or as an accomplice. For charging purposes, the distinction between principal and accomplice is academic”.

  • People v. Swamp, 84 N.Y.2d 725 (1995): Sufficiency of Field Tests for Grand Jury Indictment

    84 N.Y.2d 725 (1995)

    A grand jury indictment for drug possession can be based on a trained officer’s testimony about a positive field test, even without a formal laboratory analysis, provided the testimony offers a reliable basis to infer the presence of a controlled substance.

    Summary

    Steven Swamp was arrested after crossing the U.S.-Canadian border when a Customs inspector found drug paraphernalia and bags of white powder. A field test indicated the presence of cocaine. The trial court dismissed the indictment for legal insufficiency, arguing that a field test was insufficient. The Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the officer’s testimony regarding the field test and observations constituted a sufficient basis for the grand jury to infer the presence of cocaine, establishing a prima facie case for indictment.

    Facts

    A U.S. Customs inspector found drug paraphernalia in Steven Swamp’s car engine, along with bags of plastic vials containing white powder on his person and in the car during a border crossing. Based on the officer’s training and experience, he suspected drug possession. A second Customs inspector, Robert Stephenson, conducted a Scott-Reagent field test, which indicated the presence of cocaine in the powder. Formal laboratory analysis was deferred until trial necessity.

    Procedural History

    The trial court granted Swamp’s motion to dismiss the indictment, finding the field test results insufficient. The Appellate Division reversed and reinstated the indictment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an indictment charging possession of cocaine is supported by legally sufficient evidence when the Grand Jury hears only the results of a preliminary field test indicating the presence of cocaine.
    2. Whether the People were required to submit the results of a formal laboratory analysis to the Grand Jury.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the evidence before the Grand Jury, if uncontradicted, established that defendant possessed cocaine.
    2. No, because CPL 190.30(2) permits, but does not require, the submission of a certified laboratory report.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the Grand Jury’s role is to investigate crimes and determine if sufficient evidence exists to accuse someone. CPL 190.65 authorizes indictment when the evidence is legally sufficient to establish the offense and provides reasonable cause to believe the person committed the offense. Legally sufficient evidence means a prima facie case, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In drug cases, the evidence must provide a “reliable basis” for inferring the presence of a controlled substance, requiring more than conclusory assertions.

    The court found that CPL 190.30(2) allows, but doesn’t require, submission of a certified lab report. Officer Stephenson’s testimony about his observations (the telltale packaging, substance resembling crack-cocaine, and drug paraphernalia) was competent evidence and not hearsay. The court stated that evidence later proven unreliable can legally support an indictment, as sufficiency is examined as of the time of indictment.

    The dissent argued that a NIK field test alone is insufficient for indictment because it merely allows a police officer to presume the existence of a controlled substance and is not generally accepted as reliable under Frye v. United States. The dissent also raised concerns about the implications of convicting someone based solely on a field test.

    The court distinguished the evidence in this case from People v. Dumas, where the officer simply asserted that the defendant possessed marijuana without indicating the basis for that claim. In contrast, Officer Stephenson recounted the observations that led him to conclude the defendant possessed cocaine. The court emphasized that the standard for sufficiency is whether the evidence before the Grand Jury, if uncontradicted, would support a determination of guilt.

    The court also noted that CPL 715.50 requires a formal laboratory analysis within 45 days of receipt of the drugs, ensuring that more definitive results will be available by trial. “Contrary to the concerns of the dissent, if a subsequent laboratory analysis proved the field test incorrect a defendant would not be entitled to dismissal under CPL 210.20 (1) (b), on the ground that the evidence before the Grand Jury was insufficient.”

  • People v. Sanchez, 84 N.Y.2d 442 (1994): Sufficiency of Indictment and the Right to Notice of Charges

    People v. Sanchez, 84 N.Y.2d 442 (1994)

    An indictment must provide a defendant with fair notice of the charges against them, ensure the crime for which the defendant is tried is the same as that for which they were indicted, and protect against double jeopardy.

    Summary

    Sanchez was convicted on multiple counts, including grand larceny, scheme to defraud, criminal impersonation, and fortune telling. The indictment used broad time spans and did not identify victims. The Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order, reversing convictions for grand larceny, fortune telling, and some criminal impersonation counts due to defects in the indictment. The Court held the indictment failed to provide adequate notice, imperiling the defendant’s ability to prepare a defense and protect against double jeopardy. The convictions for scheme to defraud and one count of criminal impersonation were upheld.

    Facts

    Sanchez was charged with 35 counts, including larceny, fraud, impersonation, and fortune telling. The indictment specified broad timeframes (four months to five years) for the alleged crimes, without naming victims, and stated the crimes occurred somewhere in Queens County. The prosecution’s disclosure form described a scheme where Sanchez, posing as a parapsychologist and sometimes an FBI agent, defrauded individuals. The prosecution didn’t link specific victims to specific counts until after witnesses testified.

    Procedural History

    Following a trial, Sanchez was convicted on several counts. The Appellate Division modified the judgment, reducing one grand larceny count and reversing two others. Sanchez appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, challenging the remaining convictions based on alleged defects in the indictment.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the indictment and bill of particulars provided sufficient specificity to adequately inform the defendant of the charges against him, enabling him to prepare a defense.

    2. Whether the time spans alleged in the indictment for fortune telling and criminal impersonation were unreasonably broad, rendering those counts defective.

    Holding

    1. No, because the indictment, even with the bill of particulars, was too vague to allow Sanchez to prepare an adequate defense or protect against double jeopardy.

    2. Yes, for fortune telling and some counts of criminal impersonation, because the five-year time spans alleged were unreasonably broad given the nature of the offenses and the information available to the prosecution.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized that an indictment must serve three critical functions: provide fair notice to the defendant, ensure the defendant is tried for the crimes actually indicted by the Grand Jury, and protect against double jeopardy. Citing People v. Iannone, 45 NY2d 589, 594, the Court stated the indictment must provide “the defendant with fair notice of the accusations made against him, so that he will be able to prepare a defense”. The Court found the indictment, combined with the bill of particulars, failed to provide adequate information about the victims, dates, or places of the alleged crimes, hindering Sanchez’s ability to prepare a defense. The Court rejected the People’s argument that access to redacted Grand Jury minutes cured the defects, stating: “it is the People’s burden to provide the defendant with notice of the charges in a clear and concise manner… it is not the burden of the defendant to piece together clues disclosed in separate unconnected documents to infer what alleged conduct supported which alleged charge”. The Court determined fortune telling is not a continuing offense and the five-year time period alleged was unreasonably broad. However, the Court reasoned criminal impersonation can be a continuing offense, so one count with the same time period was allowed. Finally, the court upheld the scheme to defraud conviction because the evidence used for the dismissed counts was admissible for the scheme to defraud charge, so the defendant was not unfairly prejudiced.

  • People v. Carter, 77 N.Y.2d 95 (1991): Validity of Indictment When Prosecutor Was Not Admitted to the Bar

    People v. Carter, 77 N.Y.2d 95 (1991)

    An indictment is not invalid simply because the assistant district attorney presenting the case to the grand jury was not admitted to the bar, so long as that person was appointed by an authority with subject matter jurisdiction.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that an indictment was valid even though the Assistant District Attorney (ADA) who presented the case to the grand jury was not a licensed attorney. The court reasoned that as long as the ADA was appointed by a prosecutor with subject matter jurisdiction and had taken the oath of office, the indictment was valid. The court emphasized that neither the constitution nor statute mandates an ADA be a lawyer. The dissent argued that allowing a non-lawyer to present a case to a grand jury undermines the integrity of the legal process.

    Facts

    Daniel Penofsky, posing as an Assistant District Attorney, presented evidence to a grand jury that led to the indictment of the defendant, Carter. Penofsky was never admitted to the bar and had fraudulently represented himself as an attorney for 16 years. After his deception was discovered, the defendant challenged the validity of the indictment.

    Procedural History

    The trial court upheld the indictment. The defendant appealed, arguing that the indictment was invalid because the prosecutor was not a licensed attorney. The appellate division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the appellate division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an indictment is invalid because the Assistant District Attorney presenting the case to the grand jury was not a licensed attorney.

    Holding

    No, because the Assistant District Attorney was appointed by an authority with subject matter jurisdiction, had the permission of the Special Narcotics Prosecutor and had taken the oath of office; therefore, the indictment was valid.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that neither the Constitution nor any statute requires a District Attorney or an Assistant District Attorney to be an admitted lawyer. The critical factor is whether the person presenting the case had the authority to do so. Here, Penofsky was appointed by the Special Narcotics Prosecutor, who had subject matter jurisdiction over the case. The court distinguished this situation from cases where the prosecutor lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court found that Penofsky’s lack of a law license did not negate the Special Narcotics Prosecutor’s grant of authority. The court emphasized that Penofsky “duly executed the oath of office” and was “regularly assigned as an Assistant District Attorney.” The court also noted that concerns about Penofsky’s competence were mitigated by the fact that he worked within an office with supervisory structures. The dissent argued that allowing an unadmitted layperson to practice law and to present a criminal case to a grand jury compromises the integrity of the Grand Jury system and violates Judiciary Law provisions concerning the practice of law.

  • People v. Davis, 75 N.Y.2d 764 (1990): Peremptory Challenges Based on Highest Crime Charged

    People v. Davis, 75 N.Y.2d 764 (1990)

    The number of peremptory challenges a defendant is entitled to during jury selection is determined by the highest crime charged in the indictment, regardless of the evidence’s sufficiency to support that charge.

    Summary

    Defendant was indicted for attempted robbery in the first degree, a class C felony, but the trial court found insufficient evidence for that charge, believing the evidence supported only attempted robbery in the second degree, a class D felony. Despite this, the People did not supersede the indictment. At trial, the court granted the defendant only 10 peremptory challenges, the number allowed for the lesser charge, instead of the 15 challenges for the higher charge in the indictment. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the number of peremptory challenges is dictated by the highest crime formally charged in the indictment, not by the crime the court believes is supported by the evidence.

    Facts

    The defendant was indicted on a single count of attempted robbery in the first degree based on displaying what appeared to be a firearm during the crime. Prior to trial, the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing insufficient evidence to support the charge. The trial court agreed that the evidence was insufficient for attempted first-degree robbery but found sufficient evidence for the lesser included offense of attempted robbery in the second degree. However, the court did not dismiss the first-degree robbery charge.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defendant’s pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment. The People did not attempt to supersede the indictment. The case proceeded to trial on the original charge of attempted robbery in the first degree. The trial court granted the defendant only 10 peremptory challenges. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the case.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the number of peremptory challenges allowed to a defendant is determined by the highest crime charged in the indictment, or by the crime the trial court believes is supported by sufficient evidence presented to the Grand Jury.

    Holding

    Yes, because CPL 270.25(2) clearly states that the number of peremptory challenges is based on the degree of the highest crime charged in the indictment, regardless of the evidence’s strength regarding that charge.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the plain language of CPL 270.25(2), which explicitly ties the number of peremptory challenges to the highest crime charged in the indictment. The court rejected the argument that the trial court could effectively “amend” the indictment to reflect the lesser charge. The court stated, “Although the court made it clear that if the People’s case proceeded as expected, attempted first degree robbery would not be submitted to the jury, that was no substitute for compliance with the clear statutory directive of CPL 270.25 (2), which bases the number of peremptory challenges each party must be allowed on the degree of the highest crime charged.” The court acknowledged the trial court’s frustration with the situation but stressed that such procedural matters are for legislative action, not judicial improvisation. Because the defendant was formally charged with a class C felony, attempted robbery in the first degree, he was entitled to 15 peremptory challenges, regardless of the trial court’s assessment of the evidence.