New York Law Review

Tag: Indian Law

  • Jackson v. Smith, 9 N.Y.3d 47 (2007): Tribal Sovereignty and the Definition of ‘Intruder’ Under New York Indian Law

    Jackson v. Smith, 9 N.Y.3d 47 (2007)

    New York Indian Law § 8 defines an “intruder” as a non-member of a tribe who settles or resides on tribal lands, and the determination of who qualifies as an intruder rests primarily with the tribe, not the courts, to protect tribal sovereignty.

    Summary

    This case concerns the interpretation of New York Indian Law § 8, which addresses intrusions on tribal lands. The Unkechaug Indian Nation sought to remove Tina Jackson, a non-member, from tribal land. The County Court denied the petition, asserting the right to independently determine whether Jackson was an intruder. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that under § 8, an intruder is a non-member residing on tribal lands, and the tribe has primary authority to determine membership and residency rights, thus safeguarding tribal sovereignty.

    Facts

    George Jackson, a member of the Unkechaug Indian Nation, received an allotment of land. He moved onto the land with his wife, Tina Jackson, a non-member, in 1985. They lived there until 1988, then moved off the reservation for 14 years before returning in 2002. In 2004, Tina obtained an order of protection against George, and he moved out. George then transferred his interest in the allotment to his brother, Glenn, who sought Tina’s removal from the property. The Tribal Council authorized the District Attorney to initiate removal proceedings after Tina refused to leave.

    Procedural History

    The County Court denied the petition to remove Tina Jackson, concluding that courts must independently determine who is an intruder. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, granting the petition and declaring Tina Jackson an intruder.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Indian Law § 8 grants a County Court the discretion to determine, independent of the Indian nation, whether a person is an “intruder” upon tribal land.

    Holding

    No, because Indian Law § 8 defines an intruder as a non-member of the tribe residing on tribal lands, and the determination of membership and residency rights lies primarily with the tribe to protect tribal sovereignty.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Indian Law § 8 must be interpreted in the context of the statute itself and with consideration for tribal sovereignty. The court stated that an “intruder” is defined within the statute as a person not a member of the tribe who resides on tribal lands. The court emphasized that the tribe has the inherent right to determine its own membership and to exclude non-members from its lands. Allowing the County Court to independently determine who is an intruder would undermine the tribe’s sovereignty and its right to self-government. The court distinguished Matter of Stakel [Blueye], noting it had not adopted that court’s reasoning. It agreed with Fischer (Checkman), stating: “Who is an ‘intruder’ in the sense of the special statutory use of that word in this section is not left to rest on mere general meaning. It is given a contextual definition.” The court emphasized that the statute’s language, prohibiting non-members from residing on tribal lands, makes clear the legislative intent. The Court found that tribal customs and laws are essential to determining a nonmember’s status as an intruder, quoting Matter of Patterson v Seneca Nation: “[U]nless the last vestige of separate national life has been withdrawn from the Indian tribes by encroaching State legislation; then, surely, it must follow that the Seneca Nation of Indians has retained for itself that prerequisite to their self-preservation and integrity as a nation, the right to determine by whom its membership shall be constituted.” Therefore, because Tina Jackson was a non-member residing on the reservation, the tribe’s determination that she was an intruder should have been upheld.

  • Matter of Jacobs v. New York State Tax Appeals Tribunal, 89 N.Y.2d 695 (1997): State Authority to Tax Sales to Non-Indians on Reservations

    89 N.Y.2d 695 (1997)

    A state may require Indian retailers to collect and remit sales, use, and excise taxes on sales of cigarettes and motor fuel to non-Indian consumers at the retailer’s business on the reservation, and to keep the records necessary to ensure compliance, without violating the Commerce Clause or constitutional proscription against direct taxation of Indians absent explicit congressional consent.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the State Department of Taxation and Finance could require the plaintiff, an enrolled member of the Seneca Nation, to collect and remit sales, use, and excise taxes on sales of cigarettes and motor fuel to non-Indian consumers at the plaintiff’s retail business on the Cattaraugus Reservation. The Court of Appeals held that based on established Supreme Court precedent, the state could require the collection and remittance of taxes on sales to non-Indians. The plaintiff’s additional arguments regarding the Supremacy Clause or New York law were unpreserved.

    Facts

    The plaintiff, an enrolled member of the Seneca Nation, operated a retail business on the Cattaraugus Reservation. The New York State Department of Taxation and Finance sought to compel the plaintiff to collect and remit sales, use, and excise taxes on sales of cigarettes and motor fuel to non-Indian consumers at the plaintiff’s business. The state also sought to compel the plaintiff to keep records necessary for tax compliance.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff initiated an action for declaratory and injunctive relief, challenging the state’s authority to impose the tax collection requirement. The Appellate Division dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint. The plaintiff then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the State Department of Taxation and Finance may require the plaintiff, an enrolled member of the Seneca Nation, to collect and remit sales, use and excise taxes on sales of cigarettes and motor fuel to non-Indian consumers at plaintiff’s retail business on the Cattaraugus Reservation.

    Holding

    Yes, because the United States Supreme Court has clearly established that state tax statutes requiring Indian retailers to collect and remit taxes on sales to non-Indian purchasers, and to keep the records necessary to ensure compliance, violate neither the Commerce Clause nor the constitutional proscription against direct taxation of Indians absent explicit congressional consent.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied heavily on established Supreme Court precedent, citing Oklahoma Tax Commn. v Potawatomi Tribe, 498 US 505; Washington v Confederated Tribes, 447 US 134; and Moe v Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 US 463. These cases established the principle that states can require Indian retailers to collect taxes on sales to non-Indians. The court stated that the plaintiff’s arguments regarding the Supremacy Clause and New York law were not properly preserved for appeal, as the plaintiff’s complaint asserted only violations of the Commerce Clause and “the Laws of the United States enacted pursuant thereto”. The court did not delve into a detailed analysis of the Commerce Clause, deeming itself bound by existing Supreme Court precedent.

  • Herzog Bros. Trucking, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 69 N.Y.2d 536 (1987): State Taxation of Indian Traders Preempted

    Herzog Bros. Trucking, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 69 N.Y.2d 536 (1987)

    Federal law preempts state tax laws that impose burdens on Indian traders engaged in trade with Indians on reservations, even if the legal incidence of the tax falls on non-Indian consumers.

    Summary

    Herzog Bros. Trucking, Inc., a Pennsylvania corporation, challenged New York State’s attempt to impose motor fuel and sales taxes on its wholesale distribution of motor fuel to Seneca Indian retailers on reservations. The New York Court of Appeals held that the state’s tax scheme was preempted by federal law, specifically the Indian trader statutes, which grant the federal government broad authority to regulate trade with Indians. Even though the tax was intended to be passed on to non-Indian consumers, the court found that imposing the tax collection burden on the wholesale trader was an impermissible intrusion into an area of trade comprehensively regulated by the federal government. The court reversed the Appellate Division’s denial of a preliminary injunction and remitted the case for further proceedings.

    Facts

    Herzog Bros. Trucking, Inc., a Pennsylvania corporation, engaged in the wholesale distribution of motor fuels.
    In June 1984, Herzog began selling motor fuel to authorized Seneca Nation of Indians retail establishments on reservations in New York.
    The Seneca retailers refused to pay state taxes on these transactions, believing they were exempt.
    In October 1984, the State Tax Commission began assessing motor fuel taxes against Herzog.
    In June 1985, New York amended its Tax Law to require sales tax on motor fuel to be collected upon importation or first sale by the distributor.

    Procedural History

    Hertzog brought a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that the state’s imposition of motor fuel and sales taxes was unconstitutional and unlawful.
    Herzog moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent the state from collecting the taxes.
    Special Term granted the preliminary injunction, finding that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits.
    The Appellate Division reversed, holding that Herzog had not shown a clear likelihood of success on the merits because the tax scheme imposed only a minimal burden of collecting taxes from non-Indian consumers.
    The New York Court of Appeals granted permission to appeal and certified the question of whether the Appellate Division erred in reversing the order of Special Term and denying the preliminary injunction.

    Issue(s)

    Whether federal law preempts New York State from imposing motor fuel and sales taxes on a non-Indian wholesale distributor’s sales of motor fuel to Indian retailers on Indian reservations, even if the legal incidence of the tax ultimately falls on non-Indian consumers.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Indian trader statutes grant the federal government broad authority to regulate trade with Indians, and state tax laws that impose burdens on Indian traders are preempted, regardless of whether the legal incidence of the tax falls on non-Indian consumers. Imposing tax collection obligations on the distributor impermissibly intrudes into an area of commerce comprehensively regulated by the federal government.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that Indian affairs occupy a unique place in Supremacy Clause jurisprudence, with the federal government possessing plenary and preemptive power over matters concerning Indians.
    The court distinguished between state tax schemes that merely require Indian retailers to collect taxes from non-Indian customers (which are generally permissible) and those that burden persons engaged in trade with Indians on reservations (which are generally preempted).
    The court relied on Warren Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Commission, 380 U.S. 685 (1965), and Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 448 U.S. 160 (1980), which held that the Indian trader statutes preempt the field of transactions with reservation Indians, leaving no room for state laws that impose additional burdens on traders.
    The court found that New York’s motor fuel tax scheme, by imposing obligations on Herzog as a trader to the Seneca Nation, was preempted by the federal Indian trader laws. Even if the burden was minimal, the comprehensive federal regulatory scheme precluded state imposition. The court quoted Warren Trading Post, stating that the federal regulations were “apparently all-inclusive…[leaving] no room for state laws imposing additional burdens upon traders”.
    The court rejected the argument that the tax scheme was permissible because the legal incidence of the tax fell on non-Indian consumers, reasoning that the focus should be on whether the tax imposed any burden on the trader in its dealings with the tribe.

  • Montauk Tribe of Indians v. Long Island Railroad Co., 159 N.Y. 461 (1899): Legal Capacity of Unrecognized Tribes to Sue

    159 N.Y. 461 (1899)

    An unincorporated Indian tribe, lacking statutory authorization, does not have legal capacity to sue in ejectment, nor can an individual member sue on behalf of the tribe, because the tribe itself possesses no recognized cause of action.

    Summary

    A member of the Montauk Tribe of Indians brought an ejectment action on behalf of himself and other tribe members against the Long Island Railroad Company. The defendant demurred, arguing the plaintiff lacked the legal capacity to sue. The New York Court of Appeals held that neither the tribe, as an unincorporated entity, nor an individual member on its behalf, could maintain the action without statutory authorization. The Court emphasized that Indian tribes are wards of the state and possess only such rights to litigate as are conferred by statute, affirming the long-established public policy.

    Facts

    The plaintiff, a member of the Montauk Tribe of Indians, initiated an ejectment action against the Long Island Railroad Company. The plaintiff claimed to represent himself and all other members of the tribe who wished to contribute to the action’s expenses. The plaintiff’s claim stemmed from the tribe’s alleged right to possess certain lands occupied by the defendant. The complaint conceded that the tribe lacked a corporate name and the legal capacity to sue in its own right.

    Procedural History

    The Special Term initially sustained the defendant’s demurrer, dismissing the case. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the action was properly brought in accordance with a prior appeal. Justice Willard Bartlett dissented. The Court of Appeals granted permission to appeal and certified three questions regarding the plaintiff’s capacity to sue and the sufficiency of the complaint.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the plaintiff in this action has the legal capacity to sue?
    2. Whether there is a defect of parties plaintiff in this action, in that the members of the alleged Montauk Tribe of Indians are not made parties plaintiff?
    3. Whether the complaint herein states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action?

    Holding

    1. No, because the Montauk Tribe lacks legal capacity to sue as an unincorporated entity without statutory authorization, and an individual member cannot bring suit on behalf of a tribe that has no recognized cause of action.
    2. No, answered in the negative by extension from the answer to question #1.
    3. No, answered in the negative by extension from the answer to question #1.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on established precedent, particularly Strong v. Waterman, to conclude that Indian tribes generally lack the legal capacity to sue in ejectment unless specifically authorized by statute. The court emphasized the unique status of Indian tribes as wards of the state, subject to state control and protection. The Court distinguished the case from situations where equity might intervene to protect tribal lands, noting that ejectment requires a legal right to possession that the tribe, in its unincorporated form, did not possess.

    The court addressed the prior appeal, clarifying that its suggestion of a possible action by an individual member was not a firm endorsement but a tentative thought. The court reasoned that allowing such an action would contradict the policy of treating Indian tribes as wards of the state, possessed of only such rights to litigate as are conferred by statute. The court stated: “A decision holding that this action could be maintained either by the tribe, or an individual member thereof, on behalf of himself and all others who should come in and contribute, would be contrary to the policy and practice which have been long established in our treatment of the Indian tribes. They are regarded as the wards of the state, and generally speaking, possessed of only such rights to appear and litigate in courts of justice as are conferred upon them by statute.”

    The Court suggested that the appropriate remedy for the tribe was to seek an enabling act from the legislature authorizing a suit in the name of the tribe’s leader or designated members. The Court concluded that this approach was preferable to sustaining an action of questionable legal basis and contrary to established public policy.