New York Law Review

Tag: Indeterminate Sentence

  • People ex rel. Grimmick v. New York State Div. of Parole, 71 N.Y.2d 306 (1988): Parole Revocation Hearings and Out-of-State Felony Convictions

    People ex rel. Grimmick v. New York State Div. of Parole, 71 N.Y.2d 306 (1988)

    A New York parolee convicted of a felony in another state and sentenced to a determinate term is entitled to a final parole revocation hearing in New York, as the statutory exemption from such a hearing applies only when the parolee receives a new indeterminate sentence in New York.

    Summary

    Grimmick, a New York parolee under supervision in California, was convicted of rape in California and sentenced to a three-year term. New York revoked his parole without a final hearing, relying on a statute that allows revocation without a hearing for parolees convicted of a new felony and sentenced to an indeterminate term. The New York Court of Appeals held that this exemption applies only to new indeterminate sentences imposed in New York. Because Grimmick’s California sentence was determinate, he was entitled to a final revocation hearing in New York.

    Facts

    Grimmick was paroled in New York in 1982, with a remaining indeterminate sentence of 5 to 15 years for a 1969 burglary conviction. He moved to California in 1983 and was supervised by California parole authorities under the Interstate Parole Compact. In 1985, he was convicted of forcible rape in California and sentenced to a three-year prison term. After receiving credit for good conduct and time in custody, he was released to California parole supervision in April 1987. A preliminary parole revocation hearing was held concerning his New York parole status. He was then returned to New York, and the New York State Parole Board revoked his parole without a final revocation hearing based on the California felony conviction and sentence.

    Procedural History

    Grimmick filed a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that he was wrongly denied a final parole revocation hearing. The Supreme Court dismissed the writ, holding that Executive Law § 259-i (3) (d) (iii) authorized revocation without a hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Executive Law § 259-i (3) (d) (iii), which dispenses with the final parole revocation hearing for parolees convicted of a new felony and sentenced to an indeterminate term, applies to a parolee convicted of a felony and sentenced to a determinate term in another state.

    Holding

    No, because the statute’s plain language and legislative intent limit the exemption to parolees sentenced to a new indeterminate term in New York.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the statute plainly requires an “indeterminate” sentence for the exemption from the final revocation hearing to apply. Grimmick’s California sentence was a determinate three-year term, not an indeterminate sentence as defined under New York law. The court stated, “When its language is clear and unambiguous, it should be construed so as to give effect to the plain meaning of its words.”

    The court rejected the Division of Parole’s argument that the California sentence should be treated as if it were a New York indeterminate sentence, noting that such an interpretation is not supported by the statute’s language, purpose, or legislative history. The purpose of the exemption is to avoid redundant hearings when a parolee’s violation has already been established by a New York felony conviction and indeterminate sentence, which automatically fixes the parolee’s reappearance before the Board. The court reasoned that, unlike a new New York indeterminate sentence, the California determinate sentence does not automatically fix the parolee’s reappearance date before the board, making a final revocation hearing necessary to determine that date.

    The court also pointed out that the Division of Parole had itself recognized this statutory gap and proposed legislation to extend the exemption to out-of-state felony convictions. The court concluded, “A significant change of the kind urged by respondents, expanding such an exemption from the usual statutorily mandated hearing requirement, should come from the Legislature.” Because Grimmick was denied a timely final revocation hearing, the court ordered him restored to parole status, as ordering a hearing at this stage would render the timeliness requirement meaningless.

  • People v. Leisen, 24 N.Y.2d 592 (1969): Hearing Required for Indeterminate Sex Offender Sentences

    People v. Leisen, 24 N.Y.2d 592 (1969)

    When a sentencing judge’s discretion to impose an indeterminate one-day-to-life sentence for a sex offense is limited to cases where the record indicates the defendant is a danger to society or could benefit from the statutory scheme’s confinement, the defendant is entitled to a hearing before sentencing to determine these facts.

    Summary

    Defendants, convicted of various sex offenses, received indeterminate sentences of one day to life. The New York Court of Appeals considered whether these defendants were entitled to a hearing before sentencing, especially in light of Specht v. Patterson, which addressed similar sentencing procedures in Colorado. The court held that, like Colorado, New York’s sentencing scheme requires a finding beyond the underlying sex crime to justify a one-day-to-life sentence, specifically that the defendant is a danger to society or could benefit from treatment. Therefore, a hearing is constitutionally required to determine if such a finding is warranted before imposing the indeterminate sentence. The court reversed the judgments and remanded the cases for resentencing after a proper hearing.

    Facts

    The defendants were convicted of various sex offenses. The sentencing courts imposed indeterminate sentences of one day to life under the former Penal Law § 2189-a without conducting a hearing to determine if the defendants posed a threat to society or could benefit from the treatment envisioned under the statute. Psychiatric reports were submitted in some cases, but the court found them to be insufficient or non-compliant with statutory standards.

    Procedural History

    The defendants appealed their sentences, arguing they were imposed without due process. The Appellate Division affirmed the sentences. The cases then went to the New York Court of Appeals, which consolidated the appeals due to the common legal issue concerning the necessity of a hearing before sentencing sex offenders to indeterminate terms.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, under the New York sex offender statute, a defendant is entitled to a hearing before being sentenced to an indeterminate term of one day to life to determine if they are a danger to society or could benefit from the treatment contemplated by the statute.

    Holding

    Yes, because New York’s sentencing scheme for sex offenders, like the Colorado statute in Specht v. Patterson, requires an additional finding of fact (beyond the underlying sex crime) that the defendant is a danger to society or could benefit from treatment. This additional finding necessitates a hearing to satisfy due process requirements.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while a literal reading of the New York statute might suggest complete judicial discretion in sentencing, the statute’s purpose and judicial precedent limit the imposition of a one-day-to-life sentence to cases where the record supports a finding that the defendant poses a danger to society or could benefit from treatment. The court relied heavily on People v. Jackson, which emphasized that treatment was an integral part of the statutory scheme, and that indefinite confinement should only occur when no reasonably safe alternative exists. The court emphasized that the psychiatric report required by the statute must be current and pertinent, discussing and analyzing the defendant’s sexual problem, the risk to society, and the potential for responding to treatment. “It was not contemplated that an offender be held for many years without treatment and without some sound professional basis for believing that during all of this period it would be unsafe to release him.” The court also addressed retroactivity, finding that the need to ensure fairness in the fact-finding process outweighed concerns about administrative burden. The court held that the absence of a hearing violated the defendants’ constitutional rights, requiring resentencing after a proper hearing.