New York Law Review

Tag: independent medical examination

  • Bazakos v. Lewis, 12 N.Y.3d 631 (2009): Statute of Limitations for Negligence During an Independent Medical Exam

    Bazakos v. Lewis, 12 N.Y.3d 631 (2009)

    A claim against a doctor for negligence during an Independent Medical Examination (IME) is a claim for medical malpractice, subject to CPLR 214-a’s two-year-and-six-month statute of limitations, even in the absence of a traditional doctor-patient relationship.

    Summary

    Lewis Bazakos sued Dr. Philip Lewis, alleging injury during an IME required for a previous lawsuit. Bazakos claimed Lewis negligently injured him by forcefully rotating his head. The suit was filed approximately 2 years and 11 months after the IME. The court addressed whether such a claim constitutes medical malpractice subject to a shorter statute of limitations, or ordinary negligence. The Court of Appeals held that the claim was for medical malpractice because the doctor’s actions involved medical skill, and the legislative intent behind the shorter statute of limitations for malpractice applied equally to IMEs. Therefore, the claim was time-barred.

    Facts

    Lewis Bazakos was involved in a prior lawsuit stemming from an automobile accident. As part of that lawsuit, Bazakos was required to undergo an Independent Medical Examination (IME) by a physician selected by the opposing party.

    The opposing party designated Dr. Philip Lewis to conduct the IME. Dr. Lewis examined Bazakos on November 27, 2001.

    Bazakos alleged that during the IME, Dr. Lewis injured him by “tak[ing] plaintiff’s head in his hands and forcefully rotated it while simultaneously pulling.”

    Procedural History

    Bazakos commenced an action against Lewis on October 15, 2004, approximately 2 years and 11 months after the IME.

    Lewis moved to dismiss, arguing the claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Supreme Court granted the motion, relying on Evangelista v. Zolan.

    The Appellate Division reversed, overruling Evangelista, holding the action was timely because no physician-patient relationship existed, thus the claim was not for medical malpractice. Two justices dissented.

    The Appellate Division granted Lewis leave to appeal, certifying the question of whether its order was properly made.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a claim against a doctor for alleged negligence during an Independent Medical Examination (IME) constitutes a claim for “medical malpractice” under CPLR 214-a, thus subject to the statute’s two-year-and-six-month statute of limitations.

    Holding

    No, because such actions involve medical treatment by a licensed physician, regardless of the absence of a traditional physician-patient relationship.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the essence of Bazakos’s claim, like any medical malpractice claim, is that a doctor failed to competently perform a procedure requiring specialized medical skill.

    The Court emphasized that the act underlying the lawsuit – Lewis’s manipulation of Bazakos’s body – constitutes “medical treatment by a licensed physician,” thus negligent performance constitutes medical malpractice, citing Weiner v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 88 N.Y.2d 784, 788 (1996).

    The Court noted the legislative intent behind CPLR 214-a, enacted to address a crisis in medical malpractice insurance, aimed to enable “health care providers to get malpractice insurance at reasonable rates” (quoting Bleiler, 65 NY2d at 68). The Court found it unlikely the Legislature intended to exclude doctors performing IMEs from this protection.

    The Court agreed with the dissenting Justices at the Appellate Division that a “limited physician-patient relationship” exists during an IME, referencing an AMA opinion on the ethical responsibilities of doctors performing IMEs.

    Quoting Dyer v. Trachtman, 470 Mich. 45, 49-50, 679 N.W.2d 311, 314-315 (2004), the Court stated that this limited relationship “imposes a duty on the IME physician to perform the examination in a manner not to cause physical harm to the examinee.”

    The dissenting opinion argued that medical malpractice requires medical treatment, which was absent in the IME context. The dissent emphasized that the purpose of CPLR 214-a was to protect health care providers offering treatment, not those providing litigation support services. The dissent asserted that context matters, and that what constitutes malpractice in a treatment setting may not in an IME setting, highlighting the limited scope of responsibility in an IME.

  • Belmonte v. Snashall, 2 N.Y.3d 560 (2004): Interpreting ‘Board Certified’ Under Workers’ Compensation Law

    2 N.Y.3d 560 (2004)

    When interpreting the term “board certified” in the context of Workers’ Compensation Law § 137 (3) (a), it refers to certification by a medical specialty board recognized by either the American Board of Medical Specialties (ABMS) or the American Osteopathic Association (AOA), not certification by the Workers’ Compensation Board itself.

    Summary

    This case concerns the interpretation of “board certified” under New York’s Workers’ Compensation Law, specifically regarding who is authorized to perform independent medical examinations (IMEs). The Workers’ Compensation Board (WCB) defined “board certified” as certification by a medical specialty board recognized by the ABMS or AOA. Several physicians, licensed in New York but not certified by ABMS or AOA-recognized boards, challenged this interpretation. The Court of Appeals held that “board certified” refers to certification by a medical specialty board, upholding the WCB’s regulation as rational and consistent with the statute’s purpose of ensuring quality in IME providers.

    Facts

    Petitioners, New York State licensed medical doctors, previously conducted IMEs. The WCB denied their requests to continue performing IMEs because they lacked certification from a medical specialty board recognized by the ABMS or AOA. Some petitioners were certified by other specialty boards, and some held a “C” rating from the WCB, indicating competence based on experience.

    Procedural History

    Petitioners filed CPLR article 78 proceedings to annul the WCB’s regulation requiring ABMS or AOA certification for IME physicians. Supreme Court granted the petition in part, holding that “board certified” referred to WCB certification. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals then reversed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the term “board certified” in Workers’ Compensation Law § 137 (3) (a) means certification by a medical specialty board or by the Workers’ Compensation Board (WCB)?

    2. Whether the WCB’s regulations appropriately defined “board certified” as certification by a medical specialty board recognized by either the American Board of Medical Specialties (ABMS) or American Osteopathic Association (AOA)?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because a plain language reading of the statute supports the conclusion that “board certified” means certification by a medical specialty board, as the phrase is a term of art typically understood to refer to approval by a designated group of professionals.

    2. Yes, because the WCB is authorized to adopt reasonable rules consistent with the Workers’ Compensation Law, and these regulations are rational and relate to the goals of the Injured Workers’ Protection Act.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the phrase “board certified” is a term of art commonly understood to mean certification by a medical specialty board. The Court noted that the Legislature has used the term “board certified” in other statutes to refer to a medical specialty board. It rejected the argument that the word “board” must have the same meaning throughout the provision, explaining that context matters. The Court stated, “board can have a different meaning on its own than it does as part of the phrase board certified.”

    The Court found that requiring certification by ABMS or AOA-recognized boards was rational because it “promotes the purpose of the statute since it provides a greater level of quality assurance as the physicians authorized to perform IMEs have attained a certain degree of professional competence as recognized by the certifying boards.” The Court emphasized the WCB’s authority to adopt reasonable rules and regulations, stating, “This Court reviews administrative regulations to determine whether they are rational and to ensure that they are not arbitrary or capricious.”

    Regarding the legislative intent, the Court implicitly found that the Injured Workers’ Protection Act aimed to improve the quality and reliability of IMEs. Requiring certification by recognized specialty boards aligned with this goal.

    No dissenting or concurring opinions were mentioned.