People v. Breland, 83 N.Y.2d 294 (1994)
A witness’s participation in a crime is severed when the defendant commits a subsequent, independent criminal act against that witness, thus nullifying the need for accomplice corroboration regarding the independent act.
Summary
Victor Breland was convicted of enterprise corruption and multiple counts of murder and other crimes related to his leadership in a crack cocaine network. Key evidence included accomplice testimony regarding two sets of killings: one at a beauty parlor and another of a man named Lovell. Breland argued that the accomplice testimony was insufficiently corroborated, as required by CPL 60.22. He also argued that a witness, Ashton, who was also a victim of Breland’s violence, should have been considered an accomplice whose testimony required corroboration. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that Breland’s act of shooting Ashton constituted a separate and independent crime, thus eliminating the need for corroboration of Ashton’s testimony and that sufficient non-accomplice evidence connected Breland to the crimes.
Facts
Breland, a leader in a crack cocaine network, orchestrated a series of violent crimes. He and an accomplice murdered two people at the Glamorama Beauty Parlor, intending to kill a rival drug lord. Breland also shot and wounded Willie Ashton, an accomplice who was acting as a lookout, and killed another lookout, Mitchell Rich, to eliminate witnesses. A week later, Breland murdered Joseph Lovell, who had been used to register vehicles for the drug operation. Accomplices provided detailed accounts of both the Glamorama shootings and the Lovell murder.
Procedural History
Breland was convicted by a jury in the Supreme Court, Kings County, of enterprise corruption, multiple counts of second-degree murder, attempted murder, assault, and weapons possession. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment. Breland appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, which granted leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
1. Whether Willie Ashton should be considered an accomplice as a matter of law regarding Breland’s attempted murder of Ashton, thus requiring corroboration of Ashton’s testimony under CPL 60.22.
2. Whether there was sufficient non-accomplice evidence to corroborate the accomplice testimony regarding the Glamorama shootings and the Lovell murder, as required by CPL 60.22.
3. Whether the police identification procedure used with Ashton was impermissibly suggestive, thereby tainting Ashton’s identification of Breland.
Holding
1. No, because Breland’s attempted murder of Ashton constituted a subsequent, independent criminal act, severing Ashton’s initial accomplice relationship.
2. Yes, because the non-accomplice evidence sufficiently connected Breland to both sets of killings, satisfying the requirements of CPL 60.22.
3. No, because Ashton’s prior relationship with Breland and the circumstances of their encounters ensured that the identification was not the product of police suggestion.
Court’s Reasoning
Regarding Ashton’s status, the Court reasoned that Breland’s act of shooting Ashton was a distinct criminal event, separate from the initial plan. "Breland’s attempted murder of his erstwhile accomplice, Ashton, constitutes a subsequent independent criminal frame in a series of violent criminal scenes and acts. His own shooting of Ashton outside the beauty parlor severed, in the most profound legal and actual sense, Ashton’s initial accomplice relationship to him." This eliminated the need to corroborate Ashton’s testimony.
As for accomplice corroboration, the Court emphasized that the non-accomplice evidence need only "fairly tend[] to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime." The Court found sufficient corroboration for both the Glamorama shootings and the Lovell murder, including independent evidence regarding the location of Lovell’s body, vehicle registration records linking Breland to Lovell and the Glamorama attack, and testimony from a UPS driver who identified a getaway vehicle and another accomplice. The court noted, regarding corroboration: "The corroborative glue does not require independent proof of the elements of the crime to sustain a conviction; it just has to bind the accomplice evidence to the defendant."
Finally, the Court dismissed Breland’s argument about police suggestibility, noting Ashton’s close and intense encounters with Breland. The Court noted "while Ashton’s viewings of Breland’s face and features, as described in the Rodriguez hearing, may have been relatively brief, they could not have been more intense or focused," further observing that Ashton’s face-to-face encounter with Breland at the time he was shot precluded any claims of police suggestibility.