New York Law Review

Tag: Independent Contractor

  • Vincent v. Riggi & Sons, Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 406 (1967): Child Labor Laws and Contributory Negligence

    19 N.Y.2d 406 (1967)

    When a child is employed in violation of child labor laws, the employer may be liable for resulting injuries, and the child’s contributory negligence is not a defense.

    Summary

    A 13-year-old boy was hired by a building contractor to mow the lawn of a new house and injured himself using his father’s power lawnmower. The New York Court of Appeals held that the child labor statute applied to this situation, even though the boy was arguably an independent contractor. The court further held that the defendant could not argue that the child was contributorily negligent, as the purpose of child labor laws is to protect children from their own lack of judgment. The case was remanded for a new trial.

    Facts

    Jerry Riggi, president of Riggi & Sons, Inc., asked Howard Vincent, a 13-year-old boy, if he wanted to earn some money. Riggi pointed out the lawn of a newly constructed house and told him to cut it. There was no discussion about the method, timing, or rate of pay. Vincent borrowed his father’s power lawnmower and, while mowing, his foot slipped under the mower, resulting in the amputation of three toes. Riggi learned of the accident later and had been planning to hire someone else because the lawn wasn’t cut. The house was one of over 200 built by Riggi & Sons in the area.

    Procedural History

    Vincent sued Riggi & Sons for personal injuries. At trial, the court submitted the case to the jury on a common-law negligence theory and refused to charge the jury on the provisions of Section 130 of the Labor Law, which prohibits the employment of children under 14. The jury found for Riggi & Sons, determining they were free from negligence and that Vincent was contributorily negligent and an independent contractor. The Appellate Division affirmed. Vincent appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Section 130 of the Labor Law, prohibiting the employment of children under 14, applies to the hiring of a 13-year-old boy to mow a lawn by a building contractor.

    2. Whether a violation of Section 130 imposes liability on the employer regardless of the child’s contributory negligence.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the phrase “employed in or in connection with any trade, business, or service” includes the hiring by a building contractor of a boy to mow a lawn of a house for sale.

    2. Yes, because child labor statutes are designed to protect children from their own negligence, and allowing contributory negligence as a defense would undermine the purpose of the statute.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the term “employed” includes those “permitted or suffered to work,” which has been construed to cover independent contractors. The phrase “employed in or in connection with any trade, business, or service” is broad enough to include the hiring of a boy to mow a lawn for a house being sold by a building contractor. The court highlighted that the statute’s exceptions, such as for farm work performed for a parent, suggest the breadth of the prohibition. The court cited Warney v. Board of Educ., emphasizing that even casual employment can fall under the statutory prohibition if connected to a commercial enterprise.

    The court emphasized the statutory scheme, which classifies child employment based on hazards and limits the commercial exploitation of children. Sections 131 and 132 allow for the employment of minors 14 to 17 in specified occupations, with some requiring work permits, reflecting a graduated approach based on age and risk.

    Regarding contributory negligence, the court noted that child labor statutes are generally interpreted to make the employer liable regardless of the child’s negligence, protecting children from their own lack of judgment. Quoting Karpeles v. Heine, the court stated, “In the case of an infant employed in violation of the direct unqualified prohibition of the statute public policy requires that a recovery for injuries received by such a child in the course of his unlawful employment shall not be defeated by the very negligence, lack of care and caution that the statute was designed to prevent and make impossible…”. Although circumstances have changed since the original child labor statutes, the purpose of preventing injury to young children remains unchanged.

    The court also addressed the issue of the employer’s knowledge of the employee’s age, citing Koester v. Rochester Candy Works, which states that the employer must exercise proper vigilance to discover the fact. The court concluded that, generally, the issue of whether the employer was justified in believing the employee was of the prescribed age is a question of fact for the jury.

  • Costa v. R&M Electric Co., 26 N.Y.2d 451 (1970): Liability for Negligence of Independent Contractor in Undertaken Repairs

    Costa v. R&M Electric Co., 26 N.Y.2d 451 (1970)

    A party who undertakes to repair a chattel, even without a contractual obligation, is liable for the negligence of an independent contractor in performing those repairs or related services, such as redelivery, when the services are accepted in the reasonable belief that they are being rendered by the employer.

    Summary

    Costa purchased a defective air conditioner from R&M Electric. R&M, despite having no contractual obligation to do so, undertook to repair it, directing Olympic (the manufacturer) to contact Rondel to perform the repairs. Rondel removed the unit but delayed its return. Costa repeatedly sought updates from R&M, who assured her the matter was being handled. Rondel eventually redelivered the unit, leaving it in a place where Costa tripped and was injured. The court held that R&M, by undertaking the repairs, assumed a duty of care, and could be held vicariously liable for Rondel’s negligence in redelivering the unit, even though Rondel was an independent contractor. The Appellate Division’s dismissal of the complaint was reversed, and a new trial was ordered.

    Facts

    Plaintiff Costa purchased a defective air conditioner from R&M Electric.
    R&M did not have a service department for air conditioners but contacted the manufacturer, Olympic, who directed them to Rondel for repairs.
    A Rondel employee removed the unit from Costa’s apartment.
    For three months, Costa repeatedly asked R&M about the repair status and was assured that R&M was addressing it.
    Rondel redelivered the air conditioner, leaving it near a side door of Costa’s apartment building.
    Costa, exiting through the side door, tripped over the air conditioner and was injured.

    Procedural History

    Costa sued R&M Electric, who then filed a third-party action against Rondel.
    The trial court initially dismissed the complaint, but the Appellate Division reversed and ordered a new trial.
    A second trial resulted in a jury verdict for Costa, but the Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the complaint.
    Costa appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Did the plaintiff present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of negligence?
    2. Is R&M Electric liable for the negligence of Rondel, an independent contractor, in performing the repair and redelivery of the air conditioner?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the evidence presented a jury question regarding Rondel’s negligence.
    2. Yes, because R&M, by undertaking the repair, assumed a duty of care that extended to the proper redelivery of the unit and is vicariously liable for the negligence of its independent contractor in performing that duty.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that R&M, by undertaking to repair the air conditioner, assumed a duty to do so with reasonable care, regardless of any contractual obligation. This duty extended not only to the repair itself but also to the careful redelivery and reinstallation of the unit. The court cited the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 429, stating: “One who employs an independent contractor to perform services for another which are accepted in the reasonable belief that the services are being rendered by the employer or by his servants, is subject to liability for physical harm caused by the negligence of the contractor in supplying such services, to the same extent as though the employer were supplying them himself or by his servants.”
    The court emphasized that the negligence alleged was in the “carelessness in the detail” incident to the redelivery, a service as necessary as the repair itself. The court noted that the jury believed Costa’s testimony that R&M’s manager repeatedly assured her that R&M would repair the unit. The court concluded that the intervention of an independent contractor does not relieve a person who undertakes to repair a chattel of liability for the repairs or anything collaterally connected with the repairs. Judges Scileppi and Jasen dissented without opinion. Because the Appellate Division reversal was on the law and the facts, the Court of Appeals ordered a new trial.

  • Persichilli v. Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority, 16 N.Y.2d 136 (1965): Duty to Provide Safe Workplace and Subcontractor Negligence

    Persichilli v. Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority, 16 N.Y.2d 136 (1965)

    An owner or general contractor’s duty to provide a safe workplace does not extend to protecting employees of a subcontractor from hazards arising from the subcontractor’s own methods or equipment when the work is not inherently dangerous.

    Summary

    Persichilli, an employee of Nassau-Mascali Construction Corp. (a subcontractor), died from asphyxiation while working in a “blow-off pot”. His widow sued Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority (the owner) and Lockwood, Kessler, Bartlett, Inc. (the engineer), alleging failure to provide a safe workplace. The court held that neither Triborough nor the City of New York were liable because the duty to provide safety equipment (gas detectors, blowers) rested with the subcontractor, Nassau-Mascali. The court reasoned that a property owner is not responsible for injuries to a contractor’s employees when the contractor fails to provide necessary tools for a non-inherently dangerous job. The general contractor, Nassau-Mascali, was responsible for ensuring its employees’ safety through proper equipment and procedures.

    Facts

    Triborough contracted with Nassau-Mascali for construction work on Conduit Boulevard. Lockwood was contracted to supervise the work. The Department of Water Supply requested construction of a “blow-off pot” connected to a water main. This was added to Nassau-Mascali’s contract via an extra work order. Cracks later developed in the pavement near the “blow-off pot”. A conference was held, and it was suggested that a water leak might be causing the settling. The decedent, Persichilli, entered the “blow-off pot” to investigate and died of asphyxiation. Plaintiff alleged negligence in failing to test for gas or provide ventilation before Persichilli entered the pot.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff won a judgment against Triborough. Triborough’s third-party claim against Nassau-Mascali was also successful. The Appellate Division ordered a new trial. This appeal followed, addressing the liability of Triborough and the viability of its third-party claim.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Triborough, as the owner/general contractor, had a duty to provide gas detection and ventilation equipment to Nassau-Mascali’s employee, Persichilli, working in the “blow-off pot”.

    2. Whether Triborough’s third-party complaint against Nassau-Mascali should be upheld if Triborough is not liable to the plaintiff.

    Holding

    1. No, because the duty to provide safety equipment for the job rested with the subcontractor, Nassau-Mascali, and the work was not inherently dangerous.

    2. No, because if Triborough is not liable to the plaintiff, the third-party complaint against Nassau-Mascali must also fail.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on the principle that the duty to provide a safe place to work is not breached when the injury arises from a defect in the subcontractor’s own plant, tools, or methods. The court cited Hess v. Bernheimer & Schwartz Brewing Co., which held that an employer is not responsible for a contractor’s negligence in failing to furnish proper appliances. The court noted that the contract between Triborough and Nassau-Mascali required Nassau-Mascali to furnish all necessary equipment. The court reasoned that “a property owner who engages an independent contractor to do a task which is not inherently dangerous should not be held to account for injuries to the contractor’s employees because the contractor has omitted to bring along a tool vital to the job he was to perform.” Since Triborough was not required to supply gas measuring devices or air blowers, its failure to do so did not create liability. The court emphasized that the plaintiff’s claim was solely based on the failure to provide safety equipment, not on any other defect in the premises. The court stated, “It cannot be said, however, that the duty of the employer is by this provision of the statute extended to supervision of the method of doing the work by the contractor, or that the employer thereby becomes responsible for the negligence of the contractor in failing to furnish proper appliances therefor.”

  • Storrs v. City of Utica, 17 N.Y. 104 (1858): Independent Contractors and Non-Delegable Duties

    Storrs v. City of Utica, 17 N.Y. 104 (1858)

    A municipality cannot avoid liability for injuries resulting from inherently dangerous work in a public street by delegating the work to an independent contractor; the duty to maintain safe streets is non-delegable.

    Summary

    The City of Utica contracted for the construction of a sewer in a public street. The contractor created a deep excavation that was left unguarded, leading to an accident and injuries to the plaintiff. The city argued it wasn’t liable because the negligence was that of an independent contractor. The New York Court of Appeals held the city liable, establishing that a municipality has a non-delegable duty to maintain its streets in a safe condition. When work authorized by the city necessarily creates a dangerous condition unless properly guarded, the city remains responsible for ensuring those safeguards are in place, regardless of who performs the work.

    Facts

    The City of Utica contracted with a third party to construct a sewer in one of its public streets.
    The construction involved creating a deep excavation in the street.
    The excavation was left unguarded and unlit at night.
    The plaintiff fell into the excavation, sustaining injuries.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff sued the City of Utica to recover damages for his injuries.
    The trial court found in favor of the plaintiff.
    The City of Utica appealed, arguing it was not liable because the negligence was that of an independent contractor.
    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding the city liable.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a municipality can avoid liability for injuries caused by dangerous conditions created during public works projects by claiming the negligence was that of an independent contractor.

    Holding

    No, because a municipality has a non-delegable duty to maintain its streets in a reasonably safe condition, and this duty extends to protecting the public from dangers created during the performance of work it has authorized in those streets.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the city had a duty to ensure the safety of its streets. This duty could not be discharged by simply hiring an independent contractor. The court emphasized that the excavation itself created an inherently dangerous condition. The key was whether the work *necessarily* involved a dangerous condition. The court distinguished this from situations where the danger arose from *collateral* negligence. The court stated, “Where the obstruction or defect caused or created in the street is purely collateral to the work contracted to be done, and is entirely the result of the wrongful acts of the contractor or his workmen, the rule is that the employer is not liable; but where the obstruction or defect which occasioned the injury results directly from the acts which the contractor agreed and was authorized to do, the person who employs the contractor and authorizes him to do those acts is equally liable to the injured party.”

    The court noted that the city authorized the creation of the dangerous condition (the excavation). Therefore, the city remained responsible for ensuring that appropriate safeguards were in place to protect the public, regardless of who was performing the work. The court contrasted this situation with cases where the negligence was merely collateral to the work itself. The municipality’s duty to maintain safe streets is a crucial policy consideration that outweighs the typical rules regarding independent contractor liability.