New York Law Review

Tag: Incompetency

  • Matter of Del Bello, 22 N.Y.2d 466 (1968): Attorney Misconduct and Use of Incompetent’s Funds

    Matter of Del Bello, 22 N.Y.2d 466 (1968)

    An attorney acting as a committee for an incompetent person must prioritize the incompetent’s needs and welfare, and must not use the incompetent’s funds for the attorney’s own benefit or to the detriment of the incompetent’s estate plan.

    Summary

    This case concerns the disbarment of an attorney, Del Bello, who served as the committee for an incompetent woman, Ellen Snyder. Del Bello was accused of misusing funds from a Totten trust account established by Snyder for the benefit of David Gorfinkel. The court found that Del Bello had been surcharged for improperly using the Totten trust funds when other assets were available to care for Snyder and because he had a conflict of interest related to real property transactions with Snyder before she was declared incompetent. While the court acknowledged Del Bello’s questionable conduct, it reversed the disbarment order, finding insufficient evidence that he misappropriated the funds for personal use, and remanded for reconsideration of discipline based on other charges of misconduct.

    Facts

    Ellen Snyder created a Totten trust bank account for David Gorfinkel. Snyder later became Del Bello’s client in 1953, and he was appointed as her committee in 1955 after she was declared incompetent. Del Bello transferred the funds from Snyder’s Totten trust account into an account under his name as her committee without a court order. After Snyder’s death, Gorfinkel’s estate successfully sued to recover the Totten trust funds. The bank, in turn, sued Del Bello to recover what they paid out to Gorfinkel. Prior to her incompetency, Del Bello had also prepared wills for Snyder that favored him and arranged for her to deed him the remainder interest in her real property.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division disbarred Del Bello based on findings related to the Gorfinkel case and the misuse of the Totten trust funds. The Appellate Division cited Del Bello’s conflict of interest stemming from spending $5,302.86 withdrawn from the Totten trust to repair real property of which he was the owner. Del Bello appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the attorney misappropriated the funds for personal gain instead of using the funds for the care of the incompetent, and therefore should be disbarred.

    Holding

    No, because the court found that the Appellate Division’s finding that Del Bello misappropriated $5,302.86 from the Totten trust was not supported by evidence and the record indicates the funds were used for the ward’s maintenance and support. The matter was remanded to the Appellate Division to impose discipline based on other charges.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that Del Bello’s actions in managing Snyder’s assets were questionable, particularly his handling of the Totten trust account and the real property transactions. The court emphasized that a committee’s primary duty is to act in the best interest of the incompetent person. “Unless the proceeds of such a bank account are necessarily or properly required for the support or welfare of the incompetent, neither the committee nor the court whose arm the committee is can alter the devolution, upon death, of the property of an incompetent”. The court found that Del Bello should not have been accused of spending the Totten trust account on real estate improvements of which he owned the remainder. However, the court criticized Del Bello for drafting wills in his favor and obtaining a deed for the remainder interest in Snyder’s property, creating a conflict of interest. The court also noted that he should have disclosed his remainder interest when the welfare authorities advanced money on a mortgage given by Snyder. The court decided that the Appellate Division’s determination to disbar Del Bello was inappropriate in light of the lack of evidence that he had misappropriated the trust funds for personal use. The court stated: “It is one thing for the committee of an incompetent to misappropriate her funds by devoting them to his own private use; it is quite another matter to become liable to a surcharge for resorting to one particular asset of an incompetent rather than to another in order to provide for her support.”

  • Walter v. Walter, 217 N.Y. 439 (1916): Limits on Committee’s Power to Annul Marriage of Incompetent

    Walter v. Walter, 217 N.Y. 439 (1916)

    The committee of an incompetent person’s property and person cannot maintain an action to annul the incompetent’s marriage on the ground of lunacy unless explicitly authorized by statute.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether the committee of an incompetent person can bring an action to annul the incompetent’s marriage based on lunacy. The plaintiffs, relatives and committee of Herman N. Walter, an incompetent, sought to annul his marriage to the defendant. The court held that while relatives or a next friend could bring such an action under specific provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, the committee of the incompetent’s person and property lacked the statutory authority to do so. The decision rests on the principle that actions to annul marriages are purely statutory and that the statute’s enumeration of authorized parties excludes others, like the committee. This clarifies the limits on a committee’s power and underscores the need for explicit statutory authorization to act in such matters.

    Facts

    Herman N. Walter, an incompetent person, married the defendant. Plaintiffs, relatives of Walter, were also appointed as the committee of his person and estate. As relatives and the committee, the plaintiffs brought an action to annul the marriage, arguing Walter was a lunatic at the time of the marriage.

    Procedural History

    The lower court held that the plaintiffs, in their capacity as the committee, could not maintain the action to annul the marriage. The case then reached the New York Court of Appeals, where the central issue was whether the committee of an incompetent person’s estate could bring such an action.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the committee of the person and property of an incompetent may, as such, maintain an action to annul the marriage of the incompetent on the ground that he was a lunatic, absent explicit statutory authorization.

    Holding

    No, because the right to bring an action to annul a marriage is purely statutory, and the relevant statutes (Sections 1747 and 1748 of the Code of Civil Procedure) enumerate specific parties who may bring such an action, excluding the committee of the incompetent’s person and property.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that actions to annul a marriage are purely statutory creations. Quoting Stokes v. Stokes, the court emphasized that “an action to annul a marriage is purely statutory.” While equity jurisdiction to annul marriages existed independently of statute, the statutes now expressly define who can bring such actions. The relevant sections of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1747 and 1748, specify who may bring an action to annul a marriage based on lunacy: relatives of the lunatic, the lunatic after restoration to sanity, or, if no relative brings the action, a next friend of the lunatic. The court applied the maxim “expressio unius est exclusio alterius” (the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another). Because the statutes specifically list who can bring the action, the committee, not being among those listed, is excluded. While Section 2340 of the Code of Civil Procedure generally allows a committee to maintain any action the incompetent could have maintained, the court found that this general provision did not override the specific provisions of Sections 1747 and 1748, which explicitly designate who can bring an action to annul a marriage. The court emphasized that if the legislature intended to include the committee, it would have explicitly stated so in the statute. The court concluded that the general words of section 2340 do not enlarge the specific provisions of sections 1747 and 1748 and that these cover cases for which provision had not already been specifically made.