New York Law Review

Tag: In re St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hospital Center

  • In re St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hospital Center, 682 N.E.2d 891 (N.Y. 1997): Determining Responsibility for Counsel Fees in Mental Hygiene Proceedings

    In re St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hospital Center, 682 N.E.2d 891 (N.Y. 1997)

    When a court appoints counsel for an indigent person in a Mental Hygiene Law article 81 proceeding, the locality (e.g., a city or county) is responsible for compensating the appointed counsel, absent legislation directing otherwise.

    Summary

    St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hospital Center initiated proceedings to appoint a guardian for an indigent individual. The court appointed counsel and a court evaluator for the individual, but the statute did not specify who should pay for the counsel. The Supreme Court determined that the City of New York must pay for the court-appointed attorney. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the legislative intent of providing counsel for indigents necessarily implies authorization for the court to compensate counsel, and that the locality is responsible for funding the counsel in accordance with County Law article 18-B, in the absence of legislation to the contrary.

    Facts

    In November 1993, St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hospital Center began proceedings under Mental Hygiene Law article 81 to appoint a guardian for an indigent, allegedly incompetent person (AIP). The purpose was to transfer the AIP to a nursing home and authorize major medical/dental treatment decisions without her consent. The AIP was entitled to counsel of her choice if she could afford it, and the court was obliged to assign counsel if she could not. The Supreme Court appointed an attorney as counsel and Mental Hygiene Legal Services as a court evaluator.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court determined competent counsel could not be obtained without compensation and ruled the City of New York must pay. The Appellate Division affirmed this determination. The Court of Appeals granted review.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the court may require that assigned counsel in a Mental Hygiene Law article 81 proceeding be paid.

    2. If so, whether the City or the State is responsible for that compensation.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the Legislature, by providing for the assignment of counsel for indigents in the Mental Hygiene Law, intended, by necessary implication, to authorize the court to compensate counsel.

    2. The City is responsible because the responsibility of paying for assigned counsel in the overwhelming majority of cases in which the appointment of counsel for indigents has been authorized has fallen upon the locality under article 18-B of the County Law, rather than the State pursuant to Judiciary Law § 35.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the statute’s silence on the source of funds for appointed counsel does not preclude compensation. The court found a necessary implication that the legislature intended for counsel to be compensated when it mandated assignment of counsel for indigents. The court then analyzed article 18-B of the County Law and section 35 of the Judiciary Law, noting that assignments under article 18-B are paid by the county (or New York City), while appointments under section 35 are paid by the State. The Court emphasized the practical considerations, stating, “The evidence in the record before us establishes that article 18-B panels are better able, both financially and practically, to provide the needed assistance under this provision of the Mental Hygiene Law.” Therefore, absent explicit legislative direction to the contrary, the Court affirmed the lower courts’ determination that the City of New York should fund the assignment of counsel under County Law article 18-B. The court acknowledged, but rejected, the dissenting view below that the lower court could have avoided the issue by appointing Mental Hygiene Legal Services as counsel instead of as evaluator. The Court found that the Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion as a matter of law.