New York Law Review

Tag: In re Spargo

  • In re Spargo, 6 N.Y.3d 308 (2006): Upholding Restrictions on Judicial Candidates’ Political Activities

    In re Spargo, 6 N.Y.3d 308 (2006)

    Restrictions on judicial candidates’ political activities, particularly those distinguishing between conduct integral to a candidate’s own campaign and activities supporting other candidates or parties, are constitutional because they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests such as preserving judicial impartiality and maintaining public confidence in the court system.

    Summary

    A Supreme Court Justice, facing censure for engaging in improper political activities, challenged the constitutionality of rules restricting judges’ political conduct. The Court of Appeals upheld the censure, finding the rules, which distinguish between activities supporting a candidate’s own campaign and those supporting other candidates or parties, narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests. These interests include maintaining judicial impartiality and public confidence in the judiciary. The court emphasized that while judicial candidates have free speech rights, the state’s interest in preventing political bias or corruption justifies these limitations.

    Facts

    While a practicing attorney seeking a judicial nomination, Spargo made a $10,000 payment to the Nassau County Democratic Committee without receiving an itemized bill. Later, as a District Court Judge, he participated in a phone bank for a legislative candidate and attended a Working Families Party meeting, questioning candidates about their willingness to publicize the party’s endorsement. As a Supreme Court Justice, Spargo made an intimidating remark to an attorney after a court order he signed was vacated. Spargo stipulated to these facts before the Commission on Judicial Conduct but challenged the constitutionality of the rules underlying the political activity charges.

    Procedural History

    The Commission on Judicial Conduct sustained four charges of misconduct against Spargo and determined he should be censured. Spargo sought review of the Commission’s determination, arguing that the political activity restrictions violated the First Amendment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether New York’s rules restricting political activity by judges and judicial candidates, specifically sections 100.5(A)(1) and related subsections of the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct, violate the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.

    Holding

    No, because the rules are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests, including preserving the impartiality and independence of the judiciary and maintaining public confidence in the court system.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court distinguished Republican Party of Minn. v. White, noting that case addressed a different type of restriction (an “announce clause”) and did not invalidate all restrictions on judicial candidates’ speech. The court applied strict scrutiny, assuming its applicability without definitively deciding so. It then reasoned that the rules serve compelling state interests by ensuring a fair and impartial judiciary, free from political bias or corruption. “Charged with administering the law, Judges may not actually or appear to make the dispensation of justice turn on political concerns.” The rules distinguish between permissible campaign activities and prohibited ancillary political activities. The contribution limitations ensure that judgeships are not, and do not appear to be, for sale. The court noted the provisions allowing judicial candidates to engage in political activity in support of their own campaigns provide a realistic opportunity to fulfill their assigned role in the electoral process. The rules are designed to alleviate concerns about judges being beholden to particular political leaders or parties. The Court concluded that the impermissible political activity, coupled with the inappropriate remark to an attorney, warranted censure, accepting the Commission’s determined sanction.

  • In re която, 89 N.Y.2d 252 (1996): Judicial Removal for Deceptive Conduct During Investigation

    In re Spargo, 89 N.Y.2d 252 (1996)

    A judge may be removed from office for engaging in a pattern of deceptive and untruthful behavior during a judicial conduct investigation, even if the initial misconduct that triggered the investigation might not, on its own, warrant such a severe sanction.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the removal of a Civil Court Judge and Acting Supreme Court Justice, Spargo, based on findings by the State Commission on Judicial Conduct. The Commission determined Spargo made inappropriate remarks to a female law intern and then engaged in deceptive behavior during the ensuing investigation, including providing false information during a screening process for a potential Supreme Court appointment. The court held that while the initial inappropriate remarks might not have warranted removal, Spargo’s subsequent dishonesty and lack of candor demonstrated a lack of fitness for judicial office, justifying the sanction.

    Facts

    A complaint was filed against Judge Spargo concerning a note he passed to his court attorney regarding the physical attributes of a female law intern. The complaint also alleged that Spargo jokingly suggested to the intern that she remove an article of clothing in his presence. During the investigation, while seeking an interim appointment to the Supreme Court, Spargo answered “no” to a question on the Governor’s Judicial Screening Committee questionnaire asking if he had ever been the subject of any inquiry or investigation by a federal, state, or local agency. He also delayed returning a waiver of confidentiality regarding Judicial Conduct Commission records to the State Senate Judiciary Committee and falsely told staff counsel for the committee that he was not the subject of any complaints before the Commission.

    Procedural History

    The State Commission on Judicial Conduct determined that Judge Spargo violated rules requiring judges to uphold high standards of conduct and promote public confidence in the judiciary, recommending his removal from office. A Referee conducted a full evidentiary hearing. The Commission’s determination was based on the Referee’s findings and the Commission’s own review. Judge Spargo then sought review of the Commission’s determination in the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the State Commission on Judicial Conduct’s determination that Judge Spargo should be removed from office is supported by a preponderance of the evidence, and whether the sanction of removal is appropriate given Spargo’s conduct.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Commission’s determination was supported by a preponderance of the evidence, and the sanction of removal was appropriate, considering Judge Spargo’s pattern of evasive, deceitful, and untruthful behavior, which evidenced a lack of fitness to hold judicial office.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court deferred to the credibility determinations of the Referee and the Commission, finding no reason to disturb their findings that Spargo’s testimony was not credible. The court found that Spargo’s inappropriate note and suggestion to the intern, while deserving of sanction, would not, standing alone, justify removal. However, the court emphasized that Spargo engaged in a pattern of evasive, deceitful, and untruthful behavior, particularly in his attempts to conceal the pending investigation while seeking a Supreme Court appointment. The court rejected Spargo’s explanations for his false statements on the questionnaire and to the Senate Judiciary Committee staff. The court reasoned that “deception is antithetical to the role of a Judge who is sworn to uphold the law and seek the truth,” quoting Matter of Myers, 67 NY2d 550, 554. The court distinguished Spargo’s conduct from instances of mere poor judgment, emphasizing that Spargo was motivated by personal gain to dissimulate. The court acknowledged that removal is reserved for truly egregious conduct, but held that judges must be held to a higher standard, and Spargo’s actions warranted the sanction of removal.