In re Jeffrey V., 82 N.Y.2d 121 (1993)

A detained juvenile is entitled to a probable-cause hearing regardless of whether the alleged acts would constitute a felony or a lesser crime if committed by an adult, but commencing a fact-finding hearing within three days of detention, during which probable cause is established, satisfies this requirement.

Summary

Jeffrey V. was detained on a juvenile delinquency petition alleging acts that, if committed by an adult, would constitute less than a class C felony. The Family Court denied his request for a probable-cause hearing, arguing that the statutory right applied only to more serious felonies and commenced the fact-finding hearing within three days. The Court of Appeals held that Family Court Act § 325.1’s probable-cause hearing requirement applies regardless of the severity of the alleged acts. However, because the fact-finding hearing commenced within three days and established probable cause through the complainant’s testimony, the juvenile’s rights were not violated. The court also rejected the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Facts

Jeffrey V. was arrested and detained. A juvenile delinquency petition was filed against him, charging him with unlawful possession of a weapon and acts that, if committed by an adult, would constitute attempted assault, criminal possession of a weapon, and menacing. He was detained pending a fact-finding hearing.

Procedural History

The Family Court denied the juvenile’s request for a probable-cause hearing and commenced a fact-finding hearing. The Family Court adjudicated him a juvenile delinquent. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

Issue(s)

1. Whether Family Court Act § 325.1, requiring a probable-cause hearing for detained juveniles, applies to cases where the alleged acts would constitute crimes less serious than a class C felony if committed by an adult.

2. Whether commencing a fact-finding hearing within three days of detention, where probable cause is established, satisfies the requirement for a probable-cause hearing.

3. Whether directing the commencement of the fact-finding hearing over the Law Guardian’s claim of unpreparedness deprived the juvenile of his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.

Holding

1. Yes, because the statute does not explicitly limit the probable-cause hearing requirement to cases involving class A, B, or C felonies.

2. Yes, because the statute requires a probable-cause hearing only when a juvenile is detained for more than three days pending a fact-finding hearing. Commencement of the fact-finding hearing within that period, establishing probable cause, fulfills the statutory intent.

3. No, because the juvenile received meaningful representation, as evidenced by the Law Guardian’s participation, objections, and success in achieving dismissal of some of the charges.

Court’s Reasoning

The court reasoned that Family Court Act § 325.1 does not explicitly restrict the right to a probable-cause hearing to juveniles charged with acts constituting class A, B, or C felonies. The statute maintains a distinction between the right to a probable-cause hearing and the right to a prompt fact-finding hearing. Denying a probable-cause hearing based on the severity of the alleged acts would create the anomaly of providing less procedural protection to juveniles charged with minor offenses. However, the court found that the commencement of the fact-finding hearing within three days satisfied the intent of the statute. The complainant’s testimony during the hearing established probable cause, aligning with the procedure suggested in People ex rel. Guggenheim v. Mucci, 32 N.Y.2d 307, 313. Regarding the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the court applied the standard from United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, emphasizing that the juvenile must demonstrate the absence of meaningful adversarial representation. The court found that the Law Guardian’s performance, viewed in its totality, demonstrated meaningful representation, especially considering the dismissal of two charges. As the court noted, “When ineffectiveness of representation is claimed to be due to lack of preparedness of counsel, the United States Supreme Court has eschewed any per se inference of a constitutional deprivation; counsel who was present is presumed to have been competent and the burden is on the accused to demonstrate upon the record the absence of meaningful adversarial representation.”