In re Jamar A., 86 N.Y.2d 387 (1995)

A juvenile’s unexpected appearance in court after a warrant was issued for their arrest, coupled with the presentment agency’s witness unavailability due to the unscheduled appearance, constitutes a ‘special circumstance’ justifying an adjournment of the fact-finding hearing under Family Court Act § 340.1, even without explicit use of the term ‘special circumstances’ by the court.

Summary

Jamar A. was adjudicated a juvenile delinquent for unauthorized use of a vehicle. The Appellate Division reversed, citing a violation of Jamar’s speedy trial rights under Family Court Act § 340.1. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the Family Court Judge appropriately granted an adjournment due to “special circumstances” when Jamar A. unexpectedly appeared in court after a warrant had been issued for his arrest for failing to appear at two prior scheduled hearings, and the presentment agency indicated its witnesses were unavailable on that unscheduled date. The court emphasized that the judge’s on-the-record inquiry regarding witness availability and the setting of a mutually agreeable future date satisfied the statute’s requirements for prompt adjudication.

Facts

A delinquency petition was filed against Jamar A. on December 3, 1992, charging him with various crimes, including grand larceny and unauthorized use of a vehicle. A fact-finding hearing was initially set for January 11, 1993. The presentment agency requested and received an adjournment to January 20th. Jamar failed to appear on January 20th and February 1st, resulting in a warrant for his arrest and an adjournment to March 1st. Unexpectedly, Jamar and his mother appeared in court on February 25, 1993, before the March 1st scheduled hearing.

Procedural History

The Family Court, Bronx County, adjudicated Jamar A. a juvenile delinquent. The Appellate Division reversed the Family Court’s decision and dismissed the petition, concluding that Jamar A. was deprived of his right to a timely fact-finding hearing. Two justices dissented. The presentment agency appealed to the Court of Appeals as of right.

Issue(s)

Whether the Family Court Judge erred in adjourning the fact-finding hearing based on “special circumstances” under Family Court Act § 340.1(5) and (6) when the juvenile unexpectedly appeared in court after a warrant had been issued for his arrest, and the presentment agency’s witnesses were not available on that date?

Holding

Yes, because the unexpected appearance of the juvenile, coupled with the presentment agency’s witness unavailability due to the unscheduled appearance, constituted a “special circumstance” justifying the adjournment under Family Court Act § 340.1, and the Family Court Judge’s on-the-record inquiry and setting of a new date satisfied the statutory requirements.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals reasoned that Family Court Act § 340.1(5) requires the court to state on the record the reason for an adjournment, and subdivision (6) requires a “showing” of special circumstances. The court found that the Family Court Judge satisfied these requirements. The court noted that the judge made an explicit inquiry regarding witness availability after the juvenile’s unexpected appearance. The combination of the unscheduled appearance, the outstanding warrant, and the witness unavailability, all reflected on the record, constituted “special circumstances.” The court distinguished this case from Matter of Frank C., 70 NY2d 408, Matter of Randy K., 77 NY2d 398, and Matter of Nokia L., 81 NY2d 898, emphasizing that the special circumstances were evident on the face of the record. The court stated, “The words spoken and the action taken in the nisi prius setting constitute an effective and valid satisfaction of what the statute and we require.” The Court reasoned that it was unrealistic to expect police witnesses to be readily available on an unscheduled date. The Court emphasized that its ruling applied the statute to the particular facts of the case as governed by pre-statutory amendment precedents.