New York Law Review

Tag: In re Hime Y.

  • In re Hime Y., 54 N.Y.2d 282 (1981): Parental Rights Termination for Failure to Plan

    In re Hime Y., 54 N.Y.2d 282 (1981)

    A parent’s rights may be terminated due to permanent neglect if they fail to substantially and continuously maintain contact with or plan for the child’s future for more than one year after the child enters foster care, despite the agency’s diligent efforts and the parent’s physical and financial ability to do so.

    Summary

    This case concerns the termination of parental rights based on permanent neglect. Hime was placed in foster care shortly after birth. The agency initiated proceedings to terminate the mother’s rights, alleging both mental illness and permanent neglect. The Family Court initially found no failure to plan, but the Appellate Division terminated rights based on mental illness. The Court of Appeals reversed the mental illness finding. On remand, the Appellate Division found permanent neglect. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the weight of the evidence supported the finding that the mother failed to plan for the child’s future despite being physically and financially able to do so, and that the agency made diligent efforts to encourage the parental relationship.

    Facts

    Hime was born on March 10, 1975.
    She was temporarily placed with the Jewish Child Care Association on April 9, 1975.
    On July 8, 1975, the Family Court determined Hime was a neglected child and placed her with the agency for one year.
    The mother was hospitalized from April 1, 1975, to June 26, 1975.
    The termination proceeding was initiated on July 22, 1976, alleging mental illness and permanent neglect.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court found no failure to plan but awarded custody to foster parents based on the child’s best interests.
    The Appellate Division modified, terminating parental rights based on mental illness and remanding for further proceedings.
    The Court of Appeals reversed the mental illness finding.
    On remand, the Appellate Division found permanent neglect.
    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order terminating parental rights based on permanent neglect.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the respondent’s child, Hime, was shown to be a “permanently neglected child” within the meaning of Social Services Law § 384-b(7), because respondent failed for a period of more than one year following the date the child came into the care of an authorized agency to substantially and continuously maintain contact with or plan for the future of the child, although physically and financially able to do so, notwithstanding the agency’s diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship.

    Holding

    Yes, because the weight of the evidence supported the finding that the mother failed to plan for the child’s future despite being physically and financially able to do so, and that the agency made diligent efforts to encourage the parental relationship.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reviewed the record to determine which findings conformed to the weight of the evidence, given the disagreement between the lower courts. The court noted that Social Services Law § 384-b balances the child’s interest in not experiencing a protracted stay in foster care with the parents’ interest in continuing the parent-child relationship.
    The court found that the mother refused to provide details about her financial situation, giving rise to an unfavorable inference, and testified that she had always supported herself, demonstrating financial ability. The court also found that she had the physical ability to plan for Hime’s future.
    The court determined that the agency caseworker’s testimony sufficiently established both the mother’s failure to plan and the agency’s diligent efforts. The court also noted the mother’s hostility toward the caseworkers and her refusal to furnish information concerning treatment or employment, despite being advised that it was important for her right to regain custody of the child.
    The court concluded that the weight of the evidence supported the Appellate Division’s conclusion that the mother permanently neglected Hime. The court considered evidence of the mother’s hostility toward caseworkers and refusal to provide information relevant to her ability to care for the child. The court quoted from *Matter of Leon RR*, 48 NY2d 117, 126, noting that duties to work with both natural and foster parents are “by no means contradictory; indeed, they are complementary.”

  • In re Hime Y., 427 N.E.2d 245 (N.Y. 1981): Mental Illness and Termination of Parental Rights

    In re Hime Y., 427 N.E.2d 245 (N.Y. 1981)

    Mental illness, in itself, does not automatically excuse a parent from the obligation to plan for the future of their child in a permanent neglect proceeding; a separate and distinct finding must be made that the parent is presently and for the foreseeable future unable to care for the child due to the mental illness.

    Summary

    This case addresses the circumstances under which parental rights can be terminated due to mental illness or permanent neglect. The New York Court of Appeals held that while evidence supported the mother’s present inability to care for her child due to mental illness, there was insufficient proof regarding her future inability. Further, the court clarified that mental illness does not automatically equate to a physical inability to plan for the child’s future, which is a requirement for a finding of permanent neglect. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division to determine if the mother’s parental rights could be terminated due to permanent neglect.

    Facts

    Hime Y. was placed in foster care shortly after birth due to allegations of neglect. The Jewish Child Care Association filed a petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights, arguing both that the mother was mentally ill and unable to care for the child and that she had permanently neglected the child by failing to plan for her future despite the agency’s efforts to assist her.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court dismissed the petition, awarding custody to the foster parents with visitation rights for the mother. The Appellate Division modified the Family Court’s decision, granting the petition to terminate parental rights based on the mother’s mental illness and deeming the permanent neglect claim moot. The mother appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the finding that the mother was presently and for the foreseeable future unable to provide proper care for her child due to mental illness, justifying termination of her parental rights.

    2. Whether mental illness, in and of itself, excuses a parent from the obligation to plan for the future of the child, as required to avoid a finding of permanent neglect.

    Holding

    1. No, because while the evidence supported a finding of present inability, there was insufficient evidence to conclude that the mother would be unable to care for the child for the foreseeable future.

    2. No, because the statute requires a separate determination of physical and financial ability to plan for the child’s future, and mental illness does not automatically equate to a physical disability.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the Appellate Division erred in terminating parental rights based solely on mental illness without sufficient evidence of future inability to care for the child. The court-appointed psychiatrist testified that the mother showed improvement and might be able to care for the child in the future with ongoing treatment and medication. The court stated, “I think that remaining in remission and given therapeutic support that she might very well be able to rear the child”. The Court emphasized that any conclusion about future inability would be speculative and lacked the clear and convincing proof required for termination of parental rights.

    Regarding permanent neglect, the Court clarified that the statute requires the parent to be “physically and financially” able to plan for the child’s future. It rejected the Appellate Division’s view that mental illness automatically equates to physical inability, stating: “We do not read the language as encompassing mental condition or status, nor do we, as did the Appellate Division, equate mental and physical capacity.” The Court reasoned that if mental illness were an acceptable excuse for failing to plan, the statutory provision would be rendered nearly useless, as many parents who fail to plan may have some form of mental disturbance. The Court noted that the statute addresses mental illness specifically in other sections, implying a deliberate choice not to include it as an automatic exemption for failing to plan. The court noted that under the statute, drug and alcohol use doesn’t excuse the requirement to plan unless the parent is hospitalized for it, further emphasizing that the statute means what it says.