34 N.Y.2d 27 (1974)

The agreement essential to a common-law marriage need not be proved in any particular way, and documentary evidence, cohabitation, reputation, acknowledgment, declarations, and conduct are all probative.

Summary

This case concerns a dispute between two women both claiming to be the widow of Jacob Benjamin, who died intestate. Olga Benjamin claimed a common-law marriage predating 1933, while Lucille Benjamin based her claim on a 1956 ceremonial marriage. The Surrogate’s Court initially ruled against Olga, requiring direct proof of an agreement per verba de praesenti. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that direct proof isn’t necessary; circumstantial evidence can establish a common-law marriage. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the principle that the agreement to live as man and wife can be shown through various forms of evidence, including documentary evidence, cohabitation, and reputation.

Facts

Jacob Benjamin died intestate in 1971. Olga Benjamin claimed she had entered a common-law marriage with Jacob in 1927 and lived as husband and wife. A daughter, Elouise, was born to them in 1929 and acknowledged by both parents. Olga purportedly returned to Trinidad around 1938/1939 and had no further contact with Jacob. Lucille Benjamin claimed to be Jacob’s widow through a ceremonial marriage in 1956 in New York; Jacob had stated in his marriage license application that he had never been married. Evidence was presented that Olga and Jacob lived together and were regarded by neighbors as husband and wife.

Procedural History

Lucille and Olga both sought letters of administration for Jacob’s estate. The Surrogate’s Court ruled that Lucille was the lawful widow and that Olga had not established a valid common-law marriage. The Appellate Division affirmed the Surrogate’s decision. Olga appealed to the New York Court of Appeals as a matter of right. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts’ ruling and remanded the case to the Surrogate Court for further proceedings.

Issue(s)

Whether the Surrogate Court erred in requiring direct proof of an agreement per verba de praesenti to establish a common-law marriage in order to overcome the presumption of validity attaching to a subsequent ceremonial marriage.

Holding

No, because the agreement essential to a common-law marriage need not be proven in any particular way; direct or circumstantial evidence may suffice.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals emphasized that while common-law marriages were abolished in New York in 1933, those validly contracted before that date are still recognized. The court acknowledged that the party seeking to establish a common-law marriage bears the burden of proof. However, the court clarified that the agreement essential to a common-law marriage does not require direct proof. Circumstantial evidence, such as documentary evidence, cohabitation, reputation as husband and wife, acknowledgment, declarations, and conduct, can suffice. The court noted that cohabitation and reputation raise a presumption of common-law marriage, though this presumption can be rebutted. The court found that the Surrogate’s Court placed undue emphasis on direct proof of the marital agreement, overlooking documentary evidence such as Jacob’s acknowledgment of Elouise as his daughter in birth and baptismal records, and his 1944 army discharge certificate indicating he was married. The court stated that while the army discharge certificate was not admissible to prove the common-law marriage, it did demonstrate Jacob’s continuing attitude about his relationship with Olga. Taken together, the court found that the evidence of cohabitation, reputation, and documentary evidence suggested an agreement to live as man and wife in 1927. The court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this understanding.