In re Dale P., 81 N.Y.2d 70 (1993)

When a child has been directly placed with a custodian by the Family Court with the acquiescence of the Commissioner of Social Services, the court has the authority to order the Commissioner to initiate proceedings to terminate parental rights, even if the child is not technically in the Commissioner’s foster care.

Summary

This case concerns a child, Dale P., abandoned by his mother at birth and cared for by a friend, Mary H. The Family Court ordered the New York City Commissioner of Social Services to initiate termination proceedings so Dale P. could be permanently placed with Mary H. The Commissioner argued that because Dale P. was not in official foster care, the court lacked the authority to direct her actions. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Family Court’s order, holding that the direct placement of the child by the court, with the Commissioner’s approval, justified the order to initiate termination proceedings, even though the child was not technically in the Commissioner’s foster care system. The court modified the order, however, striking down a provision that would have required the Commissioner to provide legal services to Mary H. if the Commissioner failed to initiate termination proceedings.

Facts

Dale P. was born in 1987 to Nancy P., a cocaine addict. Nancy abandoned Dale shortly after birth. Mary H., a friend, voluntarily took care of Dale. The biological mother did not respond to court petitions. In April 1988, the Family Court found neglect and continued Dale’s placement with Mary H. for 18 months, with the Commissioner’s approval. In July 1989, the Family Court extended Dale’s placement with Mary H. for another year, again with the Commissioner’s consent.

Procedural History

In 1990, the Commissioner petitioned for another one-year extension of Dale’s placement with Mary H. The Family Court granted this extension. On its own motion, the court then ordered the Commissioner to institute termination of parental rights proceedings. The Commissioner moved to vacate this second order, arguing lack of authority. The Family Court modified the order, stating that if the Commissioner did not bring a termination proceeding within 30 days, Mary H. could bring an adoption proceeding, with the Commissioner providing her legal representation. The Commissioner appealed, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

Issue(s)

Whether the Family Court may direct the New York City Commissioner of Social Services to commence a proceeding to terminate parental rights of a child directly placed by the Family Court with a non-relative custodian under Family Court Act § 1055 and Social Services Law § 384-b (3) (b) and (4) (b), when the child is not formally part of the foster care system.

Holding

Yes, because where a child has been directly placed by the Family Court with the acquiescence of the Commissioner, the court has the authority to order the Commissioner to initiate proceedings to terminate parental rights, even if the child is not technically in the Commissioner’s foster care.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals reasoned that Dale P.’s placement with Mary H. was in the child’s best interest, as he had been abandoned by his biological mother and Mary H. had provided consistent care since 1988. The court emphasized the importance of permanency planning for children in such situations. While acknowledging the Commissioner’s concern about statutorily authorized process, the court found that the technical foster care processing was not the exclusive channel in this case. The court noted that requiring a formal placement into the foster care system before initiating termination proceedings would be an unnecessarily circuitous step. The court distinguished this case from situations where such a transfer would be necessary to preserve procedural safeguards for biological parents. The court also cited Social Services Law § 384-b (1) (b), which emphasizes the need for timely procedures for terminating parental rights in appropriate cases to reduce unnecessary stays in foster care. The Court of Appeals specifically noted, “[t]he Commissioner’s contention that Dale P. falls within gaps in the statutory scheme is contrary to the legislative intent expressed in Social Services Law § 384-b (1).” While the Commissioner argued that directly placed children do not automatically qualify for Federal foster care funds and that her authority over such children is limited, the court found these concerns were not pertinent in this specific case, given that the child was abandoned. The court concluded that the Family Court is empowered to guard the welfare of the child and is authorized to order the Commissioner to take further actions toward permanent placement. However, the court struck the portion of the order directing the Commissioner to provide legal services to Mary H. if the Commissioner failed to initiate termination proceedings, finding this issue unnecessary to resolve.