New York Law Review

Tag: In-Court Demonstration

  • People v. Acevedo, 40 N.Y.2d 701 (1976): Admissibility of In-Court Demonstrations

    People v. Acevedo, 40 N.Y.2d 701 (1976)

    A trial court has discretion to exclude in-court demonstrations or experiments if they are not sufficiently similar to the actual events at issue or if their probative value is outweighed by the potential for prejudice, confusion, or delay.

    Summary

    Acevedo was convicted of robbery based largely on voice identification by a hotel employee, Skolnick, who had extensive prior interactions with him. The defense sought to conduct an in-court experiment where Skolnick would be blindfolded and asked to identify Acevedo’s brother’s voice uttering phrases from the robbery. The trial court denied the request. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the conviction, finding no abuse of discretion. The court reasoned that the proposed experiment did not replicate the conditions under which Skolnick identified Acevedo’s voice and therefore had the potential to mislead the jury. The court modified the order of the Appellate Division by reversing the conviction of grand larceny in the third degree, determining that it was a lesser included offense.

    Facts

    Judith Skolnick, an assistant hotel manager, was accosted by a masked robber who forced her to open the manager’s office at gunpoint. The robber, familiar with the office layout, spoke frequently during the 20-25 minute robbery, both in Spanish to his accomplice and in English to the victims. Skolnick recognized the robber’s voice as that of Agilio Acevedo, a hotel security guard she had known and spoken with extensively for nearly two years. Acevedo had a slight speech impediment, particularly noticeable in his pronunciation of the word “security,” which further solidified her identification. Immediately after the robbery, Skolnick confidently identified Acevedo as the robber.

    Procedural History

    Acevedo was convicted after a jury trial. He appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in refusing to allow an in-court voice identification experiment during the cross-examination of the key witness. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Acevedo then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to allow the defense to conduct an in-court voice identification experiment during the cross-examination of the key witness.
    2. Whether the defendant’s conviction for grand larceny in the third degree was proper given the convictions for robbery in the first and second degrees.

    Holding

    1. No, because the proposed experiment did not sufficiently replicate the conditions under which the witness identified the defendant’s voice and therefore had the potential to mislead the jury.
    2. No, in part, because grand larceny in the third degree is a lesser included offense under the circumstances.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that while demonstrative evidence can be convincing, trial courts have broad discretion to exclude tests or demonstrations that are not properly relevant or that could mislead the jury. The proposed voice identification test was deemed dissimilar to the actual circumstances of Skolnick’s identification: her familiarity with Acevedo’s voice was extensive and recent, whereas her familiarity with his brother’s voice was limited and dated. The court noted, “The voice identification test proposed by the defendant in the case before us patently would not have duplicated the circumstances which surrounded Ms. Skolnick’s voice identification of the defendant.” The court also noted the jury had ample opportunity to evaluate the witness’s description of the defendant’s speech impediment. Finally, regarding the multiple convictions, the court noted that one crime is only included within another when it is impossible to commit the crime in the greater degree without also committing “by the same conduct” a crime in the lesser degree. The court reversed the conviction for larceny in the third degree holding that it was a lesser included offense in these circumstances.

  • People v. Acevedo, 40 N.Y.2d 640 (1976): Admissibility of In-Court Demonstrations

    People v. Acevedo, 40 N.Y.2d 640 (1976)

    A trial court has broad discretion to permit in-court demonstrations using physical exhibits, even if conditions are not identical to those at the scene of the event, as long as the demonstration is not deceptive, sensational, disruptive, or purely conjectural, and the opposing party has an opportunity for cross-examination.

    Summary

    This case addresses the admissibility of an in-court demonstration. An infant plaintiff was injured when a street sign fell on him. At trial, the defendant town introduced a model pole, and defense counsel demonstrated that striking the pole did not dislodge the sign. The plaintiffs objected. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the demonstration because the plaintiffs had the opportunity to cross-examine and highlight the differences between the model and the original, and the demonstration itself was not misleading.

    Facts

    An infant plaintiff was injured when a dual street sign fell on his head. The sign was allegedly dislodged when the plaintiff’s companion struck the pole supporting the sign. The street sign was recovered by the plaintiff’s father and retained in counsel’s custody. The town introduced a model metal pole, which was shorter than the original and embedded in a movable concrete block, unlike the original which was in stationary blacktop.

    Procedural History

    The case proceeded to trial where the street sign was admitted as evidence. The defendant town introduced a model pole. The plaintiffs objected to any courtroom demonstration using the model. The trial court admitted the model, and defense counsel demonstrated that striking the pole did not dislodge the sign, over the plaintiff’s objection. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the case.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court abused its discretion by permitting defense counsel to conduct an in-court demonstration using a physical exhibit introduced by the plaintiffs and a model introduced by the defendants, despite differences between the model and the original.

    Holding

    No, because the trial court has broad discretion in such matters, and the plaintiffs were afforded the opportunity to cross-examine and highlight the dissimilarities between the model and the original. Also, the demonstration was not deceptive, sensational, disruptive, or purely conjectural.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals recognized that trial courts have broad discretion in deciding whether to allow in-court demonstrations. The court acknowledged that the trial court could have forbidden the demonstration because the conditions in the courtroom were not identical to the scene of the accident. However, the court held that it was not an error as a matter of law to allow the demonstration, because plaintiffs had unrestricted opportunity to cross-examine and expose the differences between the model and the original. By highlighting the dissimilarities, plaintiffs could minimize the significance of the demonstration.

    The court reasoned that the physical features of the sign assembly and the mechanics of the demonstration were within the comprehension of the average juror, allowing them to independently weigh the probative value. Crucially, the court noted that the demonstration was not “deceptive, sensational, disruptive of the trial, or purely conjectural.” The court emphasized the importance of allowing the opposing party an opportunity to address any concerns through cross-examination. The court affirmed the order of the Appellate Division, upholding the jury verdict for the defendants.