New York Law Review

Tag: imprisonment

  • Covington v. Walker, 3 N.Y.3d 287 (2004): Statute of Limitations for Divorce Based on Imprisonment

    Covington v. Walker, 3 N.Y.3d 287 (2004)

    A cause of action for divorce based on imprisonment accrues when the defendant completes three consecutive years of incarceration, but the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the date the defendant is released from prison.

    Summary

    This case addresses the statute of limitations for divorce based on imprisonment under New York Domestic Relations Law § 170(3). The plaintiff sought a divorce more than five years after the defendant’s incarceration exceeded three years, arguing the limitations period didn’t begin until his release. The Court of Appeals held that while the cause of action arises after three years of imprisonment, the statute of limitations doesn’t begin to run until the defendant’s release, allowing the divorce action to proceed.

    Facts

    Plaintiff and Defendant married on May 12, 1983. On January 28, 1984, Defendant was arrested for murder and robbery. In 1985, Defendant was convicted and sentenced to 25 years to life. Defendant has been incarcerated since his arrest. The Plaintiff was also convicted for the same crimes and is also incarcerated.

    Procedural History

    On April 10, 2000, Plaintiff commenced a divorce action based on Defendant’s imprisonment. The Supreme Court dismissed the action on summary judgment, finding it time-barred. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the cause of action arose after three years of incarceration, which was more than five years before the action was commenced. Two dissenting justices argued the imprisonment ground was a continuing one that terminates upon release. The Court of Appeals reversed, agreeing with the dissent.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the five-year statute of limitations for a divorce action based on imprisonment begins to run from the date the defendant completes their third consecutive year of incarceration or from the date of their release from prison.

    Holding

    No, because a cause of action for divorce based on imprisonment continues to arise anew each day the defendant remains in prison, and the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the date of release.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the purpose of Domestic Relations Law § 170(3) is to allow a spouse to end a marriage where the other spouse is incarcerated. The requirement of three years of incarceration is meant to allow time for potential release. However, nothing suggests the statute was intended to penalize a spouse who delays divorce, perhaps due to children or reconciliation attempts. The Court noted the legislative intent to recognize grounds for divorce “as manifestations of dead marriages.”

    The Court applied the continuous wrong doctrine, stating, “Under a continuous wrong or violation rule, where a defendant spouse is incarcerated for a consecutive period exceeding three years, each day of continued confinement beyond three years inflicts new injury on the plaintiff spouse.” The Court further reasoned that statutes of limitations are designed to prevent surprise and protect against faded memories, none of which are implicated in imprisonment divorce cases where proof of incarceration is readily available. Balancing these concerns with the plaintiff’s interest in asserting a claim, the Court held the limitations period begins upon the defendant’s release from prison.

    The Court emphasized the policy considerations at stake, stating that a contrary rule would contravene the statute’s underlying goals of liberalizing the grounds for divorce and encouraging parties to attempt reconciliation. Allowing the action to proceed aligned with the purpose of providing a remedy for marriages effectively terminated by imprisonment.

  • People v. Colon, 77 N.Y.2d 1010 (1991): Limits on Probation When Concurrent Imprisonment Is Imposed

    People v. Colon, 77 N.Y.2d 1010 (1991)

    A sentence of probation is illegal when a defendant is also sentenced to imprisonment for another crime, regardless of whether the crimes are charged in the same accusatory instrument.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that Penal Law § 65.00(1) prohibits a sentence of probation when the defendant also receives a sentence of imprisonment for another crime, even if the crimes are charged in separate accusatory instruments. The Court reasoned that the purpose of probation is to supervise offenders in the community, which is incompatible with imprisonment. The phrase “in any case” in the statute refers to “in any instance” of multiple crimes, not just those within a single accusatory instrument. Therefore, the Appellate Division’s order was modified to vacate the probation sentence and remand for resentencing.

    Facts

    The defendant, Colon, attempted to cash a stolen check on May 7, 1989. Five months later, in a separate incident, he obtained cocaine and shared it with an undercover officer. On December 21, 1989, Colon waived indictment and pleaded guilty to two superior court informations related to these incidents.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was sentenced on February 20, 1990, to one year in Dutchess County Jail for the stolen check charge and five years’ probation for the drug possession charge. Colon appealed the sentence, arguing that the probation sentence was illegal under Penal Law § 65.00(1). The Appellate Division rejected this argument, interpreting the statute to apply only when multiple crimes are charged in a single accusatory instrument. The Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Penal Law § 65.00(1) prohibits a sentence of probation when a defendant is also sentenced to imprisonment for another crime, even if the crimes are charged in separate accusatory instruments.

    Holding

    Yes, because Penal Law § 65.00(1) prohibits a sentence of probation when the defendant is also sentenced to imprisonment for another crime, regardless of whether the crimes are charged in the same accusatory instrument. The phrase “in any case” refers to any instance where a defendant is sentenced for multiple crimes, and the purpose of probation is to supervise offenders in the community, which is inconsistent with imprisonment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals analyzed the language and legislative history of Penal Law § 65.00(1). The Court noted that the phrase “in any case” is commonly used in the Penal and Criminal Procedure Laws to mean “in any instance,” not limited to a single accusatory instrument. The Court referenced CPL 220.35 as an example of this usage. The Court also examined the legislative history of Penal Law § 65.00(1), quoting the Commission Staff Notes, which stated that probation is inappropriate for defendants being imprisoned because its purpose is to supervise offenders without removing them from the community. The court stated, “As the Commission indicated, probation is inappropriate for defendants being imprisoned because the ‘basic purpose’ of probation is to provide supervision without removing offenders from the community.” The Court reasoned that this rationale applies whether the crimes are contained in a single accusatory instrument or separate ones. The Court emphasized that the dispositive factor is that the defendant is being imprisoned for “some other crime.” The court held that the Legislature did not authorize probation as a sentencing option under these circumstances. The Court modified the Appellate Division’s order, vacating the probation sentence and remitting the case for resentencing. The Court found Colon’s remaining contention unpreserved for review.