Cohen v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 45 N.Y.2d 493 (1978)

In a statutory right of privacy case, punitive damages can be awarded if the defendant knowingly used a person’s image for commercial purposes without consent, and the element of ‘knowingly’ can be established through evidence of actual knowledge or reckless disregard for the truth of whether consent was obtained.

Summary

A professional model and her daughter sued Hallmark for using their pictures in a publication without written consent, seeking compensatory and punitive damages under New York Civil Rights Law sections 50 and 51. Hallmark argued that the evidence was insufficient to prove it acted “knowingly,” a prerequisite for punitive damages. The Appellate Division agreed, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude Hallmark acted with reckless disregard after being notified of the lack of consent. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division to determine if the jury’s finding was against the weight of the evidence.

Facts

Ken Heyman, a photographer, sold pictures of the plaintiff mother and daughter to Hallmark in June 1971 for use in a publication. Heyman assured Hallmark he had written releases from the plaintiffs. In November 1971, Heyman sought written releases from plaintiffs after selling the photos. On December 8, 1971, plaintiffs’ counsel notified Hallmark that the plaintiffs never consented to the use of their pictures and demanded they cease publication. Hallmark did not reply but asked Heyman for the releases. Heyman did not respond on the advice of his counsel. Hallmark ordered new printings of the publication on December 27, 1971, and February 10, 1972. Plaintiffs commenced an action in late December and served a complaint on February 23, seeking injunctive relief and damages.

Procedural History

The plaintiffs sued Hallmark in Supreme Court, seeking injunctive relief, compensatory damages, and punitive damages. The jury found in favor of the plaintiffs and awarded nominal compensatory damages and $50,000 in punitive damages. Hallmark appealed the punitive damages award. The Appellate Division reversed, finding insufficient evidence of knowing use without consent. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision and remitted the case for further proceedings.

Issue(s)

Whether there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Hallmark acted “knowingly” in using the plaintiffs’ pictures without their written consent, thereby justifying an award of punitive damages under Section 51 of the Civil Rights Law.

Holding

Yes, because based on the evidence, particularly Hallmark’s continued printing of the pictures after being notified of the lack of consent and after Heyman failed to provide the releases, it was not irrational for the jury to conclude that Hallmark acted with actual knowledge or reckless disregard for the truth.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals distinguished between a determination that a verdict is against the weight of the evidence and a determination that there is insufficient evidence to support the verdict as a matter of law. The former requires a new trial, while the latter results in a final judgment. To determine whether a verdict is supported by sufficient evidence, the court must decide if there is any valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences that could lead rational people to the conclusion reached by the jury. The court emphasized that “it cannot be correctly said in any case where the right of trial by jury exists and the evidence presents an actual issue of fact, that the court may properly direct a verdict.” The court noted that while Hallmark may not have known about the lack of consent before December 1971, their actions after being notified, including failing to receive confirmation from Heyman and continuing to print the publication, created a question of fact for the jury regarding their knowledge. The Court cited Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374. The court emphasized that imputation of knowledge may not be avoided by ignoring obvious warning signs and that the Appellate Division had the authority to review the jury’s factual findings to determine if they were in accord with the weight of the evidence. The court stated: “in many instances the imputation of knowledge, and its concomitant responsibility, may not be avoided by the simple expedient of closing one’s eyes, covering one’s ears, and holding one’s breath.”