New York Law Review

Tag: Implied Bias

  • People v. Furey, 18 N.Y.3d 84 (2011): Disqualifying Jurors with Close Witness Relationships

    People v. Furey, 18 N.Y.3d 84 (2011)

    A prospective juror with personal and professional relationships with numerous potential witnesses must be disqualified for cause, even if they claim impartiality, due to the risk of implied bias.

    Summary

    Scott Furey was convicted of kidnapping and burglary. During jury selection, a prospective juror, Mrs. Comerford, revealed close relationships with several police officer witnesses, including frequent professional and some personal contact. The defense challenged her for cause, arguing implied bias. The trial court denied the challenge, relying on Mrs. Comerford’s assurance of impartiality. Furey used a peremptory challenge to remove her and eventually exhausted all peremptory challenges. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by not disqualifying Mrs. Comerford for cause because her relationships with the witnesses created an unacceptable risk of bias, irrespective of her assurances.

    Facts

    Defendant Scott Furey was charged with burglary and kidnapping of his former girlfriend. During jury selection, Mrs. Comerford, the wife of a police captain, was a prospective juror. She knew several potential prosecution witnesses, who were police officers working with her husband. Specifically, she had frequent professional and some personal contact with at least two officers and knew them for several years. She also knew the assistant district attorney on the case. In total, she was acquainted with 8 of the 14 potential witnesses for the prosecution.

    Procedural History

    The County Court denied the defense’s challenge for cause against Mrs. Comerford. Furey used a peremptory challenge to remove her. Furey was convicted in County Court. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court abused its discretion as a matter of law when it denied the defendant’s challenge for cause of a prospective juror who had personal and professional relationships with several of the witnesses expected to testify at the defendant’s trial, despite the juror’s assurances of impartiality?

    Holding

    Yes, because Mrs. Comerford’s familiarity with numerous witnesses satisfied the implied bias standard, necessitating her removal for cause, irrespective of her assurances of impartiality.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPL 270.20(1)(c) allows a challenge for cause if a prospective juror’s relationship with a witness is likely to preclude an impartial verdict, creating an “implied bias.” Such bias cannot be cured by an expurgatory oath because the risk of prejudice is too great. The Court emphasized the need for caution, leaning towards disqualification when impartiality is dubious. While not all relationships require disqualification, the frequency and nature of the relationship are crucial. Here, Mrs. Comerford’s close professional and social relationships with many witnesses (including those involved in the investigation) created a considerable risk she could unwittingly give undue credence to their testimony. The court emphasized that such a situation creates the perception that the defendant might not receive a fair trial. The court stated, “[T]he risk of prejudice arising out of the close relationship… [is] so great that recital of an oath of impartiality could not convincingly dispel the taint.” Therefore, denying the challenge for cause was an abuse of discretion.

  • People v. Rentz, 67 N.Y.2d 829 (1986): Disqualification of Juror with Prior Relationship to Witness

    People v. Rentz, 67 N.Y.2d 829 (1986)

    A juror with a prior relationship with a witness may be disqualified, particularly if the witness’s testimony pertains to a central issue in the case, and the parties should be informed of any communication from a juror regarding potential bias before the court makes a ruling.

    Summary

    Defendant Rentz’s murder conviction was challenged based on the trial court’s failure to disqualify a juror who had a prior relationship with two prosecution witnesses. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order affirming the denial of Rentz’s motion to vacate the judgment, ordering a new trial. The court held that the juror’s relationship with the witnesses, who testified on the critical issue of Rentz’s sanity, created implied bias, requiring disqualification. The court also emphasized the importance of informing the parties of any communication from a juror regarding potential bias before the court makes a ruling.

    Facts

    Rentz was convicted of murder in 1976, and the conviction was affirmed. In 1982, Rentz moved to vacate the conviction, arguing that the trial court erred by not disqualifying a juror who had a prior relationship with two prosecution witnesses. The juror was acquainted with two prosecution witnesses; the relationship was described as professional, but with one witness, it was also “somewhat intimate.” The two witnesses testified to refute Rentz’s claim of insanity, the primary issue at trial.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Rentz’s motion to vacate the conviction. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. Rentz appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in failing to disqualify a juror who had a prior relationship with two prosecution witnesses.
    2. Whether the court should inform the parties of the communication from the juror before the court rules on its effect.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the juror’s prior relationship with the prosecution witnesses, who testified on the critical issue of Rentz’s sanity, created implied bias, which should have resulted in disqualification (CPL 270.35).
    2. Yes, because parties should be given an opportunity to be heard before the court rules on a matter relating to the case.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while a prior relationship with a witness does not automatically disqualify a juror, it may require excusal in certain cases. In this instance, the juror’s relationships with two prosecution witnesses, particularly given their testimony on the crucial issue of Rentz’s sanity, created implied bias. The court noted that the juror’s statement that the relationship would not affect impartiality is ineffective when implied bias is shown, citing People v. Branch, 46 N.Y.2d 645. The court emphasized that, considering all circumstances, the trial court should have found the juror unqualified. Regarding communication with the parties, the court stated: “Finally we emphasize that the court should have informed the parties of the communication from the juror before the court ruled on its effect…the parties should, in most, if not all cases, be given an opportunity to be heard before the court rules on such a matter relating to the case.” The court also noted a potential claim of ineffective assistance of counsel but did not address it due to the decision on juror disqualification.