Matter of Thall, 18 N.Y.2d 186 (1966)

When a testator’s intent is evident from the will as a whole, a court may give effect to that intent by implication to avoid intestacy, even if the exact contingency that occurred was not explicitly addressed in the will.

Summary

Solomon Thall’s will created a trust for his wife’s life, with income shared by his wife, sister Sophie, and Sophie’s two sons, Emanuel and Ben Ami, and the corpus to be divided among Sophie and her sons upon the wife’s death. The will included clauses addressing certain contingencies, but failed to address the actual scenario where Sophie and both sons died before the wife, with one son (Ben Ami) leaving a child (Barbara Ann) and the other son (Emanuel) dying without issue. The court held that the testator’s clear intent was to benefit his sister’s descendants. Therefore, the court implied a bequest of the entire corpus to Barbara Ann Landis, Ben Ami’s daughter, to avoid intestacy, carrying out the testator’s general testamentary scheme.

Facts

Solomon Thall died in 1943, survived by his wife, sister Sophie Levitsky, and the issue of a deceased brother. His will, executed in 1941, created a trust with income to his wife, Sophie, and Sophie’s sons, Emanuel Landis and Ben Ami Landis. Upon the wife’s death, the corpus was to be divided among Sophie, Emanuel, and Ben Ami. The will specified that if Sophie predeceased the wife, her share would go to Emanuel and Ben Ami. Further, if either Emanuel or Ben Ami predeceased the wife, their share would go to their children; if they died without children, it would go to the surviving brother. Ben Ami died in 1956, survived by his daughter Barbara Ann. Sophie died in 1961, and Emanuel died without issue in 1962. The will did not explicitly address the disposition of income or corpus in the event that Sophie and both sons died before the wife, with one son survived by a child and the other not.

Procedural History

The Surrogate’s Court decided that both the net income and the entire corpus should be equally divided between Ben Ami’s daughter, Barbara Ann, and the testator’s distributees at the time of death. The Appellate Division modified this, awarding all net income to the testator’s distributees and the entire corpus to Barbara Ann upon the wife’s death. The Court of Appeals reviewed the Appellate Division’s order.

Issue(s)

Whether, in the absence of an express provision in the will addressing the specific contingency that occurred, the court may imply a testamentary disposition of the trust income and corpus to the testator’s grandniece, Barbara Ann Landis, to effectuate the testator’s overall intent and avoid intestacy.

Holding

Yes, because the testator’s intent, as manifested in the will, was to benefit his sister’s descendants, and the court may give effect to this intent by implication to avoid intestacy when the testator failed to anticipate the exact sequence of deaths that occurred.

Court’s Reasoning

The court emphasized that the primary goal of testamentary construction is to ascertain and effectuate the testator’s intent from the entire will. When a “general scheme” is apparent, courts should carry out the testator’s purpose, even if general rules of interpretation suggest a different result. The court invoked the doctrine that allows courts to give effect to an intention indicated by implication, particularly when the testator neglected to provide for the exact contingency that occurred. The court noted that the testator’s main concern, outside of his wife, was his sister and her two sons. He made provisions for them, but not for the specific event that took place. The court inferred that the testator intended his estate to remain within that branch of his family. The court distinguished the case from others where intestacy was decreed due to a lack of clear testamentary intent, stating, “Quite obviously, what the testator most desired was that his estate should ultimately go to, and remain within, a particular branch of his family. He could not have intended the descendants of Sophie to be deprived of any portion of his estate by the happenstance that the son (of hers) who was without children died after, rather than before, the son who left offspring.” The court also held that Barbara Ann was entitled to the undistributed income from the trust because she was the person “presumptively entitled to the next eventual estate” under Section 63 of the Real Property Law.