57 N.Y.2d 422 (1982)

The statute of limitations for personal injury caused by a malfunctioning prosthetic or contraceptive device implanted or inserted into the body runs from the date of the injury resulting from the malfunction, not necessarily from the date of implantation or insertion.

Summary

These consolidated cases, Martin v. Edwards Labs and Lindsey v. A.H. Robins Co., concern the statute of limitations for injuries caused by implanted medical devices. Martin involved a malfunctioning heart valve, while Lindsey involved a Daikon Shield IUD. The key issue was whether the statute of limitations began running at the time of implantation/insertion or at the time the injury occurred due to the device’s malfunction. The New York Court of Appeals held that the statute of limitations runs from the date of the injury-causing malfunction, balancing the manufacturer’s need for repose with the injured party’s right to a reasonable chance to assert their claim. This rejects a strict ‘date of implantation’ rule.

Facts

In Martin, an artificial aortic valve was implanted in Michael Martin in 1976. Martin died in 1979, and a lawsuit was filed in 1981 alleging that Teflon particles from the valve lodged in his brain, contributing to his death. In Lindsey, Joyce Lindsey had a Daikon Shield IUD inserted in 1971. In 1973, she developed a pelvic infection, causing permanent damage and infertility. She filed suit in 1976.

Procedural History

In Martin, the Supreme Court initially dismissed the case as time-barred but reinstated it on reargument. The Appellate Division then modified, dismissing the personal injury cause of action. In Lindsey, Special Term dismissed the complaint against Robins (the manufacturer) but not entirely against Ullman (the doctor). The Appellate Division modified, denying Robins’ motion to dismiss. Both cases reached the New York Court of Appeals due to the significance of the statute of limitations issue.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the statute of limitations for a product liability action involving a medical device implanted or inserted into the body begins to run at the time of implantation/insertion or at the time of injury caused by the device’s malfunction.
2. (Lindsey only) Whether the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to establish a malfunction within three years prior to the lawsuit.
3. (Lindsey only) Whether the plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint to include a fraud cause of action should have been granted.

Holding

1. No, the statute of limitations begins with the injury-causing malfunction of the product because before the injury, the plaintiff has no cause to complain.
2. Yes, the physician’s affidavit was sufficient to create a triable issue of fact regarding when the injury occurred because the defendant has the burden to prove the injury occurred outside the limitations period.
3. No, the motion to amend was untimely because the plaintiff had evidence of the alleged fraud more than two years before the motion.

Court’s Reasoning

The court balanced the manufacturer’s interest in defending claims before their ability to do so deteriorates with the injured person’s interest in not being deprived of a claim before a reasonable chance to assert it. The court distinguished between inhaled, ingested, or injected substances (where the harm begins upon entry into the body) and implanted devices (where no harm occurs until malfunction). Applying the date-of-injury rule from Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co. was deemed most appropriate. The court reasoned that like the user of a machine, until a malfunction occurs, the plaintiff has no cause to complain. The availability of the device post-malfunction mitigates concerns about stale claims. The court stated, “[T]he proper rule to be applied with respect to products implanted or inserted in the human body is neither time of implantation or insertion nor time of discovery, but Victorson’s date of injury rule, which will most often be the date when the product malfunctions.” In Lindsey, the court found the physician’s affidavit sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to when the injury occurred, noting the defendant’s burden of proof on the statute of limitations defense. However, the motion to amend the complaint was deemed untimely as the plaintiff possessed evidence of fraud more than two years before seeking to amend. The court emphasized that the original complaint failed to sufficiently state the circumstances constituting fraud.