New York Law Review

Tag: Impeachment

  • People v. Blakeney, 88 N.Y.2d 1012 (1996): Admissibility of Subsequent Arrests to Contradict Defendant Testimony

    People v. Blakeney, 88 N.Y.2d 1012 (1996)

    A defendant’s testimony denying a relationship with a co-defendant opens the door to the admissibility of evidence of a subsequent arrest with the same co-defendant to disprove the claimed lack of relationship, even if it involves evidence of another crime.

    Summary

    Lorenzo Blakeney was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance. At trial, Blakeney claimed he had never met his co-defendant, Shakira Fleming, before his initial arrest. The prosecution then introduced evidence of a subsequent arrest of Blakeney with Fleming for a similar offense. The New York Court of Appeals held that Blakeney’s testimony opened the door to this evidence to contradict his claim, even if it incidentally showed another crime. The Court also found his claims of prosecutorial bias and burden shifting were unpreserved and his other claims were without merit.

    Facts

    On November 4, 1992, Lorenzo Blakeney was arrested with Shakira Fleming for allegedly selling crack cocaine to an undercover officer.

    Twelve days later, on November 16, 1992, Blakeney was again arrested with Fleming for allegedly committing the same offense at the same location.

    At trial, Blakeney testified that he had never seen or known Fleming before the initial arrest.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court found Blakeney guilty of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, with one Justice dissenting.

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant’s claim that he had never seen or known Fleming before his first arrest opened the door to evidence of a subsequent arrest with Fleming to disprove his claim.

    Holding

    Yes, because the defendant’s testimony denying any prior relationship with Fleming made the evidence of the subsequent arrest with her relevant to contradict his account of their relationship.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Blakeney’s claim of never having met Fleming before his first arrest opened the door to the admission of evidence tending to disprove his account. The subsequent arrest with Fleming was deemed relevant for “contradiction and response” regarding the existence of their relationship, rather than simply to impeach his general credibility. The court cited People v. Betts, 70 N.Y.2d 289, 295, noting that the evidence was admissible to contradict the specific testimony offered by the defendant. The court distinguished between using prior bad acts to impeach general credibility versus using them to directly contradict a specific assertion made by the defendant. The court emphasized the defendant created the issue by asserting he didn’t know Fleming. By denying the relationship, he opened the door to the prosecution’s evidence showing they were arrested together soon after, suggesting a connection that contradicted his testimony.

    The Court also found that Blakeney’s claims of prosecutorial bias and the shifting of the burden of proof were unpreserved for review because no objections were made during the trial. Further, the court summarily dismissed Blakeney’s remaining claims as without merit. The decision underscores the principle that a defendant’s specific assertions during testimony can create an opportunity for the prosecution to introduce otherwise inadmissible evidence to directly contradict those assertions.

  • People v. Gray, 84 N.Y.2d 709 (1995): Admissibility of Out-of-State Juvenile Convictions for Impeachment

    84 N.Y.2d 709 (1995)

    A trial court retains discretion to permit cross-examination of a testifying defendant regarding a prior criminal conviction from another state, even if the underlying conduct would only result in a juvenile delinquency adjudication in New York.

    Summary

    Ernest Gray was convicted of murder and robbery. Prior to trial, Gray sought to prevent the prosecution from using a prior Maryland felony conviction (cocaine trafficking at age 15) to impeach his credibility if he testified. Under New York law, this act would have been adjudicated in juvenile court. The trial court denied Gray’s motion, and he was convicted. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court’s Sandoval discretion extends to out-of-state convictions, even if the underlying act would have been treated differently in New York. The Court declined to create a per se rule excluding such convictions, emphasizing the trial court’s ability to consider the differing juvenile justice policies.

    Facts

    Harry Rhodes was found murdered in his truck. The truck’s rear door was open, the driver’s window was broken, and papers were strewn inside. Rhodes’ wallet and documents were found nearby.

    Ernest Gray and five others were arrested. Gray admitted in written and videotaped statements that he participated in the robbery of Rhodes.

    Procedural History

    Gray made a pretrial Sandoval motion to preclude the prosecution from using a 1990 New York misdemeanor conviction for criminal trespass and a 1989 Maryland felony conviction for cocaine trafficking (when Gray was 15) to impeach his credibility if he testified. The trial court denied the motion. Gray did not testify and was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant’s prior felony conviction in another state, for conduct that would only result in a juvenile delinquency adjudication in New York, is automatically inadmissible as cross-examination material under People v. Sandoval.

    Holding

    No, because the trial court’s broad discretion in Sandoval determinations extends to out-of-state convictions, and a per se rule automatically excluding such convictions is not required.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the well-established principle that a testifying defendant may be cross-examined about prior criminal, vicious, or immoral acts that bear on their credibility. The Court emphasized that Sandoval determinations are largely discretionary, and there are no per se rules requiring preclusion based on the age, nature, or number of prior crimes. The Court distinguished between juvenile delinquency adjudications in New York, which cannot be used for impeachment, and criminal convictions in foreign jurisdictions, which can be used if the underlying act constituted a crime in that jurisdiction.

    The Court acknowledged New York’s policy of protecting young persons from acquiring the stigma of criminal convictions but reasoned that New York’s interest in adjudicating criminal acts outside the state is less compelling and does not require automatically overriding another jurisdiction’s treatment of youth crime. The court also referenced People v. Kuey, where it held that New York courts may defer to other jurisdictions’ policies in sentencing matters.

    While the court declined to adopt a per se rule, it stated that the trial court should be sensitive to the differences between the juvenile justice policies of New York and the foreign state. The court found no abuse of discretion in this case.

    Judge Levine’s concurring opinion argued for a per se rule barring cross-examination on out-of-state convictions based on conduct that would only result in a juvenile delinquency adjudication in New York, to maintain consistency with New York’s policy of protecting youths from criminal status for nonviolent crimes. However, Judge Levine agreed that the Sandoval error was harmless here.

  • People v. Gelikkaya, 84 N.Y.2d 456 (1994): Admissibility of Grand Jury Testimony for Impeachment When Competency is Questioned

    People v. Gelikkaya, 84 N.Y.2d 456 (1994)

    A defendant’s Grand Jury testimony, given after waiving immunity, can be admissible for impeachment purposes at trial, even if the defendant’s competency is later questioned, provided the trial court determines the testimony was voluntary and reliable, and the defendant was able to consult with counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding.

    Summary

    Gelikkaya was convicted of attempted murder. He appealed, arguing that the prosecution’s use of his Grand Jury testimony to impeach him was improper because he was allegedly incompetent when he gave the testimony. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the Grand Jury testimony for impeachment purposes. The court reasoned that Gelikkaya was represented by counsel, consulted with counsel, and his testimony was deemed voluntary and reliable. The subsequent questioning of his competency did not automatically negate the admissibility of his prior testimony.

    Facts

    Gelikkaya was arrested for allegedly attacking the spiritual leader of a mosque. He was arraigned and indicated his intent to testify before the Grand Jury. He waived immunity with counsel present. The Grand Jury indicted him for attempted murder and assault. At arraignment on the indictment, Gelikkaya’s competency was first questioned, leading to psychiatric evaluations that initially found him unfit to proceed. After treatment, he was deemed competent. Before Gelikkaya testified at trial, his counsel moved to preclude the use of his Grand Jury testimony, arguing his incompetency at that time rendered it inadmissible. The trial court denied the motion, and portions of the Grand Jury testimony were used to impeach Gelikkaya.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Gelikkaya of attempted murder in the second degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant’s Grand Jury testimony, given after waiving immunity, is inadmissible for impeachment purposes at trial if the defendant’s competency was later questioned but not established at the time of the Grand Jury proceeding?

    Holding

    No, because the trial court determined that the testimony was voluntary and reliable, and the defendant was able to consult with counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding at the time the testimony was given.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that there is a presumption of sanity, and mental illness subsequent to the Grand Jury proceeding is not necessarily evidence of incompetency at the time of that proceeding. Even a mentally ill person may give evidentiary testimony if they understand the nature of an oath and can give a reasonably accurate account of the circumstances. The court emphasized that Gelikkaya was represented by counsel who was present during the Grand Jury proceeding and did not raise any concerns about his competency at that time. The court noted, “[s]anity being the normal and usual condition of mankind…defendant is presumed to have been competent at the time of the Grand Jury proceeding.” The Trial Judge’s determination that Gelikkaya’s Grand Jury testimony was admissible for impeachment implicitly found that he could consult with counsel “‘with a reasonable degree of rational understanding…and…ha[d] a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.’” The court concluded that using the Grand Jury testimony for impeachment went to the credibility of his trial testimony, which the jury resolved against him. There was no abuse of discretion in admitting the testimony, as there was no evidence suggesting that Gelikkaya did not comprehend the significance of his statements or the nature of the proceedings at the time.

  • People v. Inniss, 83 N.Y.2d 653 (1994): Admissibility of Evidence for Witness Impeachment

    83 N.Y.2d 653 (1994)

    A trial court does not err in excluding evidence offered solely to impeach a witness’s credibility on a collateral matter when the witness’s bias and interest have been exhaustively explored during cross-examination.

    Summary

    Kenneth Inniss was convicted of murder and weapon possession. The key witness against him, Richard Saunders, had a cooperation agreement with the prosecution. Inniss appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by refusing to admit testimony from Saunders’s alleged victim in a dismissed robbery case and the transcript of Saunders’s cooperation agreement. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the evidence was offered only to impeach Saunders’s credibility on a collateral matter, and Saunders’s bias had already been thoroughly explored. The court also found that the refusal to give a specific “interested witness” charge was not reversible error because the jury was aware of Saunders’s potential bias.

    Facts

    Richard Saunders, awaiting trial on robbery charges, contacted authorities claiming knowledge of Brian Rich’s killer. Saunders testified that Inniss offered him $10,000 to kill Rich, which he declined. On August 3, 1986, Saunders witnessed Inniss shooting Rich with an Uzi. Saunders had a cooperation agreement with the District Attorney’s office, promising dismissal of his charges in exchange for truthful testimony. Saunders testified about incriminating conversations with Inniss before and after the murder. Forensic evidence supported Saunders’s account. Inniss presented an alibi defense but was convicted.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Inniss. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to admit testimony of the complainant in Saunders’s dismissed robbery indictment and the transcript of the cooperation agreement between Saunders and the prosecution.
    2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to give an interested witness charge specifically regarding Saunders’s testimony.

    Holding

    1. No, because the evidence was offered solely to impeach Saunders’s credibility on a collateral matter, and Saunders’s bias and interest were exhaustively explored during cross-examination.
    2. No, because the charge as a whole, including the instruction that the jury could consider the interest or bias of any witness, was sufficient to convey the need to scrutinize Saunders’s testimony with care.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Inniss only sought to introduce the evidence to contradict Saunders’s denial of guilt in the dismissed robbery charges, which was a collateral matter. The court cited People v. Pavao, stating that the collateral impeachment rule bars the admission of evidence used to establish “perjury” on collateral issues. Furthermore, the court noted that the terms of the cooperation agreement and Saunders’s interest and bias were “exhaustive[ly]” explored on cross-examination, making the documentary evidence cumulative, citing People v. Chin. The Court also addressed the refusal to give an interested witness charge regarding Saunders’s testimony, finding that because Saunders’s bias and interest were heavily emphasized, the jury was sufficiently informed to scrutinize his testimony. The court stated that the jury “intensely scrutinized Saunders’ testimony,” and thus, the omission was not reversible error, citing People v. Warren. The court emphasized that the key issue was whether any benefit Saunders received affected the truthfulness of his testimony. Judge Smith dissented, arguing that the trial court failed to produce Brady and Rosario material by withholding the cooperation agreement and minutes from the proceeding dismissing the robbery charge. The dissent also argued that it was essential for the trial court to give more than the standard interested witness charge.

  • People v. Walker, 83 N.Y.2d 457 (1994): Use of Aliases and Impeachment of Witness Credibility

    People v. Walker, 83 N.Y.2d 457 (1994)

    A defendant’s prior use of aliases is generally admissible as evidence of dishonesty bearing on credibility, and the trial court has discretion to allow cross-examination on such matters unless the probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice.

    Summary

    The case concerns whether the prosecution could cross-examine the defendant about his prior use of aliases. The defendant was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance. Prior to trial, a Sandoval hearing addressed the admissibility of the defendant’s prior convictions and use of aliases. The defense argued that some aliases had innocent explanations. The trial court allowed questioning about the aliases, and the defendant did not testify. The Court of Appeals held that a defendant’s prior use of aliases is an indication of dishonesty and is relevant to credibility. The court affirmed the trial court’s decision, finding no abuse of discretion.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with selling cocaine to an undercover officer on November 20, 1990. Prior to trial, the prosecution sought to cross-examine the defendant on two prior felony convictions, 17 misdemeanor convictions, and the use of 14 different names and 5 different dates of birth when arrested. The defense argued that the use of some aliases had innocent explanations, such as religious reasons or being under the influence of drugs.

    Procedural History

    The trial court ruled that the prosecution could question the defendant about his use of aliases and the number and dates of prior convictions but not the underlying facts. The defendant did not testify and was convicted of criminal sale in the third degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to cross-examine the defendant about his prior use of aliases, despite the defense’s claim of alternative explanations for their use.

    Holding

    No, because a defendant’s prior use of aliases is an indication of dishonesty that goes to the heart of the question of that individual’s testimonial credibility, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing cross-examination on the matter.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that impeachment aims to discredit a witness and demonstrate untruthfulness. Prior immoral, vicious, or criminal conduct is relevant to credibility. Using a false name is an act of prevarication, suggesting a willingness to put self-interest ahead of principle. While some alias use may have innocent explanations, this does not require a special rule for alias evidence. The trier of fact can weigh the evidence and resolve credibility issues. The court emphasized that the trial court has broad discretion over the scope of cross-examination. Unlike prior crime evidence, alias evidence carries no implication other than untruthfulness. The court stated, “Manifestly, a suspect’s use of a false name or other inaccurate pedigree information is an indication of dishonesty that goes to the very heart of the question of that individual’s testimonial credibility.” The court concluded that defense counsel’s assertions about innocent explanations were speculative and did not suggest a legal reason to mandate preclusion. The court affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

  • People v. Taylor, 80 N.Y.2d 1 (1992): Admissibility of Prior Consistent Statements to Rehabilitate Witness Testimony

    People v. Taylor, 80 N.Y.2d 1 (1992)

    Prior consistent statements are admissible to rehabilitate a witness’s testimony if the witness’s testimony has been assailed as a recent fabrication, and the prior consistent statements predate the motive to falsify; however, mere impeachment by proof of inconsistent statements does not automatically constitute a charge that the witness’s testimony is a fabrication.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of rape and related crimes. The prosecution introduced pretrial statements by the complainant to rehabilitate her after the defense impeached her with prior inconsistent statements. The New York Court of Appeals held that the evidence of prompt outcry was admissible, but the other pretrial statements were not, because they did not predate the alleged motive to falsify. The court reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial, holding that the errors were not harmless because the evidence of rape was not overwhelming, and the improperly admitted statements could have influenced the jury’s determination of whether penetration occurred, which was essential for a rape conviction.

    Facts

    Jane Doe and the defendant were intimate. Defendant spent the night at Doe’s apartment, where Doe lived with her daughter, Mary, and two younger sons, and an elderly woman, Linda Jones. Mary usually slept in a bedroom next to her mother’s, but when defendant stayed over, Mary slept in the living room. Mary testified that defendant awakened her in the middle of the night, touched her breasts, rubbed his penis against her vagina, and threatened her. A similar incident allegedly occurred one week later, with one of Mary’s friends sleeping over who testified to seeing the defendant touch Mary. Mary told her mother about both incidents, but Doe did nothing until Mary told her stepfather, who informed the police.

    Procedural History

    Defendant was convicted of forcible and statutory rape, sexual abuse, and endangering the welfare of a child. The Appellate Division acknowledged that some statements were improperly admitted but held the errors were harmless due to overwhelming evidence of guilt. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, finding the evidence of rape was not overwhelming and ordering a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether evidence of prompt outcry was properly admitted to corroborate the allegation of sexual assault?

    2. Whether prior consistent statements of the complainant were properly admitted to rehabilitate her testimony after impeachment with prior inconsistent statements?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the child’s reports to her mother on the mornings following each incident qualified as prompt outcry made at the first suitable opportunity.

    2. No, because the prior consistent statements to police and the District Attorney did not predate the alleged motive to fabricate.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding prompt outcry, the court reasoned that its admissibility hinges on timeliness and the exclusion of details. A complaint is timely if made at the first suitable opportunity. The court found the child’s reports to her mother were timely, but statements to the police or prosecutor days later would not qualify. The court stated, “There can be no iron rule on the subject. The law expects and requires that it should be prompt, but there is and can be no particular time specified.”

    Regarding prior consistent statements, the court stated that they are admissible to rebut a charge of recent fabrication if they predate the motive to falsify. The court noted, “Mere impeachment by proof of inconsistent statements does not constitute a charge that the witness’ testimony is a fabrication.” The court found that the cross-examination implied fabrication influenced by her stepfather, the police, and the District Attorney. Therefore, only statements predating these influences were admissible. The statements to her mother were admissible, but statements to the police and District Attorney after the alleged influences were not. Because no physical evidence connected defendant to a rape and Mary’s testimony was inconsistent, it was likely that this error prejudiced the jury.

  • People v. Hynes, 75 N.Y.2d 844 (1990): Admissibility of Extrinsic Evidence to Rebut Alibi Witness Testimony

    People v. Hynes, 75 N.Y.2d 844 (1990)

    Extrinsic evidence is admissible to rebut an alibi witness’s claim of promptly reporting the alibi to police, as it directly relates to the truthfulness of the alibi, a material issue in the case, and is not merely collateral impeachment.

    Summary

    Hynes was convicted of gunpoint robbery after presenting an alibi defense. During cross-examination, his alibi witnesses claimed they told police about the alibi at the time of Hynes’s arrest. The prosecution then called the arresting officer to testify that the witnesses had not come forward at the time. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the officer’s rebuttal testimony was admissible because it related to a material issue—the truthfulness of the alibi—and was not merely an attempt to impeach the witnesses on a collateral matter. This is permissible under People v. Dawson, provided that the Dawson threshold requirements are satisfied.

    Facts

    1. Defendant Hynes was charged with participating in a gunpoint robbery.
    2. Hynes claimed mistaken identity and presented an alibi defense at trial.
    3. During the prosecutor’s cross-examination, two of Hynes’s alibi witnesses stated that they had told the police their stories when the police came to their home to arrest him.
    4. Over defense objection, the prosecution called the arresting officer.
    5. The officer testified that neither of the alibi witnesses had come forward at the time of Hynes’s arrest.

    Procedural History

    1. Hynes was convicted at trial.
    2. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial court had not erred in permitting the use of extrinsic evidence to rebut the alibi witnesses’ claims.
    3. Hynes appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to present extrinsic evidence (the arresting officer’s testimony) to rebut the alibi witnesses’ claims that they had promptly reported the alibi to the police, where such rebuttal testimony was used to undermine the alibi defense.

    Holding

    Yes, because the issue to which the extrinsic evidence related was material, i.e., relevant to the very issues the jury had to decide (the truthfulness of the alibi), and therefore the rule prohibiting impeachment on collateral matters does not apply, provided that the threshold requirements set forth in People v. Dawson have been satisfied.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the rule against using extrinsic evidence to impeach a witness on collateral matters is meant to avoid confusion and unfair surprise on issues with minimal probative value. This rule does not apply when the evidence relates to a material issue, meaning it is relevant to the issues the jury must decide.

    The court cited People v. Dawson, recognizing that an alibi witness’s failure to promptly come forward with their story can have probative value, bearing directly on the alibi’s truthfulness. Evidence of a witness’s prior silence is admissible to the extent that it could “aid the trier of fact in its effort to determine whether the [witness’s] testimony * * * is an accurate reflection of the truth.” The court emphasized that evidence of the witness’s prior silence is not admissible if offered solely on the issue of the witness’s general credibility but may be admitted to the extent that it bears on the truth of the alibi—an issue that is unquestionably material.

    The court analogized the case to People v. Cade, where rebuttal evidence contradicting an alibi witness’s testimony was permitted. Here, the rebuttal evidence undermined the believability of the alibi. In both cases, the extrinsic evidence challenged the alibi’s validity, a material issue.

    The court rejected the argument that the testimony was inadmissible because the prosecutor elicited the evidence to be impeached. The court stated that “regardless of who elicited the evidence, the subject of that testimony was directly pertinent to the truthfulness of defendant’s alibi and, consequently, was relevant to a ‘material’ issue.”

  • People v. Hults, 76 N.Y.2d 190 (1990): Admissibility of Hypnotic Statements for Impeachment

    People v. Hults, 76 N.Y.2d 190 (1990)

    Hypnotic statements are generally inadmissible for impeachment purposes because their inherent unreliability outweighs their probative value in testing a witness’s truthfulness.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of sodomy. The complainant had undergone hypnosis as part of the police investigation. Defendant sought to impeach the complainant’s trial testimony with inconsistent statements she made while under hypnosis, specifically regarding the name on the assailant’s shirt. The trial court disallowed this. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that statements made during hypnosis are generally inadmissible for impeachment due to their inherent unreliability. Furthermore, a defendant who argues the unreliability of hypnotic statements cannot then introduce those statements for impeachment purposes.

    Facts

    The complainant accepted a ride from the defendant, who she later identified as wearing a blue Exxon uniform. During the ride, the defendant drove to an empty parking lot and sodomized her at knifepoint. The complainant provided details about the defendant and his car to the police. Three months later, the defendant was arrested in a similar car while wearing a blue shirt with an Exxon patch. The complainant identified the defendant in a lineup. Critically, the complainant underwent hypnosis as part of the police investigation three weeks after the crime.

    Procedural History

    Defendant was convicted of sodomy in the first degree. The Appellate Division reversed and ordered a new trial on other grounds but noted that the defendant could not use the complainant’s hypnotic statements for impeachment at the new trial. The defendant’s subsequent motion for a Hughes-Tunstall hearing was denied. After a second trial, defendant was again convicted of sodomy. The Appellate Division affirmed, and the defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant’s application for a Hughes-Tunstall hearing.
    2. Whether precluding the defendant’s use of the complainant’s hypnotic statements for impeachment unconstitutionally restricted his right to cross-examination.

    Holding

    1. No, because the defendant failed to show good cause for his failure to bring the motion in a timely manner.
    2. No, because the state may constitutionally exclude hypnotic statements demonstrated to be unreliable, and the defendant conceded the unreliability of the complainant’s hypnotic statements.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals first addressed the Hughes-Tunstall hearing, finding the motion untimely. On the main issue, the Court extended the rule in People v. Hughes, which held posthypnotic testimony inadmissible as direct evidence due to its unreliability, to also preclude the use of hypnotic statements for impeachment. The Court reasoned that the dangers of hypnosis – suggestion and confabulation – affect all hypnotic statements, regardless of whether they are introduced as evidence-in-chief or for impeachment.

    The Court acknowledged the importance of cross-examination but distinguished hypnotic statements from other types of prior inconsistent statements. Unlike voluntary statements obtained in violation of Miranda, which can be used for impeachment because they are deemed trustworthy, hypnotic statements may be the product of suggestion or confabulation and therefore not fairly the witness’s own. As such, “because of the statement’s unreliability, the inconsistency simply is not probative of the truth or falsity of the witness’ subsequent trial testimony.”

    The Court recognized the Supreme Court’s decision in Rock v. Arkansas, which held that a State’s per se rule prohibiting posthypnotic testimony could not be applied to criminal defendants testifying in their own defense without considering indicia of reliability. However, the Court distinguished the case, noting that the defendant in this case conceded the unreliability of the complainant’s hypnotic statements. Having argued that the statements were unreliable due to the suggestiveness of hypnosis, the defendant could not then introduce those same statements for impeachment purposes. In essence, he was estopped from taking inconsistent positions.

  • Badr v. Hogan, 75 N.Y.2d 629 (1990): Use of Extrinsic Evidence to Contradict on Collateral Matters

    Badr v. Hogan, 75 N.Y.2d 629 (1990)

    A party may not introduce extrinsic evidence to contradict a witness’s testimony regarding collateral matters solely for impeachment purposes.

    Summary

    In this landlord-tenant dispute, the New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the trial court erred in allowing defense counsel to cross-examine the plaintiff about receiving public welfare funds she allegedly wasn’t entitled to, and then admitting a confession of judgment as evidence. The Court of Appeals held that admitting the confession of judgment, which contradicted the plaintiff’s denial, violated the collateral evidence rule because the matter was solely for impeachment purposes. The court reasoned that the error was prejudicial because it directly impacted the plaintiff’s credibility, a central issue in the case, thus warranting a new trial.

    Facts

    Lydia Badr, her husband, and their daughter Dina lived in an apartment rented from Mark Hogan. Dina allegedly sustained injuries due to Hogan’s negligence in failing to repair a broken window in the apartment. At trial, Badr testified that the window was broken and Hogan only covered the hole with cardboard. Hogan testified that the window was not broken before the accident. During cross-examination, defense counsel questioned Badr about whether she had received money from the Department of Social Services to which she was not entitled. Badr denied this. Over objection, defense counsel then introduced a confession of judgment where Badr admitted receiving $2,654.50 improperly from the Department of Social Services. Badr admitted signing the document but insisted she was entitled to the funds.

    Procedural History

    The trial court initially sustained an objection to the line of questioning regarding welfare funds but later reversed its decision and allowed the questioning and admission of the confession of judgment. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant, finding that the window was not defective. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The plaintiff appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court committed reversible error by allowing defense counsel to cross-examine the plaintiff about collateral matters (receipt of allegedly improper welfare funds) and admitting extrinsic evidence (the confession of judgment) to contradict her denial, solely for the purpose of impeaching her credibility.

    Holding

    Yes, because the confession of judgment constituted extrinsic evidence used to contradict the plaintiff on a collateral matter solely for impeachment purposes, which violated the collateral evidence rule and was prejudicial, thus warranting a new trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated the general rule that a witness may be cross-examined on specific immoral, vicious, or criminal acts bearing on credibility. However, the court emphasized that the cross-examination is discretionary and must show moral turpitude to be relevant. Even assuming the questioning was proper, the court found that the matter was collateral. “It was neither relevant to some issue in the case other than credibility nor was proof of it independently admissible to impeach a witness.” The court distinguished this case from situations where further questioning is permitted to induce a witness to change their testimony, stating, “But further examination of the witness is not what happened here.” Instead, defense counsel introduced extrinsic evidence—the confession of judgment—to directly contradict Badr’s denial. The court stated, “It was error to admit this extrinsic proof for the sole purpose of contradicting her testimony on that collateral issue”. The court also rejected the argument that the confession of judgment was used to refresh Badr’s recollection. Because the confession of judgment was emphasized during the trial and in defense counsel’s summation, the court found the error prejudicial, requiring a new trial. The court concluded that, in light of the emphasis placed on the confession of judgment as bearing on the critical issue of the plaintiff’s credibility, the error was sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new trial.

  • People v. De George, 73 N.Y.2d 614 (1989): The Ambiguity of Silence and its Admissibility as Evidence

    People v. De George, 73 N.Y.2d 614 (1989)

    A defendant’s pre-arrest silence in the face of general police inquiries is generally inadmissible as evidence of guilt or for impeachment purposes due to its ambiguity and potential for prejudice, unless specific circumstances establish a duty to speak or make the silence more probative of guilt than innocence.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of assault and criminal use of a firearm. A key piece of evidence against him was testimony regarding his silence when police made general inquiries at the scene of the shooting before his arrest. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that using the defendant’s pre-arrest silence as evidence was improper. The court reasoned that such silence is inherently ambiguous and potentially prejudicial, as an individual might have numerous reasons for remaining silent other than guilt. Unless a specific duty to speak existed, or the circumstances made the silence uniquely probative, it should not be admitted as evidence.

    Facts

    On February 11, 1985, the defendant, along with Donna Barreiro and Cynthia Cassano, were at Captain Steve’s Bar. Gary Campbell joined their conversation and became increasingly obnoxious. An argument ensued, leading to a physical altercation during which the defendant drew a handgun. The gun discharged, hitting Campbell in the neck. Police Officer Carl Lisi arrived to find Campbell injured and the defendant sitting at the bar. Lisi made general inquiries but received no information. The defendant did not respond to Lisi’s initial questions about what happened or who had the gun.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was charged with first-degree assault. At trial, the prosecution used the defendant’s silence at the scene as evidence of depraved indifference and to impeach his claim that the shooting was accidental. The defense objected, but the evidence was admitted. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals then reversed the Appellate Division’s order and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant’s pre-arrest silence in response to general inquiries made by police officers at the scene of the crime is admissible as evidence of guilt or for impeachment purposes.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant’s pre-arrest silence in this case was inherently ambiguous and its probative value was minimal, creating a substantial risk of prejudice.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied heavily on its prior decisions in People v. Conyers, which addressed the admissibility of a defendant’s silence. While Conyers primarily dealt with post-arrest silence, the court extended its reasoning to pre-arrest silence in this case. The court emphasized that silence is often ambiguous. An innocent person might remain silent for various reasons, including awareness of the right to remain silent, fear of self-incrimination, mistrust of law enforcement, or simply confusion. The court noted, “Silence in these circumstances is ambiguous because an innocent person may have many reasons for not speaking.”

    The court distinguished this case from People v. Rothschild, where an officer’s silence was admissible because he had a duty to report his undercover activities. Here, the defendant had no such duty. Furthermore, the court highlighted that the officer’s questions were general and not directed at the defendant specifically. The court stated, “Officer Lisi’s questioning was not directed at any particular person at the scene and no direct statement or implied accusation was made to defendant that would naturally result in protest if untrue”.

    The Court also rejected the prosecution’s argument that the silence was direct evidence of “depraved indifference to human life.” It reasoned that the objective circumstances surrounding the shooting, not the defendant’s subjective state of mind or post-incident behavior, should determine whether his actions demonstrated depraved indifference. As such, the defendant’s silence held little relevance in this determination. The Court concluded that the admission of the defendant’s pre-arrest silence was prejudicial error, warranting a new trial.