People v. Conyers, 49 N.Y.2d 174 (1980)

Impeachment of a defendant’s trial testimony by questioning about their silence at the time of arrest is generally prohibited if Miranda warnings were given, as such silence is ambiguous and may be an exercise of their constitutional right to remain silent.

Summary

The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a defendant’s silence at the time of arrest could be used to impeach their trial testimony. Conyers was arrested for robbery, possession of a weapon, assault, and attempted murder. At trial, he presented a different version of events, claiming he was the victim. The prosecution questioned him about his failure to mention this version to the arresting officers. The court held that using Conyers’ silence for impeachment was improper because it was ambiguous and potentially an exercise of his right to remain silent, especially if Miranda warnings were given. The court emphasized the potential prejudice to the defendant and the importance of ensuring a fair trial.

Facts

Dantzler and Johnson were allegedly robbed at gunpoint. Dantzler chased the defendant, Conyers, who was apprehended by police. At the time of the arrest, Conyers had a gun. He was told he was being arrested for robbery, possession of a weapon, assault and attempted murder. Conyers remained silent. At trial, Conyers testified to a different version of events, claiming that Dantzler had tried to rob him after a numbers bet dispute and Conyers was merely defending himself.

Procedural History

The trial court allowed the prosecution to cross-examine Conyers regarding his silence at the time of arrest. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals initially affirmed but, upon reargument, reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

Issue(s)

Whether the prosecution could use the defendant’s silence at the time of arrest to impeach his trial testimony, given that he was in custody and potentially aware of his right to remain silent.

Holding

No, because using Conyers’ silence for impeachment was improper. The court reasoned that such silence is inherently ambiguous and could be an exercise of his constitutional right to remain silent, especially considering he was in custody. It was deemed to violate the principles of due process and the privilege against self-incrimination.

Court’s Reasoning

The court reasoned that using a defendant’s silence at the time of arrest for impeachment purposes is problematic. It emphasized that silence is inherently ambiguous; it could be due to the defendant exercising their right to remain silent, confusion, or fear. The court highlighted that permitting such impeachment could unfairly prejudice the defendant by implying guilt from their silence, thereby undermining the constitutional right against self-incrimination. Citing Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), the court noted the unfairness of using post-Miranda silence against a defendant, as the warnings themselves imply that silence will not be penalized. The court distinguished situations where silence might be more probative, but found that in this case, the potential for prejudice outweighed any probative value. The dissent argued that the majority’s ruling unduly restricted the prosecution’s ability to test the defendant’s credibility and that the defendant’s silence was inconsistent with his later exculpatory testimony. Judge Meyer, in dissent, stated: “To refuse to permit the jury to consider defendant’s silence at arrest under those circumstances is to fly in the face of human experience and of the public interest in truthful testimony embodied in the impeachment rule. It is, to put it bluntly, to provide defendants with a license to lie, not required by Constitution, statute or precedent.” However, the majority found that allowing the impeachment would create an unacceptable burden on the exercise of the constitutional right to remain silent.