New York Law Review

Tag: impartiality

  • People v. Rodriguez, 10 N.Y.3d 951 (2008): Standard for Dismissing a Sworn Juror

    People v. Rodriguez, 10 N.Y.3d 951 (2008)

    A sworn juror may only be dismissed if the court determines the juror is grossly unqualified to serve, meaning the juror possesses a state of mind that would prevent the rendering of an impartial verdict.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed an Appellate Division order and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial court improperly dismissed a sworn juror. The juror had informed the court that she might have worked with the complainant and recalled he was fired for a gun-related incident. However, she assured the court she could remain impartial. The trial court dismissed her, reasoning that it was simply substituting one qualified juror for another. The Court of Appeals found this dismissal improper because the juror was not shown to be grossly unqualified.

    Facts

    During the trial, after the complainant testified, a sworn juror informed the court that she and the complainant may have worked at the same nursing center. She had some recollection that the complainant was fired for an incident involving a gun. However, the juror stated she was “100 percent sure” she could remain impartial and that the information would not influence her decision because she did not know the complainant well and was not involved in the incident. She also stated that she would not mention this to the other jurors.

    Procedural History

    The People sought the juror’s removal, and the trial court dismissed her over the defendant’s objection, replacing her with an alternate juror. The defendant appealed the conviction, arguing that the dismissal was improper. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the County Court improperly dismissed a sworn juror over the defendant’s objection, when the juror stated that she could remain impartial despite a possible prior association with the complainant and knowledge of a negative incident involving him.

    Holding

    Yes, because the court failed to determine that the juror was grossly unqualified to serve, as required by CPL 270.35(1) and the juror stated that she could remain impartial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on CPL 270.35(1), which permits dismissal of a sworn juror only if he or she is “grossly unqualified to serve.” The court referenced People v. Buford, 69 NY2d 290, 298 (1987), stating that a juror is grossly unqualified only when it becomes obvious that the juror possesses a state of mind that would prevent the rendering of an impartial verdict. The court emphasized that the trial court must conduct a probing inquiry and consider the juror’s answers and demeanor to ascertain whether their state of mind will affect deliberations. The court quoted Buford, noting that a court may not speculate as to possible partiality based on equivocal responses but must be convinced that the juror’s knowledge will prevent an impartial verdict.

    Here, the juror explicitly stated she was “100 percent sure” she could remain impartial. The trial court’s reasoning that it was merely substituting one qualified juror for another was insufficient to justify the dismissal. The Court of Appeals found that the trial court failed to determine the juror was grossly unqualified or, indeed, unqualified at all. The Court stated, “[A]t worst ‘what I’m doing is substituting one qualified juror for another qualified juror.’ On this record, the juror’s dismissal was improper, and thus defendant is entitled to a new trial.”

  • People v. Rodriguez, 2 N.Y.3d 737 (2004): Upholding Denial of Mistrial Based on Juror Qualification

    2 N.Y.3d 737 (2004)

    A trial court’s determination regarding a juror’s qualification will be upheld if the juror unequivocally declares impartiality and the court reasonably concludes the juror is not grossly unqualified.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of attempted rape and sodomy. During deliberations, a juror’s fitness was questioned based on a claim she had been raped. After questioning, the juror denied being raped and affirmed her impartiality. The trial court denied a mistrial. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court properly denied the mistrial motion because the juror unequivocally stated she had never been raped and affirmed her ability to render an impartial verdict. The Court also found that defendant’s claim that the trial court failed to conduct a probing and tactful inquiry was unpreserved. Further, the court properly denied the motion to set aside the verdict because the evidence was not of the type that would entitle the defendant to a new trial.

    Facts

    Defendant was charged with rape and related crimes. During jury deliberations, the foreperson raised a concern that a juror should be excused because she claimed to have been forcibly raped by her boyfriend or fiancé. The trial court questioned the juror, who denied ever being raped. The juror also affirmed that her previous answer that she had never been the victim of a crime was true. The defense moved for a mistrial which was denied. The jury convicted the defendant of attempted rape and sodomy. Defendant moved to set aside the verdict based on newly discovered evidence in the form of testimony from a parole officer that would tend to impeach the victim’s testimony.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied the defendant’s motion for a mistrial and subsequent motion to set aside the verdict, sentencing him as a second felony offender. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of conviction. The case then went to the Court of Appeals after a Judge of that court granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for a mistrial based on concerns about a juror’s qualification and impartiality.

    2. Whether the defendant’s claim that the court failed to conduct a probing inquiry of the juror was preserved for appellate review.

    3. Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to set aside the verdict based on newly discovered evidence.

    Holding

    1. No, because the juror unequivocally declared that she had never been raped and stated that she could render an impartial verdict.

    2. No, because the defendant failed to object to the scope or intensity of the court’s inquiry at trial.

    3. No, because the testimony offered in conjunction with the defendant’s motion was unclear and lacked indicia of certainty, and merely tended to impeach the victim’s trial testimony.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the trial court acted within its discretion in determining that the juror was not grossly unqualified to serve. The court emphasized the juror’s unequivocal denial of ever being raped and her affirmation of impartiality. The Court deferred to the trial court’s assessment of the juror’s credibility. Regarding the claim that the trial court failed to conduct a probing inquiry, the Court stated that this argument was not preserved for appellate review because the defendant did not object to the scope or intensity of the inquiry at trial, nor did he request further questioning. The Court of Appeals also stated that a defendant must inform the court that its questioning was insufficient or objectionable, or suggest additional avenues of inquiry, to preserve the issue for appellate review.

    Concerning the motion to set aside the verdict, the Court found that the testimony offered in support of the motion was “unclear, equivocal and lacking in indicia of certainty.” The Court stated that the testimony did not give rise to a “probability” of a verdict more favorable to the defendant, as required by CPL 330.30 (3). Furthermore, the Court noted that the testimony merely tended to impeach the victim’s trial testimony, which is “not the sort of ‘newly discovered evidence’ that would entitle a defendant to a new trial” (People v Jackson, 78 NY2d 638, 645 [1991]).

    The Court emphasized the importance of raising objections at trial to preserve issues for appellate review, stating that, “In the absence of a protest to the scope or intensity of the court’s inquiry, no question of law was preserved for our review.” This highlights the practical importance of timely objections in preserving legal arguments for appeal.

  • Matter of Friedman, 100 N.Y.2d 306 (2003): Judicial Candidate’s Campaign Promises & Impartiality

    Matter of Friedman, 100 N.Y.2d 306 (2003)

    A judicial candidate’s campaign statements violate the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct if they explicitly and repeatedly indicate an intention to “work with” and “assist” police and other law enforcement personnel if elected, as such statements compromise the faithful and impartial performance of judicial duties.

    Summary

    This case concerns a City Court Judge, Friedman, who made campaign statements indicating he would “work with” police if elected. The Commission on Judicial Conduct determined this violated rules against making pledges of conduct in office other than faithful and impartial performance, warranting removal. The New York Court of Appeals found the statements did violate the rules, as they compromised impartiality. However, considering Friedman’s remorse and lack of prior misconduct in office, the court modified the sanction from removal to censure, emphasizing the importance of judicial impartiality while acknowledging First Amendment rights.

    Facts

    Friedman, while running for Lockport City Court judge, made statements in letters, newspaper ads, and articles indicating he would “work with” police, assist law enforcement, and be tough on crime, especially drug offenses by out-of-towners. He cited rising arrest rates under incumbent judges, suggesting he would take different action to deter crime. He stated the city should establish a reputation for “zero tolerance” and deter criminals before they enter the city.

    Procedural History

    The Commission on Judicial Conduct filed a complaint against Friedman. A Referee found misconduct. Friedman acknowledged the violations and apologized. The Commission sustained the charge and recommended removal. Friedman appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Friedman’s campaign statements violated section 100.5(A)(4)(d)(i) of the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct by making pledges of conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial performance of duties.

    2. Whether, if the rules were violated, the pledges or promises prohibition impermissibly abridges Friedman’s First Amendment rights.

    3. Whether removal is the appropriate sanction.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because Friedman explicitly and repeatedly indicated that he intended to “work with” and “assist” police and other law enforcement personnel if elected to judicial office which indicated bias and amounted to a pledge to engage in conduct antithetical to the judicial role.

    2. No, because New York’s pledges or promises clause is sufficiently circumscribed to withstand exacting scrutiny under the First Amendment, essential to maintaining impartiality and the appearance of impartiality in the state judiciary.

    3. No, because Friedman expressed remorse and acknowledged poor judgment and the Commission made no claim of inappropriate behavior in the performance of Friedman’s judicial duties.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court found Friedman’s statements violated the rule against pledges compromising impartial judicial duties. The statements expressed bias favoring police and pledged conduct inconsistent with the judicial role of impartial application of law. The court distinguished this case from Matter of Shanley, where the phrase “law and order candidate” was deemed too generic to compromise impartiality.

    Regarding the First Amendment challenge, the Court distinguished Republican Party of Minn. v. White, noting that New York’s rule doesn’t prohibit articulating views on legal issues, but only pledges compromising impartiality. The Court applied strict scrutiny (assuming it was appropriate) and found the rule narrowly tailored to serve the compelling state interest of judicial impartiality. “The ability to be impartial is an indispensable requirement for a judicial officer” (Matter of Sardino v State Commn. on Jud. Conduct, 58 NY2d 286, 290 [1983]). The Court emphasized that the rule only precludes statements singling out parties for special treatment or conveying behavior inconsistent with impartial judicial duties.

    On the sanction, the Court acknowledged the purpose of judicial discipline is to safeguard the bench, not punish. Considering Friedman’s remorse, inexperience, and lack of prior misconduct, the Court deemed removal too harsh. Censure was imposed as the appropriate sanction.

  • People v. Bludson, 97 N.Y.2d 644 (2001): Excusing Jurors for Cause Based on Impartiality

    People v. Bludson, 97 N.Y.2d 644 (2001)

    A prospective juror who expresses doubt about their ability to be impartial based on the law must be excused unless they unequivocally state on the record that they can be fair.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and mandated a new trial. The court held that the trial court erred by denying the defendant’s challenges for cause regarding two prospective jurors who expressed doubts about their ability to render an impartial verdict. One juror indicated that they would require the defense to prove the defendant’s innocence, and another stated that the defendant’s failure to testify would negatively influence their decision. Because the trial court failed to obtain unequivocal assurances of impartiality from these jurors, the defendant was prejudiced, warranting a new trial.

    Facts

    During jury selection, defense counsel questioned prospective jurors about their ability to presume the defendant’s innocence, the prosecution’s burden of proof, and the defendant’s right not to testify. One prospective juror stated that they would require the defense to prove the defendant’s innocence to return a not-guilty verdict. Another prospective juror indicated that the defendant’s failure to testify would make it difficult for them to find the defendant not guilty. The trial court did not take any corrective action after these statements. The defense challenged these jurors for cause, but the challenges were denied. The defendant then used peremptory challenges to remove both jurors, exhausting all of their peremptory challenges during jury selection.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was tried and convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s challenges for cause regarding two prospective jurors who expressed doubts about their ability to render an impartial verdict.

    Holding

    Yes, because the prospective jurors’ statements cast serious doubt on their ability to render a fair verdict under the proper legal standards, and the trial court failed to obtain unequivocal assurances from them that they could reach a verdict based entirely on the court’s instructions on the law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on Criminal Procedure Law § 270.20 (1) (b), which allows a party to challenge a prospective juror for cause if the juror “has a state of mind that is likely to preclude him [or her] from rendering an impartial verdict based upon the evidence at the trial.” Citing People v. Arnold, 96 N.Y.2d 358, 362, the court reiterated that “a juror who has revealed doubt, because of prior knowledge or opinion, about [his or] her ability to serve impartially must be excused unless the juror states unequivocally on the record that [he or] she can be fair.” The court found that the prospective jurors’ statements indicated a predisposition that would prevent them from fairly considering the evidence and following the court’s instructions. The court emphasized that the trial court had a duty to elicit an unequivocal assurance of impartiality from the jurors, and the jury panel’s earlier collective acknowledgement was insufficient. The court stated, “We conclude that the prospective jurors’ statements cast serious doubt on their ability to render a fair verdict under the proper legal standards. The trial court therefore was required to elicit some unequivocal assurance from the two prospective jurors that they were able to reach a verdict based entirely upon the court’s instructions on the law. The jury panel’s earlier collective acknowledgment that they would follow the court’s instructions was insufficient to constitute such an unequivocal declaration”. Because the defendant was forced to use peremptory challenges to remove these biased jurors, and because he subsequently exhausted all his peremptory challenges, the error was not harmless and a new trial was required.

  • In the Matter of Josephine D. Tyler, 75 N.Y.2d 525 (1990): Judicial Misconduct and Sanctions for Impartiality Violations

    In the Matter of Josephine D. Tyler, 75 N.Y.2d 525 (1990)

    A judge’s actions demonstrating partiality, abuse of power, and failure to uphold the integrity of the judiciary warrant severe sanctions, including removal from office.

    Summary

    This case involves a review of a determination by the State Commission on Judicial Conduct to remove Justice Josephine Tyler from her position as a Town Court Justice. The Commission found her guilty of multiple acts of misconduct, including presiding over a case involving her husband, improperly ordering child support, using court stationery for personal matters, and striking a defendant. The New York Court of Appeals upheld most of the Commission’s findings and agreed that removal was the appropriate sanction, emphasizing the importance of impartiality and fairness in the judicial system.

    Facts

    Josephine Tyler, a Justice of the Caneadea Town Court, engaged in the following actions:

    1. Issued an arrest warrant for a defendant who gave her husband a dishonored check and then presided over the arraignment, setting bail at $5,000 and failing to appoint counsel, despite being advised to disqualify herself.
    2. Improperly ordered a defendant charged with harassment to pay child support.
    3. Sent a letter on court stationery to a contractor regarding a dispute over the installation of a septic tank at her father’s property.
    4. Requested a young man she had sentenced to return to court and struck him with a telephone directory after accusing him of vandalism.
    5. Sent a personal letter in a Town Court envelope to tenants of an apartment building owned by her father regarding water usage and also sent a letter to an attorney concerning the water quality.

    Procedural History

    The State Commission on Judicial Conduct investigated Justice Tyler and sustained five of seven charges of misconduct. The Commission determined that removal from office was the appropriate sanction. Justice Tyler then sought review of the Commission’s determination in the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence substantiates the Commission’s findings of judicial misconduct.
    2. Whether the sanction of removal from office is an appropriate punishment for the sustained charges of misconduct.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the evidence supports the Commission’s findings regarding charges I, V, VI, and supplemental charge I. Charge III was not supported by sufficient evidence.
    2. Yes, because Justice Tyler’s actions demonstrated a lack of fairness, impartiality, and self-restraint, posing a threat to the proper administration of justice.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals conducted an independent review of the record, giving due deference to the Commission’s determination. It found sufficient evidence to support most of the charges. The Court emphasized that Justice Tyler’s actions, particularly her handling of the dishonored check case involving her husband, displayed a clear lack of impartiality. The court cited Matter of VonderHeide, 72 NY2d 658, 661, noting that the judge’s continuance in office would pose a threat to the proper administration of justice.

    Regarding the child support order (charge III), the Court agreed with Justice Tyler that it was an error of law rather than intentional misconduct. However, the Court found that the other actions sufficiently demonstrated a pattern of abuse of power and disregard for judicial ethics. The Court highlighted her failure to heed the advice of the District Attorney and a County Court Judge to disqualify herself. The Court concluded that “her conduct displayed a lack of the basic qualities of fairness, impartiality and self-restraint which are essential for judicial office.” This behavior violated multiple sections of the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct and Canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Therefore, the Court accepted the Commission’s determined sanction of removal from office, without costs.

  • People v. Williams, 63 N.Y.2d 882 (1984): When Juror’s Bias Requires Removal for Cause

    People v. Williams, 63 N.Y.2d 882 (1984)

    A juror’s expression of abstract feelings about a defendant’s circumstances does not automatically require removal for cause if the juror expresses confidence in their ability to be fair and impartial.

    Summary

    This case addresses the circumstances under which a prospective juror’s biases require dismissal for cause. During jury selection for a case involving a Black defendant who had a child with a white girlfriend, two jurors expressed discomfort with interracial relationships but affirmed their ability to render a fair verdict. The defense’s challenge for cause was denied. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that abstract biases, without concrete evidence of an inability to be impartial, do not warrant removal for cause, especially when jurors affirm their capacity to be fair. The court emphasized the trial judge’s role in evaluating juror impartiality.

    Facts

    The defendant, a Black man, was on trial. During jury selection, two prospective jurors stated they did not associate with Black people and disapproved of interracial marriages. The defendant had a white girlfriend, and they had a child together, although they were unmarried. The jurors stated that these circumstances would not interfere with their ability to render a fair and impartial verdict. Defense counsel did not pursue further questioning of the jurors after being given the opportunity.

    Procedural History

    The defense counsel’s application to excuse the two prospective jurors for cause was denied by the trial court. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in denying defense counsel’s application to excuse two prospective jurors for cause, given their expressed disapproval of interracial relationships and the fact that the defendant had a child with a white girlfriend.

    Holding

    No, because the jurors expressed confidence in their ability to be fair and impartial, and there was no concrete indication that their feelings would affect their ability to serve on the jury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from People v. Blyden, where a juror volunteered a specific, individualized opposition to minorities and expressed uncertainty about his ability to be impartial. In this case, the jurors only expressed abstract feelings and affirmed their ability to be fair. The court stated, “It is only when it is shown that there is a substantial risk that such predispositions will affect the ability of the particular juror to discharge his responsibilities… that his excuse is warranted.” The court deferred to the trial judge’s judgment, emphasizing the judge’s opportunity to evaluate the jurors’ demeanor and sincerity. The court recognized that jurors bring predispositions to the jury box, but not every predisposition warrants removal for cause. A potential juror who discloses anything but total absence of prejudice with respect to racial differences should not be removed if he demonstrates a readiness to lay his feelings aside in the discharge of his duties as a juror.

  • Lowcher v. New York City Employees’ Retirement System, 45 N.Y.2d 751 (1978): Impartiality in Administrative Decision-Making

    Lowcher v. New York City Employees’ Retirement System, 45 N.Y.2d 751 (1978)

    Due process is violated when a member of an administrative board reviewing a claim previously served as an independent physician evaluating the same claim and recommended its denial.

    Summary

    Lowcher, a former school secretary, applied for accidental disability retirement benefits. Her claim was initially rejected by a medical board after an independent psychiatrist, Dr. Gould, recommended denial. Following a federal court ruling that the initial denial violated due process, the board designated Dr. Schneck as a second independent psychiatrist, who essentially concurred with Dr. Gould. Subsequently, Dr. Schneck was appointed to the medical board itself. The New York Court of Appeals held that Dr. Schneck’s presence on the board reviewing his own prior determination violated Lowcher’s due process rights because it presented a conflict of interest, undermining the impartiality of the review process.

    Facts

    Lowcher applied for accidental disability retirement after an on-the-job assault. She had pre-existing coronary and psychiatric issues, but her condition worsened after the assault. The key issue was whether the deterioration was causally related to the assault. The medical board initially rejected her claim after an independent psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Gould. Following a court ruling that the initial process was flawed, a second independent psychiatrist, Dr. Schneck, was appointed and also recommended denial. Later, Dr. Schneck himself was appointed as a member of the medical board.

    Procedural History

    1. Lowcher initially applied for accidental disability benefits, which were denied.

    2. A federal court overturned the denial, citing due process violations.

    3. On remand, the medical board again denied the claim, with Dr. Schneck now a member of the board.

    4. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal of Lowcher’s Article 78 proceeding.

    5. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether due process is violated when a member of the medical board reviewing a claim for accidental disability retirement previously served as an independent physician evaluating the same claim and recommended its denial.

    Holding

    Yes, because it is improper for an impartial reviewer of an issue of fact to sit in review of his own prior determination of fact. This creates a conflict of interest and undermines the impartiality required for administrative decision-making.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that Dr. Schneck’s presence on the board, after having already concluded that Lowcher was not disabled as a result of the assault, violated fundamental fairness and due process. The court cited Goldberg v. Kelly, emphasizing that due process does not allow an administrative decision-maker to review their own decisions. The court rejected the city’s argument that the medical board was merely engaging in independent expert inquiry, stating that, in reality, the other two members of the board, who were not psychiatrists, likely deferred to Dr. Schneck’s psychiatric opinion. The court stated, “it is, indeed, improper for an impartial reviewer of an issue of fact to sit in review of his own prior determination of fact.” The court found that requiring Lowcher to establish prejudice by demonstrating that the other board members were influenced by Dr. Schneck’s dual role would be unreasonable, stating “Human nature being what it is, the presumption, if any, should be the other way”. The court emphasized the importance of an impartial decision-making process, particularly when expert opinions are in conflict.

  • People v. Moulton, 43 N.Y.2d 944 (1978): Extent of Permissible Judicial Intervention During Trial

    People v. Moulton, 43 N.Y.2d 944 (1978)

    A trial judge may actively participate in a trial to clarify issues and ensure the proceedings remain within reasonable bounds, provided such intervention is impartial, infrequent, and necessary for the jury’s understanding of the case; excessive interference or the suggestion of an opinion by the judge can be prejudicial error.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, finding that the trial justice did not unduly inject himself into the proceedings or display bias against the defendant. The court reiterated that a trial court can actively participate in a trial to clarify issues and restrict proof, but must do so sparingly and impartially. The court found that the trial judge’s interventions were evenhanded and infrequent, aimed at aiding the jury’s understanding, and did not exceed the bounds of the court’s supervisory role.

    Facts

    The specific facts of the underlying criminal trial are not detailed in this memorandum opinion. The appeal centers solely on the conduct of the trial judge during the proceedings and the judge’s charge to the jury. The defendant claimed the judge’s actions demonstrated bias and unduly influenced the jury.

    Procedural History

    The case originated in a trial court, presumably resulting in a conviction. The defendant appealed to the Appellate Division, arguing that the trial judge’s conduct warranted a reversal. The Appellate Division upheld the conviction. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial justice unduly or improperly injected himself into the proceedings, thereby denying the defendant a fair trial.
    2. Whether the trial justice displayed bias or hostility toward the defendant’s case.
    3. Whether the trial justice’s charge to the jury contained prejudicial error.

    Holding

    1. No, because the court intervened evenhandedly, infrequently, and only when necessary to aid the jury in understanding the legal and factual issues presented.
    2. No, because neither the defense nor the prosecution was singled out for special treatment, and the defense was not treated in a hostile fashion.
    3. No, because the portion of the charge to the jury preserved for review is not beset by prejudicial error.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision on established precedent regarding the role of a trial judge in an adversarial system. The court acknowledged that a judge can actively participate in the truth-seeking process by clarifying issues and restricting proof to reasonable bounds, citing People v. De Jesus. However, this power must be exercised with restraint, impartiality, and without bias, citing People v. Carter and People v. Budd. The court emphasized that excessive interference or the suggestion of an opinion from the judge could prejudice the jury, citing People v. Bell.

    The court found that the trial judge’s interventions were balanced and aimed at assisting the jury, not at favoring either side. The court determined that the judge did not exceed the proper bounds of their supervisory role. It also stated that the jury charge, as preserved for review, did not contain prejudicial error. The court stated, “Often the Judge plays a vital role at trial by clarifying the issues to be resolved and restricting the proof to reasonable bounds.” However, the court also cautioned, “excessive interference or the suggestion of an opinion on the part of the Trial Judge might well prove decisive in the minds of the jury”.