New York Law Review

Tag: impartial jury

  • People v. Bowling, 89 N.Y.2d 993 (1997): The Effect of Erroneous Denial of Challenges for Cause on Jury Selection

    People v. Bowling, 89 N.Y.2d 993 (1997)

    An erroneous denial of a challenge for cause is reversible error when the defendant exhausts their peremptory challenges before the jury selection is complete, even if the court offers an additional peremptory challenge at the end of the selection process.

    Summary

    The defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his challenges for cause of two prospective jurors. He further argued that because he exhausted his peremptory challenges, the erroneous denial requires reversal. One juror expressed doubt about impartiality due to the nature of the victim’s injuries. The other was a law student interning at the prosecutor’s office. The Court of Appeals held that when a defendant exhausts their peremptory challenges after an erroneous denial for cause, reversal is required, even if an additional challenge is offered, especially where the initial denials were questionable. This decision reinforces the importance of impartial jury selection and protects a defendant’s right to a fair trial.

    Facts

    During jury selection, a prospective juror stated the victim’s injuries would likely prevent an impartial verdict and that she could not guarantee she would follow instructions regarding the justification defense. The defendant challenged her for cause, but the court denied the challenge. The defendant used a peremptory challenge to remove her.

    Another prospective juror was a law student interning at the Queens District Attorney’s Office, the prosecuting agency in this case. The defendant challenged this juror for cause, arguing her employment created an appearance of impropriety. The court denied the challenge after the juror asserted she could be impartial. The defendant used a peremptory challenge to remove her.

    The defendant exhausted his statutorily allotted peremptory challenges before the end of jury selection.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. He appealed to the Appellate Division, arguing that the trial court improperly denied his challenges for cause and that because he exhausted his peremptory challenges, reversal was required. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s challenges for cause regarding the two prospective jurors?

    2. Whether the erroneous denial of a challenge for cause constitutes reversible error when the defendant exhausts his peremptory challenges, even if the court offers an additional peremptory challenge?

    Holding

    1. The dissenting justice argued yes, because one juror demonstrated actual bias, and the other had professional ties to the prosecutor’s office.

    2. Yes, because an erroneous ruling denying a challenge for cause constitutes reversible error when the defendant exhausts his peremptory challenges before the jury selection is complete, and offering an additional challenge at the last second does not cure the error.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The dissenting Justice Smith argued that the trial court erred by denying the challenges for cause. He reasoned that the first juror did not provide adequate assurance of impartiality, and the second juror’s connection to the prosecutor’s office created an appearance of impropriety.

    The dissent further reasoned that under CPL 270.20(2), an erroneous denial of a challenge for cause is reversible error if the defendant exhausts their peremptory challenges. The dissent emphasized that offering an additional peremptory challenge after the defendant has exhausted their statutory allotment does not negate the error, particularly when challenges for cause should have been granted in the first place.

    The dissent cited People v. Culhane, 33 N.Y.2d 90, 97, stating: “It is well settled that an erroneous ruling by the court, denying a challenge for cause, constitutes reversible error when the defendant peremptorily challenges the prospective juror and his peremptory challenges are exhausted before the jury selection process is complete.”

    The dissent argued that it was an abuse of discretion to offer an extra peremptory challenge after eleven jurors had already been selected and the defendant had exhausted his challenges, suggesting this was an attempt to circumvent CPL 270.20(2). The dissent emphasized that reversal is necessary to ensure the defendant’s right to a fair trial by an impartial jury.

  • People v. Johnson, 94 N.Y.2d 600 (2000): Obtaining Unequivocal Assurance of Juror Impartiality

    People v. Johnson, 94 N.Y.2d 600 (2000)

    When potential jurors express doubts about their ability to be impartial, trial judges must obtain an unequivocal assurance of their impartiality or excuse them for cause.

    Summary

    This case consolidates appeals concerning jury selection. The central issue is whether a challenge for cause should be denied when a prospective juror expresses doubt about their impartiality, absent an unequivocal indication of their ability to set aside predispositions and fairly evaluate evidence. The Court of Appeals held that in such circumstances, the challenge for cause must be granted. The Court reasoned that the right to an impartial jury is fundamental, and when a juror expresses doubt, an explicit assurance of impartiality is required. Failure to obtain such assurance constitutes reversible error.

    Facts

    In People v. Johnson and Sharper, the defendants were tried for robbery. A prospective juror stated he had a friend in the DA’s office, dealt with prisoners and police officers, and had a great deal of trust and respect for police officers. He admitted he would favor police testimony more than civilian testimony. In People v. Reyes, the defendant was tried for selling heroin. A prospective juror expressed concern about drug activity near her son’s park, stating her emotional feelings might color her views and that she might have difficulty being open-minded due to the defendant’s prior convictions.

    Procedural History

    In Johnson and Sharper, the trial court denied the challenge for cause, the defendants used a peremptory challenge, exhausted all challenges, and were convicted. The Appellate Division reversed. In Reyes, the trial court denied challenges for cause and the defendant again used peremptory challenges, exhausted them, and was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a challenge for cause may properly be denied when a prospective juror expresses doubt as to their impartiality in the case.
    2. Whether an unequivocal indication of a prospective juror’s ability to set aside any predisposition and fairly appraise the evidence is necessary before denying a challenge for cause.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because when potential jurors reveal knowledge or opinions reflecting a state of mind likely to preclude impartial service, they must give unequivocal assurance that they can set aside any bias and render an impartial verdict based on the evidence.
    2. Yes, because in cases of “actual bias,” an unambiguous assurance of impartiality is required before a challenge for cause may be denied.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that an accused’s right to trial by an impartial jury is a fundamental constitutional right. When potential jurors reveal knowledge or opinions reflecting a state of mind likely to preclude impartial service, they must in some form give unequivocal assurance that they can set aside any bias and render an impartial verdict based on the evidence. The Court emphasized that the elimination of the “talismanic expurgatory oath” requirement in the Criminal Procedure Law gave trial judges both “greater flexibility and a greater responsibility” in determining which venirepersons should be excused for cause.

    The Court distinguished People v. Blyden, where a juror’s statement was deemed insufficient, and People v. Williams, where the jurors never expressed doubt that they could serve impartially. The Court quoted People v. Torpey, stating that “the prospective juror should be dismissed if there appears to be any possibility that his impressions might influence his verdict.” (People v Torpey, 63 N.Y.2d 361). The Court held that a bright-line standard exists: “a prospective juror who expresses partiality towards [one side] and cannot unequivocally promise to set aside this bias should be removed for cause.”

    In the cases at bar, the Court found that the potential jurors had openly acknowledged doubt that they could be fair in the case. The Court also noted that despite the Trial Judge stating that the jurors had expressed that they could be fair, the record did not support this statement. Therefore, the judges erred in failing to obtain unequivocal assurances, or excusing potential jurors for cause, when they openly acknowledged doubt that they could be fair in the case.

  • People v. Rodriguez, 71 N.Y.2d 214 (1988): When a Juror’s Racial Bias Requires Dismissal

    People v. Rodriguez, 71 N.Y.2d 214 (1988)

    A juror must be dismissed as grossly unqualified if, during trial, they express racial or other invidious bias against the defendant, unless the court determines, after a probing inquiry, that the juror can render an impartial verdict unaffected by such bias and the juror provides unequivocal assurance of impartiality.

    Summary

    During deliberations in a criminal trial for drug offenses, a juror informed the court that she was biased against dark-skinned Hispanics due to a recent negative experience. The trial judge, after questioning the juror, urged her to continue deliberating, emphasizing the consequences of a mistrial. The defendant was convicted. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the juror should have been dismissed as grossly unqualified. The Court emphasized that the juror’s expressed bias, coupled with her inability to provide unequivocal assurance of impartiality, mandated her dismissal under CPL 270.35.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of criminal sale and possession of a controlled substance. During jury deliberations, one juror stated she wished to be excused because, after being selected, she was “bothered, touched, handled by a dark Hispanic man on the subway” and was holding that against the defendant, stating, “At the moment, yes, sir, I am [condemning the whole Hispanic race because a Hispanic touched me on the subway].” Despite the juror’s expressed bias, the trial judge urged her to continue deliberating, emphasizing the potential mistrial.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted after a jury trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motions for a mistrial and to set aside the verdict, based on the juror’s bias. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in failing to dismiss a juror who expressed racial bias against the defendant during jury deliberations, thereby violating the defendant’s right to an impartial jury.

    Holding

    Yes, because when a juror expresses racial or other invidious bias against the defendant during trial, the juror must be dismissed as “grossly unqualified” unless the trial court determines, after a probing inquiry, that the juror can render an impartial verdict and the juror provides unequivocal assurance of impartiality.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to a fair trial, including the right to an impartial jury. CPL 270.35 mandates the dismissal of a juror who is “grossly unqualified to serve.” The Court distinguished this case from People v. Buford, where the jurors’ concerns were minor and they gave unambiguous assurances of fairness. In this case, the juror explicitly stated her racial bias against Hispanics and did not provide unequivocal assurance that she could set aside this bias. The Court stated, “where, during the course of a trial, the court learns that a juror is racially or otherwise invidiously biased against the defendant due to an incident occurring after voir dire, the juror must be discharged as ‘grossly unqualified’ unless (1) the trial court makes a determination on the record, following a probing and tactful inquiry with the juror, that the juror can render an impartial verdict according to the evidence and that her verdict will not be influenced by such bias; and (2) the trial court’s determination is supported in the record by the juror’s answers to the court’s questions including unequivocal assurance from the juror that he or she will decide the case solely on the evidence and free from any effect of the bias.” The Court also noted that the trial court erred in overemphasizing the consequences of a mistrial to the individual juror. The juror’s statement that she would “try” to deliberate impartially was deemed insufficient to overcome the expressed bias.

  • People v. Cargill, 70 N.Y.2d 687 (1987): Standard for Discharging a Sworn Juror as Grossly Unqualified

    People v. Cargill, 70 N.Y.2d 687 (1987)

    A trial court may only discharge a sworn juror as “grossly unqualified” if, after a probing inquiry, it is convinced that the juror’s knowledge or state of mind prevents them from rendering an impartial verdict; speculation about partiality based on equivocal responses is insufficient.

    Summary

    During a criminal trial, a juror expressed concerns about the jury’s racial composition, suggesting it might color his judgment. Without further probing, the trial court discharged the juror, deeming him potentially biased. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the discharge was improper. The court emphasized that discharging a sworn juror requires a concrete showing of gross disqualification based on a thorough inquiry, not mere speculation. The Court also noted that harmless error analysis was not applicable when a defendant is denied their constitutional right to a jury of their choosing. Finally, the court noted that the trial court erred in failing to make a record of its Sandoval ruling.

    Facts

    During the People’s presentation of evidence, Juror Number 7 advised the court of concerns regarding the racial makeup of the jury and stated his judgment might be “colored, distorted.” The juror stated he might “bend over backwards one way or another in order to be fair… [and] give this individual…the benefit of the doubt.” The trial court, after a brief exchange, discharged the juror without further inquiry.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and ordered a new trial, finding the trial court improperly discharged a sworn juror.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in discharging a sworn juror based on concerns about potential bias without conducting a sufficiently probing inquiry to determine if the juror was, in fact, grossly unqualified to serve.

    2. Whether harmless error analysis applies when a defendant has been denied their constitutional right to a jury of their choosing.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because a trial court must be convinced, based on a tactful and probing inquiry, that the juror’s knowledge will prevent them from rendering an impartial verdict before discharging a sworn juror as grossly unqualified.

    2. No, because a defendant has a constitutional right to a trial by a particular jury chosen according to law and harmless error analysis is unavailable when that right is denied.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that discharging a sworn juror is a serious matter that requires more than just a suspicion of bias. The standard, as articulated in People v. Buford, requires the trial court to be “convinced that the juror’s knowledge will prevent that person from rendering an impartial verdict.” The court found that the trial court’s inquiry was insufficient and the juror’s responses were not unequivocal, making the discharge improper. The Court reasoned that the trial court impermissibly speculated as to the possible partiality of the juror based on equivocal responses.

    The Court stated, “[a] defendant has a constitutional right to a trial by a ‘particular jury chosen according to law, in whose selection [the defendant] has had a voice’.” Because the defendant was denied his constitutional right to a jury of his choosing, the Court held that harmless error analysis was unavailable.

    The Court also briefly noted that the trial court erred in failing to make a record of its Sandoval ruling to allow for appellate review.

  • People v. Torpey, 63 N.Y.2d 361 (1984): Actual Bias and Juror Impartiality Based on Defendant’s Reputation

    People v. Torpey, 63 N.Y.2d 361 (1984)

    A prospective juror’s unfavorable impression of a defendant, stemming from hearing or reading about the defendant’s reputation apart from the specific crimes charged, can create actual bias and warrant a challenge for cause.

    Summary

    Thomas Torpey was convicted of criminal mischief, coercion, attempted assault, and conspiracy. The central issue on appeal was the trial court’s refusal to grant a challenge for cause against a prospective juror, Mrs. Raleigh, who had prior knowledge of Torpey’s alleged involvement with the Mafia and had formed a negative opinion of him based on media reports and information from her husband, a sheriff’s department investigator. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that Mrs. Raleigh’s statements indicated a state of mind likely to preclude her from rendering an impartial verdict. The court emphasized that a juror’s bias can stem from a defendant’s reputation, not just opinions about the charged crime, and that general assurances of impartiality may not overcome such bias.

    Facts

    Thomas Torpey was indicted for crimes stemming from an incident at a bar, allegedly part of a conspiracy to extort money. During jury selection, Mrs. Raleigh revealed she had heard of Torpey before the incident, both through media reports linking him to organized crime and through her husband’s work as a sheriff’s department investigator. She admitted to forming a negative opinion of Torpey, associating him with the Mafia and hearing that he might be a “hit man.” She also conceded that it would “probably not” be fair to have someone with her frame of mind judging him.

    Procedural History

    Following a jury trial, Torpey was convicted of several charges. He appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his challenge for cause against Mrs. Raleigh. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. Torpey appealed to the New York Court of Appeals based on the denial of his challenge for cause and exhaustion of peremptory challenges.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s challenge for cause against a prospective juror who admitted to having a negative impression of the defendant based on prior media reports and information linking him to organized crime, thus creating a state of mind likely to preclude her from rendering an impartial verdict.

    Holding

    Yes, because Mrs. Raleigh’s statements demonstrated a state of mind likely to prevent her from rendering an impartial verdict based on the evidence. Her declarations aimed at purging her expressed bias revealed uncertainty and did not overcome the bias.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that CPL 270.20(1)(b) allows a challenge for cause when a prospective juror has a state of mind likely to preclude an impartial verdict. The court emphasized that this provision reflects the fundamental right to trial by an impartial jury. While prior cases often involved jurors expressing opinions on the defendant’s guilt for the charged crimes, the court clarified that actual bias isn’t limited to such situations, citing People v. Blyden, where a juror’s prejudice against minorities was grounds for a challenge for cause.

    The court found that Mrs. Raleigh’s association of Torpey with the Mafia and her impression that he was a “hit man” indicated a substantial risk that her predispositions would affect her ability to discharge her responsibilities. Even though the expurgatory oath is not automatically available under CPL 270.20 (subd 1, par [b]), the court stated that a trial judge should require a prospective juror with a prima facie showing of actual bias to “expressly state that his prior state of mind * * * will not influence his verdict, and * * * that he will render an impartial verdict based solely on the evidence” (People v Biondo, 41 NY2d 483, 485).

    The court distinguished between jurors holding opinions about the charged crime (which might be addressed by trial evidence) and jurors holding negative impressions of the defendant’s overall reputation (which trial evidence might not alter). In the latter case, the court stated, “the prospective juror should be dismissed if there appears to be any possibility that his impressions of the defendant might influence his verdict.” Because Mrs. Raleigh’s declarations revealed uncertainty and did not overcome her expressed bias, the trial court erred in denying the challenge for cause. The court reiterated the importance of erring on the side of disqualification to ensure impartiality.

  • People v. Ventimiglia, 52 N.Y.2d 770 (1981): Demonstrating Prejudice from Pretrial Publicity

    People v. Ventimiglia, 52 N.Y.2d 770 (1981)

    A defendant seeking a change of venue due to pretrial publicity must demonstrate, through the jury selection process, that a fair and impartial jury could not be selected because of the publicity.

    Summary

    Ventimiglia was convicted of murder, robbery, and burglary. He appealed, arguing that extensive pretrial publicity prevented a fair trial. His initial motion for a change of venue was denied before trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the defendant failed to create a record during jury selection demonstrating the inability to select an impartial jury due to the publicity. The court emphasized the necessity of a detailed record of jury selection, including questions, answers, and the use of peremptory challenges, to support a claim of prejudice from pretrial publicity.

    Facts

    Defendant Ventimiglia was convicted of second-degree murder, first-degree robbery, and first-degree burglary.

    Prior to trial, there was extensive pretrial publicity concerning the homicide and the defendant’s alleged involvement.

    The defendant moved for a change of venue based on this pretrial publicity, which was denied.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved for a change of venue before trial, which was denied by the Appellate Division.

    Following his conviction, the defendant appealed the judgment, renewing his claim that pretrial publicity prevented a fair trial.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant demonstrated that he was unable to select a fair and impartial jury due to widespread pretrial publicity, thus warranting a change of venue.

    Holding

    No, because the record on appeal did not contain a transcript of the jury selection proceedings, making it impossible to determine whether the extensive publicity prevented the selection of a fair and impartial jury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the importance of creating a proper record during jury selection to demonstrate prejudice from pretrial publicity. The court stated that after the initial motion for a change of venue is denied, the defendant must attempt to select an impartial jury, and these proceedings must be recorded stenographically.

    The court noted, “At that time counsel could have attempted to establish by his questions and the answers to them that the extensive publicity made it impossible to select an impartial jury, if such was the fact, and upon said record the motion for change of venue could have been renewed and given proper consideration by the court.”

    The court also mentioned the importance of whether the defendant used all of his peremptory challenges during jury selection, as this could indicate the difficulty in finding an impartial jury.

    Because the record lacked a transcript of the jury selection, the court could not determine whether the defendant was prejudiced by the pretrial publicity. The absence of this record was fatal to the defendant’s claim on appeal.

  • People v. Goldswer, 39 N.Y.2d 656 (1976): Constitutionality of Venue Change Based on Impartiality Concerns

    People v. Goldswer, 39 N.Y.2d 656 (1976)

    A statute allowing a change of venue upon the prosecutor’s application due to reasonable cause to believe an impartial trial is impossible in the original county does not violate the defendant’s constitutional right to a jury from the district where the crime occurred.

    Summary

    The defendant, a former sheriff, was convicted in Warren County after the venue was changed from Schoharie County due to concerns about impartiality. The Special Prosecutor sought the change because the defendant, still in office, was accused of misusing his position. The New York Court of Appeals addressed the constitutionality of CPL 230.20(2), which allows the Appellate Division to change venue if a fair trial is unlikely in the original county. The court held the statute constitutional, finding it did not violate either the State or Federal Constitutions’ jury trial provisions, while cautioning against using venue changes to gain prosecutorial advantage.

    Facts

    The defendant, while Sheriff of Schoharie County, was indicted on 38 counts related to misusing his office, including using prisoners and personnel to construct his home and create campaign signs. Due to the District Attorney’s recusal, a Special Prosecutor was appointed. The prosecutor applied for a change of venue, arguing the defendant’s position as sheriff, the county’s small population, pre-trial publicity, and the sheriff’s office’s role in law enforcement and court security could inhibit jurors.

    Procedural History

    The Special Prosecutor’s motion for a change of venue was granted by the Appellate Division, Third Department. The case was moved to Warren County, where the defendant was convicted of 11 counts of official misconduct. The defendant appealed, arguing that the venue change violated his constitutional right to be tried by a jury from the county where the offenses occurred.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether CPL 230.20(2) violates the New York State Constitution’s guarantee of trial by jury in cases where it has been constitutionally guaranteed.
    2. Whether CPL 230.20(2) violates the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which guarantees the right to an impartial jury of the State and district where the crime occurred.

    Holding

    1. No, because prior to the adoption of the State Constitution, the legislature had the power to alter the common-law right to a jury trial in the county where the crime was committed.
    2. No, because the Sixth Amendment’s vicinage requirement is a modified version of the common-law rule, allowing the legislature to define the “district” where the jury is drawn.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while common law traditionally granted the accused the right to a jury from the vicinage (county where the crime occurred), this right was not absolute at the time of the State Constitution’s adoption. Legislative power to alter this right was recognized. The court cited Mack v. People, stating the Bill of Rights should be read “in the light of the law as it was when the bill of rights was adopted.”

    Regarding the Sixth Amendment, the court referenced Williams v. Florida, noting that the framers did not intend to equate constitutional jury characteristics with common-law characteristics. The Sixth Amendment’s vicinage requirement is a compromise, protecting individuals from trial by alien bodies while allowing the government a forum when trial in the county is impractical. The court stated, “Under this expanded vicinage rule the individual is guaranteed a trial ‘by an impartial jury of the State and district’ where the crime was committed and the Legislature is given the power to define or designate the district.”

    The court cautioned that CPL 230.20(2) should not be used to allow the prosecutor to seek a more favorable tribunal. There must be a reasonable basis to believe the original county is not neutral. The transferred venue should reflect the character of the original county, ensuring a fair trial without undue advantage for the prosecution. The court emphasized the importance of a neutral forum and cautioned against construing the statute to permit the prosecution to choose a more favorable tribunal. The court noted, “There must be some showing—at least a reasonable basis for belief— that the county in which the indictment is pending is not neutral between the parties because it is charged with an emotional atmosphere or some other factor which would preclude a fair and impartial trial and determination on the merits.”