New York Law Review

Tag: immediate flight

  • People v. Smith, 79 N.Y.2d 434 (1992): Immediate Flight Rule in Felony Murder

    People v. Smith, 79 N.Y.2d 434 (1992)

    A homicide occurring during a high-speed chase 15-20 minutes and 1 1/2 to 2 miles away from an attempted robbery can constitute “immediate flight” for felony murder purposes, and the determination of whether the defendant reached a place of temporary safety is a factual question for the jury.

    Summary

    Smith was convicted of felony murder after a high-speed chase following an attempted robbery resulted in a fatal car crash. The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the homicide occurred during the “immediate flight” from the attempted robbery and whether the trial court adequately ensured the defendant understood the risks of proceeding *pro se*. The Court held that the immediate flight issue was properly submitted to the jury but reversed the conviction due to the trial court’s inadequate inquiry regarding the defendant’s decision to represent himself during a suppression hearing.

    Facts

    Smith and accomplices attempted to rob a warehouse. An employee alerted the police, and the perpetrators fled in a van. Approximately 15 minutes later and 1 1/2 to 2 miles from the warehouse, police spotted the van based on a radio description. A high-speed chase ensued, culminating in a collision that killed a passenger in another vehicle. Smith was immediately apprehended.

    Procedural History

    Smith was indicted and a suppression hearing commenced. He expressed dissatisfaction with his court-appointed attorney, which the court initially denied replacement. Later, Smith requested to represent himself during the hearing. The court allowed this without adequate inquiry. After trial with new counsel, Smith was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed, deeming the *pro se* error harmless. The Court of Appeals granted leave and reversed.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence was legally sufficient to support a conviction for felony murder, specifically whether the homicide occurred during the immediate flight from the attempted robbery.

    2. Whether the suppression hearing court conducted a sufficiently searching inquiry to ensure that the defendant understood the risks of proceeding *pro se*.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because given the proximity in time and distance between the robbery and the homicide, a jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant was still in the course of “immediate flight.”

    2. No, because the hearing court failed to make the required searching inquiry of the defendant to ensure that he was aware of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding without counsel.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the felony murder conviction, the Court of Appeals relied on Penal Law § 125.25(3) and *People v. Gladman*, 41 NY2d 123. The Court reiterated that whether a homicide occurred in “immediate flight” is generally a factual question for the jury, unless the record compels the inference that the actor was not in immediate flight. Relevant factors include the distance between the felony and the homicide, the time interval, possession of the fruits of the crime, police pursuit, and whether the criminals reached a place of temporary safety. The Court found the jury could reasonably conclude the defendant was still fleeing, given the short distance and time frame, and the active police pursuit. “Given the circumstances and particularly the proximity in time and distance between the robbery and the homicide, we cannot say that the brief interruption in the flight from the crime scene and the van’s direction toward the scene when first observed by police were sufficient, as a matter of law, to preclude a conclusion that when the homicide occurred defendant and his accomplice were still in the course of ‘immediate flight’.”

    Regarding the *pro se* issue, the Court cited *People v. McIntyre*, 36 NY2d 10, and *Faretta v. California*, 422 US 806, emphasizing that a waiver of the right to counsel must be unequivocal, voluntary, and intelligent. The court must conduct a sufficiently searching inquiry to ensure the defendant understands the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding without counsel. “the ‘court should undertake a sufficiently ‘searching inquiry’ of the defendant to be reasonably certain that the ‘dangers and disadvantages’ of giving up the fundamental right to counsel have been impressed on the defendant”. Here, the court failed to make *any* inquiry, rendering the waiver ineffective. The Court also rejected the argument that the new counsel’s failure to seek reopening of the suppression hearing constituted abandonment of the claim or that the error was harmless, as the defendant was forced to proceed *pro se* at a critical stage of the hearing without understanding the implications.

  • People v. Irby, 47 N.Y.2d 894 (1979): Defining ‘Immediate Flight’ in Felony Murder

    People v. Irby, 47 N.Y.2d 894 (1979)

    Under New York’s felony murder statute, liability extends to deaths caused during the immediate flight from a felony, not just during the commission of the underlying felony itself; the determination of whether the killing occurred during the immediate flight is generally a question of fact for the jury.

    Summary

    Irby was convicted of felony murder after her accomplice shot and killed a police officer during their escape from a burglary. Irby argued that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that the burglary had to be ongoing at the time of the shooting for her to be guilty of felony murder, and that if she was in custody, she could not be guilty. The New York Court of Appeals reversed Irby’s conviction, holding that the jury instructions failed to adequately explain that felony murder liability extends to the immediate flight from the underlying felony and improperly removed from jury consideration the crucial factual question of whether the shooting occurred during the immediate flight.

    Facts

    Irby and her accomplice, MacKenzie, burglarized a clothing boutique. Irby acted as a lookout while MacKenzie entered the store and passed stolen merchandise to her through a window, which she placed in the trunk of their car. Police officers on patrol noticed the suspicious activity and approached Irby. While the officers questioned Irby, MacKenzie broke out of the front of the store and, in an attempt to escape, shot and killed an officer who tried to stop him. Irby was subsequently convicted of felony murder.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Irby of felony murder. The Appellate Division sustained the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals initially affirmed, but on reargument, reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that the felony of burglary had to be ongoing at the time of the shooting for Irby to be guilty of felony murder.
    2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that if Irby was in custody at the time of the shooting, she could not be guilty of felony murder.
    3. Whether the trial court improperly removed from the jury the factual question of whether the shooting occurred during the immediate flight from the burglary.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the charge, as a whole, was inadequate in that it did not provide for proper consideration by the jury of whether the shooting took place during the immediate flight from the burglary.
    2. The court did not reach this conclusion explicitly, but the reversal implies that this too was improperly presented to the jury.
    3. Yes, because the charge failed to submit to the jury for resolution the crucial factual question of whether, when the fatal shot was fired, MacKenzie was in immediate flight from the scene of the burglary.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the statutory language of New York’s felony murder statute, which extends liability to deaths caused “in the course of and in furtherance of such crime or of immediate flight therefrom.” The court emphasized that the trial court’s instructions failed to adequately explain this concept of “immediate flight” to the jury. Specifically, the court found that the charge was deficient for failing to require the jury to determine whether MacKenzie was in “immediate flight” from the burglary when he shot the officer. The court stated, “[t]he charge failed to submit to the jury for resolution the crucial factual question of whether, when the fatal shot was fired, MacKenzie was in immediate flight from the scene of the burglary.”

    The court distinguished this case from others where the issue of immediate flight was so clear that it could be decided as a matter of law. Here, the court found that the facts presented a question for the jury to determine. Because the jury instructions did not adequately guide the jury in making this determination, the court reversed Irby’s conviction and ordered a new trial.

    The dissent argued that the majority was inappropriately interpreting the felony murder statute and ignoring precedent. The dissent emphasized that Irby willingly participated in the burglary and should be held responsible for the consequences, including the death of the officer during the escape. The dissent stated that the jury was properly instructed on the law, and there was no reason to reverse the conviction. The dissent cited People v. Jackson, 20 N.Y.2d 440 (1967) as precedent.