New York Law Review

Tag: Illegitimacy

  • Bacon v. Bacon, 46 N.Y.2d 477 (1979): Enforceability of Agreements for Support of Out-of-Wedlock Children

    Bacon v. Bacon, 46 N.Y.2d 477 (1979)

    Section 516 of the Family Court Act, permitting binding support agreements for out-of-wedlock children, does not violate equal protection because it is substantially related to permissible state interests, such as encouraging settlements and ensuring child support.

    Summary

    The mother and child challenged the constitutionality of Section 516 of the Family Court Act, arguing it violated equal protection by allowing binding support agreements for out-of-wedlock children, unlike support for legitimate children. The Court of Appeals upheld the statute, finding it substantially related to permissible state interests. The statute encourages settlement of paternity claims, reducing legal proceedings, while protecting the child’s and mother’s interests through judicial review. It also prevents support loss in complex paternity adjudications.

    Facts

    The mother and the putative father entered into an agreement for the support of their out-of-wedlock child, pursuant to Section 516 of the Family Court Act.

    The mother and child later challenged the constitutionality of Section 516, arguing that it violates equal protection because complete performance of such an agreement bars other remedies for support and education, a rule different from support principles for legitimate children.

    Procedural History

    The case originated in the Family Court, where the support agreement was likely approved. The mother and child appealed, challenging the constitutionality of the statute. The Appellate Division’s order was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Section 516 of the Family Court Act, which allows a mother and putative father to enter into a binding agreement for the support of their out-of-wedlock child, violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution?

    Holding

    No, because the statute is substantially related to permissible state interests.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that not every legislative classification violates equal protection. Classifications based on illegitimacy are constitutional if they are substantially related to permissible state interests, citing Lalli v. Lalli and Trimble v. Gordon. Section 516 serves two important state interests.

    First, the statute encourages putative fathers to settle paternity claims, reducing the need for legal proceedings. It provides certainty regarding the father’s future obligations by making the settlement agreement binding. Judicial review and approval of the agreement protect the interests of the child and mother. The flexibility to include modifiable terms further protects against unforeseen circumstances.

    Second, the statute ensures that the child receives support from the father. The Court recognized that paternity proceedings often involve complex and difficult problems of proof, making the outcome uncertain. By incentivizing settlement, the statute prevents the child’s support from being lost in the complexities of the legal process.

    The court stated, “By furnishing an incentive to settle, the statute serves to prevent the illegitimate child’s support from becoming lost in the intricacies of the adjudicatory process. The statute is thus related, in a substantial respect, to permissible and salutary governmental interests and represents a balanced approach to the sensitive problem it addresses.”

  • In re Estate of Fay, 44 N.Y.2d 146 (1978): Inheritance Rights of Paternal Kindred of Illegitimate Children

    In re Estate of Fay, 44 N.Y.2d 146 (1978)

    New York’s EPTL 4-1.2, precluding inheritance by the paternal kindred of an illegitimate child absent a filiation order, does not violate equal protection guarantees.

    Summary

    This case concerns the inheritance rights of the paternal kindred of an illegitimate child. John P. Fay died intestate with a substantial estate. Violet Josephine Fay Buck claimed to be his half-sister through a common father. The Surrogate Court determined Fay was illegitimate and, therefore, Buck could not inherit under EPTL 4-1.2. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the statute, which restricts inheritance by paternal relatives of illegitimate children, does not violate equal protection, particularly when no filiation order exists establishing paternity.

    Facts

    John P. Fay died intestate in France, a U.S. citizen and New York domiciliary, leaving a $6 million estate. His birth certificate from Edinburgh stated he was illegitimate. A baptismal certificate, however, suggested his parents were married. Fay’s parents separated early in his life. He lived in a foster home and later became a seaman. Violet Josephine Fay Buck claimed to be Fay’s half-sister, the product of Fay’s father’s later marriage. Other claimants (Weatherall relatives) claimed through Fay’s mother’s bloodline.

    Procedural History

    The Surrogate Court sustained the objections of the Weatherall claimants, who claimed through the maternal line, and dismissed Buck’s claim because Fay was deemed illegitimate, precluding inheritance through his father. The Appellate Division affirmed the Surrogate’s decision. Buck appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that EPTL 4-1.2 was unconstitutional.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the decedent, John P. Fay, was illegitimate.
    2. If so, whether EPTL 4-1.2(b), which precludes inheritance by the paternal kindred of an illegitimate child, violates equal protection.

    Holding

    1. No, because the Surrogate Court’s factual finding of illegitimacy, based on the birth certificate and other evidence, was affirmed by the Appellate Division and thus not reviewable by the Court of Appeals.
    2. No, because the preclusion of inheritance by the paternal kindred of an illegitimate child, at least where there has been no order of filiation, is not violative of equal protection.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals addressed two issues: the determination of Fay’s legitimacy and the constitutionality of EPTL 4-1.2. On the first issue, the court noted the strong presumption of legitimacy but acknowledged it can be rebutted. Since the Surrogate Court’s finding of illegitimacy was a factual determination affirmed by the Appellate Division, it was not subject to review by the Court of Appeals.

    Regarding the constitutionality of EPTL 4-1.2, the court applied a standard of review that is “less than strict scrutiny” but “not a toothless one.”. The court referenced its prior decision in Matter of Lalli, which upheld the constitutionality of EPTL 4-1.2(a)(2), requiring a filiation order for an illegitimate child to inherit from the father. The court reasoned that if an illegitimate child can be constitutionally precluded from inheriting from the father without a filiation order, then precluding inheritance by the paternal kindred of the illegitimate, absent such an order, is also constitutional.

    The court emphasized the legislative intent behind EPTL 4-1.2, which was based on recommendations from the Bennett Commission on Estates. The Commission sought to avoid creating artificial family groups by excluding paternal kindred, who may not have knowledge of the child’s birth, unlike maternal kindred. The court stated, “It is merely a legislative judgment designed to ensure that only the true members of an illegitimate’s family are permitted to share in his or her estate.” The court also found the statute served a legitimate purpose in providing for the orderly settlement of estates and the dependability of title to property passing under intestate distribution laws.

    Ultimately, the court concluded that precluding inheritance by the paternal kindred of an illegitimate child does not violate equal protection.

  • Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240 (1963): The “Wrongful Life” Doctrine and its Rejection

    Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240 (1963)

    A child born as a result of his father’s tortious act of adultery, where the father deceives the mother into believing he is free to marry, does not have a cause of action against his father for “wrongful life.”

    Summary

    This case addresses the novel claim of “wrongful life,” brought by a child born out of an adulterous relationship against his father. The father deceived the child’s mother into believing he was free to marry her, resulting in the child’s birth. The child sought damages for his illegitimate status and the associated social stigma. The Illinois Appellate Court rejected the claim, holding that while the father’s actions were reprehensible, recognizing a cause of action for wrongful life would be against public policy. The court reasoned that the judiciary should not be the instrument to undermine the family, and because calculating damages based on the difference between non-existence and life is inherently impossible, the claim was not legally cognizable.

    Facts

    The defendant, the child’s father, engaged in sexual relations with the child’s mother. He fraudulently represented to her that he was single and free to marry. As a result of this deception, the child was born out of wedlock. The plaintiff, the child, through his mother as next friend, filed suit against his father, alleging that his illegitimate status caused him significant harm.

    Procedural History

    The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint. The plaintiff appealed the dismissal to the Illinois Appellate Court, First District. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that the child did not have a cognizable cause of action.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a child born as a result of his father’s intentional tort of adultery, based on the father’s fraudulent representation of his marital status to the mother, has a legally recognizable cause of action against his father for damages relating to the circumstances of his birth and the stigmatizing status of illegitimacy.

    Holding

    No, because public policy considerations and the inherent impossibility of calculating damages in such a case preclude recognition of a “wrongful life” cause of action.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court acknowledged the father’s morally reprehensible conduct but emphasized that not every wrong is compensable with money damages. The court stated that “being born under one set of circumstances rather than another was not a tort that the common law was prepared to recognize.” The court reasoned that comparing the value of being born into illegitimacy versus not being born at all is a philosophical question, not a legal one. The court stated that the damages would require a calculation of the difference between being and non-being. The court recognized that such a calculation is not within the realm of conventional tort damage assessment. The court further reasoned that allowing the child to recover would have profound social implications, potentially opening the door to suits based on a parent’s undesirable characteristics or genetic predispositions. The court also cited the sanctity of the family unit as a key policy consideration: “[t]he judiciary is not the place to provide a platform for undermining the institution of the family.”