New York Law Review

Tag: Illegal Stop

  • People v. Townes, 77 N.Y.2d 582 (1991): Attenuation Doctrine and Justification in Illegal Stops

    People v. Townes, 77 N.Y.2d 582 (1991)

    An individual’s actions during an illegal stop can attenuate the taint of the illegality if those actions are not immediate, spontaneous, and proportionate to the officer’s actions, thus providing an independent basis for arrest and the admissibility of evidence seized incident to that arrest; however, Penal Law § 35.27 relates only to the defense of justification and does not create a new substantive crime.

    Summary

    This case concerns the attenuation doctrine in the context of an illegal stop. An officer stopped Townes based on an anonymous tip. Townes resisted, striking the officer. A search incident to the arrest revealed cocaine. The New York Court of Appeals held that the lower courts correctly suppressed the evidence. The Court reasoned that Townes’s actions were immediate, spontaneous, and proportionate to the officer’s unlawful attempt to detain him, and thus did not attenuate the taint of the illegal stop. The court clarified that Penal Law § 35.27 (the “no-sock” law) does not create a substantive crime; it only pertains to the defense of justification.

    Facts

    An anonymous caller reported that a medium-build, dark-complexioned black male was selling narcotics at a specific intersection in Rochester.

    An officer was dispatched and observed Townes, who matched the description, at the intersection.

    As Townes crossed the street, the officer stopped his vehicle and motioned him on, but Townes stopped and the officer exited his car and asked Townes to stop.

    Townes refused, stating, “For what? I’m walking.”

    The officer approached Townes, attempting to restrain him; Townes resisted and started to run.

    The officer grabbed Townes, who struck the officer in the face before eventually being handcuffed.

    A pat-down search revealed four packets of cocaine.

    Procedural History

    Townes was charged with criminal possession of a controlled substance, resisting arrest, and second-degree assault.

    The hearing court granted Townes’s motion to suppress the cocaine, finding the stop unlawful and Townes’s actions proportionate to the attempted restraint.

    The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that Penal Law § 35.27 did not provide a substantive basis for the arrest.

    The People appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Townes’s act of striking the officer attenuated the taint of the illegal stop, thereby justifying the arrest and search.

    2. Whether Penal Law § 35.27 could serve as the basis for a lawful arrest and seizure of contraband, despite the unlawful initial stop.

    Holding

    1. No, because there was evidence in the record to support the determination of the lower courts that defendant’s action in striking the officer was “immediate, spontaneous, and proportionate to the officer’s attempt to lay hands on him when he refused to stop” and thus, was not sufficient to attenuate the unlawful stop so as to render the arrest and seizure of the contraband lawful.

    2. No, because that statute concerns the defense of justification and does not create a new substantive crime.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the suppression of evidence, distinguishing the case from People v. Townes, 41 N.Y.2d 97, where the defendant’s act of firing a gun at an officer attenuated the initial illegality. The Court emphasized that the attenuation doctrine requires evaluating whether the connection between the unlawful police conduct and the discovery of evidence is sufficiently weakened. Here, the Court deferred to the lower courts’ factual finding that Townes’s response was “immediate, spontaneous, and proportionate” to the officer’s attempt to lay hands on him. Because of that, the action was not an independent crime that would justify the arrest.

    The Court further clarified that Penal Law § 35.27, often called the “no-sock law,” provides only a defense to a charge of assault; it does not create a new crime that could independently justify an arrest. Thus, even if Townes violated § 35.27, it could not retroactively legalize the illegal arrest. The Court reasoned that allowing the statute to validate an otherwise unlawful arrest would circumvent the protections against unreasonable searches and seizures.

    The Court cited People v. Harewood, 63 A.D.2d 876 and People v. Simms, 36 A.D.2d 23, 24, reinforcing the principle that § 35.27 is a justification defense, not a source of substantive criminal liability. The practical implication is that police cannot retroactively justify an illegal stop based on a suspect’s reactive resistance if that resistance is deemed an immediate and proportionate response to the unlawful police action.

  • People v. Martinez, 37 N.Y.2d 662 (1975): Admissibility of Statements After an Illegal Stop

    People v. Martinez, 37 N.Y.2d 662 (1975)

    The admissibility of custodial statements obtained after an illegal stop depends on whether the police acted in good faith with a reasonable belief that probable cause existed for the arrest, considering the purpose and flagrancy of the misconduct.

    Summary

    Martinez was convicted of felony murder. The key issue was whether an illegal initial stop of the car he was in tainted his subsequent arrest for illegal gun possession and the station house interrogation regarding the homicide. The Court of Appeals held that while the initial stop was illegal, the subsequent statements made by Martinez were admissible because the police acted in good faith and had a reasonable basis for believing probable cause existed after discovering the gun in the car. The court emphasized that the interrogation was not a result of the illegal stop but rather stemmed from independent evidence linking Martinez to the homicide.

    Facts

    On April 1, 1971, Martinez was a passenger in a parked car in a high-crime area. Police officers approached the car, suspecting something related to a nearby liquor store based on the time of day and the occupants’ appearance. After the driver made a quick motion towards the glove compartment, an officer opened the car door and saw a gun on the floor in the back. All occupants were arrested. Detectives investigating a previous homicide interrogated Martinez after informing him of his Miranda rights. Martinez admitted being near the crime scene with others but denied involvement. A woman, Geraldine Neal, told police Martinez confessed to stabbing a man near a Lafayette Radio Store. Police found the victim’s coat with a switchblade knife in the pocket at an apartment where Martinez often stayed.

    Procedural History

    The trial court admitted the gun, Martinez’s statements, and the knife and coat as evidence, finding the stop and arrest justified and Martinez’s statements voluntary after a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights. The Appellate Division affirmed Martinez’s conviction. This appeal followed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the illegality of the initial stop tainted the subsequent arrest for illegal possession of a firearm and, therefore, the subsequent station house interrogation of the defendant concerning the homicide, requiring suppression of the statements and evidence obtained as a result.

    Holding

    No, because the police acted in good faith and had a reasonable basis to believe probable cause existed for the arrest after discovering the gun, and the interrogation was based on independent evidence linking Martinez to the homicide, thus attenuating any taint from the illegal stop.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court addressed the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine under Wong Sun v. United States, requiring that evidence be excluded if obtained through exploitation of illegal police conduct. Citing Brown v. Illinois, the court stated that Miranda warnings alone are not always sufficient to break the causal connection between an illegal arrest and a confession. Relevant factors include temporal proximity, intervening circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. The court adopted a good-faith standard, asking whether law enforcement acted in good faith with a fair basis for belief that probable cause existed for the arrest. This standard is similar to the ALI’s Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure. The court found the initial stop was improper under People v. Ingle. However, a reasonable basis for arrest existed once the gun was discovered. The officers, unaware of Martinez’s potential involvement in the homicide, acted in good faith. The detectives investigating the homicide had independent evidence linking Martinez to the Manague stabbing, which broke the causal chain between the illegal stop and the interrogation. The court emphasized that the exclusionary rule’s purpose is to deter unlawful police activity. Here, the police misconduct was not exploitative and did not require suppression of the evidence. The court stated: “[T]he controlling consideration for determining the admissibility of ‘verbal’ evidence obtained pursuant to claimed illegal police conduct is whether law enforcement officers acted in good faith and with a fair basis for belief that probable cause existed for an arrest.”