New York Law Review

Tag: illegal sentence

  • People v. Jaber, 89 N.Y.2d 870 (1996): Court’s Power to Correct Illegal Sentences

    People v. Jaber, 89 N.Y.2d 870 (1996)

    A trial court has the inherent power to correct an illegal sentence, even if it means imposing a more severe sentence than originally promised, provided the defendant is given the opportunity to withdraw their guilty plea.

    Summary

    Defendant pleaded guilty to robbery and received a sentence to run concurrently with a prior sentence. The Department of Correctional Services informed the court that the sentence was illegal, as it should have been consecutive under Penal Law § 70.25 (2-a). The trial court resentenced the defendant to a consecutive term, over his objection. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court possessed the inherent power to correct the illegal sentence. However, the Court noted that when a correction results in a more severe sentence than originally promised, the defendant must be given the opportunity to withdraw their guilty plea.

    Facts

    Defendant pleaded guilty to third-degree robbery on October 25, 1995.

    On November 17, 1995, the trial court sentenced him to two to four years in prison, to run concurrently with an undischarged portion of an earlier sentence.

    By letter dated January 5, 1996, the Department of Correctional Services notified the trial court that Penal Law § 70.25 (2-a) required the sentence to run consecutively with his prior sentence.

    At resentencing, defense counsel stated the defendant did not want to withdraw his plea nor be resentenced. The court resentenced the defendant to a consecutive term over his objection.

    Procedural History

    The trial court resentenced the defendant to a consecutive term after being informed that the original concurrent sentence was illegal.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the resentencing.

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court had the authority to vacate the original sentence and impose a consecutive term when the original sentence was illegal under Penal Law § 70.25 (2-a), even though the defendant objected to the resentencing and did not want to withdraw his guilty plea?

    Holding

    Yes, because the trial court has the inherent power to correct an illegal sentence it initially imposed. However, when the corrected sentence is more severe than the original promise, the defendant must be afforded the opportunity to withdraw their guilty plea.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on precedent, specifically People v. Williams, to establish that a trial court has the inherent power to correct an illegal sentence. The Court distinguished this case from Matter of Campbell v. Pesce, where the court held that a court could not vacate a misdemeanor conviction and reinstate a felony charge after the defendant’s sentence had begun when the initial reduction was illegal. The Court acknowledged the potential problem presented by People v. Selikoff which held that if a court makes a sentencing promise to a defendant and is unable to fulfill it, the defendant has a right to withdraw the guilty plea and to be restored to pre-plea status. The Court stated that while the resentencing resulted in a more severe sentence, the defendant did not seek to withdraw his guilty plea and did not demonstrate that he detrimentally relied on the illegal sentence in a way that could not be rectified by restoring him to his pre-plea status if he so desired. Thus, the defendant should have been offered that opportunity. The Court did not reverse the decision, implying that since the defendant did not want to withdraw his plea, the error was harmless. The Court reasoned: “We conclude that the trial court had inherent power to correct the illegal sentence it initially imposed.”

  • People v. Williams, 87 N.Y.2d 1014 (1996): Correcting Illegal Sentences and Double Jeopardy

    People v. Williams, 87 N.Y.2d 1014 (1996)

    A trial court has the inherent power to correct an illegal sentence, and a corrected, harsher sentence does not violate double jeopardy if the defendant had no legitimate expectation of finality in the original, lesser sentence.

    Summary

    Defendant Williams pleaded guilty to burglary and was initially sentenced to 3 1/2 to 7 years. The court then, *sua sponte*, resentenced him to 3 1/2 to 10 1/2 years after realizing it had incorrectly sentenced him as a first-time offender instead of as a predicate felon. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that the trial court had the inherent power to correct the illegal sentence. The Court further held that the resentencing did not violate double jeopardy principles because Williams had been informed during his plea hearing that he could receive up to 15 years, meaning he had no legitimate expectation of finality in the lesser, illegal sentence.

    Facts

    On March 17, 1993, Williams pleaded guilty to second-degree burglary. He admitted to entering a dwelling without permission while the occupant was sleeping and stealing a CD player and a pocketbook on June 21, 1991. During the plea hearing, the court informed Williams that he was pleading guilty to a Class C felony and could be sentenced up to 15 years in prison.

    Procedural History

    The trial court initially sentenced Williams to an indeterminate term of 3 1/2 to 7 years in prison on April 9, 1993. On April 16, 1993, the court, *sua sponte*, resentenced Williams to 3 1/2 to 10 1/2 years in prison after realizing it had incorrectly sentenced him as a first felony offender. The Appellate Division affirmed the amended sentence following a motion for an amended sentence. The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court had the power to correct an illegal sentence *sua sponte*?
    2. Whether resentencing the defendant to a harsher sentence after discovering an error in the initial sentencing violated the principle of double jeopardy?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because a trial court has the inherent power to correct an illegal sentence.
    2. No, because the defendant had no legitimate expectation of finality in the original, lesser sentence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on *People v. Minaya*, 54 N.Y.2d 360, which affirmed the inherent power of a trial court to correct an illegal sentence. Regarding double jeopardy, the court explained that a claim of double jeopardy would only be valid if the defendant’s sentence had been increased beyond his legitimate expectations of what the final sentence should be.

    Because the trial court stated during the plea proceedings that Williams could receive up to 15 years in prison, the Court of Appeals reasoned that Williams could have had “no expectation of finality on his part with respect to the lesser and illegal sentence.” The court also cited *United States v. DiFrancesco*, 449 U.S. 117, 139, to support the proposition that an increased sentence doesn’t violate double jeopardy if the defendant was aware of the potential for a greater sentence from the outset. The court emphasized the importance of preventing a defendant from benefiting from a sentencing error when they were already aware of the potential for a harsher punishment. This prevents manipulation of the system and ensures that sentences reflect the actual severity of the crime.

  • People v. Ford, 86 N.Y.2d 836 (1995): Enforceability of Illegal Plea Agreements

    People v. Ford, 86 N.Y.2d 836 (1995)

    When a plea agreement results in an illegal sentence, either because the agreed-upon sentence or the sentence actually imposed is not authorized by law, the sentence must be reversed, and both parties must be given the opportunity to withdraw from the plea agreement.

    Summary

    Defendant Ford was arrested at Kennedy Airport with cocaine and marijuana. She pleaded guilty via an Alford plea to attempted criminal possession of a controlled substance, with the prosecution recommending a sentence of four years to life imprisonment, based on the mistaken belief it was a class A-II felony. The trial court, however, sentenced her to lifetime probation, citing her cooperation and concerns about cruel and unusual punishment. The Appellate Division reversed, finding neither the agreed nor imposed sentences legal for a class A-I felony, and allowed either party to withdraw the plea. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that illegal sentences render plea agreements voidable by either party.

    Facts

    Defendant Ford arrived at Kennedy Airport from Jamaica and was found to be in possession of 14 ounces of cocaine and over two pounds of marijuana during a customs inspection of her carry-on baggage. She was subsequently indicted for criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree and criminal possession of marijuana in the second degree.

    Procedural History

    The defendant pleaded guilty to attempted criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree pursuant to an Alford plea. The Supreme Court sentenced her to lifetime probation, deviating from the prosecution’s recommended sentence. The Appellate Division reversed the sentence and remitted the case for resentencing, allowing either party to withdraw from the plea agreement. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a sentence imposed pursuant to a plea agreement, which is either the agreed-upon sentence or the sentence actually imposed, is not authorized by law for the crime of which the defendant was convicted, the Appellate Division properly ruled that the sentence must be reversed and the case remitted for resentencing with the opportunity for both parties to withdraw from the plea agreement.

    Holding

    Yes, because neither the sentence pursuant to the plea agreement nor the sentence actually imposed was authorized by law for the crime of which defendant was convicted, the Appellate Division properly ruled that the sentence must be reversed and the case remitted for resentencing with the opportunity for both parties to withdraw from the plea agreement.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision on the established principle that a sentence not authorized by law is invalid. Because the defendant pleaded guilty to a class A-I felony, neither the agreed-upon sentence of four years to life (appropriate for a class A-II felony) nor the imposed sentence of lifetime probation was legally permissible. The court relied on People v. Farrar, 52 N.Y.2d 302, 307-308, which provides that when a plea agreement is flawed due to an illegal sentence, both the prosecution and the defendant have the right to withdraw from the agreement and return to their original positions. The court emphasized the importance of adhering to statutory sentencing guidelines and ensuring that plea agreements result in lawful dispositions. The court stated: “Because neither the sentence pursuant to the plea agreement nor the sentence actually imposed was authorized by law for the crime of which defendant was convicted, the Appellate Division properly ruled that the sentence must be reversed and the case remitted for resentencing with the opportunity for both parties to withdraw from the plea agreement”.