New York Law Review

Tag: illegal search and seizure

  • Boyd v. Constantine, 81 N.Y.2d 189 (1993): Admissibility of Illegally Seized Evidence in Police Disciplinary Proceedings

    Boyd v. Constantine, 81 N.Y.2d 189 (1993)

    Evidence illegally seized by local police is admissible in a state police administrative disciplinary proceeding where the local police were not acting as agents of the state police, and the deterrent effect of exclusion is negligible compared to the need for accurate fact-finding.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether evidence suppressed in a criminal trial due to an unlawful search is admissible in a subsequent administrative proceeding against a State Trooper. The Court of Appeals held that the evidence was admissible. The Court reasoned that the exclusionary rule should not be applied because the Buffalo City Police, who conducted the search, were not acting as agents of the State Police. Furthermore, the deterrent effect of excluding the evidence was outweighed by the need to maintain the integrity of the State Police by disciplining officers found in possession of illegal substances.

    Facts

    Two Buffalo City police officers observed Boyd, a State Trooper, and another man in a parked car. A search of the car revealed a bag of marihuana in the console. Boyd identified himself as a State Trooper and claimed the marihuana belonged to his girlfriend. Boyd was issued a summons for unlawful possession of marihuana, and his superiors were notified.

    Procedural History

    The Superintendent of State Police charged Boyd with violating State Police regulations. Boyd requested a hearing and simultaneously moved to suppress the evidence in Buffalo City Court. The City Court granted Boyd’s motion to suppress the evidence, leading to the dismissal of the criminal charge. At the administrative hearing, the Hearing Officer admitted the marihuana into evidence over Boyd’s objection and recommended dismissal. The Superintendent adopted the recommendation and dismissed Boyd. The Appellate Division annulled the Superintendent’s determination, holding the evidence was inadmissible. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, reinstating the dismissal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether evidence that is the product of an unlawful search by the Buffalo City Police, and is suppressed in a criminal prosecution, may be used in an administrative proceeding commenced by the Division of State Police against one of its troopers?

    Holding

    Yes, because the Buffalo City Police were not acting as agents of the Division of State Police, and the deterrent effect of excluding the evidence is outweighed by the adverse impact on the truth-finding process in administrative proceedings concerning police officers involved in drug-related incidents.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court distinguished this case from Matter of Finn’s Liq. Shop v State Liq. Auth., where the exclusionary rule was applied because the municipal police officers were acting as agents of the State Liquor Authority. Here, there was no evidence the Buffalo City Police were acting as agents of the State Police. The court applied a deterrence analysis, balancing the deterrent effect of excluding the evidence against the adverse impact on the truth-finding process. Referencing People v. McGrath and People v. Drain, the Court emphasized that exclusion is unwarranted where the deterrent benefit is insubstantial. The Court reasoned that the Buffalo City Police could not have foreseen that their search would lead to a State Police administrative proceeding. As such, excluding the evidence would have a negligible deterrent effect. The court also noted the importance of maintaining the integrity of the State Police by disciplining officers involved in drug-related incidents, stating that “the benefit to be gained from precluding police officers, who unlawfully possess controlled substances, from making arrests… clearly outweighs any deterrent effect that may arise from applying the exclusionary rule”. Finally, the court held that the penalty of dismissal was not disproportionate to the offense.

  • People v. May, 81 N.Y.2d 725 (1992): Reasonable Suspicion Required for Vehicle Stop

    People v. May, 81 N.Y.2d 725 (1992)

    A vehicle stop constitutes a seizure and is lawful only if supported by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity; merely being parked on a deserted street known for criminal activity and slowly driving away from approaching police officers does not provide reasonable suspicion.

    Summary

    Defendant was sitting in a parked car with a companion on a deserted street known for criminal activity when police officers approached in a marked car with turret lights and a spotlight. The defendant started the car and slowly drove away. The officers ordered the defendant to pull over using a loudspeaker. After the stop, the officers discovered the car was stolen and found crack cocaine on the defendant. The New York Court of Appeals held that the initial stop was unlawful because the officers lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Evidence obtained as a result of the illegal stop was suppressed.

    Facts

    Two police officers, patrolling in a marked car, observed the defendant and a female companion seated in a parked Oldsmobile on a deserted street known for criminal activity at approximately 2:30 a.m. The officers approached the parked car, activating the patrol car’s red turret lights and spotlight. As the officers approached, the defendant started the engine of the Oldsmobile and slowly pulled away. One of the officers, using the police car’s loudspeaker, ordered the car to pull over. The defendant complied.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved to suppress the crack cocaine and police photographs of the stolen car, arguing they were the fruits of an illegal stop and seizure. The trial court denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, granted the defendant’s motion to suppress, and dismissed the indictment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether police officers, who observe a vehicle parked on a deserted street known for criminal activity and then slowly pulling away as they approach with activated turret lights and spotlight, have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity justifying a vehicle stop.

    Holding

    No, because the police officers lacked reasonable suspicion that a crime had been or was about to be committed. The police officers only knew that the defendant and another person were sitting in a car parked on a desolate street, which provided them with no information regarding criminal activity.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that the defendant was effectively “seized” when the police, using red turret lights, a spotlight, and a loudspeaker, ordered him to pull the car over. Because a seizure occurred, the stop was only proper if the officers had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, as required by People v. Sobotker, 43 N.Y.2d 559 (1978), and People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210 (1976). The Court reasoned that the circumstances did not give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The Court noted that the defendant’s action in slowly moving the car away as the police approached could not create a reasonable suspicion because the defendant had a right “to be let alone” and refuse to respond to police inquiry, citing People v. Howard, 50 N.Y.2d 583 (1980). The Court stated that the police could have followed the car to keep it under observation while they checked on its plates, but they had no legal basis to stop the car when they did. The court emphasized that police cannot forcibly detain civilians for questioning without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The court stated, “once defendant indicated, by pulling away from the curb, that he did not wish to speak with the officers, they should not have forced him to stop without legal grounds to do so.” The evidence was suppressed based on Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), because it was obtained as a result of the illegal stop.

  • People ex rel. Piccarillo v. New York State Board of Parole, 48 N.Y.2d 76 (1979): Exclusionary Rule Applies to Parole Revocation Hearings

    People ex rel. Piccarillo v. New York State Board of Parole, 48 N.Y.2d 76 (1979)

    The exclusionary rule, which prohibits the use of illegally seized evidence, applies to parole revocation hearings in New York, preventing the use of such evidence to revoke parole.

    Summary

    Piccarillo, a parolee, was arrested for possession of a controlled substance after a police search of his car revealed amphetamine pills. At his parole revocation hearing, the evidence from the search was admitted, and his parole was revoked. Subsequently, the evidence was suppressed in the criminal case due to an illegal search. Piccarillo then sought habeas corpus, arguing the Board of Parole should not have considered the suppressed evidence. The New York Court of Appeals held that the exclusionary rule applies to parole revocation hearings, reasoning that allowing illegally seized evidence would undermine the rule’s deterrent effect and violate a parolee’s constitutional rights.

    Facts

    Piccarillo was released on parole after serving sentences for attempted robbery. He was stopped by police for driving without operational taillights. A search of his car revealed a container of pills, leading to his arrest for possession of a controlled substance. At his parole revocation hearing, this evidence was admitted. Later, in the criminal case stemming from the same incident, a court determined the search was illegal and suppressed the evidence.

    Procedural History

    A preliminary parole revocation hearing found probable cause to revoke Piccarillo’s parole. At the final revocation hearing, his motion to suppress the evidence from the car search was denied, and his parole was revoked based on that evidence. Subsequently, the evidence was suppressed in the criminal case. Piccarillo then initiated a habeas corpus proceeding, which was initially denied by the Supreme Court. The Appellate Division reversed, restoring Piccarillo to parole. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the exclusionary rule prohibits the consideration of evidence at a parole revocation hearing when such evidence has been determined by a court to be the fruit of an illegal search and seizure.

    Holding

    Yes, because the exclusionary rule applies to administrative proceedings in New York, and a parolee’s right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures remains intact, even while on parole.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while a parole revocation hearing is administrative, the consequences for the parolee are significant. The exclusionary rule applies to administrative as well as criminal proceedings in New York. The court emphasized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is deterrence: “To the extent that the State, or its agents, can bypass the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule by using the fruits of an illegal search in a ‘civil’ or ‘administrative’ proceeding, the incentive for enforcement and investigative personnel to exceed constitutional limitations on their activity remains and the effectiveness of the rule as a deterrent is diminished.” Allowing illegally seized evidence in parole revocation hearings would undermine this deterrent effect. The court further noted that parolees do not relinquish all constitutional rights, including the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. While a parolee’s status may be considered when determining whether a search is unreasonable, it does not justify an exception to the exclusionary rule. The court rejected the argument that the Parole Board’s need for all relevant information outweighs the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule, stating that the rule is addressed to the “insidiousness of unreasonable searches and seizures.” The court concluded that applying the exclusionary rule to parole revocation hearings upholds the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures and prevents the rule’s erosion.