New York Law Review

Tag: Illegal Search

  • People v. Stith, 69 N.Y.2d 313 (1987): Inevitable Discovery and Primary Evidence

    People v. Stith, 69 N.Y.2d 313 (1987)

    The inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply when the evidence sought to be admitted is the primary evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search.

    Summary

    Defendants were arrested and charged with criminal possession of a weapon after a traffic stop led to an unlawful search of their truck, revealing a loaded gun. They were later charged with criminal possession of stolen property when a registration check revealed the truck was stolen. The lower courts, while acknowledging the illegal search, invoked the inevitable discovery rule, arguing the gun would have been found during a subsequent inventory search. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the weapon possession conviction, holding that the inevitable discovery exception cannot be used to justify the admission of primary evidence obtained directly from an illegal search, while affirming the stolen property conviction.

    Facts

    State troopers stopped the defendants’ truck for speeding. The driver, Newton, produced a Connecticut driver’s license but could not find the truck’s registration. A trooper, dissatisfied with Newton’s search, entered the truck and found a brown vinyl bag. Inside the bag, he discovered a revolver. Both defendants were arrested for criminal possession of a weapon. During transport to the police barracks, a radio check revealed that Newton’s license was expired and the truck had been stolen. Consequently, the defendants were also charged with criminal possession of stolen property.

    Procedural History

    The suppression court and the Appellate Division denied the defendants’ motion to suppress the gun, applying the inevitable discovery rule, despite acknowledging the unlawful search. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal. The Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order, reversing the weapon possession conviction and affirming the stolen property conviction.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule applies to primary evidence (the gun) obtained directly as a result of an illegal search, such that the gun should be admissible at trial.

    Holding

    No, because applying the inevitable discovery rule to primary evidence obtained during an illegal search would dilute the exclusionary rule and undermine its purpose of deterring police misconduct.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished between primary and secondary evidence. The Court acknowledged that the exclusionary rule bars illegally obtained evidence from trial but recognizes exceptions such as the independent source rule, attenuated connection, and inevitable discovery. The Court emphasized that prior applications of the inevitable discovery rule in New York (e.g., People v. Fitzpatrick, People v. Payton) and in federal cases (e.g., Nix v. Williams) involved secondary evidence – evidence derived from information obtained during the illegal search, not the illegally seized evidence itself. In those cases, the rationale for admitting secondary evidence was that the police should not be in a worse position due to an earlier error if the evidence would have been discovered independently. However, applying the rule to primary evidence, as in this case, would effectively excuse the initial illegal conduct. The court reasoned that allowing admission of the gun would be a “post hoc rationalization of the initial wrong” and “would encourage unlawful searches in the hope that probable cause would be developed after the fact.” The Court explicitly stated it would be an unacceptable dilution of the exclusionary rule. The court emphasized the importance of deterring police misconduct. The court noted that its decision rests on both federal law and the independent state ground of the New York Constitution (Article I, § 12).

  • People v. De Salvo, 32 N.Y.2d 12 (1973): Waiver of Objections in Grand Jury Testimony

    People v. De Salvo, 32 N.Y.2d 12 (1973)

    A witness who asserts only the privilege against self-incrimination before a grand jury and is subsequently granted immunity waives any other grounds, such as an illegal search, for refusing to testify and cannot assert such grounds as a defense to a contempt charge.

    Summary

    De Salvo was convicted of criminal contempt for refusing to answer questions before a Grand Jury after being granted immunity. He argued that his appearance before the Grand Jury stemmed from an illegal search and seizure. The New York Court of Appeals held that De Salvo waived this objection by initially asserting only his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and accepting immunity. The court reasoned that he should have raised the illegal search issue during his Grand Jury appearance, allowing the prosecutor to address it. By failing to do so and accepting immunity, De Salvo forfeited his right to challenge the contempt charge based on the alleged illegal search.

    Facts

    In November 1968, police searched a restaurant in the Bronx and De Salvo, finding him in possession of a loaded revolver, wager slips, and eavesdropping devices. De Salvo claimed the search warrant was ineffective and illegal as to him.
    In March 1969, De Salvo was called before a Grand Jury investigating gambling activities. He refused to answer questions based on self-incrimination. He consulted with counsel and was granted transactional and testimonial immunity. However, De Salvo continued to refuse to answer questions.

    Procedural History

    De Salvo was indicted for criminal contempt. He moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing his Grand Jury appearance resulted from an illegal search. The motion was denied. He was convicted at trial and sentenced to imprisonment and a fine. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. This appeal followed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a witness who refuses to answer questions before a Grand Jury based on self-incrimination, is granted immunity, and *then* refuses to answer, can later challenge a contempt conviction based on the argument that the Grand Jury appearance was prompted by an illegal search, when that argument was not raised initially.

    Holding

    No, because by initially asserting only his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and accepting immunity, De Salvo waived any other grounds for refusing to testify, and he cannot assert those omitted grounds as a defense to the contempt charge.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court distinguished Gelbard v. United States, which allowed witnesses to invoke the illegality of electronic eavesdropping as a defense to a contempt charge, because that case involved a federal statute prohibiting the use of illegal wiretaps before a Grand Jury and, crucially, the witnesses in Gelbard expressly refused to testify on the ground of illegal wiretaps. The court emphasized that De Salvo never raised the illegal search as a reason for refusing to testify before the Grand Jury. The court cited Lanza v. New York which stated that it would be “a completely unprecedented step” to hold that a witness could not constitutionally be convicted for refusing to answer questions related to an unlawfully overheard conversation, suggesting the importance of contemporaneous objection. By failing to raise the issue of the illegal search when he first refused to testify, the prosecutor was misled into granting immunity. The court reasoned, “The obtaining of immunity, especially transactional immunity, may be a highly desired end. Such immunity could only be obtained by a claim of a privilege against self incrimination, with the prospect to the People, if immunity were granted, that useful testimony would follow. The granting of immunity would be a futility to the People if then the witness could assert the nullity of the questioning on some ground suppressed until immunity had been first obtained.” The court noted that the proper procedure for challenging Grand Jury questions, as outlined in People v. Ianniello, requires the witness to assert their right and force the prosecutor to take the issue to open court for a ruling. Failing to do so results in a waiver of the objection.

  • People v. Schisck, 31 N.Y.2d 170 (1972): Admissibility of Witness Testimony Discovered Through Illegal Search

    31 N.Y.2d 170 (1972)

    Evidence, including witness testimony, derived directly from an illegal search is inadmissible in court unless the connection between the illegal search and the evidence is sufficiently attenuated.

    Summary

    The case concerns the admissibility of testimony from a witness discovered as a direct result of an illegal search. Police conducted an unlawful search of Schisck’s apartment, finding narcotics. During the search, they questioned Bramante, who provided information leading to Holbauer, who testified Schisck performed abortions on her. Schisck moved to suppress Holbauer’s testimony, arguing it was fruit of the poisonous tree. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision to admit the testimony, finding a sufficient attenuation between the illegal search and the witness’s testimony, despite strong dissent arguing for suppression.

    Facts

    Police illegally searched Schisck’s apartment and found narcotics.
    During the illegal search, a man named Bramante was admitted into the apartment and questioned.
    Bramante gave the police information that led them to Elizabeth Holbauer.
    Holbauer testified that Schisck had performed two abortions on her.
    This testimony formed the basis of the indictment against Schisck for abortion.

    Procedural History

    Schisck moved to suppress the physical evidence seized during the illegal search; the motion was granted, and the People did not appeal.
    Schisck then moved to suppress all evidence stemming from the search, including witness testimony.
    The trial court granted this motion, but the Appellate Division reversed.
    The case reached the New York Court of Appeals on appeal from the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether testimony of a witness, whose identity was discovered as a direct result of an illegal search, is admissible against the defendant.

    Holding

    No, because while evidence obtained during an illegal search, as well as evidence derived directly from it, is generally inadmissible, the connection between the illegal search and the testimony was sufficiently attenuated in this case to permit its admission.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court acknowledged the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine, which generally excludes evidence derived from illegal searches. However, it also recognized the attenuation doctrine, which allows the admission of evidence when the connection between the illegal search and the evidence is sufficiently weak.
    The court reasoned that the testimony of Holbauer was admissible because the connection between the illegal search and her testimony was sufficiently attenuated. They did not provide specific reasoning for the attenuation.
    Chief Judge Fuld dissented, arguing that there was a direct and strong connection between the illegal search and Holbauer’s testimony. He emphasized that Bramante was discovered and questioned during the search itself, and the information he provided led immediately to Holbauer.
    The dissent further argued that there is no logical basis for distinguishing between tangible and testimonial evidence when applying the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine, quoting Silverthorne Lbr. Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392: “the knowledge gained by the Government’s own wrong cannot be used by it”.
    The dissent cited Smith v. United States, 344 F.2d 545, as analogous, where witness testimony was excluded as fruit of an illegal search because the connection between the illegality and the testimony was direct.
    The dissent highlighted the importance of excluding illegally obtained evidence to discourage police misconduct, referencing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643.
    This case illustrates the complexities in applying the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine, particularly when dealing with witness testimony. The attenuation exception can be difficult to apply, and the presence of dissenting opinions indicates the lack of clear consensus on when the connection between the illegal search and the evidence becomes too attenuated. It highlights the importance of meticulously examining the causal chain between illegal police action and the evidence sought to be admitted, considering whether the evidence would inevitably have been discovered through independent legal means.