New York Law Review

Tag: Illegal Detention

  • People v. Wilson, 57 N.Y.2d 786 (1982): Attenuation Doctrine and Admissibility of Evidence After Illegal Detention

    People v. Wilson, 57 N.Y.2d 786 (1982)

    Evidence obtained following an illegal detention is admissible if the taint from the initial illegality is sufficiently attenuated by intervening events and investigation, breaking the causal chain between the unlawful conduct and the acquisition of the evidence.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether identifications and statements obtained after an illegal detention should be suppressed as “fruits of the poisonous tree.” The court held that even though the initial detention was unlawful for lacking probable cause, the subsequent lineup identification and statements were admissible because the taint of the illegal detention was attenuated by the intervening time and the continued independent investigation by the Transit Authority police. The police obtained the defendant’s name, address, and photograph during the illegal detention, but this was considered basic identification information. A ten-day interval and further investigation, including informing the defendant of his rights before the lineup, sufficiently purged the taint of the initial illegality.

    Facts

    Transit Authority police stopped the defendant based on reasonable suspicion, but the suppression court later determined they lacked probable cause for the detention. During the illegal detention, the police obtained the defendant’s name, address, and photograph. Ten days later, the police, as part of their ongoing investigation, asked the defendant to participate in a lineup, informing him of his rights, and he agreed.

    Procedural History

    The suppression court determined that the initial stop was based on reasonable suspicion, but the subsequent detention lacked probable cause. The defendant sought to suppress the lineup identification and subsequent statements as fruits of the illegal detention. The lower court denied the motion to suppress. The Appellate Division affirmed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether identifications and statements obtained following an illegal detention must be suppressed as “fruits of the poisonous tree,” even if intervening events and investigation have occurred.

    Holding

    No, because the exploitation of the illegality was sufficiently attenuated by the intervening time and investigation that suppression of the lineup identification and subsequent statements made by the defendant was not required.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied the attenuation doctrine, derived from Wong Sun v. United States, to determine whether the connection between the illegal detention and the subsequent evidence was sufficiently weak to permit the use of the evidence at trial. The court reasoned that the police were entitled to make reasonable inquiry as to the person’s identity when acting on reasonable suspicion, and obtaining name, address, and photograph was simply gathering identification information. The court emphasized that the intervening ten-day period and the independent investigation by the Transit Authority police, coupled with informing the defendant of his rights before the lineup, sufficiently attenuated any taint from the initial unlawful detention. The court noted, “the facts of this case clearly indicate that any taint flowing from the initial unlawful detention was attenuated by the intervening investigation.” The photograph obtained during the detention was used in a photo array, but not offered as evidence at trial. This further supported the conclusion that the lineup identification was independent of the initial detention.

  • People v. Henley, 53 N.Y.2d 403 (1981): Effect of Illegal Detention on Consent to Search

    People v. Henley, 53 N.Y.2d 403 (1981)

    An individual’s consent to a search is invalid if it is the product of an illegal detention; however, a defendant cannot assert the violation of another person’s Fourth Amendment rights to challenge the validity of a search.

    Summary

    Two brothers, Jim Henley, Jr., and Willie Norman Henley, were arrested after police found stolen goods in their apartment. Jim was stopped near the scene of a burglary and brought to the apartment where he consented to a search. Willie was present in the apartment during the search. The court held that Jim’s consent was invalid because it followed an illegal detention, as police lacked probable cause to detain him initially. Therefore, the evidence seized should be suppressed as to Jim. However, Willie could not claim the violation of Jim’s rights; thus, the search was valid as to him.

    Facts

    Around 4:00 AM, police received a call about a burglary at Mercury Radio and Battery Company. Officer Szczur saw Jim Henley, Jr., walking from a yard onto the street about a block away from the reported burglary. Jim had nothing in his hands. Officer Szczur stopped Jim, who said he was going to buy a loaf of bread. Szczur, finding no open stores, took Jim to the scene of the burglary and then to his residence at 24 Spiess Street. Jim initially gave the wrong apartment, but then directed the officers to the upstairs apartment. Other officers arrived, and Jim was arrested. He consented to a search of the apartment. Willie Norman Henley, Jim’s brother, was present in the apartment. During the search, officers found boxes stamped with the name of Mercury Radio and Battery Company.

    Procedural History

    Jim and Willie were indicted for burglary and grand larceny. Willie was also charged with possession of a controlled substance. Willie was charged under a separate indictment with possession of burglar’s tools and attempted burglary related to an earlier incident. The trial court denied the motion to suppress the evidence seized at the apartment. Jim pleaded guilty to attempted burglary, and Willie pleaded guilty to grand larceny and criminal trespass, resolving all charges. The Appellate Division affirmed all convictions. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed Willie’s convictions but reversed Jim’s.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Jim Henley, Jr.’s, consent to the search of the apartment was valid, given that he was detained and transported to the apartment without probable cause.
    2. Whether Willie Norman Henley can challenge the validity of the search of the apartment based on the violation of his brother’s Fourth Amendment rights.

    Holding

    1. No, because Jim Henley, Jr.’s, consent to the search was tainted by his illegal custodial detention and transportation, rendering the consent invalid.
    2. No, because Willie Norman Henley cannot assert the violation of his brother’s Fourth Amendment rights to challenge the validity of the search.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while Officer Szczur had reasonable suspicion to stop and question Jim, there was no probable cause to take him into custody and transport him to his residence. Jim’s presence near the burglary scene and his statement about buying bread did not provide probable cause to link him to the crime. Because the custodial detention and transportation violated Jim’s Fourth Amendment rights, his subsequent consent to the search was invalid. The court stated, “The custodial detention and transportation having violated Henley, Jr.’s, constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable seizure, his subsequent consent to the police to enter the upstairs apartment was fatally tainted.” Consequently, the evidence seized should have been suppressed as to Jim.

    However, the court held that Willie could not challenge the search’s validity based on the violation of his brother’s rights. Willie lacked standing to assert that Jim’s illegal detention invalidated the consent to search. Absent the illegal detention, there was no evidence to suggest that Jim’s consent was involuntary. Therefore, the entry into the apartment was authorized as to Willie, and the seizure of evidence did not violate his constitutional rights.

  • People v. Dunaway, 38 N.Y.2d 813 (1975): Admissibility of Confession After Illegal Detention

    38 N.Y.2d 813 (1975)

    A confession obtained after an illegal detention may be inadmissible, even if Miranda warnings are given, if the confession is a product of that illegal detention.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reconsidered its prior affirmance of Dunaway’s conviction for felony murder and attempted robbery in light of Brown v. Illinois. The court found that Dunaway may have been illegally detained when police took him into custody without probable cause, and that the confession he subsequently gave, even after being read his Miranda rights, may have been inadmissible as a product of that illegal detention. The court remitted the case to the trial court for a hearing to determine whether the detention was supported by probable cause and, if not, whether the confession was tainted by the illegal arrest.

    Facts

    Two men committed an armed robbery at a pizza shop in Rochester, New York, during which the proprietor was shot and killed. Four months later, three police officers went to Dunaway’s home and asked him to come downtown to talk about “something.” The record did not indicate that the police had any reason to suspect him. At the police station, Dunaway was taken to an interrogation room, given Miranda warnings, and waived his right to counsel. He then made inculpatory statements and drew incriminating sketches.

    Procedural History

    Prior to trial, Dunaway moved to suppress the statements and drawings, arguing they were obtained during an illegal detention without probable cause. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that the statements were voluntary after proper Miranda warnings. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals initially affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court of the United States remanded the case to the New York Court of Appeals for further consideration in light of Brown v. Illinois.

    Issue(s)

    1. Was Dunaway illegally detained when the police took him into custody?

    2. If Dunaway was illegally detained, was his confession inadmissible as a product of that illegal detention, even though Miranda warnings were given?

    Holding

    1. The court did not make a determination on whether Dunaway was illegally detained, because the record was inadequate to support a determination of probable cause.

    2. If there was an illegal detention, the court did not make a determination on whether Dunaway’s confession was inadmissible because the trial court needed to determine whether the confession was tainted by the illegal arrest.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that the trial court made no findings as to the nature of Dunaway’s detention or whether there was probable cause for it. The District Attorney conceded that the record was inadequate to support a determination of probable cause. The court stated, “accordingly, this case must be remitted to the Monroe County Court for a factual hearing and such other proceedings as may be necessary to determine the issues…and, in the event there was a detention and probable cause is not found for such detention, to determine the further question as to whether the making of the confessions was rendered infirm by the illegal arrest (see Brown v Illinois, 422 US 590, supra).” The court recognized that even though Miranda warnings were given, a confession could still be inadmissible if it was the product of an illegal arrest. This reflects the Supreme Court’s holding in Brown v. Illinois, which held that Miranda warnings alone do not dissipate the taint of an illegal arrest. The focus must be on whether the confession was obtained by exploitation of the illegal arrest.