New York Law Review

Tag: Illegal Arrest

  • People v. Jones, 22 N.Y.3d 452 (2013): Admissibility of Lineup Identification After Illegal Arrest

    People v. Jones, 22 N.Y.3d 452 (2013)

    Evidence obtained following an illegal arrest is admissible if the connection between the illegal conduct and the discovery of the evidence is sufficiently attenuated.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a lineup identification should be suppressed as the product of an illegal arrest. The defendant was initially arrested without probable cause for disorderly conduct, but a subsequent conversation between the arresting officer and a detective, who had independently gathered substantial evidence linking the defendant to a robbery, provided probable cause for the defendant’s detention. The Court held that the lineup identification was admissible because the taint of the illegal arrest was sufficiently attenuated by the intervening discovery of the detective’s independent evidence. The Court considered the temporal proximity of the arrest and identification, the presence of intervening circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.

    Facts

    A woman was robbed in her apartment building. The victim and a neighbor described the perpetrator as a tall, dark-skinned man in his early thirties, with a large build. The neighbor added that the perpetrator was known as “Izz.” A detective learned that “Izz” was also known as “Michael Wright,” and that Wright’s physical attributes matched the descriptions given by the witnesses. Several days later, a store employee who had seen the man leaving the building identified the defendant to a sergeant. The sergeant located the defendant, who identified himself as “Michael Wright” but could not produce identification. The sergeant arrested the defendant for disorderly conduct because he was allegedly blocking the sidewalk. The sergeant also suspected the defendant was involved in the robbery. After the arrest, the sergeant contacted the detective, who informed him about the photograph of the suspect in his case folder.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of burglary and robbery. The Appellate Division held the appeal in abeyance and remitted the matter for a Dunaway hearing to determine the legality of the arrest. The hearing court found that the arrest was illegal but that the detective’s independently gathered evidence attenuated the taint. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the lineup identification must be suppressed as the product of an illegal arrest, or whether the taint of the illegal arrest was sufficiently attenuated by intervening events such that the identification was admissible.

    Holding

    No, the lineup identification was admissible because the taint of the illegal arrest was attenuated because the detective possessed sufficient independent evidence to establish probable cause for the defendant’s arrest, which was discovered shortly after the illegal arrest.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the initial arrest was illegal because it was made without probable cause. However, the Court emphasized that evidence discovered subsequent to an illegal arrest is not automatically subject to the exclusionary rule. Instead, the People must show that the evidence was obtained independently of the illegal conduct. To determine whether attenuation exists, the Court must consider “’the temporal proximity of the arrest and [the evidence at issue], the presence of intervening circumstances and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct’” (People v. Bradford, 15 N.Y.3d 329, 333 (2010), quoting People v. Conyers, 68 N.Y.2d 982, 983 (1986)).

    The Court found that the detective had gathered detailed descriptions of the perpetrator from two witnesses, learned of the perpetrator’s street name, and discovered that the street name was associated with an individual whose physical description matched the witnesses’ descriptions. The detective also had a photograph of the suspect. This evidence was obtained independently of the illegal arrest. The sergeant’s conversation with the detective shortly after the arrest, which revealed the existence of this independent evidence, constituted an intervening circumstance that attenuated the taint of the illegal arrest.

    The Court rejected the defendant’s argument that the disorderly conduct charge was a pretext for an illegal investigation, noting that there was record support for the Appellate Division’s finding that the police did not exploit the illegal arrest. The Court further stated that “a police officer is entitled to rely on a name given him by a fellow officer as part of his investigation” (People v. Ketcham, 93 N.Y.2d 416, 420 [1999]).

  • People v. Gethers, 86 N.Y.2d 159 (1995): Suppression of Identification Evidence After Illegal Arrest

    People v. Gethers, 86 N.Y.2d 159 (1995)

    An identification of a suspect made immediately following an illegal arrest and detention, where the arrest was for the purpose of the identification, is a product of the illegal arrest and must be suppressed.

    Summary

    Gethers was arrested for selling cocaine as part of a buy and bust operation. A pretrial suppression hearing revealed that the arresting officer lacked probable cause. The physical evidence was suppressed, but the identification evidence was allowed. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the identification was tainted by the illegal arrest and ordered a new trial preceded by an independent source hearing. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the confirmatory identification made immediately after the illegal arrest should have been suppressed because it was a direct result of the illegal seizure and detention. The court distinguished this case from situations involving suggestive identification procedures, focusing instead on the causal link between the illegal arrest and the identification.

    Facts

    Undercover Detective Rye purchased cocaine from two sellers. She transmitted a description of the sellers to Officer Bell. Bell located and arrested Gethers and another man. Immediately after the arrest, Bell walked the two men to a street corner. Detective Rye then performed a drive-by identification, confirming Gethers as one of the sellers.

    Procedural History

    At the pretrial suppression hearing, the court suppressed physical evidence due to a lack of probable cause for the arrest. However, the court denied the motion to suppress the identification evidence. Gethers was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance. The Appellate Division reversed and ordered a new trial preceded by an independent source hearing. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Detective Rye’s on-the-scene confirmatory identification must be suppressed as a product of the illegal arrest.

    2. Whether Detective Rye’s in-court identification of defendant was improperly admitted in the absence of evidence at the suppression hearing of an independent source.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the identification was made immediately following the illegal arrest and detention, and the illegal seizure and detention of the defendant made the identification possible, and was done for the purpose of displaying him to the undercover officer.

    2. Yes, because there was no evidence at the suppression hearing of an independent source upon which the hearing court could rely to find that the in-court identification was come at by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the identification of Gethers was a direct product of the illegal arrest. It stated that evidence obtained through the exploitation of illegal police conduct must be suppressed, citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). The court found that the causal link between the arrest and identification was clear. The illegal seizure made the identification possible, and the purpose of the arrest was to display Gethers to the undercover officer. The court distinguished this case from People v. Wharton, 74 N.Y.2d 921 (1989), which dealt with the suggestiveness of identification procedures, a due process issue, while this case concerned the Fourth Amendment protection against illegal seizures. The court stated, “[A]n identification derived from exploitation of an illegal arrest is equally tainted whether made by a trained officer or a lay person.” Regarding the in-court identification, the Court emphasized that there was no evidence presented at the suppression hearing regarding an independent source for the identification, as required by People v. James, 67 N.Y.2d 662 (1986).

  • People v. Bradshaw, 68 N.Y.2d 1032 (1986): Determining Attenuation Between Illegal Arrest and Consent to Search

    People v. Bradshaw, 68 N.Y.2d 1032 (1986)

    When evidence is obtained through a consensual search following an illegal arrest, the prosecution must demonstrate that the consent was sufficiently independent of the illegal arrest to be considered a product of free will, considering factors such as temporal proximity, intervening circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a defendant’s consent to search his apartment was sufficiently attenuated from his illegal arrest. The Court held that while the voluntariness of the consent is important, it is not dispositive. The court emphasized that the prosecution must prove the consent was acquired independently of the illegal arrest, considering several factors to determine if the consent was a product of free will. Because the lower court only considered voluntariness, the case was remitted for further proceedings to determine if the consent was sufficiently attenuated from the illegal arrest.

    Facts

    The defendant, Bradshaw, was illegally arrested, a fact conceded by the prosecution on appeal. After the illegal arrest, Bradshaw consented to a search of his apartment. The suppression court determined Bradshaw’s consent was voluntary. However, Bradshaw argued that the consent was tainted by the illegal arrest and should not be admissible as evidence.

    Procedural History

    The suppression court focused solely on the voluntariness of Bradshaw’s consent to the search. The Appellate Division upheld the lower court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case, finding that the lower courts applied an incorrect legal standard by not fully considering the attenuation between the illegal arrest and the consent to search. The Court of Appeals remitted the case to the Supreme Court for a proper determination.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant’s consent to search his apartment, following an illegal arrest, was sufficiently attenuated from the illegal arrest to be admissible as evidence, considering factors beyond the mere voluntariness of the consent.

    Holding

    No, because the voluntariness of consent is not dispositive when the consent follows an illegal arrest; the prosecution must demonstrate that the consent was “acquired by means sufficiently distinguishable from the arrest to be purged of the illegality,” considering factors beyond mere voluntariness.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that when a consent to search follows an illegal arrest, the prosecution has a heightened burden to prove the consent was truly independent of the illegal police action. The court stated that “the burden rests on the People to demonstrate that the consent was ‘acquired by means sufficiently distinguishable from the arrest to be purged of the illegality’.” While voluntariness is a factor, it is not the only one. The Court outlined several factors to consider:

    • Temporal proximity of the consent to the arrest
    • Presence or absence of intervening circumstances
    • Whether the police purpose underlying the illegality was to obtain the consent or the fruits of the search
    • Whether the consent was volunteered or requested
    • Whether the defendant was aware he could decline to consent
    • The purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct

    The Court cited Brown v. Illinois, 422 US 590, 603-604, emphasizing the need to examine the causal connection between the illegal arrest and the subsequent consent. The Court found that the suppression court erred by focusing solely on voluntariness and failing to consider these other factors. Because the lower court applied an incorrect legal standard, the Court of Appeals remitted the case for a new determination, instructing the suppression court to consider all relevant factors to determine if the consent was sufficiently an act of free will to purge the taint of the illegal arrest. The Court noted, “Of course, the relevant factors will vary from case to case and each case must be individually considered on the particular facts and circumstances presented and the determination made with due regard for the purposes sought to be served by the exclusionary rule.”

  • People v. Harris, 68 N.Y.2d 951 (1986): Admissibility of Confession Following Illegal Warrantless Arrest

    68 N.Y.2d 951 (1986)

    When a confession follows an illegal arrest, it is admissible only if the prosecution proves the confession was attenuated from the illegal arrest by intervening events, considering temporal proximity, intervening circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy of the misconduct.

    Summary

    Harris was arrested at his home without a warrant for assault. After being given Miranda warnings, he was taken to the police station. After two hours alone, he was questioned and confessed to the shooting, claiming it was accidental. He sought to suppress the statement. The New York Court of Appeals held that while the arrest was illegal under Payton v. New York, the confession was admissible because it was sufficiently attenuated from the illegal arrest. The court emphasized the extensive findings by the hearing court, including the multiple advisements of Miranda rights, the two-hour period of isolation before questioning, and the proper conduct of the police throughout the custody period. The court found that the lower courts’ finding of attenuation had support in the record and was thus beyond their power to review.

    Facts

    Defendant was arrested at his home on November 18, 1980, without a warrant, and charged with first-degree assault for shooting Thelma Barnes. The arrest was based on probable cause. After the arrest, he was given Miranda warnings in a police vehicle and taken to headquarters, where he remained alone for two hours. He was then questioned for an hour and admitted to the shooting, claiming it was accidental. The police prepared a written statement, which he signed.

    Procedural History

    Harris moved to suppress his post-arrest statements. The hearing court denied the motion, initially holding the arrest lawful because Payton v. New York was not retroactive, and alternatively, that any illegality was attenuated. Harris was convicted at trial. The Appellate Division affirmed, acknowledging the Supreme Court’s retroactive application of Payton, but agreed with the attenuation finding.

    Issue(s)

    Whether statements made following a warrantless and thus illegal arrest in the home are admissible, or whether they must be suppressed as the fruit of the illegal arrest.

    Holding

    No, the statements are admissible because the connection between the illegal arrest and the confession was sufficiently attenuated by intervening circumstances, including the administration of Miranda warnings, a significant time lapse, and proper police conduct.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on the principle that when a defendant challenges statements as the product of an illegal arrest, the prosecution must show the statements were acquired by means sufficiently distinguishable to purge the illegality. This determination considers the temporal proximity of the arrest and confession, intervening circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy of the misconduct.

    While Miranda warnings are important, they are not conclusive. The court highlighted the hearing court’s findings: Harris was advised of his rights twice, waived them, was alone for two hours before questioning, questioning was intermittent, the statement was partly exculpatory, and police conduct was proper. The court quoted People v Johnson, 66 NY2d 398, 407: That determination requires consideration of the temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession, the presence of intervening circumstances and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.

    The court deferred to the finding of attenuation made by the courts below, noting that this presented a mixed question of law and fact, and because the finding was supported by the record, it was beyond their power to review. The court emphasized the original legality of the arrest, which later became illegal due to a subsequent Supreme Court decision, as a factor contributing to the attenuation. The court analogized to People v Graham, 90 AD2d 198, 202, emphasizing the act of free will in making the statement, unaffected by the subsequent change in the law.

  • People v. Johnson, 444 N.E.2d 670 (N.Y. 1982): Exclusionary Rule and Attenuation of Taint

    People v. Johnson, 444 N.E.2d 670 (N.Y. 1982)

    Confessions obtained after an illegal arrest are inadmissible unless the taint of the illegal arrest is sufficiently attenuated.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the admissibility of a confession following an arrest later deemed potentially illegal under Dunaway v. New York. The court reversed the lower court’s decision, which had relied on a now-overruled precedent permitting detention based on reasonable suspicion. The Court of Appeals held that a new suppression hearing was needed to determine whether the police had probable cause for the arrest or if, lacking probable cause, intervening circumstances sufficiently attenuated the taint of the illegal arrest to render the subsequent confession admissible. The court emphasized that neither probable cause nor attenuation could be determined as a matter of law based on the existing record, necessitating further factual findings.

    Facts

    The defendant was taken into custody and confessed to a crime. The Supreme Court initially denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the confession, relying on People v. Morales, which allowed police to detain a suspect based on reasonable suspicion for questioning. The Supreme Court, prior to the US Supreme Court case of Dunaway v. New York, used this standard in its ruling to deny the motion to suppress.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress his confession. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision without issuing an opinion. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case after the U.S. Supreme Court decided Dunaway v. New York, which impacted the legal basis of the lower court’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the police officers had probable cause to take the defendant into custody.

    2. Whether, if the police lacked probable cause for the defendant’s detention, attenuating circumstances existed to establish that the subsequent confession was not a product of the illegal arrest or obtained as a consequence of its exploitation.

    Holding

    1. The court could not determine probable cause from the record. Case remitted for a new hearing.

    2. The court could not determine if attenuating circumstances existed to allow for the confession because further factual determinations are needed based on the precedent set by Dunaway v. New York. Case remitted for a new hearing.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the lower court’s denial of the motion to suppress relied on a legal premise (detention based on reasonable suspicion) that had been invalidated by Dunaway v. New York. The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Dunaway made it clear that custodial interrogation requires probable cause. Therefore, the Court of Appeals needed to determine (1) whether probable cause existed for the arrest, and (2) if not, whether the connection between the illegal arrest and the confession was sufficiently attenuated. The Court stated that “no determination has been made by either court below as to whether the police officers had probable cause to take defendant into custody or whether, if they did not have probable cause and his detention was thus illegal, there were such attenuating circumstances as to establish that his subsequent confession was neither the product of his illegal arrest nor obtained in consequence of its exploitation.” Since neither issue could be resolved based on the existing record, the court remitted the case for a new suppression hearing. The court further specified the course of action based on the outcome of the suppression hearing: If the motion to suppress is denied, the conviction stands, subject to appellate review limited to the suppression ruling. If the motion is granted, the conviction is vacated, and the case proceeds on the indictment.

  • People v. Graham, 42 N.Y.2d 96 (1977): Admissibility of Confessions After Arrest Without Probable Cause

    People v. Graham, 42 N.Y.2d 96 (1977)

    Confessions obtained as a result of an arrest made without probable cause are inadmissible as evidence.

    Summary

    In this New York Court of Appeals case, the court reversed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the defendant’s confessions should have been suppressed because his arrest lacked probable cause. The Court reasoned that the confessions obtained after the illegal arrest were inadmissible. Additionally, the inadvertent delivery of unadmitted exhibits to the jury further warranted a new trial. The dissent argued that the police had probable cause based on the victims’ statements and that the jury’s exposure to unadmitted exhibits did not prejudice the outcome, given that the jury acquitted the defendant on some counts.

    Facts

    The defendant was arrested and subsequently made confessions. Prior to the arrest, police had taken detailed statements from three young victims, two of whom were 11 years old, alleging sodomy and rape by the defendant. These statements formed the basis of the police’s belief that the defendant had committed the crimes. However, these detailed statements were not formally presented as evidence at the suppression hearing to establish probable cause.

    Procedural History

    The trial court admitted the defendant’s confessions into evidence and the jury convicted the defendant on several counts. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, finding the confessions inadmissible and ordering a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant’s arrest was supported by probable cause, thereby rendering his subsequent confessions admissible.
    2. Whether the inadvertent delivery of unadmitted exhibits to the jury prejudiced the defendant’s right to a fair trial.

    Holding

    1. No, because the arrest was made without establishing probable cause at the suppression hearing to justify the detention; therefore, any confessions obtained as a result of the illegal arrest are inadmissible.
    2. Yes, because the delivery of unadmitted exhibits to the jury further tainted the trial process.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the confessions should have been suppressed as the arrest was not based on probable cause established at the suppression hearing. Even though the police possessed detailed statements from the victims prior to the arrest, these statements were not formally introduced or relied upon during the suppression hearing to demonstrate probable cause. The court emphasized that the prosecution must affirmatively demonstrate the existence of probable cause at the suppression hearing to justify the admission of evidence obtained as a result of the arrest. The Court further held that the inadvertent delivery of unadmitted exhibits to the jury independently warranted a new trial, as it could have influenced the jury’s deliberations and prejudiced the defendant. The dissent argued that probable cause existed based on the victims’ statements, which the arresting officer referenced, and that the jury’s viewing of unadmitted evidence was harmless error given the acquittals on some counts and the jurors’ statements about their deliberations.