New York Law Review

Tag: identification testimony

  • People v. Bernier, 73 N.Y.2d 1006 (1989): Consequences of Failing to Provide Timely Notice of Identification Testimony

    People v. Bernier, 73 N.Y.2d 1006 (1989)

    When the prosecution fails to provide timely notice of intent to use identification testimony, as required by CPL 710.30, preclusion is mandatory unless a valid excuse exists for the lack of notice, and a defendant does not waive the right to preclusion by subsequently participating in a suppression hearing after the initial motion to preclude was denied.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of robbery and weapons possession. During jury selection, the defense learned of an unnoticed identifying witness. The defense moved to preclude the testimony due to lack of notice. The court denied the motion, but ordered a Wade hearing after the prosecutor admitted an out-of-court identification occurred. After the initial suppression, the court reopened the hearing to establish an independent source for the in-court identification. The Appellate Division reversed, suppressing the in-court identification. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the initial failure to provide statutory notice mandated preclusion, and the defendant did not waive this right by participating in the Wade hearing after the initial motion to preclude was denied.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with robbery and weapons possession related to three separate incidents at the same gas station. During jury selection, the defense became aware of a witness, Gedeon, who would be the prosecution’s primary identifying witness, but for whom no prior notice had been given as required by CPL 710.30(1). The prosecutor acknowledged that an out-of-court identification had been made by Gedeon.

    Procedural History

    The trial court initially denied the defendant’s motion to preclude Gedeon’s testimony but ordered a Wade hearing. The Wade hearing resulted in suppression of the out-of-court identification. The prosecution then successfully moved to reopen the Wade hearing to establish an independent source for an in-court identification. The trial court then allowed Gedeon to make an in-court identification. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction and suppressed the in-court identification. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s initial motion to preclude identification testimony when the prosecution failed to provide timely notice as required by CPL 710.30.

    2. Whether the defendant waived the protection of CPL 710.30 by participating in a Wade hearing after the initial motion to preclude was denied.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the People failed to present any valid excuse for not giving the required notice under CPL 710.30, requiring preclusion of the identification testimony.

    2. No, because the waiver exception of CPL 710.30(3) does not apply when the defendant initially moved to preclude and lost, and the defendant made no suppression motion qualifying under CPL 710.30(3).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, emphasizing the mandatory nature of CPL 710.30. The court stated, “Inasmuch as the People failed to present or establish any excuse for not giving the required notice, the court should have granted the preclusion motion and suppressed the identification testimony.” The court explicitly referenced People v. O’Doherty, 70 NY2d 479, which firmly established the consequences for failing to adhere to the statutory notice requirements. The Court also rejected the People’s argument that the defendant waived his right to preclusion by participating in the Wade hearing after his initial motion to preclude had been denied. Quoting, “The waiver exception cannot become operative in a case such as this when the defendant clearly moved initially to preclude and lost. In any event, he made no suppression motion qualifying under CPL 710.30 (3) (see, People v Amparo, 73 NY2d 728, 729; People v McMullin, 70 NY2d 855).” The court’s decision underscores the importance of strict compliance with CPL 710.30 and clarifies that a defendant’s participation in subsequent suppression proceedings, after an initial preclusion motion is wrongly denied, does not constitute a waiver of their right to challenge the identification testimony. This prevents the prosecution from benefitting from its initial failure to provide timely notice. The case serves as a reminder that the prosecution bears the burden of demonstrating a valid excuse for failing to provide timely notice of identification testimony, and absent such an excuse, preclusion is the required remedy.

  • People v. Bernier, 73 N.Y.2d 852 (1988): Consequences of Failing to Provide Timely Notice of Identification Testimony

    People v. Bernier, 73 N.Y.2d 852 (1988)

    When the prosecution intends to use identification testimony at trial, they must provide notice to the defendant within 15 days of arraignment, and a lack of prejudice to the defendant does not excuse the failure to demonstrate good cause for a late notice.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and mandated a new trial because the prosecution failed to provide timely notice of their intent to use identification testimony at trial, as required by CPL 710.30. The court emphasized that demonstrating good cause for the delay is mandatory, and a lack of prejudice to the defendant does not excuse this requirement. The improperly admitted identification testimony, being the only direct evidence placing the defendant at the scene, was deemed not harmless, necessitating a new trial.

    Facts

    Two witnesses observed the defendant inside their home. Subsequently, these witnesses identified the defendant at the police station. The prosecution intended to use these witnesses’ identification testimony at trial.

    Procedural History

    The People failed to serve notice within 15 days of arraignment regarding their intention to use the identification testimony. Despite this failure, the trial court allowed the witnesses to identify the defendant at trial. The defendant was convicted of burglary in the second degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. This appeal followed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the People’s failure to provide notice within 15 days of arraignment of their intent to use identification testimony at trial, absent a showing of good cause for the delay, requires suppression of that identification testimony, even if the delay did not prejudice the defendant.

    Holding

    Yes, because CPL 710.30 requires the People to establish good cause for a delay in serving notice of intent to use identification testimony, and a lack of prejudice to the defendant does not negate this requirement. The admission of the identification testimony was not harmless error in this case.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court based its reasoning on a strict interpretation of CPL 710.30, which mandates that the People provide notice within 15 days of arraignment if they intend to use identification testimony at trial. The statute also requires the People to establish good cause for any delay in providing such notice. The Court of Appeals emphasized that fulfilling the “statutory requirement of good cause” is essential, and a lack of prejudice to the defendant is insufficient to excuse the failure to meet this requirement, citing People v. O’Doherty, 70 NY2d 479, 481. The court acknowledged that the erroneously admitted identification testimony was the sole direct evidence linking the defendant to the crime, making the error not harmless. Thus, because the prosecution failed to demonstrate good cause for the delay and the error was not harmless, the defendant’s conviction was overturned.

  • People v. Gonzalez, 68 N.Y.2d 950 (1986): Admissibility of Prior Identification Testimony

    People v. Gonzalez, 68 N.Y.2d 950 (1986)

    Under New York Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) 60.25, a witness’s failure to affirmatively state current certainty of a prior identification does not automatically render the identification testimony insufficient as evidence-in-chief, provided that the prior identification meets constitutional reliability standards and any objections to admissibility are timely raised.

    Summary

    In this case, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the admissibility of prior identification testimony under CPL 60.25, where witnesses did not explicitly confirm their present certainty regarding their previous identifications of the defendant. The Court held that the absence of such an affirmative statement does not render the evidence insufficient as a matter of law. The Court emphasized the importance of the prior identification being made under circumstances consistent with the accused’s constitutional rights and stressed that challenges to the reliability of the identification must be raised promptly to preserve the issue for appellate review.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of a crime based on identification testimony given pursuant to CPL 60.25. The witnesses had previously identified the defendant but did not explicitly state at trial that they were currently certain of the accuracy of those prior identifications. The core issue revolved around whether this omission affected the admissibility and sufficiency of the identification evidence.

    Procedural History

    The case reached the New York Court of Appeals after an appeal concerning the admissibility of identification testimony under CPL 60.25. The specific procedural history prior to the Court of Appeals is not detailed in this memorandum opinion, but the appeal focused on the argument that the lack of affirmative certainty regarding prior identifications rendered the evidence insufficient.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the failure of identification witnesses to affirmatively state their current certainty regarding prior identifications of the defendant, made under circumstances consistent with constitutional rights, renders the identification testimony insufficient as a matter of law under CPL 60.25.

    Holding

    No, because the absence of a current certainty statement does not automatically invalidate prior identification testimony if the prior identification was made under constitutionally sound circumstances and any objections to admissibility were not timely raised. The Court emphasized that challenges to the reliability of such testimony must be promptly asserted to be preserved for review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that while CPL 60.25 might be interpreted as requiring an affirmative statement of current certainty for prior identifications, this requirement primarily pertains to the foundation for admissibility of the evidence. Critically, the Court pointed out that CPL 60.25(1)(a)(ii) requires that the prior identification be made “under circumstances consistent with such rights as an accused person may derive under the constitution of this state or of the United States.” This constitutional safeguard provides a basis for admitting the past identification as evidence-in-chief, connecting the defendant to the crime. The court noted that if a defendant wishes to challenge the reliability of a past identification based on the witness’s failure to affirm current certainty, they must object in a timely manner, as required by CPL 470.05(2). Because the defendant in this case did not object to the admission of the testimony at trial, the issue was not preserved for appellate review. The court essentially held that the reliability of the identification is ensured by the constitutional context in which it was made and that procedural rules require timely objections to evidentiary matters.

  • People v. Quevas, 81 N.Y.2d 70 (1993): Admissibility of Prior Identification Testimony When Witness Refuses to Identify Due to Fear

    People v. Quevas, 81 N.Y.2d 70 (1993)

    Third-party testimony recounting a witness’s pretrial identification of the defendant is inadmissible under CPL 60.25 when the witness refuses to make an in-court identification due to fear, as the statute requires the witness to be unable to identify the defendant based on present recollection.

    Summary

    Abraham Rodriguez was robbed and identified two of his assailants to police shortly after the incident. However, at a pretrial hearing and subsequent trial, Rodriguez refused to identify the defendants in court, stating he feared for his life. The trial court allowed the police officers to testify about Rodriguez’s prior identification, and the defendants were convicted. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that CPL 60.25 does not permit third-party testimony of a prior identification when the witness’s refusal to identify is based on fear, not an inability to recall.

    Facts

    Abraham Rodriguez was robbed by a group of men after leaving a bar. He reported the robbery to the police and, while in a patrol car, identified two men on the street as his assailants. The police arrested the two men. Rodriguez stated that a third man who was with them was not involved. At the time of arrest, one defendant had $70, and the other had no cash.

    Procedural History

    At a pretrial Wade hearing, Rodriguez refused to identify the defendants, citing fear for his safety. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to preclude the police officer’s testimony regarding the prior identification. The defendants were convicted of first-degree robbery. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions, finding the officers’ testimony admissible due to Rodriguez’s fear. A dissenting judge believed the fear was an improper basis for admitting the testimony. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, under CPL 60.25, an eyewitness’s refusal to identify defendants because of fear allows the admission of third-party testimony of an identification made by him at the time of arrest.

    Holding

    No, because CPL 60.25 requires that the witness be unable to make an identification “on the basis of present recollection,” and the witness’s fear indicates a present ability to identify, not an inability to recall.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that third-party testimony of a prior identification is generally inadmissible. CPL 60.25 provides a specific exception, allowing such testimony only when the witness is “unable at the proceeding to state, on the basis of present recollection, whether or not the defendant is the person in question.” The court reasoned that Rodriguez’s refusal to identify the defendants stemmed from fear, demonstrating that he was, in fact, able to recognize them. The court stated that “By his repeated refusals to identify defendants because of fear of retribution, Rodriguez manifested not an inability to identify these defendants — a neutral fact — but the converse.” The court distinguished this situation from cases where the witness’s inability to identify the defendant resulted from a lapse of time or a change in appearance, which would properly invoke CPL 60.25. The court explicitly declined to extend the application of CPL 60.25 to situations where fear prevents identification, as this would contradict the statute’s clear language requiring an inability to identify based on present recollection.

  • People v. Brewster, 63 N.Y.2d 419 (1984): Admissibility of Identification Testimony Before Grand Jury

    People v. Brewster, 63 N.Y.2d 419 (1984)

    An indictment is not dismissable solely because a complaining witness identified the defendant before the Grand Jury without disclosing that the initial identification was based on photographs.

    Summary

    Defendants Brewster and Alfonso were indicted for robbery, burglary, and firearm offenses. A complaining witness testified before the Grand Jury that she identified the defendant without mentioning that the identification was made from photographs. The defense moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the Grand Jury proceeding was defective. The Court of Appeals held that the indictment was valid because the identification testimony presented to the Grand Jury, absent any information about the photographic identification, established a prima facie case. The court emphasized that the Grand Jury proceeding is not an adversary proceeding and the identification testimony was not hearsay because the Grand Jury was not informed of the photographic identification.

    Facts

    Two defendants, Brewster and Alfonso, were indicted along with others for robbery, burglary, and related firearm charges. Before the Grand Jury, a complaining witness testified that she identified Brewster, and another witness testified she identified Alfonso. Neither witness revealed that their identifications were made from photographs. The People served notice of intent to present testimony at trial from witnesses who had previously identified the defendants from photographs. During a Wade hearing, it was revealed that the Grand Jury testimony was based on photographic identifications, and each witness made a corporeal identification of the defendant during the hearing.

    Procedural History

    The defendants moved to dismiss the indictment based on insufficient evidence and defects in the Grand Jury proceedings, and a Wade hearing was ordered. During the Wade hearing, the defendants filed a supplementary motion to dismiss the indictment pursuant to CPL 210.35 (subd 5). The hearing judge granted the motion, finding the indictment based on incompetent evidence but allowed in-court identification based on an independent source. The Appellate Division reversed and reinstated the indictment, deeming CPL 60.30 inapplicable to Grand Jury proceedings. The Court of Appeals affirmed, albeit with different reasoning.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an indictment should be dismissed under CPL 210.35 (subd 5) when a complaining witness testifies before the Grand Jury that she identified the defendant, without disclosing that the identification was initially made from photographs.

    Holding

    No, because the identification testimony before the Grand Jury established a prima facie case that, if unexplained, would warrant a conviction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that a Grand Jury proceeding is not an adversary proceeding, except for the limited rights granted to a defendant to testify and request witnesses. The purpose of an indictment is to bring a defendant to trial upon a prima facie case that, if unexplained, would warrant a conviction. The identification testimony before the Grand Jury served that purpose. The court emphasized that the identification testimony was not hearsay because the Grand Jury was not presented with information about how or when the identification was made. The Grand Jury was only informed that the witness identified a defendant as her assailant, which constituted a present statement of the fact that she recalled the defendant as the person who assaulted her. The court noted that withholding the information about the photographic identification avoided unfairness to the defendant by preventing the Grand Jury from inferring a prior arrest record. The court stated, “The identification testimony before the Grand Jury satisfied that purpose.” (quoting People v. Oakley, 28 NY2d 309, 312). The court found no infringement of CPL 60.30, which concerns the admissibility of prior identification evidence at trial, because the Grand Jury was not presented with any evidence concerning the photographic identification. The court distinguished the case from situations where a witness identifies a photograph of the perpetrator and a custodian testifies to the name of the person in the photograph, which is permissible.

  • People v. Whalen, 59 N.Y.2d 273 (1983): Prosecutorial Misconduct and Alibi Evidence

    People v. Whalen, 59 N.Y.2d 273 (1983)

    A prosecutor’s summation that misrepresents evidence, denies prior notice of an alibi, and implies recent fabrication, coupled with knowledge that the defendant was advised by counsel not to speak with the police, constitutes prosecutorial misconduct warranting a new trial.

    Summary

    Whalen was convicted of rape, but the conviction was reversed due to prosecutorial misconduct during summation. The prosecutor improperly characterized the defendant’s alibi as a recent fabrication, despite having prior notice and knowing that the defendant and his wife were advised by counsel not to speak to the police. The prosecutor also falsely denied that notice of the alibi had been given. The Court of Appeals held that this conduct prejudiced the defendant and warranted a new trial, emphasizing the prosecutor’s duty to seek justice, not just conviction.

    Facts

    Deborah C. was raped on July 4, 1979. She described her attacker as having shoulder-length blond hair, weighing 150-160 pounds, and being 5 feet 8 inches to 5 feet 9 inches tall. At trial, Whalen presented a “mistaken identification” defense and an alibi, claiming he was home sick at the time of the rape, corroborated by his wife. He presented evidence that his hair was red and that he was six feet tall. The defense had served notice of alibi more than eight months prior to trial.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of rape in the first degree in County Court. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Leave to appeal was granted by a judge of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case for a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to give an expansive jury instruction on the scrutiny to be given to identification testimony.

    2. Whether the jury charge on alibi improperly shifted the burden of proof to the defendant.

    3. Whether the prosecutor’s conduct during summation constituted prosecutorial misconduct warranting a new trial.

    Holding

    1. No, because the trial court gave a technically correct, albeit minimal, instruction that the prosecutor had the burden of proving identification beyond a reasonable doubt.

    2. No, because the defendant failed to properly preserve the objection to the alibi instruction for appellate review.

    3. Yes, because the prosecutor’s repeated characterization of the defendant’s alibi as a fabrication, coupled with the false denial of prior notice and knowledge of the attorney’s advice, constituted prejudicial misconduct.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court found no legal error in the minimal identification instruction, noting that a general instruction on witness credibility coupled with the reasonable doubt standard for identification is technically correct. However, the Court advised that the better practice is to grant a defendant’s request for an expanded charge on identification, especially when mistaken identity is intertwined with an alibi.

    The Court held that the objection to the alibi instruction was not preserved because the trial judge granted the request to charge, but the delivered charge was unsatisfactory, and defense counsel failed to alert the judge to the error. The Court distinguished this from People v. Le Mieux, where the request was denied outright.

    The Court found that the prosecutor’s conduct during summation was improper and prejudicial. The prosecutor misrepresented the evidence by repeatedly characterizing the alibi as a recent fabrication, despite having received notice months earlier and knowing that defense counsel had advised both the defendant and his wife not to speak to the police. The prosecutor then falsely denied that notice had been given. The court stated, “This was completely unjustified, going far beyond any bounds of proper advocacy.” This conduct violated the prosecutor’s ethical obligation “to seek justice, rather than conviction” and warranted a new trial. The Court cited the Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 7-13, to support the prosecutor’s duty.

  • People v. Rodriguez, 51 N.Y.2d 751 (1980): Admissibility of Negative Identification Testimony

    People v. Rodriguez, 51 N.Y.2d 751 (1980)

    Negative identification testimony, where a witness fails to identify a defendant from a photo array or lineup, is admissible to demonstrate the witness’s ability to distinguish features and the credibility of their identification, provided the individuals in the array or lineup share similar characteristics with the defendant.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the admissibility of “negative identification” testimony, where a witness failed to identify the defendant from a photo array. The court held that such testimony is admissible to show the witness’s ability to discern specific features and assess their overall credibility. The key consideration is the similarity in appearance between the defendant and the other individuals in the array. This case clarifies the distinction between bolstering positive identification (generally inadmissible) and using negative identification to assess witness credibility (potentially admissible).

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of rape based on two separate incidents with similar characteristics. In one instance, the victim, Anne L., identified the defendant in a lineup and at trial. Before the defendant’s apprehension, Detective Sheehy showed Anne L. a photo array that did not include the defendant’s picture, and she did not identify anyone. At trial, Detective Sheehy testified about this prior failure to identify.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of rape in the first degree. The appeal centered on the admissibility of Detective Sheehy’s testimony regarding Anne L.’s failure to identify anyone in the photo array. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, finding the negative identification testimony admissible in this specific context.

    Issue(s)

    Whether third-party testimony regarding a witness’s failure to identify the defendant in a pre-trial photo array (negative identification testimony) is admissible at trial.

    Holding

    Yes, because negative identification testimony is relevant to assessing the eyewitness’s ability to distinguish features and the credibility of their subsequent identification, provided there’s a reasonable similarity between the defendant and the other individuals in the array.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court distinguished negative identification testimony from the inadmissible bolstering of positive identification. The court reasoned that negative identification is not hearsay because it is not offered for the truth of the matter asserted (i.e., that the defendant *is not* the perpetrator), but rather to show the witness’s powers of observation, memory, and reasoning. Unlike positive identification testimony, negative identification doesn’t create the risk of improperly influencing the jury by repeated assertions of identification. Instead, it assists the jury in evaluating the eyewitness’s credibility. The court emphasized that the relevance of negative identification hinges on the similarity between the defendant’s features and those of the other individuals depicted in the photo array or lineup. If the defendant’s appearance is significantly dissimilar, the negative identification has limited probative value. The court also addressed the concern that negative identification could be manufactured, stating that courts should reject such testimony if it appears motivated by anything other than sincere efforts to facilitate identification. In this case, the court found the testimony admissible because Detective Sheehy testified that all individuals in the array were male blacks with short afro haircuts and no beards, thus establishing a basis for comparison. Judge Gabrielli, writing the concurrence, stated: “In each case, the relevance of negative identification testimony will depend largely on the extent to which there is some similarity between the features of the individuals the eyewitness declined to identify and the features of the defendant.”

  • People v. Trowbridge, 43 N.Y.2d 937 (1978): Admissibility of Bolstering Testimony and Harmless Error Analysis

    People v. Trowbridge, 43 N.Y.2d 937 (1978)

    The erroneous admission of bolstering testimony is subject to harmless error analysis, requiring a determination of whether the evidence of guilt is overwhelming and whether there is a significant probability that the jury would have acquitted the defendant absent the error.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction, despite acknowledging that the admission of bolstering testimony regarding the victim’s identification of the defendant was an error. The Court applied a two-stage harmless error analysis. First, it determined that the evidence of the defendant’s guilt, without considering the error, was overwhelming due to the victim’s credible and unequivocal identification. Second, it concluded that there was no significant probability that the jury would have acquitted the defendant had the bolstering testimony not been admitted because the testimony only confirmed the fact of the identification, not the reliability of it.

    Facts

    The victim was sexually assaulted by the defendant and two companions in a vestibule after being dragged from the street. The victim had a clear view of her attacker under bright street lighting and good lighting in the vestibule. The assault lasted for 15-20 minutes. Twenty minutes after the assault, police apprehended the defendant a block away. Initially, the victim did not identify the defendant, but after the police turned him around, she made an unhesitating and unequivocal identification.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted. The Appellate Division’s order affirming the conviction was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the admission of bolstering testimony regarding the victim’s identification of the defendant constitutes reversible error, requiring a new trial.

    Holding

    No, because the error was harmless. The evidence of the defendant’s guilt was overwhelming, and there was no significant probability that the jury would have acquitted the defendant had the bolstering testimony not been admitted.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court applied the two-stage harmless error analysis outlined in People v. Crimmins. The Court found that the victim’s identification testimony was “unusually credit-worthy” due to the favorable lighting conditions, the length of the observation, and the unequivocal nature of the identification shortly after the crime. The court also noted that the defendant’s presence in the area in the early morning hours was not explained or controverted. Regarding the bolstering testimony, the Court emphasized that it only confirmed the fact of the identification and did not add any substance to its reliability or probative value. The Court reasoned, “Beyond the fact that she did identify him, there was nothing to shore up the reliability or probative worth of her identification. Unquestionably defendant had been identified; the erroneously admitted bolstering testimony went no further than to corroborate that uncontroverted fact.” Because the victim’s identification was strong and the bolstering testimony added little to the evidence, the court concluded that the error was harmless under the standard for nonconstitutional error. “[U]nless the proof of the defendant’s guilt, without reference to the error, is overwhelming, there is no occasion for consideration of any doctrine of harmless error” (People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 241).

  • People v. Colon, 46 N.Y.2d 722 (1978): Admissibility of Negative Identification Testimony

    People v. Colon, 46 N.Y.2d 722 (1978)

    Negative identification testimony (i.e., testimony that a witness failed to identify the defendant in a prior lineup or viewing) is generally inadmissible as evidence-in-chief because it lacks probative value and constitutes bolstering, unless offered to rebut a specific defense claim.

    Summary

    In a rape and robbery case, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the admissibility of testimony that the victim failed to identify the defendant in a prior lineup where the defendant was not present. The Court held that such evidence was inadmissible because it was not probative and served only to bolster the victim’s in-court identification. The dissent argued that the defense’s objection was sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal and that the evidence was prejudicial. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision to admit the testimony, because the issue was not properly preserved for appeal.

    Facts

    The victim testified that she knew her attackers from previous encounters at her apartment, where they discussed potential employment opportunities. During the investigation, the police took the victim to the moving company where the alleged attackers worked. On two occasions, the victim viewed employees but did not identify the defendant or his co-defendant. Evidence was also presented that the victim failed to identify anyone in a “blank lineup” that did not include the defendant.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of rape and robbery. The defendant objected to the admission of the negative identification testimony, arguing it was irrelevant. The trial court overruled the objection. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the issue of admissibility was not properly preserved for appellate review because the defense did not specifically object on hearsay grounds.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in admitting testimony that the victim failed to identify the defendant or others in prior lineups when the defendant was not present, and whether the defendant’s objection was sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant’s objection at trial was not specific enough to preserve the issue of inadmissibility for appeal. The Court found that the objection needed to be based on hearsay grounds to alert the trial court to the specific nature of the error alleged.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals majority held that the defendant’s general objection to the evidence as “irrelevant” was insufficient to preserve the issue for appellate review. The dissent argued that the basis of the objection (bolstering) was clear to the trial judge and that the evidence was both nonprobative and hearsay. The dissent stated, “Fairness to the defendant requires that, rather than turn aside his contention on the basis of the hairsplitting distinction which the majority makes, we hold it sufficiently preserved and, since it was both improper and prejudicial bolstering, that we reverse and remand for a new trial.” The dissent cited to People v Jung Hing, 212 NY 393, 402: “Testimony of nonidentification is admissible, if at all, only on rebuttal and even then is not admitted to prove or disprove any fact involved in the issues on trial, but solely to support the credibility of the witness”. The dissent argued the evidence was not relevant because it did not make any fact in issue more or less probable.

  • People v. Morales, 37 N.Y.2d 262 (1975): Admissibility of Prior Identification Testimony

    People v. Morales, 37 N.Y.2d 262 (1975)

    Prior identification of a defendant is admissible at trial when the identifying witness observed the defendant at the crime scene, previously identified the defendant, and is unable to make a present in-court identification.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the admissibility of prior identification testimony under CPL 60.25 when the identifying witness could not make a present in-court identification. The Court held that the testimony of a police officer confirming the pretrial identification of the defendant by the witness was properly admitted because all three preconditions of CPL 60.25(2) were met. The Court also found that the showup identification procedure was not unnecessarily suggestive, as it was deemed accidental and spontaneous, thus upholding the lower court’s decision.

    Facts

    A witness, Grant, observed an individual at a crime scene. Later, at the police station, Grant saw and recognized the defendant, Morales, as the person he had observed at the scene. At trial, Grant was unable to state with present recollection whether Morales was the person he had seen. Officer Moroney was present when Grant identified Morales at the station house.

    Procedural History

    The suppression court found the showup was not unnecessarily suggestive and denied the motion to suppress the identification. The Appellate Division affirmed this finding, characterizing the showup as “accidental” and the identification as spontaneous. The case then reached the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the testimony of Officer Moroney confirming the pretrial identification of the appellant by the witness Grant was properly admissible at trial under CPL 60.25(2)?

    2. Whether the procedures followed by the police in connection with the showup at which Grant identified the appellant were unconstitutionally suggestive?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because all three preconditions to the application of CPL 60.25 (subd 2) were met.

    2. No, because the showup was found to be accidental and the identification spontaneous and untainted by any untoward police conduct.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that all three conditions of CPL 60.25(2) were satisfied, making the officer’s testimony admissible. First, the identifying witness observed the person claimed to be the defendant at the crime scene (CPL 60.25, subd 1, par [a], cl [i]). Second, the identifying witness, in the presence of Officer Moroney, observed a person whom he recognized as the subject of his on-the-scene observation (CPL 60.25, subd 1, par [a], cl [ii]). Third, the identifying witness was unable at trial to state, on the basis of present recollection, whether or not appellant was the person in question (CPL 60.25, subd 1, par [a], cl [iii]).

    Regarding the constitutionality of the showup, the Court deferred to the Appellate Division’s finding that the showup was “accidental” and the identification spontaneous. Citing People v. Gruttola, 43 NY2d 116, 122, the Court stated that such a determination, affirmed by the Appellate Division, is beyond their power of review. The court emphasized the absence of “untoward police conduct” that might have tainted the identification.

    The court implicitly reinforced the importance of spontaneous identifications made without undue influence from law enforcement, suggesting that such identifications are more reliable and less susceptible to constitutional challenges. The ruling emphasizes adherence to statutory requirements for the admissibility of prior identification testimony and deference to lower court findings on factual matters related to identification procedures.