New York Law Review

Tag: identification procedures

  • People v. Hawkins, 55 N.Y.2d 474 (1982): Right to Counsel at Pre-Accusatory Lineups

    People v. Hawkins, 55 N.Y.2d 474 (1982)

    Under the New York State Constitution, a suspect does not have the right to counsel at an investigatory lineup conducted before the commencement of formal adversarial proceedings.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that suspects do not have a right to counsel at investigatory lineups under the state constitution, provided the lineup occurs before formal adversarial proceedings begin. The court reasoned that the benefits of counsel at this stage are outweighed by the policy considerations favoring prompt identification, such as preserving witness memory and quickly exonerating innocent suspects. This decision clarifies the scope of New York’s right to counsel, distinguishing it from the right during custodial interrogations.

    Facts

    Four separate cases were consolidated on appeal, each involving a defendant who participated in a pre-accusatory lineup without counsel:
    1. Laffosse: Convicted of robbery after being identified in a lineup. He requested an attorney during questioning but proceeded with the lineup after failing to secure one.
    2. Johnson: Convicted of murder; he requested counsel just before the lineup, but it proceeded without an attorney.
    3. Hawkins: Convicted of rape, sodomy, robbery, and burglary after being identified in a lineup. He consented to the lineup without requesting counsel, despite having a pending drug charge.
    4. Diaz: Convicted of sodomy and assault after being identified in a lineup; police were aware of unrelated charges against him but did not contact his attorney.

    Procedural History

    In all four cases, the defendants moved to suppress the lineup identifications based on a denial of the right to counsel. The trial courts denied the motions, and the defendants were convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and consolidated the cases.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the New York State Constitution provides a suspect with the right to counsel at an investigatory lineup conducted before the initiation of formal adversarial proceedings.

    Holding

    No, because the benefits of requiring counsel at investigatory lineups are outweighed by policy considerations favoring prompt identification procedures, and the New York Constitution does not mandate counsel at this stage.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court acknowledged that the U.S. Supreme Court in Kirby v. Illinois established that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches only after the initiation of formal adversarial proceedings. The court then examined whether the New York State Constitution should be interpreted to provide greater protection. While New York has expanded the right to counsel in the context of custodial interrogations, the court found that the role of counsel at a lineup is more limited than during an interrogation. The court emphasized that, unlike interrogations where counsel actively advises the suspect, counsel at a lineup serves primarily as an observer. The court stated, “the need for and right to a lawyer at an identification lineup is insignificant compared to the need in an ensuing interrogation.” People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 485.

    The court also emphasized the importance of prompt lineups to preserve witness memory, benefit the suspect by diminishing mistaken identification, and aid police investigations. Requiring counsel at this stage could cause unreasonable delays, undermining these advantages. Although a suspect’s attorney may attend the lineup if they are already represented, police are not required to notify counsel or delay the lineup significantly to accommodate counsel’s arrival. The court found no basis in the State Constitution to mandate counsel at investigatory lineups. The court noted, “The Constitution does not expressly or even impliedly require it.”

  • People v. Gissendanner, 48 N.Y.2d 543 (1979): Admissibility of Prior Identification and Evidence of Force

    People v. Gissendanner, 48 N.Y.2d 543 (1979)

    When the victim is familiar with the defendant prior to an alleged crime, a formal identification procedure is not required under CPL 710.30; additionally, evidence of prior violent acts is admissible to demonstrate the victim’s state of mind and the element of force in crimes like sodomy when consent is at issue.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision to admit evidence of the victim’s identification of the defendants, as well as evidence of a prior assault. The court held that since the victim knew the defendants as fellow inmates, a formal identification procedure was unnecessary. Furthermore, evidence of a prior assault committed by the defendants on another inmate was deemed admissible to demonstrate the victim’s fear and the element of force, which was relevant because the defense questioned the victim’s consent to the acts of sodomy.

    Facts

    The victim and the defendants were inmates housed in the same tier of cells for at least a month before the attack. The defendants assaulted the victim. Prior to this assault, the defendants also assaulted another prisoner in the victim’s presence. The defense raised the issue of the victim’s consent to the acts of sodomy during the trial.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defendants’ motion to preclude evidence related to the victim’s identification and admitted evidence of the prior assault. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence related to the victim’s identification of the defendants without prior notice to defense counsel, as required by CPL 710.30.
    2. Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a prior assault committed by the defendants on another prisoner.

    Holding

    1. No, because the victim was familiar with the defendants as individuals prior to the assault, so there was no “identification” within the meaning of CPL 710.30.
    2. No, because the evidence of the prior assault was probative of the victim’s state of mind and helped establish the element of force, which was relevant to the crime charged.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that CPL 710.30, which requires notice to defense counsel before using identification evidence, does not apply when the victim and the perpetrators are known to each other. Quoting the decision, “Since the participants in the incident —the victim and the perpetrators — were known to each other, there was no ‘identification’ within the meaning of CPL 710.30 (People v Gissendanner, 48 NY2d 543, 552) and no prior notice need have been given by the People.”

    Regarding the admission of evidence of the prior assault, the court stated that it was admissible to establish the victim’s fear and the element of force. By questioning the victim’s consent, the defense put the element of force at issue. The court cited People v Yannucci, 283 NY 546, 549-550, noting that the People could introduce evidence probative of the victim’s state of mind to establish lack of consent. The court noted that the prior assault on another prisoner, occurring just minutes before the attack on the victim and participated in by both defendants, was “highly relevant in establishing the victim’s fear and, thus, force as an element of the crime charged.” Furthermore, evidence of the other victim’s injuries was admissible to establish the forcible nature of the crime when defense counsel sought to impeach the victim’s testimony by suggesting the other victim had not reported the assault.

  • People v. Rahming, 26 N.Y.2d 786 (1970): Right to a Pretrial Hearing on Identification Procedures

    People v. Rahming, 26 N.Y.2d 786 (1970)

    A defendant is entitled to a pretrial hearing to determine whether improper pretrial identification procedures tainted a witness’s in-court identification, especially when the defendant is unaware of the prior identification.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case to the County Court for a post-trial hearing. The hearing was ordered to determine whether improper pretrial identification procedures tainted the victim’s in-court identification of the defendant. The Court emphasized that a trial judge must affirmatively find that taking proof on the main trial attacking the identification will not prejudice the defendant. Where the defendant was unaware of a prior photographic identification, prejudice was likely, warranting a separate hearing to ensure fairness.

    Facts

    The victim identified the defendant in court as the perpetrator of the crime.

    The prosecution had previously shown the victim a photographic lineup where the victim identified the defendant.

    The defendant was unaware of the photographic identification before trial.

    Procedural History

    The case proceeded to trial, where the victim identified the defendant.

    The defendant was convicted.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.

    The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in not holding a pretrial hearing to determine if the victim’s in-court identification was tainted by an impermissibly suggestive prior photographic identification, especially when the defendant was unaware of the prior identification.

    Holding

    Yes, because the trial court made no finding that it would not prejudice the defendant to take proof on the main trial attacking the identification, and prejudice arising out of presenting proof on the main trial in this case was almost inevitable due to the defendant’s lack of knowledge about the prior photographic identification.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that while People v. Ganci (27 N.Y.2d 418) allows a trial judge to direct that proof regarding identification be taken at trial if it won’t be prejudicial, in this case, prejudice was “almost inevitable.” The defendant’s lack of knowledge of the photographic identification created a situation where cross-examination on that point would risk improperly bolstering the identification with otherwise inadmissible evidence. The Court highlighted that the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL 710.30, subd. 1, par. [b]), though not effective at the time of trial, requires pretrial notice to the defendant of testimony identifying the defendant by a witness who previously identified him. This underscores the importance of ensuring fairness in identification procedures. Since identification goes to guilt or innocence, the court found it unfair to deny the defendant a hearing on the possibility that the in-court identification was based on suggestive procedures. The court implied the importance of a pretrial hearing outweighed judicial efficiency in this case. As the court stated, “Since identification of the accused goes to the determination pf guilt or innocence, it would be unfair not to extend to this defendant the right to a hearing where there is the unexplored possibility that the in-court identification was based on suggestive procedures.”