New York Law Review

Tag: identification procedure

  • People v. Delamota, 18 N.Y.3d 107 (2011): Limits on the Ledwon Rule and Unduly Suggestive Identification Procedures

    People v. Delamota, 18 N.Y.3d 107 (2011)

    The rule in People v. Ledwon, which holds that a conviction cannot stand when based solely on inherently contradictory testimony from a single witness, does not apply when inconsistencies arise from multiple witnesses or when a witness provides a credible explanation for discrepancies; furthermore, using a translator with a pre-existing relationship with the defendant during a photo array can render the identification unduly suggestive, warranting suppression.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of robbery. The victim, Hernandez, identified him in a photo array and lineup. At trial, discrepancies emerged between Hernandez’s description of the robber and the description given to the police shortly after the crime. Also, Hernandez’s son, Juan Jr., served as translator during the photo array, and it was later revealed that Juan Jr. knew the defendant, a fact not disclosed initially. The New York Court of Appeals held that the discrepancies in testimony did not warrant reversal under People v. Ledwon because the inconsistencies did not arise from a single witness and the victim provided a reason for the differences in description. However, the Court found the identification procedure unduly suggestive due to Juan Jr.’s involvement and ordered a new trial preceded by an independent source hearing.

    Facts

    Juan Hernandez was robbed at knifepoint in his apartment building. His son, Juan Jr., called 911 and provided a description of the robber. Detective Koch interviewed Hernandez, with Juan Jr. translating. Hernandez described the robber, but the description did not match the defendant, Delamota, who was later identified as the perpetrator. Juan Jr. later told the detective that he had heard neighborhood gossip that “Sebastian” was the robber. Detective Koch then showed Hernandez a photo array containing Delamota’s picture, and Hernandez identified him, with Juan Jr. translating. Delamota had a functionally impaired left arm. At trial, Juan Jr. admitted to knowing Delamota for a long time prior to the robbery.

    Procedural History

    Delamota was indicted for robbery and weapon possession. He moved to suppress the identifications, arguing undue suggestiveness. The trial court denied the motion. At trial, defense counsel moved to reopen the suppression hearing after Juan Jr.’s revelation. The motion was denied. Delamota was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, finding the identification procedure unduly suggestive and ordering a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the People’s proof was legally insufficient under People v. Ledwon due to conflicting testimony regarding the perpetrator’s appearance.

    2. Whether the victim’s identification should have been suppressed because his son participated in the photo array, having known the defendant prior to the identification procedure.

    Holding

    1. No, because the conflicting testimony came from multiple witnesses, not a single witness, and the victim provided a rational explanation for the discrepancies.

    2. Yes, because Juan Jr.’s participation as a translator, combined with his prior knowledge of Delamota, created an unduly suggestive identification procedure.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, the Court clarified the narrow scope of the Ledwon rule. The Court stated, “Ledwon applies in rare cases where the charged crime is established by only one witness who provides inherently contradictory testimony at trial.” Because discrepancies arose from multiple witnesses (the victim and the detective), Ledwon did not apply. The Court emphasized that it is the jury’s role to weigh conflicting evidence. The victim’s trial testimony was not internally inconsistent, and he offered an explanation for the differing description he allegedly gave to the detective. The court noted it is up to the Appellate Division to review the weight of the evidence.

    Regarding the identification procedure, the Court found that the trial court erred in denying Delamota’s motion to reopen the Wade hearing. Juan Jr.’s role as translator, coupled with his undisclosed prior relationship with Delamota, created an unduly suggestive situation. “In our view, the suggestiveness cannot be attributed to the victim’s son, but to the detective’s decision to utilize him as the interpreter notwithstanding the possible risks that were involved in this practice.” The Court reasoned that the detective should have used a neutral Spanish interpreter and therefore ordered a new trial preceded by an independent source hearing to determine if the victim’s in-court identification had an independent basis.

  • People v. Herner, 85 N.Y.2d 877 (1995): Admissibility of Prior Lineup Photo for Trial Preparation

    85 N.Y.2d 877 (1995)

    Showing a witness a photograph of a prior lineup identification to prepare them for trial testimony does not constitute a new identification procedure requiring notice under CPL 710.30.

    Summary

    William Herner was convicted of robbery. Before trial, the victim identified him in a lineup, and the prosecution properly notified the defense. However, the prosecutor showed the victim a photograph of the lineup prior to her testimony as trial preparation. The defendant argued this violated CPL 710.30 because no notice was given for this subsequent viewing. The Court of Appeals held that showing the victim a photo of the lineup for trial preparation wasn’t an identification procedure that triggered the notice requirement under CPL 710.30, thus affirming the lower court’s decision to admit the identification testimony.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with robbery. The victim identified the defendant in a pre-trial lineup. The prosecutor disclosed the lineup identification to the defense as required. Prior to trial testimony, the prosecutor showed the victim a photograph of the lineup she had previously identified the defendant in to prepare her testimony. The victim viewed the photograph again on the morning of her trial testimony. During the trial, it was revealed that the victim had been shown the lineup photo the night before her testimony. The defendant moved to suppress the identification testimony.

    Procedural History

    The County Court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the identification testimony. The defendant was subsequently convicted of robbery in the first and second degrees after a jury trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holding that showing the photograph was merely trial preparation. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether showing a witness a photograph of a prior lineup identification, for the purpose of preparing the witness’s testimony, constitutes an “identification procedure” requiring notice to the defendant under CPL 710.30.

    Holding

    No, because the prosecutor’s action of showing the victim a photograph of the lineup was clearly preparation for trial and not a new identification procedure under CPL 710.30.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the prosecutor’s showing the victim a photo of the lineup was merely trial preparation. The court emphasized that the initial lineup identification, for which proper notice was given, was the actual identification procedure. Showing the photograph was intended to refresh the witness’s memory and prepare them for trial, not to elicit a new identification. The Court held that CPL 710.30 is designed to provide notice of actual identification procedures, not preparatory steps taken by the prosecution. To require notice for every instance a witness is shown a photo of a prior identification would unduly burden trial preparation without providing additional protection against suggestive identification procedures. The court thus distinguished between an identification procedure and legitimate trial preparation, finding the latter does not trigger the notice requirement of CPL 710.30.

  • People v. Dixon, 85 N.Y.2d 218 (1995): Right to Wade Hearing After Canvassing Identification

    People v. Dixon, 85 N.Y.2d 218 (1995)

    A defendant is entitled to a Wade hearing when an identification occurs as a result of a police-arranged canvassing procedure, even if the witness spontaneously identifies the defendant.

    Summary

    Dixon was convicted of robbery based on an out-of-court identification by the victim during a police canvass of the crime scene. The trial court summarily denied Dixon’s motion for a Wade hearing, arguing the identification was spontaneous and not police-arranged. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that because the canvassing was a police-directed procedure, Dixon was entitled to a Wade hearing to determine if the identification was tainted by police suggestion, regardless of whether the victim’s identification was unprompted.

    Facts

    Harold Knowings was robbed by a group of men. Transit police drove Knowings through the area near the crime scene in a marked police van to search for the perpetrators. During this “canvass,” Knowings pointed to Dixon on the street and identified him as one of the robbers. Dixon was arrested based on this identification and charged with robbery, grand larceny, and assault.

    Procedural History

    The People notified Dixon about the out-of-court identification. Dixon moved for a Wade hearing, arguing the identification procedure was unfair and created a substantial likelihood of misidentification. The People opposed, stating the identification was spontaneous during a canvass, not a police-arranged procedure. The suppression court denied the motion without a hearing. Dixon was convicted of second-degree robbery. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding the identification was spontaneous and not police-arranged. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant is entitled to a Wade hearing when an identification results from a police-directed canvassing procedure, even if the witness’s identification is spontaneous.

    Holding

    Yes, because the canvassing was an identification procedure undertaken at the deliberate direction of the State, and the possibility of police prompting was not foreclosed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals noted that CPL 710.60 requires a hearing unless summary denial is authorized. A suppression motion can be summarily denied if there’s no legal basis for suppression or the factual predicate is insufficient. The Court emphasized that defendants are no longer required to plead specific facts about the identification procedure to be entitled to a Wade hearing. The purpose of a Wade hearing is to test for taint arising from official suggestion during police-arranged confrontations. The Court rejected the argument that a spontaneous identification removes the canvassing from the category of police-sponsored viewings warranting a Wade hearing, distinguishing between witness-initiated procedures and witness-initiated identifications.

    “[T]he due process concerns underlying the notice provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law…are implicated whenever ‘identification procedures…come about at the deliberate direction of the State.’” The Court emphasized the canvassing was arranged for the distinct purpose of identifying perpetrators, making it a police-sponsored procedure. The Court reiterated that exceptions to Wade hearings are narrowly confined to confirmatory identifications or when the protagonists are known to one another. It noted that “'[t]he influence of improper suggestion upon identifying witnesses probably accounts for more miscarriages of justice than any other factor.’” Without a hearing, the courts could not conclude the identification was free from police suggestion. The case was remitted for a Wade hearing.

  • People v. Cicero, 572 N.E.2d 986 (N.Y. 1991): Limits on Calling Complainant at Wade Hearing

    People v. Cicero, 78 N.Y.2d 1020, 572 N.E.2d 986 (1991)

    A defendant does not have an absolute right to call a complainant at a Wade hearing to challenge an identification procedure unless there is some indication of suggestiveness in the procedure itself.

    Summary

    Cicero was convicted of a crime, and on appeal, argued that he should have been allowed to call the complainant as a witness at his Wade hearing, which was convened to determine if the pre-trial identification procedure was unduly suggestive. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that a defendant only has the right to call a complainant at a Wade hearing if there is some indication that the identification procedure was suggestive. The Court reasoned that because the showup was conducted promptly at the scene of the crime, and Cicero did not claim the complainant’s testimony would differ from the prosecution’s witnesses, calling the complainant was unnecessary.

    Facts

    The key fact is that the identification procedure used in this case was a showup that occurred promptly at the scene of the crime. Cicero did not dispute the timeliness or location of the showup. Furthermore, Cicero did not allege that the complainant’s potential testimony would contradict the accounts given by the People’s witnesses regarding the identification.

    Procedural History

    The case began in a trial court, which ruled against Cicero’s request to call the complainant to testify at the Wade hearing. Cicero was convicted. He appealed, arguing that the denial of his request was an error. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and Cicero appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the hearing court abused its discretion in denying the defendant’s request to call the complainant at the Wade hearing to challenge the identification procedure.

    Holding

    No, because the showup was conducted promptly at the scene of the crime, and the defendant did not claim that the complainant’s testimony would differ from the People’s witnesses; thus, there was no indication of suggestiveness requiring the complainant’s testimony.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior holdings in People v. Chipp and People v. Love. The Court stated, “A defendant does not have an absolute right to call a complainant at the Wade hearing absent some indicia of the suggestiveness of the identification procedure employed.” The court distinguished cases involving inherently suggestive procedures, such as showups, by noting that the suggestiveness is mitigated when the showup is conducted promptly at the scene of the crime. The court emphasized that Cicero had not claimed that the complainant’s testimony would differ from the prosecution’s witnesses. Thus, the Court concluded that requiring the complainant to testify would be unnecessary and would not serve the purpose of the Wade hearing, which is to determine whether the identification procedure was unduly suggestive. The court essentially found that in the absence of any evidence suggesting impropriety, the defendant’s request was a fishing expedition. As the court stated, “In these circumstances, defendant is not entitled to call the complainant at the hearing.”