New York Law Review

Tag: Identification Evidence

  • People v. Gee, 8 N.Y.3d 861 (2007): Notice Requirements for Pretrial Identifications

    People v. Gee, 8 N.Y.3d 861 (2007)

    Under CPL 710.30(1)(b), the prosecution is only required to provide notice of pretrial identification evidence that it intends to offer at trial; because photographic identifications are generally inadmissible in the prosecution’s case-in-chief, notice of such identifications is not required.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that the prosecution was not required to provide notice of a pretrial photographic identification of the defendant because such evidence is generally inadmissible in the prosecution’s case-in-chief. The victim identified the defendant from a photographic array and later in a street point-out. The prosecution only provided notice of the street point-out. The Court reasoned that CPL 710.30(1)(b) only mandates notice of pretrial identification evidence “intended to be offered” at trial. Because photographic identifications are generally inadmissible as direct evidence, the prosecution had no intention to offer it and thus, no notice was required.

    Facts

    On February 4, 2003, the victim was robbed at gunpoint in a coffee shop in Brooklyn. Later that day, the police showed the victim two photographic arrays, one of which contained a picture of the defendant taken after a prior arrest. The victim identified the defendant as the robber with the gun. One week later, on February 11, 2003, the victim saw the defendant on the street and called the police, identifying him as one of the robbers. The defendant was immediately arrested.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was arraigned on March 26, 2003. The People served notice of the February 11, 2003 street point-out. The defense learned of the photographic identification during pretrial discovery and moved to preclude the in- and out-of-court identifications due to lack of notice. Supreme Court denied the motion. The defendant was convicted of robbery in the first degree on March 2, 2004, and sentenced on May 27, 2004. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment, finding the prosecution discharged its statutory obligation to provide notice. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether CPL 710.30(1)(b) requires the prosecution to provide notice of a pretrial photographic identification of the defendant when the prosecution only intends to offer evidence of a subsequent in-person identification at trial.

    Holding

    No, because CPL 710.30(1)(b) only mandates preclusion in the absence of timely notice “specifying” the pretrial identification evidence “intended to be offered” at trial, and evidence of a witness’s pretrial photographic identification of an accused is not admissible in the prosecution’s case-in-chief.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPL 710.30(1)(b) requires notice only of pretrial identification evidence that the prosecution intends to offer at trial. The court noted that evidence of a witness’s pretrial photographic identification is generally inadmissible in the prosecution’s case-in-chief, citing People v Cioffi, 1 NY2d 70 (1956) and People v Caserta, 19 NY2d 18 (1966). Therefore, since the People could not intend to offer the photographic identification at trial, the notice provided was adequate.

    The court acknowledged that while providing notice of photographic arrays would be good policy, it was unwilling to read the statute more broadly than the Legislature had written it, especially when the remedy is preclusion. The court emphasized that it had never before been asked this specific question, belying any notion that it was upending the common understanding of the law.

  • People v. Gee, 99 N.Y.2d 158 (2002): CPL 710.30 Notice Not Required for Witness Viewing Video of Crime

    People v. Gee, 99 N.Y.2d 158 (2002)

    A witness’s viewing of a surveillance videotape depicting the actual crime, as opposed to a lineup, showup, or photo array, does not constitute a “previous identification” requiring notice under CPL 710.30(1) because it doesn’t present the risk of undue suggestiveness that the statute aims to prevent.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a convenience store clerk’s viewing of a surveillance video of the robbery shortly after it occurred did not trigger the notice requirements of CPL 710.30. The court reasoned that showing the clerk the video of the robbery she witnessed was not an identification procedure because the clerk was simply ratifying the events as revealed in the videotape, and no issue or inquiry as to the defendant’s identity was made. The purpose of CPL 710.30 is to protect against suggestive pretrial identification procedures that could lead to misidentification; because the video depicted the actual crime, there was no risk of such suggestiveness. This ruling clarifies the scope of CPL 710.30 and its application to situations where a witness views a recording of the crime itself.

    Facts

    Defendant Gee and an accomplice robbed a convenience store. The robbery was recorded by the store’s surveillance camera. The clerk, shortly after the robbery, viewed the surveillance videotape and confirmed its authenticity to Officer Buduson. The People provided notice under CPL 710.30 regarding a lineup and photographic identification, but not the videotape viewing.

    Procedural History

    Defendant was indicted for robbery. At trial, the defense learned of the clerk’s videotape viewing and moved to preclude the clerk’s identification testimony due to lack of CPL 710.30 notice. The trial court denied the motion, allowing cross-examination on the viewing. The jury convicted the defendant. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the convenience store clerk’s viewing of the surveillance videotape, depicting the robbery she witnessed, constituted a “previous identification” of the defendant as contemplated by CPL 710.30(1), thus requiring the prosecution to provide notice to the defense.

    Holding

    No, because the clerk’s viewing of the videotape depicting the actual robbery did not constitute a “previous identification” within the meaning of CPL 710.30(1), as it did not present the risk of undue suggestiveness that the statute is designed to prevent.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that CPL 710.30 aims to protect against suggestive pretrial identification procedures that could lead to misidentification. The statute requires notice when a witness will testify about observing the defendant “either at the time or place of the commission of the offense or upon some other occasion relevant to the case, to be given by a witness who has previously identified him as such” (CPL 710.30 [1]). The court emphasized that in viewing the videotape, the clerk did not “previously identify the defendant as such,” meaning as the defendant in the case. Because the videotape depicted the actual robbery and the only people shown were the clerk and the robbers, there was no selection process or risk of suggestiveness. The clerk was simply ratifying the events on the tape. The court distinguished this from lineups, showups, and photo arrays, where the defendant’s identity is at issue and suggestiveness is a concern. As the Court stated, “In cases in which the defendant’s identity is not in issue, * * * ‘suggestiveness’ is not a concern and, hence, [CPL 710.30] does not come into play” (citing People v. Gissendanner, 48 N.Y.2d 543, 552 (1979)). The Court also noted that a Wade hearing would have been “all but purposeless” because the only way to argue suggestibility would be to call the clerk as a witness, which a defendant does not have an absolute right to do. The Court also cited Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968), contrasting that viewing a clear image of the robber on video shortly after the robbery does not constitute an “undue” or improper suggestion of what he looked like.

  • People v. Clark, 88 N.Y.2d 552 (1996): Reopening Wade Hearings Based on New Facts

    People v. Clark, 88 N.Y.2d 552 (1996)

    A trial court has discretion to deny a motion to reopen a Wade hearing (regarding the admissibility of identification evidence) when the “additional pertinent facts” presented by the defendant are not sufficiently related to the issue of police suggestiveness.

    Summary

    Clark was convicted of attempted robbery. Prior to trial, a Wade hearing was held regarding the victim’s identification of Clark. At trial, Clark sought to reopen the Wade hearing based on a discrepancy between the arresting officer’s testimony at the Wade hearing and the victim’s grand jury testimony regarding the chase that led to Clark’s arrest. The trial court denied the motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because the discrepancy was not “pertinent” to the issue of police suggestiveness in the identification.

    Facts

    Ronald Cuocolo was making a delivery when he was accosted by Clark, who demanded money. After a struggle, Clark fled. Cuocolo and others chased Clark. Cuocolo then directed police officers toward Clark, who was standing on the sidewalk two blocks away. The police arrested Clark. Cuocolo identified Clark as the perpetrator in a “corporeal non-lineup.” Prior to trial, a Wade hearing was held to determine the admissibility of Cuocolo’s identification.

    Procedural History

    Prior to trial, Clark moved to suppress Cuocolo’s identification. A Wade hearing was granted. The hearing court denied suppression. At trial, after the People’s opening statement, Clark renewed the motion to suppress or, alternatively, to reopen the Wade hearing based on a discrepancy in testimony. The trial court denied the motion. Clark was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to reopen the Wade hearing based on a discrepancy between the arresting officer’s Wade hearing testimony and the victim’s grand jury testimony regarding the events leading to the defendant’s arrest.

    Holding

    No, because the discrepancy between the testimonies was not “pertinent” to the issue of police suggestiveness in the identification.

    Court’s Reasoning

    CPL 710.40(4) allows a court to permit renewal of a suppression motion if “additional pertinent facts have been discovered by the defendant which he could not have discovered with reasonable diligence before the determination of the motion.” The Court of Appeals stated that the crucial question is whether the asserted facts are “pertinent” to the issue of official suggestiveness such that they would materially affect or have affected the earlier Wade determination. The Court emphasized that the statute doesn’t mandate that the new facts be outcome-determinative, but they must be related to the issue of suggestiveness by law enforcement. The court found that the discrepancy regarding the chase was not pertinent to whether the police engaged in suggestive conduct during the identification. The court distinguished this case from *People v. Dixon*, where no Wade hearing was held initially. The court stated: “To suggest here that this standard was met as a matter of law and that the victim-initiated and uninterrupted chase, culminating in the apprehension of this perpetrator was a police-arranged procedure (dissenting opn, at 559), as a matter of law also, compelling a reopening of the *Wade* hearing, goes well beyond what this record presented to the trial court and Appellate Division.”

  • People v. Gethers, 86 N.Y.2d 159 (1995): Suppression of Identification Evidence After Illegal Arrest

    People v. Gethers, 86 N.Y.2d 159 (1995)

    An identification of a suspect made immediately following an illegal arrest and detention, where the arrest was for the purpose of the identification, is a product of the illegal arrest and must be suppressed.

    Summary

    Gethers was arrested for selling cocaine as part of a buy and bust operation. A pretrial suppression hearing revealed that the arresting officer lacked probable cause. The physical evidence was suppressed, but the identification evidence was allowed. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the identification was tainted by the illegal arrest and ordered a new trial preceded by an independent source hearing. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the confirmatory identification made immediately after the illegal arrest should have been suppressed because it was a direct result of the illegal seizure and detention. The court distinguished this case from situations involving suggestive identification procedures, focusing instead on the causal link between the illegal arrest and the identification.

    Facts

    Undercover Detective Rye purchased cocaine from two sellers. She transmitted a description of the sellers to Officer Bell. Bell located and arrested Gethers and another man. Immediately after the arrest, Bell walked the two men to a street corner. Detective Rye then performed a drive-by identification, confirming Gethers as one of the sellers.

    Procedural History

    At the pretrial suppression hearing, the court suppressed physical evidence due to a lack of probable cause for the arrest. However, the court denied the motion to suppress the identification evidence. Gethers was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance. The Appellate Division reversed and ordered a new trial preceded by an independent source hearing. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Detective Rye’s on-the-scene confirmatory identification must be suppressed as a product of the illegal arrest.

    2. Whether Detective Rye’s in-court identification of defendant was improperly admitted in the absence of evidence at the suppression hearing of an independent source.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the identification was made immediately following the illegal arrest and detention, and the illegal seizure and detention of the defendant made the identification possible, and was done for the purpose of displaying him to the undercover officer.

    2. Yes, because there was no evidence at the suppression hearing of an independent source upon which the hearing court could rely to find that the in-court identification was come at by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the identification of Gethers was a direct product of the illegal arrest. It stated that evidence obtained through the exploitation of illegal police conduct must be suppressed, citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). The court found that the causal link between the arrest and identification was clear. The illegal seizure made the identification possible, and the purpose of the arrest was to display Gethers to the undercover officer. The court distinguished this case from People v. Wharton, 74 N.Y.2d 921 (1989), which dealt with the suggestiveness of identification procedures, a due process issue, while this case concerned the Fourth Amendment protection against illegal seizures. The court stated, “[A]n identification derived from exploitation of an illegal arrest is equally tainted whether made by a trained officer or a lay person.” Regarding the in-court identification, the Court emphasized that there was no evidence presented at the suppression hearing regarding an independent source for the identification, as required by People v. James, 67 N.Y.2d 662 (1986).

  • People v. Rodriguez, 79 N.Y.2d 445 (1992): Right to Cross-Examine Witness at Pre-Trial Hearing

    People v. Rodriguez, 79 N.Y.2d 445 (1992)

    A defendant has the right to cross-examine a witness called by the prosecution at a pre-trial hearing to determine the admissibility of evidence, especially when the witness’s testimony is critical to determining the admissibility of evidence.

    Summary

    Rodriguez was convicted of first-degree robbery. Prior to trial, a hearing was held to determine if a *Wade* hearing was necessary regarding a photo array identification. The complainant testified she had seen Rodriguez many times before the robbery. The trial court limited the defense’s cross-examination of the complainant. The Court of Appeals held that restricting cross-examination was error because Rodriguez had the right to cross-examine the witness. The Court reversed the Appellate Division’s affirmance and remitted the case for a new hearing, emphasizing the importance of cross-examination to determine the extent of the complainant’s prior familiarity with the defendant, which was crucial to whether the photo identification was merely confirmatory.

    Facts

    Defendant was charged with first-degree robbery stemming from a knifepoint robbery in The Bronx. The complainant identified Rodriguez from a photo array. At a pre-trial hearing, the complainant testified that she had seen Rodriguez more than ten times at the bodega where she worked and over twenty times in the neighborhood. The trial court curtailed cross-examination of the complainant regarding her familiarity with the defendant prior to the robbery.

    Procedural History

    The trial court determined the photo identification was confirmatory, that CPL 710.30 notice was not required, and there was no impermissible suggestiveness by the police. Rodriguez was convicted after a jury trial. The Appellate Division affirmed, acknowledging the curtailment of cross-examination was error, but finding the complainant’s testimony sufficiently established the confirmatory nature of the photo identification. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case to the Supreme Court for a new hearing.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in restricting the defendant’s cross-examination of the complainant at the pre-trial hearing regarding the complainant’s prior familiarity with the defendant.

    Holding

    Yes, because once the complainant was called as a witness for the People at the hearing, the defendant had the right to cross-examine her, and the curtailment of that right eliminated any supportable basis upon which to find that the photo identification was the product of prior familiarity and, therefore, merely confirmatory.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that restricting cross-examination was a reversible error. The court stated that “once the complainant was called as a witness for the People at the hearing, defendant had the right to cross-examine her”. The central issue at the hearing was the extent of the complainant’s prior familiarity with the defendant, which became crucial at trial in this single-witness identification case. The preclusion of an adequate opportunity to cross-examine the complainant on that key issue eliminated any supportable basis upon which to find that the photo identification was the product of prior familiarity and, therefore, merely confirmatory.

    Because the trial court’s determination that the identification was merely confirmatory rested on an incomplete record due to the restriction on cross-examination, the Court of Appeals remitted the case for a new pre-*Wade* hearing. The court instructed that if the pre-*Wade* hearing results in a determination that a *Wade* hearing is not required, the judgment should be amended to reflect that determination, and the judgment of conviction and sentence should be treated as affirmed. Otherwise, a *Wade* hearing should be held and further proceedings, including a new trial, carried out as warranted.

  • People v. Edmonson, 75 N.Y.2d 672 (1990): Admissibility of Videotape Identification Evidence

    People v. Edmonson, 75 N.Y.2d 672 (1990)

    Evidence of a prior extrajudicial identification made by a witness from a police videotape canvassing a neighborhood is admissible if the tape and its presentation are not suggestive.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a witness’s identification of the defendant from a police-created videotape showing random passersby in a neighborhood was admissible evidence. The court reasoned that because the videotape and its presentation to the witness were not suggestive, there was no risk of misidentification. This case clarifies the circumstances under which videotape identification evidence is permissible, balancing the need for reliable identification with the potential for suggestive procedures to taint the process.

    Facts

    The victim was violently attacked. She had seen her attacker a few times prior to the attack. After the attack, while hospitalized, she described her attacker to the police and suggested possible locations where he could be found. Based on this information, the police videotaped pedestrian traffic in the specified area. The videotape captured numerous people, including the defendant, in closeup shots. The victim viewed the tape at home and immediately identified the defendant as her attacker.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of attempted murder and assault. He moved to suppress the victim’s identification of him from the videotape. The trial court denied the motion, finding the identification procedure not suggestive. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction without opinion. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to consider the admissibility of the videotape identification.

    Issue(s)

    Whether evidence of a prior extrajudicial identification made by the complaining witness from a videotape taken by the police, canvassing a particular neighborhood and focusing on numerous passersby, is inadmissible as a matter of law under CPL 60.30.

    Holding

    No, because the videotape procedure employed by the police officers and the subsequent viewing by the victim were neither suggestive nor prejudicial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that suggestive pretrial identifications are generally inadmissible to reduce the risk of misidentification. The Court found that the videotaping procedure in this case was not inherently suggestive. The defendant was not singled out or portrayed unfavorably. At the time of videotaping, the police did not suspect the defendant or have reason to believe the attacker would be captured on camera. The police simply canvassed the area mentioned by the victim, videotaping all pedestrian traffic. While the police took a closeup of the defendant, they did the same for approximately 50 other individuals. The Court distinguished this case from prior decisions where identification procedures were deemed suggestive, such as precinct showups where the defendant was forced to wear similar clothing as the suspect (People v. Ballott, 20 NY2d 600) and showups where suspects were presented in handcuffs (People v. Riley, 70 NY2d 523; People v. Adams, 53 NY2d 241). The Court also noted that a videotape of random pedestrians does not carry the same prejudicial inference as a “rogues’ gallery” of mug shots. The Court quoted People v. Tunstall, 97 AD2d 523, 524, stating that “videotaped lineups avoid the possibility that the credibility of third parties will be used to strengthen a questionable identification”. The Court reasoned that the videotaping procedure was akin to permitting a victim to canvass an area for her attacker. In conclusion, the Court found no abuse of the videotaping procedure and affirmed the order of the Appellate Division.

  • People v. Rodriguez, 69 N.Y.2d 159 (1987): Admissibility of Identification Evidence After Loss of Filler Photos

    People v. Rodriguez, 69 N.Y.2d 159 (1987)

    The accidental loss of filler photos used in a photo array does not automatically render a subsequent identification inadmissible if the pretrial identification procedures were not suggestive and an independent source for the identification exists.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of attempted robbery. Prior to trial, a witness identified Defendant’s photo, but the five “filler” photos used in the array were misplaced. Another witness was told by police “We got the guy who hold [sic] you up” before viewing a photo array and identifying the defendant. The trial court ruled that the pre-trial identifications were not tainted and that an independent basis existed for in-court identification. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that because the pretrial identification procedures were not suggestive and an independent source existed for the identification, the loss of the filler photos was irrelevant.

    Facts

    Three witnesses to a grocery store robbery were unable to identify the perpetrator from drawers of photographs at the station house shortly after the incident; Defendant’s photo was not among those viewed. Three months later, one witness, Rodriguez, identified Defendant’s photo from a second set of photos at the station house, claiming to have seen him at a restaurant. On the same day, police showed another witness, Bolanos, Defendant’s photo among five others, stating, “I got photos. I want you to look at the photos. We got the guy who hold [sic] you up.” Bolanos identified Defendant. The five “filler” photos used in the Bolanos array were later misplaced.

    Procedural History

    Following the two positive photo identifications, a “Wanted” card was prepared. Defendant was arrested and placed in a lineup, where Bolanos again identified him. At a Wade hearing, the trial court found that none of the pretrial photo identifications were tainted or suggestive, and that the loss of the filler photos was inadvertent. The court also found each complainant had an independent basis for an in-court identification. Defendant pleaded guilty, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals then affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the identification procedures were unconstitutionally suggestive as a matter of law, rendering the identification evidence inadmissible.
    2. Whether Defendant was improperly denied his right to counsel when police, knowing he had an unrelated pending case, arrested him and placed him in a lineup without his attorney present.

    Holding

    1. No, because the police officer’s statements did not suggest that defendant’s photo was in the array and the trial court made undisturbed findings of nonsuggestive pretrial identification procedures and of independent source. Therefore, any theoretical prejudice from the lost filler photos is irrelevant.
    2. No, because there is no Federal or State constitutional right to counsel for an accused at a preindictment lineup.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the police officer’s statement to Bolanos did not suggest that the defendant’s photo was in the array, citing People v. Rodriguez, 64 N.Y.2d 738, 740. This supported the finding that the pretrial identification procedures were not suggestive. The court emphasized that there were undisturbed findings of nonsuggestive pretrial identification procedures and an independent source for the identifications. Given these findings, the court concluded that any potential prejudice from the loss of the “filler” photos was irrelevant. The court noted the absence of a constitutional right to counsel at a pre-indictment lineup, citing Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 and People v. Hawkins, 55 N.Y.2d 474. The court concluded that the defendant’s other claims were without merit.

  • People v. Williams, 62 N.Y.2d 765 (1984): Permissible Inference from Recent and Exclusive Possession of Stolen Property

    People v. Williams, 62 N.Y.2d 765 (1984)

    When the circumstances indicate the defendant was either guilty of stealing the property or not guilty at all, a charge on recent and exclusive possession is appropriate, and there is no need to charge the jury on the separate crime of possession of stolen property.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the trial court’s charge on recent and exclusive possession was not erroneous because the evidence presented at trial indicated the defendant was either guilty of stealing from the complainant or not guilty at all. The Court distinguished this case from cases where a reasonable view of the evidence could support a conviction for possession of stolen property without also finding the defendant guilty of the theft itself. Furthermore, the court found the identification evidence sufficient to present a jury question and determined that the defendant’s statement at the time of arrest was spontaneous and admissible.

    Facts

    The complainant was robbed, and during a chase, the officers and complainant briefly lost sight of the defendant. The complainant identified the person being chased to the police as the robber, and the officer identified the apprehended person as the person pointed out to him. The defendant was found to be in possession of the complainant’s property. At the time of the arrest, the defendant made a statement that the court later deemed spontaneous.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The case was then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in its charge to the jury regarding recent and exclusive possession of stolen property.
    2. Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to establish identification of the defendant as the perpetrator.
    3. Whether the statement made by the defendant at the time of arrest was admissible.

    Holding

    1. No, because the circumstances of the case indicated that the defendant was either guilty of stealing from the complainant or guilty of nothing, making a separate charge on possession of stolen property unnecessary.
    2. Yes, because the complainant pointed out the person being chased to the police as the robber, and the officer identified the apprehended person as the person pointed out to him, and that together with the defendant’s possession of complainant’s property was sufficient to present a jury issue on identification.
    3. Yes, because the statement was spontaneous, resulting from the officer’s response to the defendant’s question, and that response was a simple statement of fact, not provocative in any sense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the charge on recent and exclusive possession was not error because the evidence suggested the defendant was either guilty of stealing or not guilty at all. The Court distinguished the case from People v. Baskerville, where there was a reasonable view of the evidence under which the defendant could be guilty of possession of stolen property without being guilty of the theft itself. Here, no such view existed. Regarding identification, the Court found the complainant’s identification of the defendant during the chase, coupled with the defendant’s possession of the stolen property, sufficient to present a jury question. Finally, the Court determined that the defendant’s statement at the time of arrest was spontaneous and admissible because it resulted from the officer’s non-provocative response to the defendant’s question. The court stated that the officer’s response was simply “a simple statement of fact, not provocative in any sense.” The Court found no merit in the defendant’s remaining contentions, affirming the Appellate Division’s order.

  • People v. Blackman, 43 N.Y.2d 585 (1978): Harmless Error in Bolstering Identification Testimony

    People v. Blackman, 43 N.Y.2d 585 (1978)

    Improper bolstering of a witness’s identification testimony by police officers is harmless error when the evidence of the defendant’s identity and guilt is overwhelming.

    Summary

    Defendants Blackman and Williams were convicted of robbery and weapons charges. At trial, three police officers testified that the victim identified the defendants shortly after the robbery. The New York Court of Appeals held that this testimony improperly bolstered the victim’s identification, violating established rules of evidence. However, the Court affirmed the convictions, finding the error harmless because the other evidence against the defendants, including their physical description matching the robbers, their presence in an apartment where the perpetrators fled, and the discovery of a matching weapon, was overwhelming. This holding illustrates the application of the harmless error doctrine in cases involving improper bolstering of identification testimony.

    Facts

    A man was beaten and robbed on a Bronx street. An eyewitness described the robbers as one tall and one short and heavyset. The robbers fled into a nearby building. Police apprehended Blackman and Williams in an apartment in the same building. A third man, whom the victim also identified as being with the defendants before the robbery, was also present. The apartment owner testified that the defendants and the third man had left the apartment for about 30 minutes, coinciding with the robbery, and returned with money that they gave her to buy liquor. A gun matching the description of the weapon used in the robbery was found near one of the defendants hiding under a bed.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were convicted of robbery in the first degree in a jury trial. Blackwell was also convicted of criminal possession of a weapon and reckless endangerment. The defendants appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting the police officers’ testimony that bolstered the victim’s identification. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court committed reversible error by admitting testimony from police officers that improperly bolstered the victim’s identification of the defendants.

    Holding

    No, because the error in admitting the bolstering testimony was harmless due to the overwhelming evidence of the defendants’ identification and guilt.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court acknowledged that the police officers’ testimony, describing the victim pointing to the defendants shortly after the robbery, improperly bolstered the victim’s identification. The court cited People v. Trowbridge, 305 N.Y. 471, emphasizing that such bolstering testimony should be excluded, regardless of whether it involves oral statements or gestures. However, the Court applied the harmless error doctrine, stating that a Trowbridge error is harmless when “the evidence of identity is so strong that there is no substantial issue on the point” (People v. Malloy, 22 NY2d 559, 567), or when the identification is “clear and strong” (People v. Johnson, 32 NY2d 814, 816). The Court found that the circumstantial evidence strongly confirmed the victim’s identification. The defendants matched the physical descriptions provided by an eyewitness. They were found in an apartment in the building where the robbers fled. A third man identified by the victim was also present. The apartment owner’s testimony placed the defendants at the scene of the crime at the time of the robbery. The matching gun was found near one of the defendants. Considering these facts, along with the victim’s opportunity to observe and prior sightings of one defendant, the Court concluded that the evidence of identification and guilt was overwhelming, rendering the error harmless. The court reasoned that when the other evidence is so strong the bolstering is not prejudicial.

  • People v. Fuentes, 53 N.Y.2d 892 (1981): Standard for Reopening a Wade Hearing

    53 N.Y.2d 892 (1981)

    A trial court may reopen a pretrial Wade hearing only if the defendant demonstrates that they have discovered additional pertinent facts that could not have been discovered with reasonable diligence before the original determination.

    Summary

    Jesus Fuentes appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his requests to reopen the Wade hearing during trial. He claimed new facts warranted a re-examination of the identification procedures. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The court emphasized that under CPL 710.40(4), reopening a pretrial hearing requires a showing by the defendant of newly discovered, pertinent facts that could not have been previously discovered with reasonable diligence. Fuentes failed to meet this burden, justifying the trial court’s denial.

    Facts

    During the trial, the defendant, Jesus Fuentes, sought to reopen a previously held Wade hearing concerning the admissibility of identification evidence. The specific nature of the underlying criminal charges or the identification evidence itself is not detailed in this memorandum opinion, but the defendant argued that new facts had emerged that warranted a re-evaluation of the fairness and reliability of the identification procedures used.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. He appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed the trial court’s decision. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in refusing to reopen the Wade hearing during the trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the defendant’s request to reopen the Wade hearing during the trial, based on the defendant’s claim of newly discovered facts.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant failed to demonstrate that the alleged new facts were pertinent and could not have been discovered with reasonable diligence before the initial Wade hearing determination, as required by CPL 710.40(4).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision on CPL 710.40(4), which governs the reopening of pretrial hearings. The statute explicitly states that a trial court may reopen a pretrial hearing if it “is satisfied, upon a showing by the defendant, that additional pertinent facts have been discovered by the defendant which he could not have discovered with reasonable diligence before the determination” of the pretrial application. The court emphasized that the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating both the pertinence of the new facts and the prior inability to discover them with reasonable diligence. Since Fuentes failed to establish these elements, the trial court’s refusal to reopen the Wade hearing was deemed a proper exercise of its discretion. The Court of Appeals found no merit in the defendant’s remaining arguments, reinforcing the affirmance of the lower court’s order. This case highlights the importance of diligently pursuing all relevant facts before a pretrial hearing concludes and underscores the limited circumstances under which a court will allow a reopening of such a hearing during trial. The decision also affirms a trial court’s discretion in managing the presentation of evidence and ensuring the orderly conduct of proceedings.