New York Law Review

Tag: identification

  • People v. Perkins, 27 N.Y.3d 435 (2016): Suggestiveness of Lineups When Defendant Possesses a Distinctive Feature

    People v. Perkins, 27 N.Y.3d 435 (2016)

    A lineup is unduly suggestive if the defendant has a distinctive feature, such as dreadlocks, that makes him stand out, even if that feature was not mentioned in the witness’s prior description of the perpetrator.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the suggestiveness of a lineup where the defendant was the only participant with dreadlocks, a distinctive feature. The court held that the lineup was unduly suggestive, regardless of whether the witness mentioned the defendant’s dreadlocks in their initial description to the police. The court emphasized that the totality of the circumstances must be considered when assessing the suggestiveness of a lineup. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, finding that the lower court erred in determining that a lineup was not unduly suggestive just because the witness had not mentioned the distinctive feature in their initial description. This case highlights the importance of conducting fair lineups to avoid suggestive identification procedures that could lead to misidentification.

    Facts

    After being identified as a suspect, the defendant was placed in photo arrays and lineups. In the relevant lineups, the defendant was the only participant with long dreadlocks. Four robbery victims identified the defendant in the lineups. Two of the victims had described the perpetrator as having dreadlocks, while the other two had not. The Supreme Court suppressed the lineup identifications for the two victims who had mentioned dreadlocks and not for the others. The Appellate Division affirmed, focusing on whether the distinctive feature was part of the complainants’ descriptions. All four victims identified the defendant in court, but the defendant was acquitted of the robbery counts with respect to two of the victims and convicted of the counts with respect to the others.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress the lineup identifications for two victims but denied it for the others. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals granted the defendant leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a lineup is unduly suggestive when the defendant possesses a distinctive feature, even if the witness did not mention that feature in their prior description of the perpetrator?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because a lineup’s suggestiveness should be determined by considering all circumstances to determine whether the lineup created a substantial likelihood that the defendant would be singled out for identification.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that a bright-line rule that a distinctive feature only renders a lineup unduly suggestive if it was mentioned in the witness’s prior description would be unworkable and unwise. Instead, the court emphasized that the focus should be on whether the lineup created a substantial likelihood of misidentification. The court found the lineup was unduly suggestive as the defendant was the only person with long dreadlocks. The court referenced its prior decision in People v. Chipp, stating that it must consider all circumstances to determine suggestiveness. The court held that there was no record support for the lower courts’ conclusion. The court held that, as a matter of law, a witness’s failure to mention a distinctive feature in his or her initial description is not necessarily the determinative factor in assessing a lineup’s suggestivity. The Court reversed the Appellate Division, ordered that both lineups should have been suppressed, and remanded to Supreme Court for further proceedings.

    Practical Implications

    This decision clarifies the standard for determining the suggestiveness of a lineup in New York. Law enforcement must be cautious when conducting lineups and ensure that distinctive features do not make the defendant stand out. Prosecutors must be prepared to establish an independent basis for in-court identifications if a lineup is found to be unduly suggestive. Defense attorneys should challenge lineups where the defendant is the only participant with a distinctive feature, regardless of whether the witness mentioned that feature in their initial description. This case emphasizes that a totality of the circumstances test must be applied. Post-Perkins, courts must consider all factors when assessing the reliability of an identification procedure and not rely solely on the witness’s prior description.

  • People v. Maldonado, 97 N.Y.2d 522 (2002): Admissibility of Composite Sketches as Evidence

    97 N.Y.2d 522 (2002)

    Composite sketches are generally inadmissible as evidence to prove guilt, as they constitute hearsay and may unduly prejudice the jury, except when offered to rebut a claim of recent fabrication by the identifying witness.

    Summary

    Maldonado was convicted of attempted murder and robbery based on a composite sketch and the victim’s identification. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the composite sketch was improperly admitted into evidence because it constituted inadmissible hearsay and served to bolster the victim’s identification. The defense’s cross-examination did not assert recent fabrication, which is required to admit a sketch as a prior consistent statement. The Court emphasized the risk of prejudice when jurors compare a defendant to a sketch, potentially leading to a guilty verdict based on resemblance rather than independent evidence.

    Facts

    Younis Duopo, a livery cab driver, was shot during an attempted robbery. The gunman, Poventud, was apprehended separately. Duopo later worked with a police artist to create a composite sketch of the non-shooting accomplice. A detective showed the sketch to Poventud’s associates, who identified Maldonado. Based on the sketch, the detective brought Maldonado in, and Duopo identified him in a photo array and lineup. At trial, the defense showed Duopo a photo of Maldonado’s brother, whom Duopo mistakenly identified as the assailant.

    Procedural History

    The trial court initially disallowed the composite sketch but later admitted it after the defense cross-examined the detective, arguing that the defense had opened the door by questioning the investigation’s integrity. The jury convicted Maldonado. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reversed the conviction.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in admitting a composite sketch of the defendant into evidence, where the defense did not allege recent fabrication by the identifying witness.

    Holding

    No, because the composite sketch constituted inadmissible hearsay and served to improperly bolster the victim’s identification, and the defense never claimed the witness recently fabricated his testimony. The cross-examination of the detective also did not create an opening to admit the sketch.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court held that composite sketches are generally inadmissible as evidence of guilt because they are considered hearsay. A sketch is the artist’s interpretation of a witness’s description, not a direct record of events. Admission carries a risk of prejudice, as jurors may focus on the defendant’s resemblance to the sketch, rather than independent evidence. The Court acknowledged an exception: a sketch may be admissible as a prior consistent statement to rebut a claim of recent fabrication, meaning “charging the witness not with mistake or confusion, but with making up a false story well after the event.” Here, the defense only challenged the accuracy of Duopo’s identification, not its veracity. Questioning the detective’s investigative thoroughness also did not open the door to admit the sketch. The Court emphasized the lack of other evidence against Maldonado, making the erroneous admission prejudicial. As the court noted, “When a jury examines a composite sketch, the temptation to inculpate or exonerate the defendant on the basis of the sketch is all but irresistible… the prejudice of that circular logic is manifest and inescapable.”

  • People v. Johnson, 47 N.Y.2d 785 (1979): Admissibility of Evidence of Non-Identification in Unrelated Crimes

    People v. Johnson, 47 N.Y.2d 785 (1979)

    Evidence that a defendant was not identified as the perpetrator of a separate, uncharged crime is generally inadmissible as evidence-in-chief to prove that the defendant did not commit the charged crime because it lacks probative value and is irrelevant.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that evidence of a victim’s inability to identify the defendant in a separate rape case was inadmissible to prove that the complaining witness in the present case misidentified him. The Court reasoned that such evidence is irrelevant because it does not tend to establish that the defendant did not commit the charged crime. The Court also found that while the prosecutor’s conduct was not exemplary, it was not egregious enough to deprive the defendant of a fair trial.

    Facts

    The defendant was tried for robbery, rape, and sodomy. He sought to introduce evidence that a victim of a separate rape was unable to identify him as her assailant. The defendant argued this evidence was relevant to the issue of whether the victim in the present case misidentified him. The trial court excluded the evidence.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted the defendant. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holding that the evidence of non-identification in the separate rape case was inadmissible. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether evidence that a victim of a separate, uncharged crime was unable to identify the defendant as her assailant is admissible as evidence-in-chief to prove that the complaining witness in the present case misidentified him.

    Holding

    No, because such evidence is irrelevant and lacks probative value in determining whether the defendant committed the charged crime.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that evidence is relevant if it tends to convince that the fact sought to be established is so. Applying this principle, the Court found that the evidence of the other victim’s inability to identify the defendant was irrelevant to prove his claim of misidentification in the present case. The Court agreed with the Appellate Division that “[testimony of another victim concerning another robbery and rape committed in a different manner at another location, and on a different date, that defendant was not the man who attacked her, had no probative value in determining whether defendant robbed, raped and sodomized complainant in this case.” The Court distinguished this situation from cases where evidence of prior criminal conduct is inadmissible to establish a predisposition to commit the crime charged, emphasizing that the defendant was attempting to use the evidence to disprove his commission of the crime, not to prove a general lack of criminal predisposition. However, the Court found this distinction unavailing because the evidence lacked the necessary connection to the specific facts of the charged crime. The Court also addressed the defendant’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct, finding that while the prosecutor’s conduct was not exemplary, it did not rise to the level of depriving the defendant of a fair trial.

  • People v. Pena, 37 N.Y.2d 642 (1975): Confidential Informant Disclosure Standard

    People v. Pena, 37 N.Y.2d 642 (1975)

    A defendant seeking disclosure of a confidential informant’s identity must demonstrate a basis in fact showing the demand is not improperly motivated and that the informant’s testimony is relevant to guilt or innocence.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed an Appellate Division order directing a new trial for a defendant convicted of drug sale and possession, which was based on the need to disclose a confidential informant’s identity. The Court of Appeals held that the defendant failed to meet his burden of showing that the informant’s testimony was necessary for a fair trial. The court emphasized that the informant’s limited involvement in the drug transactions and the strength of the officer’s independent identification of the defendant justified protecting the informant’s identity.

    Facts

    Patrolman Pantano, working undercover, met the defendant Pena through a confidential informant. The informant introduced Pantano to Pena, who was selling drugs. The informant then left and was not present during the drug sale. A week later, Pantano again met Pena in the same area and purchased more drugs. The informant was present in the neighborhood but did not participate in the transaction. Pantano made a clear identification of Pena immediately after the second sale and again at the time of arrest. Pena’s aunt provided an alibi for Pena, but her testimony was contradicted by police officers. The trial court denied the defendant’s request for the disclosure of the informant’s identity, conducting an in camera hearing instead.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted on all counts of an indictment charging him with the sale and possession of dangerous drugs. The Appellate Division reversed the judgment and ordered a new trial so that the informer could be produced. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s application for disclosure of the identity of a confidential informant.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant failed to demonstrate that the informant’s testimony was relevant or necessary to his defense, given the officer’s independent identification and the informant’s limited involvement in the actual drug transactions.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals balanced the privilege of confidentiality for informants against the defendant’s right to a fair trial. Citing Roviaro v. United States, the court acknowledged that the privilege must yield when a fair trial is imperiled. Referring to People v. Goggins and People v. Brown, the court reiterated that the defendant bears the initial burden of showing a factual basis indicating that the demand for disclosure is not merely an attempt to find weaknesses in the prosecution’s case. The court stated, “Bare assertions or conclusory allegations by a defendant that a witness is needed to establish his innocence will not suffice. Instead he must show a basis in fact to establish that his demand does not have an improper motive and is not merely an angling in desperation for possible weaknesses in the prosecution’s investigation.” The court emphasized the importance of the informant’s relevance to the defendant’s guilt or innocence, quoting Marks v. Beyfus: “[I]f upon the trial of a prisoner the judge should be of opinion that the disclosure of the name of the informant is necessary or right in order to show the prisoner’s innocence, then one public policy is in conflict with another public policy, and that which says that an innocent man is not to be condemned when his innocence can be proved is the policy that must prevail.” The court distinguished the case from Goggins, noting the strength of the officer’s identification, the daylight conditions during the transactions, and the immediate arrest. The court found the facts similar to those in Brown, where disclosure was not required because the informant’s testimony was not relevant. The court concluded that the informant’s limited role in the transactions and the officer’s independent identification justified protecting the informant’s confidentiality.