New York Law Review

Tag: Icy Conditions

  • Solazzo v. New York City Transit Authority, 6 N.Y.3d 734 (2005): “Storm in Progress” Rule for Premises Liability

    6 N.Y.3d 734 (2005)

    A property owner is not liable for injuries sustained as a result of icy conditions during an ongoing storm, or for a reasonable time thereafter, and general awareness of wet conditions during inclement weather is insufficient to establish constructive notice of a specific dangerous condition.

    Summary

    The plaintiff, Solazzo, sued the New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA) for injuries sustained when he slipped and fell on icy steps leading into a subway station. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the NYCTA, holding that the “storm in progress” doctrine applied. The Court reasoned that because it had been snowing, sleeting, and raining all day, and the steps were exposed to these conditions, the NYCTA could not be held liable. The Court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the NYCTA’s general awareness of wet conditions constituted constructive notice of the specific icy condition.

    Facts

    On the day of the incident, it had been snowing, sleeting, and raining on and off. The steps leading down into the subway station were exposed to the weather. Solazzo slipped and fell on the icy steps, sustaining injuries. Solazzo then sued the NYCTA, alleging negligence in failing to maintain the steps in a safe condition.

    Procedural History

    The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the NYCTA. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a property owner can be held liable for a plaintiff’s injuries sustained as a result of an icy condition occurring during an ongoing storm, or for a reasonable time thereafter.

    Holding

    No, because a property owner will not be held liable in negligence for a plaintiff’s injuries sustained as the result of an icy condition occurring during an ongoing storm or for a reasonable time thereafter. The Court also held that general awareness that the stairs and platforms become wet during inclement weather was insufficient to establish constructive notice of the specific condition causing plaintiff’s injury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the “storm in progress” doctrine, which provides that a property owner is not liable for injuries sustained as a result of icy conditions during an ongoing storm or for a reasonable time thereafter. The Court reasoned that because it had been snowing, sleeting, and raining all day, and the steps were exposed to these conditions, the NYCTA could not be held liable. The Court cited Valentine v City of New York, 86 AD2d 381, 383 (1st Dept 1982), affd 57 NY2d 932 (1982), for the principle that liability is not imposed during an ongoing storm. The Court further stated that a “general awareness that the stairs and platforms become wet during inclement weather was insufficient to establish constructive notice of the specific condition causing plaintiff’s injury”, citing Piacquadio v Recine Realty Corp., 84 NY2d 967, 969 (1994). This highlights that the plaintiff must demonstrate the defendant had notice of the specific dangerous condition that caused the injury, not just a general awareness of potential hazards during bad weather. This case serves as an example of the application of the storm in progress doctrine, protecting property owners from liability when taking immediate remedial action is impractical due to ongoing weather conditions.

  • Caristo v. Sanzone, 96 N.Y.2d 172 (2001): The Emergency Doctrine and Foreseeable Road Conditions

    96 N.Y.2d 172 (2001)

    The emergency doctrine does not apply when the allegedly emergent situation, such as icy road conditions, was foreseeable given the weather conditions and defendant’s awareness of them.

    Summary

    In this motor vehicle accident case, the New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the trial court properly instructed the jury on the emergency doctrine. Defendant Sanzone’s car slid on ice and collided with plaintiff’s vehicle. The Court of Appeals held that it was reversible error to give the emergency instruction because the icy conditions were not sudden or unexpected, given the known weather conditions (freezing rain, hail) in the hours leading up to the accident. The defendant was aware of the inclement weather. The Court emphasized that the emergency doctrine applies only when a party faces a sudden and unexpected circumstance not of their own making.

    Facts

    Defendant Sanzone was driving a vehicle owned by his wife, defendant Cinquemani. The weather that morning consisted of snow, rain, and freezing rain and the temperature was 22 degrees Fahrenheit. As Sanzone drove downhill toward an intersection, his vehicle began to slide on a sheet of ice. Despite pumping the brakes, the car slid through a stop sign and collided with plaintiff Caristo’s vehicle. The Plaintiff and other witnesses confirmed icy conditions. Sanzone was aware of worsening weather conditions for several hours before the accident. Neither driver had trouble controlling their vehicles before this incident.

    Procedural History

    Plaintiff sued the defendants for negligence. The trial court, over plaintiff’s objection, instructed the jury on the emergency doctrine. The jury returned a verdict for the defendants, and the complaint was dismissed. The Appellate Division affirmed. Plaintiff appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in charging the jury on the emergency doctrine when the defendant’s vehicle slid on ice, given that the defendant was aware of the inclement weather conditions prior to the accident.

    Holding

    No, because the icy conditions were not a sudden and unexpected emergency, given the defendant’s admitted knowledge of the worsening weather conditions.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the emergency doctrine applies only when an actor is faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance that leaves little or no time for thought or deliberation. The actor must also not have created the emergency. The Court emphasized that a trial judge must make a threshold determination that there is some reasonable view of the evidence supporting the occurrence of a qualifying emergency. Here, the Court held that even considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, there was no qualifying emergency because, considering Sanzone’s knowledge of the inclement weather, the presence of ice could not be deemed sudden and unexpected. "[T]here was no reasonable view of the evidence that would lead to the conclusion that the ice and slippery road conditions on the Foster Road slope were sudden and unforeseen." The court distinguished this case from Ferrer v. Harris, 55 N.Y.2d 285 (1982), where the emergency doctrine was applicable because a child darted into traffic, an unanticipated event. The dissent argued that it was a question of fact for the jury whether the sheet of ice was unforeseen, given that the roads were otherwise ice-free. The dissent also cited other jurisdictions that had held that the emergency charge should be given in factually similar circumstances. However, the majority stated, "[G]iven Sanzone’s admitted knowledge of the worsening weather conditions, the presence of ice on the hill cannot be deemed a sudden and unexpected emergency."

  • Cummings v. State, 53 N.Y.2d 104 (1981): Duty of Care to Intoxicated Persons in Custody

    Cummings v. State, 53 N.Y.2d 104 (1981)

    Law enforcement officers owe a duty of reasonable care to individuals in their custody who are impaired by intoxication, but this duty does not make the state an insurer of the individual’s safety against all possible harm.

    Summary

    An intoxicated claimant, arrested by Officer Forbes, sustained injuries when he fell on an icy surface while being escorted by the officer. The Court of Claims found the State negligent and awarded damages. The Appellate Division reversed, finding no negligence. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the officer’s actions, although intended to assist the claimant, did not meet the standard of reasonable care required under the circumstances. The court emphasized the officer’s awareness of the claimant’s intoxicated state and the icy conditions as factors contributing to the State’s negligence.

    Facts

    Officer Forbes found Cummings’ car in a highway median after it skidded on ice. Cummings appeared intoxicated and was arrested. At the hospital, Cummings refused a blood test and became hostile. Forbes handcuffed Cummings and placed him in the patrol car. Cummings complained that the handcuffs were too tight. Forbes pulled into a gas station to loosen the handcuffs, warning Cummings about the icy conditions. While Forbes was opening the car door, Cummings fell and broke his nose.

    Procedural History

    Cummings sued the State in the Court of Claims, alleging negligence. The Court of Claims dismissed all causes of action except negligence, sustaining that cause and awarding Cummings $14,500. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the claim, finding no negligence by Officer Forbes. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and reinstated the Court of Claims’ judgment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Officer Forbes breached his duty of reasonable care to Cummings, an intoxicated person in custody, by failing to adequately protect him from a foreseeable risk of harm (falling on ice), thereby constituting negligence on the part of the State.

    Holding

    Yes, because Officer Forbes, knowing Cummings was intoxicated and aware of the icy conditions, did not exercise reasonable care to prevent Cummings from falling and injuring himself. The State is responsible for the officer’s negligence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that while police officers owe a duty of reasonable care to those in custody who are impaired, the State is not an insurer of their well-being. However, in this case, Officer Forbes knew Cummings was intoxicated and also knew the ground was icy. Despite this knowledge, he did not take sufficient precautions to prevent Cummings from falling. The court distinguished this case from situations where the hazard is not readily apparent. The court stated that the question of negligence is typically a question of fact. Here, given the totality of the circumstances (the intoxication of the claimant, the icy conditions known to the officer) it was reasonable for the Court of Claims to determine that the officer was negligent. The court cited the standard jury instruction PJI 2:26, which instructs that a police officer is required to exercise reasonable care for the safety of a person in custody. Quoting the dissent in the Appellate Division, the Court of Appeals stated that the claimant’s condition created “a foreseeable risk of injury” and the officer should have taken steps to protect the claimant, such as holding his arm. The dissent argued that the officer took reasonable precautions, warning Cummings of the ice. The dissent also noted that the officer was attempting to alleviate Cummings’ discomfort from the handcuffs. The dissent believed that imposing liability in this case would require police officers to insulate intoxicated individuals from all unexpected harm, which is an unreasonable standard. The majority disagreed, holding that the officer failed to take reasonable steps to protect Cummings from a foreseeable risk, given Cummings’ impaired state and the known icy conditions.