New York Law Review

Tag: Human Rights Law

  • Board of Education v. State Division of Human Rights, 39 N.Y.2d 376 (1976): Pregnancy Discrimination Under State Human Rights Law

    Board of Education v. State Division of Human Rights, 39 N.Y.2d 376 (1976)

    Personnel policies, even those resulting from collective bargaining under the Taylor Law, are subject to the constraints of the New York Human Rights Law, and cannot discriminate based on sex, including pregnancy.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a collectively bargained personnel policy that treats childbirth differently from other physical conditions violates the New York Human Rights Law. The Court of Appeals held that such policies are indeed subject to the Human Rights Law and cannot discriminate based on sex, including pregnancy-related conditions. The court emphasized that what the Constitution permits, state statutes may still forbid. Further, the Court clarified that the Division of Human Rights’ procedural delays do not strip it of jurisdiction absent substantial prejudice to the charged party. The case affirms that negotiated agreements do not supersede the protections against discrimination afforded by the Human Rights Law.

    Facts

    A teacher filed a complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights, alleging that the Board of Education’s personnel policy discriminated against her based on sex because it treated childbirth differently from other physical conditions in terms of compensation and return to employment. This policy was the result of collective bargaining under the Taylor Law.

    Procedural History

    The State Division of Human Rights found probable cause and, after a hearing, determined that the school district had engaged in unlawful discrimination. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Board of Education appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that collectively bargained policies should be subject to a less stringent standard of review and that the Division of Human Rights lacked jurisdiction due to procedural deficiencies.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether personnel policies reached through collective bargaining under the Taylor Law are subject to the same scrutiny under the Human Rights Law as unilaterally imposed policies.

    2. Whether the Division of Human Rights lacked jurisdiction due to the complainant’s failure to comply with the notice-of-claim provisions of section 3813 of the Education Law.

    3. Whether the Division of Human Rights’ failure to adhere to the time schedules specified in section 297 of the Executive Law deprives it of jurisdiction.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because personnel policies and practices are no less subject to the constraints of the Human Rights Law because they are the product of negotiations conducted under the Taylor Law.

    2. No, because the proceeding seeks to vindicate a public interest (elimination of discrimination) and is thus not subject to the notice-of-claim requirements applicable to actions enforcing private rights.

    3. No, because the time schedules specified in section 297 of the Executive Law are directory, not mandatory, and noncompliance does not oust the Division of jurisdiction absent a showing of substantial prejudice.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the Human Rights Law reflects a “more direct and positive focus” than the constitutional standard under the Equal Protection Clause. What the Constitution does not forbid, state statutes may nonetheless proscribe. Collective bargaining under the Taylor Law does not create an exception to the Human Rights Law’s prohibitions against discrimination. The court cited Syracuse Teachers Assn. v. Board of Educ., Syracuse City School Dist., 35 N.Y.2d 743, clarifying that collective bargaining has a broad scope but is limited by plain and clear statutory prohibitions.

    The court distinguished between actions seeking to enforce private rights and those seeking to vindicate a public interest, holding that the notice-of-claim provisions of section 3813 of the Education Law apply only to the former. Here, the proceeding was triggered by an individual complaint, but its ultimate goal was the elimination of sex-based discrimination, a public interest. The court stated: “[A]dvantages which accrue to these teachers stem not from their rights of contract or other individual entitlement but rather flow as an appropriate and intended consequence of the vindication by the division, acting on behalf of the public, of the public’s interest in the elimination of discrimination based on sex”.

    Regarding the Division of Human Rights’ procedural delays, the court found that the time limits specified in section 297 of the Executive Law are directory, intended for the benefit of complainants. Noncompliance does not oust the Division of jurisdiction absent a showing of substantial prejudice to the charged party. The court concluded that there was substantial evidence to support the commissioner’s determination that the school district’s policy constituted discrimination based on sex. “Absent some showing of substantial prejudice, noncompliance with such schedules does not operate to oust the division of the jurisdiction conferred on it by the Human Rights Law.”

  • National Organization for Women v. Gannett Co., 40 N.Y.2d 406 (1976): Aiding and Abetting Sex Discrimination Through Classified Ads

    National Organization for Women v. Gannett Co., 40 N.Y.2d 406 (1976)

    A newspaper that publishes classified advertisements under separate “Male” and “Female” headings aids and abets sex discrimination, violating state human rights laws.

    Summary

    The National Organization for Women (NOW) sued Gannett, a newspaper publisher, alleging that maintaining separate “Male” and “Female” columns in classified advertising violated New York’s anti-discrimination laws. The New York Court of Appeals held that Gannett aided and abetted sex discrimination by publishing these separate listings, reinforcing discriminatory practices even though the newspaper itself wasn’t directly discriminating nor was it an “employer” or “employment agency”. The court emphasized that such practices perpetuate wage disparities and limit opportunities based on gender stereotypes.

    Facts

    Gannett Publishing Co., Inc. published a newspaper with classified advertisement sections. These sections included separate columns labeled “Help Wanted – Male” and “Help Wanted – Female.” NOW filed a complaint alleging this practice violated New York State’s anti-discrimination laws, arguing it aided and abetted sex discrimination.

    Procedural History

    The State Division of Human Rights initially determined the separate listings were discriminatory, but this was overruled by the Division itself, dismissing the complaint. The State Human Rights Appeal Board upheld the dismissal. The Appellate Division confirmed the Division’s determination. The New York Court of Appeals granted permission for further appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether NOW has standing to bring suit as a representative organization.

    2. Whether a newspaper aids and abets sex discrimination by publishing classified advertisements under separate “Male” and “Female” headings, in violation of Executive Law § 296(6).

    Holding

    1. Yes, NOW has standing because it is a bona fide organization dedicated to eliminating discriminatory practices against women.

    2. Yes, Gannett aided and abetted sex discrimination because designating separate want ad column listings as “Help Wanted – Male” and/or “Help Wanted – Female” reinforces discriminatory practices.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that unlawful discrimination against women is widespread and often subtle. Although Gannett argued the separate listings were for the convenience of readers, the court found that such a practice perpetuates sex discrimination. The court highlighted that jobs listed in the “female” column often have lower pay than those in the “male” column, reinforcing wage disparities. The court cited Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm., noting similar findings of wage disparities between male and female job listings. Although Gannett was not directly discriminating as an employer or employment agency, it was culpable for aiding and abetting discrimination under Executive Law § 296(6). The court stated, “We hold only that to designate separate want ad column listings as ‘Help Wanted – Male’ and/or ‘Help Wanted – Female’ reinforces the very discriminatory practices which the Federal and State antidiscrimination laws were meant to eliminate.” The court emphasized that the separate listings reinforce discriminatory practices that the law seeks to eliminate and rejected the argument that such listings are merely for reader convenience, stating that such policies can become self-fulfilling prophecies that perpetuate gender stereotypes in employment opportunities.

  • State Commission for Human Rights v. Speer, 29 N.Y.2d 555 (1971): Scope of Damages Awardable by Human Rights Division

    State Commission for Human Rights v. Speer, 29 N.Y.2d 555 (1971)

    The State Division of Human Rights possesses broad authority to award compensatory damages, including for mental anguish and suffering, in cases of unlawful discrimination, but the amount of such damages must be supported by evidence.

    Summary

    This case concerns the scope of the State Division of Human Rights’ power to award damages for mental anguish and suffering resulting from unlawful discrimination. The New York Urban League and John Gaynus filed a complaint alleging discriminatory rental practices. The Human Rights Appeal Board awarded compensatory damages. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that the Division of Human Rights could award damages for mental anguish, but the amount awarded must be supported by evidence. The matter was remitted to determine if the evidence justified the damage award.

    Facts

    • The New York Urban League and John Gaynus, as Director of Operation Open City, filed a complaint with the State Commission for Human Rights.
    • The complaint alleged discriminatory rental practices by Edmund M. Speer, Jr., as Trustee, and others.
    • The Human Rights Appeal Board made an award that included compensatory damages for mental anguish and suffering.

    Procedural History

    • The State Commission for Human Rights initially heard the complaint.
    • The Human Rights Appeal Board reviewed the Commission’s decision and made its own award.
    • The Appellate Division reversed the Appeal Board’s determination.
    • The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the State Division of Human Rights has the authority to award compensatory damages for mental anguish and suffering in discrimination cases?
    2. Whether the amount of damages awarded by the Division of Human Rights must be supported by evidence?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the State Division of Human Rights has broad authority to award compensatory damages to individuals who have suffered as a result of unlawful discriminatory practices.
    2. Yes, because any award for damages, including those for mental anguish and suffering, must be justified by the evidence presented.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals, in reversing the Appellate Division, adopted the dissenting opinion from the lower court, which supported the Human Rights Division’s authority to award damages for mental anguish and suffering. The court emphasized that the purpose of the human rights laws is to eliminate discrimination, and this purpose is best served by allowing the Division to provide complete relief to victims of discrimination. However, the Court also stressed that any award of damages must be supported by evidence; the amount awarded must be reasonable and proportionate to the harm suffered. The Court remitted the case to the Appellate Division to determine whether the evidence justified the specific amount of damages awarded in this case. The dissenting judge believed that the Legislature never intended to allow the commission the power to award damages for pain, suffering and mental anguish since these claims often involved large sums of money and deprived the defendant of the right to a jury trial.