New York Law Review

Tag: Human Rights Law

  • Margerum v. City of Buffalo, 24 N.Y.3d 724 (2015): Notice of Claim Not Required for Human Rights Law Claims; Summary Judgment Inappropriate in Discrimination Cases

    24 N.Y.3d 724 (2015)

    A notice of claim is not required as a condition precedent to bringing a Human Rights Law claim against a municipality, and summary judgment is generally inappropriate in cases involving employment discrimination.

    Summary

    White firefighters sued the City of Buffalo, alleging reverse discrimination under the New York Human Rights Law after the City allowed promotion eligibility lists to expire, thereby allegedly denying them promotions. The trial court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs on the issue of liability, finding the City did not have a strong basis in evidence to believe it would face disparate impact liability in a related federal case. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the summary judgment ruling, holding that the trial court had improperly decided liability at the summary judgment stage and also clarified that a notice of claim is not required for Human Rights Law claims against a municipality, differentiating these claims from tort claims requiring pre-suit notice.

    Facts

    The City of Buffalo had been subject to federal court orders regarding discriminatory hiring practices in its fire department. The City allowed promotion eligibility lists to expire before their maximum duration. White firefighters who would have been promoted had the lists been extended sued the City, claiming reverse discrimination under the Human Rights Law. The City moved to dismiss, arguing the firefighters failed to file a notice of claim as required under General Municipal Law. The plaintiffs cross-moved for summary judgment on liability, which was granted by the trial court.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the City’s motion to dismiss and granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs. The Appellate Division affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss, finding no notice of claim was needed and, after a subsequent Supreme Court case (Ricci v. DeStefano), reversed the grant of summary judgment, finding the City failed to meet a “strong basis in evidence” standard. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the plaintiffs were required to file a notice of claim under General Municipal Law § 50-i before commencing an action alleging violations of the New York Human Rights Law.

    2. Whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs on the issue of liability, given the factual disputes concerning the City’s actions.

    Holding

    1. No, because Human Rights Law claims are not tort actions under section 50-e and are not personal injury, wrongful death, or damage to personal property claims under section 50-i.

    2. No, because factual issues remained regarding the City’s motivation and justification for its actions that should not have been decided at the summary judgment stage.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals first addressed the notice of claim requirement. It held that the General Municipal Law provisions requiring a notice of claim applied only to tort actions and did not apply to claims brought under the Human Rights Law. The Court cited prior Appellate Division cases, which have consistently held that a notice of claim is not required for claims based on the Human Rights Law, concluding that “Human rights claims are not tort actions under section 50-e and are not personal injury, wrongful death, or damage to personal property claims under section 50-i.”

    Regarding summary judgment, the Court cited the Supreme Court case of Ricci v. DeStefano, which held that before taking race-based action, “the employer must have a strong basis in evidence to believe it will be subject to disparate-impact liability if it fails to take the race-conscious, discriminatory action.” The Court emphasized that the standard of proof for claims under the New York Human Rights Law is in nearly all instances identical to Title VII and other federal law. The court explained that there were questions of fact surrounding the City’s actions that were inappropriate to resolve on summary judgment.

    The Court noted that the City’s motivations in allowing the eligibility lists to expire and the strength of any justifications were central to the issue of liability. The Court recognized that the City’s motivations were unclear. The Court of Appeals concluded, “In this case, the issue of liability turns on the factual circumstances behind the City’s actions, the strength of its justifications and its motivations.” The court determined that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment because questions of fact remained regarding the City’s motivations, and thus the case was sent back for further proceedings.

  • Romanello v. Intesa Sanpaolo, S.p.A., 22 N.Y.3d 881 (2013): Indefinite Leave and Differing Disability Standards in State and City HRL

    Romanello v. Intesa Sanpaolo, S.p.A., 22 N.Y.3d 881 (2013)

    Under the New York State Human Rights Law, a request for indefinite leave is not considered a reasonable accommodation, but the New York City Human Rights Law provides broader protections and places the burden on the employer to prove undue hardship and that the employee could not perform essential job functions with reasonable accommodation.

    Summary

    Giuseppe Romanello, an executive at Intesa Sanpaolo, was terminated after informing his employer of his severe and disabling illnesses and an “indeterminate” return-to-work date. He sued, alleging disability discrimination under both the New York State Human Rights Law (State HRL) and the New York City Human Rights Law (City HRL). The Court of Appeals held that while the State HRL claim was properly dismissed because indefinite leave is not a reasonable accommodation under that statute, the City HRL claim should be reinstated because the City HRL places the burden on the employer to prove that no reasonable accommodation would allow the employee to perform the job’s essential functions.

    Facts

    Giuseppe Romanello, an executive with Intesa Sanpaolo (Intesa), became ill and unable to work, diagnosed with major depression and other disorders. After nearly five months of paid leave, Intesa inquired about his return. Romanello’s counsel responded that his return date was “indeterminate” due to his ongoing illnesses. Intesa then terminated his employment, even as he sought and received long-term disability payments under Intesa’s policy.

    Procedural History

    Romanello sued Intesa, alleging disability discrimination under the State HRL and City HRL. The Supreme Court dismissed both claims. The Appellate Division affirmed. The plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals from so much of the Appellate Division order as affirmed the dismissal of the severed first and second causes of action.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the plaintiff stated a claim for disability discrimination under the New York State Human Rights Law (State HRL) when he requested an indefinite leave of absence.

    2. Whether the plaintiff stated a claim for disability discrimination under the New York City Human Rights Law (City HRL) when he requested an indefinite leave of absence.

    Holding

    1. No, because under the State HRL, a “reasonable accommodation” does not include indefinite leave; thus, the first cause of action was properly dismissed.

    2. Yes, because the City HRL provides broader protections for discrimination plaintiffs, and the employer bears the burden of proving that the employee could not perform the essential functions of the job with reasonable accommodation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court distinguished between the State HRL and City HRL. Under the State HRL, a disability is “limited to disabilities which, upon the provision of reasonable accommodations, do not prevent the complainant from performing in a reasonable manner the activities involved in the job or occupation sought or held” (Executive Law § 292 [21]). The Court stated that indefinite leave is not considered a reasonable accommodation under the State HRL, citing Phillips v City of New York, 66 AD3d 170, 176 (1st Dept 2009). Because Romanello requested an “indeterminate” leave, he failed to state a claim under the State HRL.

    However, the Court emphasized the broader protections of the City HRL, stating that its provisions “shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment of the uniquely broad and remedial purposes thereof” and “broadly in favor of discrimination plaintiffs, to the extent that such a construction is reasonably possible” (Albunio v City of New York, 16 NY3d 472, 477-478 [2011]). The City HRL does not define disability with reference to reasonable accommodation, as the State HRL does (Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-102 [16]). Instead, it requires employers to “make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to satisfy the essential requisites of a job,” and it is the employer’s burden to prove undue hardship and that the employee could not, with reasonable accommodation, perform the job (Administrative Code § 8-107 [15] [a]; Phillips, 66 AD3d at 183). Since Intesa did not attempt to meet this burden, the City HRL claim should not have been dismissed.

  • Town of Oyster Bay v. Kirkland, 19 N.Y.3d 1036 (2012): Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies for Discrimination Claims

    Town of Oyster Bay v. Kirkland, 19 N.Y.3d 1036 (2012)

    A party must exhaust available administrative remedies before litigating a claim in court, even if the claim alleges a constitutional violation, where resolution of factual issues is required and the administrative agency could provide the requested relief.

    Summary

    The Town of Oyster Bay sued the New York State Division of Human Rights (SDHR), challenging the SDHR’s authority to investigate the Town’s zoning practices, which favored local residents in housing programs. The Town claimed the SDHR’s actions constituted “reverse discrimination.” The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the Town’s action, holding that the Town was required to exhaust its administrative remedies before bringing its claim to court, as factual issues needed resolution and the SDHR could provide the requested relief.

    Facts

    The Town of Oyster Bay created zoning districts for “Golden Age Housing” and “Next Generation Housing,” offering below-market-rate housing with preference for Town residents and their families.

    In 2009, the SDHR filed an administrative complaint alleging that the Town’s actions discriminated based on race, color, and national origin, violating the Human Rights Law, citing the Town’s low Black population compared to the rest of Nassau County.

    The SDHR assigned the complaint for investigation to determine jurisdiction and probable cause.

    The Town then sued the SDHR, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing the SDHR lacked authority, the claims were time-barred, and the complaint constituted “reverse racial discrimination.”

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court dismissed the Town’s action, holding that the SDHR had the authority to bring the action and that the Town needed to exhaust administrative remedies.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision, modifying it to declare that the SDHR acted within its authority and that the relevant statutes were not unconstitutional.

    The Court of Appeals granted the Town leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Town was required to exhaust its administrative remedies before bringing its claim of “reverse discrimination” to court.

    Holding

    Yes, because the SDHR’s allegation of discrimination and the Town’s claim of “reverse discrimination” require resolution of factual issues at the administrative level, and the SDHR could provide the relief sought by the Town.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reaffirmed the principle that a party must exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief. It acknowledged exceptions to the exhaustion rule, such as when an agency’s action is challenged as unconstitutional or beyond its power, or when pursuing administrative remedies would be futile or cause irreparable injury.

    Although the Town argued the SDHR was engaged in unconstitutional “reverse discrimination,” the Court found that this claim required factual development regarding the impact of the Town’s preferences on minority home buyers and the consequences of removing those preferences.

    The Court cited Matter of Schulz v State of New York, 86 NY2d 225, 232 (1995): “A constitutional claim that may require the resolution of factual issues reviewable at the administrative level should initially be addressed to the administrative agency having responsibility so that the necessary factual record can be established. Moreover, merely asserting a constitutional violation will not excuse a litigant from first pursuing administrative remedies that can provide the requested relief.”

    The Court reasoned that an administrative law judge could find that the Town’s preferences do not amount to discrimination, thus providing the Town with the relief it sought. Because administrative relief was possible, exhausting administrative remedies was not futile.

    Therefore, the Court concluded that the Town should first present its constitutional claim and defenses to the SDHR for factual development and resolution.

  • Matter of North Syracuse Cent. School Dist. v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 20 N.Y.3d 482 (2013): SDHR Jurisdiction Over Public School Discrimination Complaints

    Matter of North Syracuse Cent. School Dist. v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 20 N.Y.3d 482 (2013)

    Executive Law § 296(4), which prohibits discrimination by “education corporations or associations,” does not apply to public school districts, and therefore the New York State Division of Human Rights (SDHR) lacks jurisdiction to investigate complaints against public school districts under that provision.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the New York State Division of Human Rights (SDHR) has jurisdiction to investigate discrimination complaints against public school districts under Executive Law § 296(4). Students filed complaints with the SDHR, alleging that their school districts permitted harassment based on race and/or disability. The school districts argued that they are not “education corporations or associations” under the statute. The Court of Appeals held that public school districts are not “education corporations or associations” as contemplated by Executive Law § 296(4), reversing the Appellate Division’s order in North Syracuse and reinstating the Supreme Court’s judgment, and reversing the Appellate Division’s order in Ithaca City School Dist. and reinstating the Supreme Court’s order. Therefore, the SDHR lacks jurisdiction over these complaints.

    Facts

    Students in the North Syracuse Central School District and Ithaca City School District filed complaints with the SDHR, alleging that their respective school districts engaged in unlawful discriminatory practices by allowing harassment based on race and/or disability.

    Procedural History

    Both school districts initiated CPLR article 78 proceedings seeking to prohibit the SDHR from investigating the complaints, arguing that public school districts are not “education corporations or associations” under Executive Law § 296(4). In North Syracuse, the Supreme Court initially granted the petition, but the Appellate Division reversed, stating the school district should have first exhausted administrative remedies. In Ithaca City School Dist., the Supreme Court initially annulled the SDHR’s determination of discrimination and award of damages, but the Appellate Division modified the award and confirmed the determination, concluding that public school districts are “educational institutions” over which the SDHR has jurisdiction.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a public school district is an “education corporation or association” as contemplated by Executive Law § 296(4), thereby granting the SDHR jurisdiction to investigate complaints against them.

    Holding

    No, because the legislative history of Executive Law § 296(4) indicates that the term “education corporation or association” refers to private, non-sectarian entities that are exempt from taxation under RPTL article 4, and public school districts do not fall into this category.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals examined the legislative history of Executive Law § 296(4), tracing the term “education corporation or association” back to the Tax Law. The Court highlighted that Tax Law § 4 differentiated between the tax-exempt status of municipal corporations, like school districts, and that of private corporations or associations organized for various purposes, including education. The Court noted that the language of Executive Law § 296(4) was taken almost verbatim from Tax Law § 4(6), indicating the Legislature’s intention for the term to have the same meaning in both laws. The Court emphasized that the phrase “non-sectarian” in Executive Law § 296(4) was intended to carve out an exception for parochial schools, reserving jurisdiction for the SDHR to investigate complaints against private, non-sectarian education corporations or associations. The court rejected the SDHR’s argument to liberally construe the statute to include public school districts, finding no underlying directive to support such a construction. The Court concluded that public school districts, as part of a public system, are distinct from private, non-sectarian institutions and do not need to “hold themselves out to the public to be non-sectarian” to receive tax-exempt status.

  • Stephenson v. Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees Union Local 100, 6 N.Y.3d 265 (2005): Establishing Pretext in Age Discrimination Claims

    6 N.Y.3d 265 (2005)

    In age discrimination cases, after the employer provides a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for termination, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove that the employer’s stated reason was pretextual.

    Summary

    Plaintiffs Stephenson and Hodge sued their former union employer, alleging age discrimination after their termination. The employer argued they were terminated due to involvement in corruption. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision to set aside a jury verdict for the plaintiffs, holding that while the plaintiffs established a prima facie case of age discrimination, they failed to prove that the employer’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for their termination (corruption) was a pretext for age discrimination. The court emphasized that the burden of proving pretext remains with the plaintiff.

    Facts

    Stephenson, 63, and Hodge, 55, were terminated from their positions as union organizers and business agents. The union was under investigation for corruption and RICO violations. The union entered a consent decree with the federal government allowing a takeover and investigation. The union claimed the plaintiffs were terminated due to their involvement in corruption, acting as “bag men” for the mob. Plaintiffs argued they were fired due to their age and replaced, or intended to be replaced, by younger workers. Stephenson alleged a union official made ageist comments prior to his firing. Defendants argued the plaintiffs were not qualified, as evidenced by the federal probe into their activities that resulted in a recommendation that they be terminated.

    Procedural History

    Plaintiffs filed separate complaints, which were consolidated. A jury found in favor of the plaintiffs. The Supreme Court denied the defendant’s motion to set aside the verdict. The Appellate Division reversed, granting the defendant’s motion, finding the plaintiffs failed to prove the non-discriminatory reason for firing was pretextual. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division erred in setting aside the jury verdict and dismissing the complaint, determining that the plaintiffs failed to prove that the defendants’ valid reasons for termination were pretextual for age discrimination.

    Holding

    No, because the plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove that the employer’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for their termination was a pretext for age discrimination.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied a three-part analysis, similar to federal Title VII standards, for age discrimination claims under New York’s Human Rights Law. First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Second, the burden shifts to the defendant to provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the termination. Finally, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s reason is pretextual.

    The court found that while the plaintiffs established a prima facie case, the employer presented sufficient evidence of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the termination – their alleged involvement in corruption, based on an FBI informant’s information and recommendation from an investigating company.

    Crucially, the court noted the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proving that this reason was a pretext for age discrimination. They simply denied the allegations of corruption, which was deemed insufficient to overcome the evidence presented by the employer. The court emphasized that “the burden of persuasion of the ultimate issue of discrimination always remains with the plaintiffs.”

    The court rejected the argument that the Appellate Division improperly substituted its factual findings for those of the jury. The court concluded that there was “no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences that could have lead rational jurors to the conclusion they reached” based on the evidence presented. The court noted the Appellate Division’s point that younger employees implicated in corruption were also terminated, and older employees not implicated were retained which further undermined the pretext argument.

  • Mittl v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 100 N.Y.2d 326 (2003): Employer Liability for Discrimination Influenced by Third-Party Bias

    Mittl v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 100 N.Y.2d 326 (2003)

    An employer can be held liable for pregnancy discrimination when the decision to terminate an employee is influenced by the discriminatory bias of a third party, even if the employer claims to have acted to avoid marital problems.

    Summary

    An ophthalmologist terminated his secretary after his wife became jealous and made accusations about the secretary’s pregnancy. The secretary filed a complaint with the Division of Human Rights (DHR), alleging unlawful termination based on pregnancy. The DHR found in favor of the secretary. The employer sought to annul the DHR’s order, but the Appellate Division reversed, finding no sex discrimination. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that substantial evidence supported the DHR’s determination that the termination was discriminatory. The court emphasized that it is irrelevant if the record could also support the employer’s explanation that he discharged the employee to save his marriage.

    Facts

    An ophthalmologist hired a secretary. Approximately a year later, the secretary informed the ophthalmologist she was pregnant. The ophthalmologist told the secretary his wife suspected the secretary was carrying his child and that her pregnancy was “becoming a problem” in the office. The secretary requested two days off for doctor’s appointments. Minutes after the ophthalmologist granted the time off, his wife called the secretary and made accusatory and threatening statements. Shortly after the phone call, the ophthalmologist terminated the secretary, stating, “it’s going to cause a lot of problems if you stay.”

    Procedural History

    The secretary filed a complaint with the Division of Human Rights (DHR). The DHR Commissioner ruled in favor of the secretary. The employer sought to annul the DHR’s order in the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division granted the petition and annulled the DHR’s determination. The secretary cross-petitioned for enforcement of the order. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case for consideration of damages.

    Issue(s)

    Whether substantial evidence supported the DHR Commissioner’s determination that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee based on her pregnancy.

    Holding

    Yes, because the employer’s remark that the employee’s pregnancy was “becoming a problem,” followed by the wife’s objections and the subsequent discharge, constituted sufficient evidence to support the DHR’s finding of a prima facie case of discrimination, and the employer’s proffered reasons for the termination were found to be incredible and unsubstantiated.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court stated that judicial review of the DHR’s determination is limited to whether substantial evidence supports the agency’s decision. Substantial evidence is defined as “such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact” (300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v State Div. of Human Rights, 45 NY2d 176, 180 [1978]). The court emphasized that it cannot weigh the evidence or reject the DHR’s choice where the evidence is conflicting. The court found that the employer’s remark about the pregnancy becoming a problem, the wife’s objections, and the termination were sufficient to support a prima facie case of discrimination. The burden then shifted to the employer to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the termination. The court noted the DHR found the employer’s proffered reasons to be unsubstantiated. DHR’s rejection of the employer’s reason that the wife terminated the secretary because they did not get along was supported by evidence that the wife had no supervisory authority over the secretary. DHR’s rejection of the employer’s claim of a time and attendance problem was supported by the employer’s own admission that he was satisfied with the secretary’s job performance and the absence of any documentation of attendance issues. The court stated, “the issue of whether substantial evidence supports an agency determination is solely a question of law.” The court distinguished this case from cases involving consensual sexual relationships, noting that no such relationship was alleged here. The court stated that the Appellate Division misapplied the relevant standards and that its conclusion was, therefore, erroneous.

  • Freudenthal v. County of Nassau, 99 N.Y.2d 285 (2003): Notice of Claim Requirements in Discrimination Claims

    Freudenthal v. County of Nassau, 99 N.Y.2d 285 (2003)

    A claimant pursuing an administrative complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights for unlawful discrimination is not required to file a notice of claim with the county as a condition precedent to the Division’s review of the complaint.

    Summary

    Anita Freudenthal filed a complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights after her termination from the Nassau County Department of Health, alleging gender and age discrimination. The Division later sought to dismiss the complaint due to Freudenthal’s failure to file a notice of claim with Nassau County within 90 days of her termination, as required by County Law § 52(1). The New York Court of Appeals held that filing a notice of claim is not a prerequisite for pursuing an administrative complaint with the Division of Human Rights, emphasizing the legislative intent to provide a simplified alternative to litigation for resolving discrimination claims.

    Facts

    Anita Freudenthal was terminated from her position as Chief of the Office of Marine Ecology for the Nassau County Department of Health on January 9, 1992.
    In April 1992, Freudenthal filed a discrimination complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights, alleging her termination was due to gender and age discrimination.
    The Nassau County Department of Health was promptly notified and responded that Freudenthal’s position was eliminated due to budget cuts.
    The Division found probable cause for discrimination and recommended a hearing or arbitration.
    In July 1999, the Division sought to dismiss the complaint because Freudenthal had not filed a notice of claim with the County within 90 days of her termination.

    Procedural History

    Freudenthal initiated a judicial proceeding seeking a declaratory judgment that her failure to file a notice of claim was not a valid reason to dismiss her administrative complaint.
    Supreme Court ruled in favor of Freudenthal, declaring that she was not required to serve Nassau County with a notice of claim before pursuing relief from the Division of Human Rights.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a claimant pursuing an administrative complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights for unlawful discrimination must file a notice of claim with the county within 90 days of the alleged discriminatory act, as a condition precedent to the Division’s review.

    Holding

    No, because requiring a notice of claim prior to pursuing administrative relief before the Division of Human Rights is inconsistent with the legislative intent to provide a simplified alternative to litigation for resolving discrimination claims.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the comprehensive statutory scheme of the New York Human Rights Law, designed to combat employment discrimination and provide a framework for redress through the Division of Human Rights.
    The Court highlighted the Division’s special expertise in adjudicating Human Rights Law claims and its ability to offer remedies not available in court.
    The Court noted that Executive Law § 297 sets forth the procedures for filing and resolving complaints with the Division, specifying a one-year limitation period for filing a verified complaint. Freudenthal complied with this requirement.
    The Court distinguished this case from Mills v. County of Monroe, where the notice of claim requirement was applied to a judicial action, not an administrative proceeding before the Division of Human Rights.
    The Court reasoned that the Legislature was aware of statutes of limitations outside Executive Law § 297(5) that apply to discrimination claims brought in court, but did not extend those limitations to Section 297 proceedings.
    The Court found no evidence of legislative intention to classify a Division of Human Rights proceeding as an “action or special proceeding” referenced in the general notice of claim provisions. The court stated, “Nothing in the Human Rights statutes or regulations suggests that an aggrieved party is required to take any action prior to seeking administrative relief beyond timely filing a complaint with the Division, nor would judicial imposition of such a requirement be consistent with the Legislature’s intent to provide aggrieved parties a simplified alternative to litigation as a means to resolve discrimination claims.”
    The Court explicitly stated that to the extent that Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 2, E. Williston, Town of N. Hempstead v New York State Div. of Human Rights (Arluck) suggested that a petitioner must file a notice of claim prior to pursuing administrative relief from the Division, it is not to be followed.

  • Aurecchione v. Classic Coach, 96 N.Y.2d 23 (2001): Entitlement to Pre-Determination Interest in Employment Discrimination Cases

    Aurecchione v. Classic Coach, 96 N.Y.2d 23 (2001)

    In employment discrimination cases under the New York Human Rights Law, while pre-determination interest on back pay awards is not mandatory, its denial is an abuse of discretion unless the Commissioner provides a justification for the denial, as pre-determination interest is an element of complete compensation to make the victim whole.

    Summary

    Carol Aurecchione won a human rights employment discrimination claim against her former employer. The State Division of Human Rights (Division) awarded her back pay but denied “pre-determination interest” (interest accruing from the date of discrimination). The New York Court of Appeals held that, under these facts, denying pre-determination interest was an abuse of discretion because the purpose of the Human Rights Law is to make victims whole, and pre-determination interest is part of that compensation. Although not mandatory, denying it without justification is an abuse of discretion.

    Facts

    Carol Aurecchione was hired by Classic Coach in April 1986 as a charter reservationist and was later promoted to office manager and then general manager. Despite increased responsibilities, her salary remained significantly lower than that of male office managers. In October 1987, Classic eliminated her manager position and offered her a lower-paying reservationist role, which she refused, requesting a termination letter.

    Procedural History

    Aurecchione filed a complaint with the Division of Human Rights in February 1988, alleging employment discrimination. Public hearings were held between 1995 and 1996. In 1999, an Administrative Law Judge issued a recommended decision, and the Commissioner rendered a decision, awarding Aurecchione back pay and compensatory damages but denying pre-determination interest. Aurecchione challenged the denial of pre-determination interest in a proceeding pursuant to Executive Law § 298. The Appellate Division confirmed the Commissioner’s determination. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether victims of employment discrimination are entitled to pre-determination interest on back pay awards under the New York Human Rights Law.
    2. Whether the Commissioner of the State Division of Human Rights has discretion in awarding pre-determination interest.

    Holding

    1. While not automatically entitled, the denial of pre-determination interest in this case was an abuse of discretion; the award should have been granted because it complements the back pay award and contributes to making the victim whole.
    2. Yes, the Commissioner has some discretion in determining appropriate compensation, subject to appellate review for abuse of that discretion; however, that discretion must be justified.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Human Rights Law intends to compensate victims of employment discrimination fully. Although the statute does not explicitly mention pre-determination interest, it should be liberally construed to effectuate its intent, which is to make victims whole. Citing Loeffler v Frank, the Court noted that federal courts have recognized pre-determination interest as an essential component of back pay awards under Title VII. The court emphasized that interest is not a penalty but a means of indemnifying the aggrieved party for the loss of the use of money during the period of discrimination. Quoting Love v. State of New York, the court stated that interest represents “the cost of having the use of another person’s money for a specified period.” Since Classic Coach had the use of the money wrongfully withheld from Aurecchione, denying pre-determination interest would provide them with an “interest-free loan.” The Court clarified that pre-determination interest is not automatically required but the Commissioner must justify its denial. Because no such justification was offered in this case, the denial was an abuse of discretion. The Court ordered the Division to calculate the interest and complete the process within 30 days.

  • Ferrante v. American Lung Ass’n, 90 N.Y.2d 623 (1997): Establishing Pretext in Age Discrimination Claims

    Ferrante v. American Lung Ass’n, 90 N.Y.2d 623 (1997)

    In an age discrimination claim under New York’s Human Rights Law, summary judgment for the employer is inappropriate where the employee raises a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the employer’s stated reasons for termination were a pretext for discrimination.

    Summary

    Ferrante sued the American Lung Association (ALA), alleging he was terminated due to age discrimination. ALA claimed Ferrante’s termination was performance-based. Ferrante argued that ALA’s reasons were pretextual and pointed to his supervisor’s ageist remarks and irregularities in the termination process. The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to ALA, but the Appellate Division reversed, finding that Ferrante had raised a factual issue. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Ferrante presented sufficient evidence to create a question of fact as to whether ALA’s reasons were a pretext for age discrimination, thus precluding summary judgment.

    Facts

    Ferrante, 58, was terminated from his position as controller at ALA after nearly 10 years of employment. He received merit-based salary increases until a new Chief Financial Officer (CFO) became his supervisor. Ferrante alleged the CFO made disparaging remarks about his age, referring to him as “the old man.” ALA claimed Ferrante was terminated for poor performance, citing errors in financial reporting and failure to adapt to a new computer system. However, the primary evidence of poor performance was a memorandum written by the CFO after Ferrante’s termination, which Ferrante argued deviated from ALA’s standard procedure.

    Procedural History

    Ferrante sued ALA, claiming age discrimination under New York’s Human Rights Law. The Supreme Court granted ALA’s motion for summary judgment, finding Ferrante failed to prove ALA’s reasons were pretextual. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that Ferrante only needed to identify a disputed material issue of fact regarding pretext. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division properly reversed the Supreme Court’s grant of summary judgment to the American Lung Association, based on the plaintiff raising a question of fact as to whether the employer’s articulated basis for the dismissal was merely a pretext for discriminatory action?

    Holding

    Yes, because Ferrante presented sufficient evidence to raise a question of fact as to whether ALA’s stated reasons for his termination were a pretext for age discrimination.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals aligned New York’s Human Rights Law standards with federal Title VII standards. The court reiterated the burden-shifting framework: the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. If successful, the burden shifts to the employer to provide legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the termination. Finally, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer’s reasons are pretextual.

    The court emphasized that while the plaintiff retains the ultimate burden of proving discrimination, to defeat summary judgment, the plaintiff only needs to raise a material issue of fact as to whether the employer’s asserted reason is false or unworthy of belief, and that more likely than not the employee’s age was the real reason. “To defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment in an age discrimination case, plaintiffs must ‘show that there is a material issue of fact as to whether (1) the employer’s asserted reason for [the challenged action] is false or unworthy of belief and (2) more likely than not the employee’s age was the real reason.”

    The court found several factors that raised credibility issues and supported a finding of pretext, including the supervisor’s alleged ageist remarks, the timing of the performance memorandum (written after the termination), the deviation from standard termination procedures, and the contested evidence about other employees over 50 who were fired. The court noted that assessing credibility is not the court’s function on a motion for summary judgment. Because Ferrante successfully raised a question of fact concerning the falsity of ALA’s proffered basis for the termination, summary judgment was inappropriate.

  • Scott v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 86 N.Y.2d 429 (1995): Discrimination Claims by Independent Contractors Under the Human Rights Law

    Scott v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 86 N.Y.2d 429 (1995)

    An independent contractor cannot bring a discrimination claim under Executive Law § 296(1)(a) unless they can demonstrate an employer-employee relationship; discrimination claims under Executive Law § 296(13) require showing a boycott, blacklisting, or concerted effort to disadvantage a protected class.

    Summary

    Marilyn Scott, an insurance agent, sued Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company and its general agent, G. James Blatt, alleging discrimination based on gender, age, and marital status after her contract was terminated. Scott claimed violations of New York’s Human Rights Law, specifically Executive Law § 296(1)(a) and § 296(13). The court held that as an independent contractor, Scott could not claim discrimination under § 296(1)(a) because she failed to prove an employer-employee relationship. Furthermore, the court determined that § 296(13) did not apply because Scott did not demonstrate a boycott, blacklisting, or a concerted effort by the defendants to economically disadvantage women or any other protected group.

    Facts

    Marilyn Scott was hired as an insurance agent by G. James Blatt, a general agent for Massachusetts Mutual, in 1981 under a career contract explicitly stating that no employer-employee relationship was created. In 1987, she became a district manager. Both contracts were terminable at will. Blatt terminated Scott’s contract and her license to sell certain mutual funds in 1992. Scott was responsible for her operating expenses, support staff, and taxes were not withheld from her pay. She could also sell competitors’ products. She claimed she was required to recruit and train agents according to MassMutual’s guidelines, but this applied only to agents financed by MassMutual.

    Procedural History

    Scott sued Massachusetts Mutual and Blatt in New York Supreme Court, alleging discrimination under the Human Rights Law. The Supreme Court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, dismissing the complaint. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Scott, as an independent contractor, can bring a discrimination claim under Executive Law § 296(1)(a).
    2. Whether Scott’s discrimination claim can proceed under Executive Law § 296(13), even if she is an independent contractor.

    Holding

    1. No, because Scott failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether an employer-employee relationship existed.
    2. No, because Scott failed to present evidence of a boycott, blacklisting, or a concerted effort to economically disadvantage a protected class.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the first issue, the court stated that an employer-employee relationship exists when the employer exercises control over the results produced or the means used to achieve the results. Minimal control is insufficient. Here, Scott financed her operations, was paid by performance, didn’t have taxes withheld, could sell competitors’ products, and contracted as an independent contractor, demonstrating a high degree of independence. The court cited Matter of Ted Is Back Corp. [Roberts], 64 NY2d 725, 726, stating that "a determination that an employer-employee relationship exists may rest upon evidence that the employer exercises either control over the results produced or over the means used to achieve the results." Thus, summary judgment was proper.

    Regarding the second issue, the court analyzed Executive Law § 296(13), noting its focus on boycotts, blacklisting, and refusals to deal. The court reasoned that "[s]ince the term ‘discriminate’ immediately precedes the list of terms including boycott, blacklisting and refusals to trade, that term should be construed to refer to similar types of commercial activity." Legislative history revealed that § 296(13) was enacted to address economic warfare against protected classes, such as the Arab Boycott Law. The court stated, "While the enactment found its impetus in the Arab boycott of Jewish businesses, it was drafted more broadly to prohibit not only boycotts imposed by foreign entities, but any business tactics, utilized in New York State or against a New York resident or corporation, which are driven by ‘religious or racial bigotry’" The court found no evidence of a formal boycott or blacklisting campaign against Scott, nor any pattern of conduct commercially disadvantaging only members of a protected class. Thus, the claim under § 296(13) was properly dismissed. The court emphasized that even without a formal boycott, a pattern of discriminatory conduct could suffice, citing Harvey v NYRAC, Inc., 813 F Supp 206. However, Scott’s allegations were insufficient to defeat summary judgment.