New York Law Review

Tag: home rule

  • Resnick v. County of Ulster, 44 N.Y.2d 279 (1978): Local Governments’ Power to Fill Vacancies

    Resnick v. County of Ulster, 44 N.Y.2d 279 (1978)

    In non-charter counties, county legislatures have the authority to enact local laws providing that vacancies in the office of county legislator, occurring other than by expiration of the term, can be filled by the remaining members of the body.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether county legislatures in non-charter counties can enact local laws to fill vacancies in their membership. Ulster and Oswego Counties passed such laws, leading to legal challenges arguing that the power to appoint interim legislators rested solely with the Governor. The New York Court of Appeals held that the local laws were valid. The court emphasized the constitutional bill of rights for local governments, granting them broad authority to manage their “affairs or government,” including the selection of their officers. This authority extends to filling interim vacancies, even without specific authorization from the State Legislature.

    Facts

    Ulster County adopted a local law allowing the County Board of Supervisors to fill vacancies in the office of County Legislator. A resident and a legislator challenged the law’s validity. Oswego County enacted a similar local law. When a vacancy occurred, the county legislature appointed William Dyer to fill it, while the Governor simultaneously appointed Raymond Rebeor. This dual appointment led to legal suits to determine the rightful appointee.

    Procedural History

    In Resnick, the Supreme Court declared the Ulster County law invalid, which was affirmed by the Appellate Division, Third Department. In Rebeor, the Special Term, following the Resnick decision, declared the Oswego law invalid. However, the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, reversed, finding the law valid. The New York Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether county legislatures in non-charter counties have the authority to enact local laws providing that vacancies in the office of county legislator, occurring other than by expiration of the term, are to be filled by the remaining members of the body.

    Holding

    Yes, because the State Constitution vests local governments with the right to confer upon their officers the authority to appoint other officers of local government.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the bill of rights for local governments (NY Const, art IX, § 1, subd [b]) grants broad authority to local governments to manage their affairs, including the selection of their officers. This includes the power to fill interim vacancies. The court emphasized the constitutional and statutory provisions granting local governments the power to determine the mode of selection of their officers. The court noted that the 1964 home rule amendment was intended to be expansive, granting similar authority to all local governmental units. The court rejected the argument that the constitutional provision stating “the legislature shall provide for filling vacancies in office” (NY Const, art XIII, § 3) exclusively vested the State Legislature with authority over filling vacancies, stating that if inconsistencies in the Constitution do exist, the later amendment controls. The Court cited Bareham v City of Rochester, 246 NY 140, 145. To invalidate the local laws would be to take a step in the direction against which Cardozo warned when he observed that the home rule enactments “adopted by the people with much ado and after many years of agitation, will be another Statute of Uses, a form of words and little else, if the courts * * * ignore the new spirit that dictated their adoption” (Matter of Mayor, etc., of New York [Elm St.], 246 NY 72, 76).

  • NYSA-Westchester Assoc. v. City of New York, 43 N.Y.2d 257 (1977): Upholding City’s Power to Amend Tax Foreclosure Laws

    NYSA-Westchester Assoc. v. City of New York, 43 N.Y.2d 257 (1977)

    A city’s local law amending tax foreclosure procedures is constitutional, even if it differs from state law, provided the state law is optional and the local law doesn’t contradict the state’s overall scheme.

    Summary

    This case addresses the constitutionality of New York City’s Local Law No. 45 of 1976, which reduced the time before in rem tax foreclosure proceedings from three years to one. The petitioners argued this law was inconsistent with state law and thus unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals upheld the local law, finding that the state’s in rem tax foreclosure procedure was optional, allowing the city to enact its own procedure as long as it did not contradict state law. The court emphasized that lack of uniformity does not equate to inconsistency.

    Facts

    The City of New York enacted Local Law No. 45, shortening the waiting period for in rem tax foreclosure proceedings to one year. Previously, the city’s Administrative Code, Title D, established a tax foreclosure procedure, initially enacted by the State Legislature and amended several times. The state’s Stagg Act (later Real Property Tax Law) provided an optional in rem foreclosure procedure for tax districts. New York City had its own specific procedures under Title D of its Administrative Code. Petitioners challenged Local Law No. 45, arguing it was inconsistent with state law.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court, New York County, granted the city’s motion for summary judgment, upholding the constitutionality of Local Law No. 45. The petitioners appealed directly to the New York Court of Appeals under CPLR 5601(b)(2), arguing that a local law should be considered a state statutory provision for the purposes of that section.

    Issue(s)

    Whether New York City’s Local Law No. 45 of 1976, reducing the waiting period for in rem tax foreclosure proceedings, is unconstitutional because it is inconsistent with a “general law” of the state, namely Title 3 of Article 11 of the Real Property Tax Law (the successor to the Stagg Act)?

    Holding

    No, because the state’s in rem tax foreclosure procedure is optional, not mandatory, and the city’s local law does not contradict the overall design and pattern of the state statute.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the taxing power in New York State is vested in the Legislature, which can delegate this power to cities. While the Constitution grants local governments the power to adopt local laws, this power is restricted regarding the levy, collection, and administration of local taxes. The court reasoned that even assuming the Real Property Tax Law is a “general law,” Local Law No. 45 is not inconsistent with it. The state law is optional, allowing local tax districts to choose whether to use it. Nothing prevents the establishment of local in rem foreclosure procedures through special acts. The court emphasized the difference between lack of uniformity and inconsistency, stating, “Petitioners appear to have been diverted by the false assumption that lack of uniformity (i.e., the failure of the procedural details of the city’s title D precisely to parallel those of the optional State statute) is the same as inconsistency or contradiction. It is not.” The court upheld the local law, finding that it did not deny petitioners equal protection of the laws. The court stated that the State procedure is optional, rather than mandatory, i.e., local tax districts may elect to take advantage of its provisions but are not required to do so. Nothing in the statute forecloses the establishment of local in rem foreclosure procedures by the adoption of special acts.

  • Town of Black Brook v. State, 41 N.Y.2d 486 (1977): Local Government Standing in Home Rule Challenges

    Town of Black Brook v. State, 41 N.Y.2d 486 (1977)

    A local government has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a state statute when it alleges that the statute violates the home rule provisions of Article IX of the New York State Constitution.

    Summary

    The Town of Black Brook challenged the Adirondack Park Agency Act, arguing it violated the home rule provisions of the New York Constitution. The State moved to dismiss for lack of standing. The Court of Appeals held that while generally, a political subdivision cannot challenge state legislation restricting its powers, an exception exists when a local government alleges a violation of its home rule rights under Article IX of the Constitution. The Court reasoned that denying standing in such cases would frustrate the purpose of Article IX, which is to promote strong local government. Despite finding standing, the Court noted the complaint would likely fail on the merits based on the companion case, Wambat Realty Corp. v. State of New York.

    Facts

    The Town of Black Brook, located within the Adirondack Park region, brought suit against the State, challenging the Adirondack Park Agency Act (APAA). The APAA subordinated the zoning and land planning powers of local governments within the park to a comprehensive state-level land use and development plan managed by the Adirondack Park Agency. The town claimed this subordination violated the home rule provisions of Article IX of the New York State Constitution.

    Procedural History

    Special Term dismissed the Town of Black Brook’s complaint based on lack of standing. The Appellate Division reversed the Special Term’s decision, finding that the town did have standing to bring the action. The State then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a local government has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a state statute on the grounds that it violates the home rule guarantees of Article IX of the New York State Constitution.

    Holding

    Yes, because when a local government’s claim is based on the protections of Article IX, the principle prohibiting it from questioning legislative action affecting its powers is no longer applicable, as the powers the locality is seeking to protect are directly and specifically guaranteed by the Constitution.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court acknowledged the general rule that a political subdivision of the state cannot challenge the constitutionality of a state act restricting its governmental powers. However, it distinguished this case, stating that “Undiscriminating application of the general rule to the instant case, however, would undermine the home rule protection afforded local governments in article IX of the Constitution, by subverting the very purpose of giving the local governments powers which the State Legislature is forbidden by the Constitution to impair or annul except as provided in the Constitution”.

    The Court emphasized that Article IX, the “bill of rights” of home rule, was intended to create stronger and more effective local government. Allowing the state to unilaterally diminish these guaranteed rights without the possibility of challenge would render the constitutional protections meaningless.

    The Court reasoned that “when a home rule challenge is brought, the powers the locality is seeking to protect are not suffered at the will of the State Legislature, but directly and specifically guaranteed by the Constitution.” Therefore, the local government has a direct political interest in ensuring the preservation of its home rule power.

    The Court clarified that this ruling does not significantly erode the general standing rule; it merely recognizes a specific exception for cases involving Article IX home rule challenges. The Court also pointed out that the merits of the case were likely to fail based on the reasoning in the companion case, Wambat Realty Corp. v State of New York, which addressed the substantive constitutional issues raised by the Adirondack Park Agency Act.

  • Wambat Realty Corp. v. State of New York, 41 N.Y.2d 490 (1977): State Authority over Matters of Regional or Statewide Concern

    Wambat Realty Corp. v. State of New York, 41 N.Y.2d 490 (1977)

    When a matter is of significant state concern, the state legislature can enact laws that may impact or even supersede local government powers, even those powers granted to localities under the Statute of Local Governments.

    Summary

    Wambat Realty Corp. challenged the Adirondack Park Agency Act, arguing it unconstitutionally deprived the Town of Black Brook of its zoning and planning powers. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the Act, finding that preserving the Adirondack Park was a matter of substantial state concern, justifying state legislation that might impact local government powers. The Court reasoned that the home rule provisions of the New York Constitution do not prevent the state from addressing problems of statewide significance, even if it means overriding local interests.

    Facts

    Wambat Realty Corp. owned over 2,200 acres in the Town of Black Brook, within the Adirondack Park. Wambat proposed a land development project called “Valmont Village,” which was permissible under the town’s existing zoning and planning regulations. The Adirondack Park Agency Act of 1971 created the Adirondack Park Agency to regulate land use within the park. The 1973 amendments to the act established a comprehensive zoning and planning program for the park’s public and private lands. Wambat was required to seek agency approval for its project, which prompted this lawsuit challenging the Act’s validity.

    Procedural History

    Wambat Realty Corp. filed a declaratory judgment action challenging the Adirondack Park Agency Act. Special Term granted summary judgment declaring the act valid. Wambat appealed directly to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Adirondack Park Agency Act, which diminishes local zoning and planning powers granted under the Statute of Local Governments, is invalid because it was not enacted and re-enacted in two successive legislative sessions as required by the home rule provisions of the New York Constitution for laws affecting local government powers.

    Holding

    No, because the Adirondack Park Agency Act addresses a matter of substantial state concern (preserving the Adirondack Park) and therefore falls within the powers reserved to the state legislature, which can override local government powers in such cases.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the term “property, affairs or government” of a local government, which defines the scope of home rule powers, does not prevent the state legislature from acting when a matter of state concern is involved. The Court cited previous cases, such as Adler v. Deegan, where legislation affecting only New York City was upheld because it addressed a matter of statewide importance (public health). The Court emphasized that the Adirondack Park Agency Act serves a supervening state concern—preserving the Adirondack Park—that transcends local interests. The court stated, “preserving the priceless Adirondack Park through a comprehensive land use and development plan is most decidedly a substantial State concern, as it is most decidedly not merely 119 separate local concerns”. The Court also rejected Wambat’s argument that legislation dealing with state concerns must be rooted in a specific constitutional provision. The court noted that both the Constitution and the Statute of Local Governments recognize the state’s power to address problems of significant state concern, even if it means overriding local interests. The Court pointed out that interpreting article IX in the way Wambat urges was rejected in Floyd v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp. The court said the multiplication of provisos and exceptions in Article IX and in the Statute of Local Governments “are not the product of clumsy draftsmanship but of a fine-tuned sensitivity to the difficult problem of furthering strong local government but leaving the State just as strong to meet the problems that transcend local boundaries, interests and motivations.”

  • Tucker v. Toia, 43 N.Y.2d 831 (1977): Constitutionality of State Mandates for County Social Service Funding

    Tucker v. Toia, 43 N.Y.2d 831 (1977)

    The New York State Constitution mandates that the aid, care, and support of the needy are public concerns to be provided by the state and its subdivisions as the legislature determines; statutes requiring counties to contribute to the non-federal costs of public assistance programs are constitutional general laws, not violating equal protection, due process, or home rule provisions.

    Summary

    This case concerns a challenge by Erie County against provisions of the Social Services Law requiring the county to bear 50% of the non-federal costs of public assistance programs. Erie County argued these provisions were unconstitutional, violating equal protection, due process, the right to self-government, and imposing excessive local taxes. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the Social Services Law was constitutional. The court relied on a prior federal case and the state constitution to uphold the state’s power to enact general laws relating to the affairs of local governments.

    Facts

    Erie County public officials were ordered to provide funds for home relief, aid to dependent children, medical assistance, and day care programs. The county counterclaimed, arguing that the Social Services Law provisions, which subjected Erie County to a 50% burden of the non-Federal costs of these programs, were unconstitutional. The county asserted that this financial burden infringed upon the county’s ability to manage its own affairs and violated various constitutional rights.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially ordered Erie County officials to provide the necessary funds and denied the county’s counterclaim challenging the law’s validity. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the Supreme Court’s judgment. Erie County then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether provisions of the Social Services Law requiring Erie County to contribute 50% of the non-federal costs for public assistance programs are unconstitutional because they:
    1. Violate equal protection and due process under the United States and New York State Constitutions?
    2. Violate the right of county residents to effective self-government and home rule?
    3. Result in the imposition of local taxes exceeding the limit set by the State Constitution?

    Holding

    1. No, because the division of the state into social services districts with varying burdens of public assistance costs has already been determined to be constitutional.
    2. No, because the applicable statutes of the Social Services Law are general laws, and the State Legislature has the power to act in relation to the property, affairs, or government of any local government by general law.
    3. No, because it was not proven that Erie County is currently taxing property at the maximum allowable rate.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, agreeing with its reasoning and analysis. The court relied heavily on the federal case of Lindsay v. Wyman, which upheld the constitutionality of the Social Services Law against an equal protection challenge based on the unequal distribution of public assistance costs across the state. The court found that the Lindsay decision conclusively negated Erie County’s position under both the Federal and State Constitutions. The court also cited Montgomery v. Daniels in support of this position.

    Regarding the home rule argument, the court noted that the Social Services Law statutes are general laws, and the State Legislature has the power to act concerning local governments via general laws, according to Article IX, Section 2(b)(2) of the New York Constitution. Thus, the state’s general laws are controlling in this situation.

    Finally, the court dismissed the argument regarding excessive taxation because Erie County failed to prove it was currently taxing property at the maximum allowable rate under Article VIII, Section 10 of the State Constitution.

    The court emphasized that the state constitution grants the legislature the authority to determine how the aid, care, and support of the needy are provided, even if it places a significant financial burden on the counties. The court essentially deferred to the legislature’s judgment in allocating the costs of social services programs.

  • City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 37 N.Y.2d 19 (1975): Constitutionality of Compulsory Arbitration for Public Employees

    City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 37 N.Y.2d 19 (1975)

    The New York State Legislature can constitutionally delegate to the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) and arbitration panels the authority to resolve collective bargaining impasses between municipalities and their police and fire departments through compulsory and binding arbitration, as this does not violate the Home Rule provisions of the New York Constitution or constitute an improper delegation of legislative power.

    Summary

    The cities of Amsterdam and Buffalo challenged the constitutionality of amendments to Section 209 of the Civil Service Law, which mandated compulsory and binding arbitration for disputes between municipalities and their police and fire departments. The cities argued these amendments violated the Home Rule provisions of the New York Constitution and improperly delegated legislative power to arbitration panels. The Court of Appeals held that the amendments were constitutional, finding that they constituted a general law applicable to all municipalities and that the delegation of authority to PERB and arbitration panels was permissible with sufficient safeguards and standards.

    Facts

    The City of Amsterdam and the collective bargaining representative for its policemen and firemen reached an impasse in negotiations. The union sought compulsory and binding arbitration under the amended Section 209 of the Civil Service Law. The City of Amsterdam refused to participate and obtained a court order preventing arbitration, arguing the amendments were unconstitutional.

    Similarly, the City of Buffalo and the unions representing its policemen and firemen also reached an impasse. The unions petitioned PERB to refer the disputes to an arbitration panel. The City of Buffalo then filed an action seeking a judgment declaring Section 209, as amended, unconstitutional.

    Procedural History

    In City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, the trial court initially granted a temporary restraining order and then a final judgment preventing arbitration and declaring the amendments unconstitutional. The City of Amsterdam appealed directly to the Court of Appeals.

    In City of Buffalo v. New York State Public Employment Relations Bd., the trial court granted a judgment declaring the amendments constitutional and valid, dismissing the city’s complaint. The City of Buffalo appealed directly to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the amendments to Section 209 of the Civil Service Law, mandating compulsory and binding arbitration for disputes between municipalities and their police and fire departments, violate the Home Rule provisions of the New York Constitution?

    2. Whether the Legislature unconstitutionally delegated its legislative authority to the arbitration panel by enacting the amendments to Section 209 of the Civil Service Law?

    Holding

    1. No, because the amendments constitute a general law applicable to all cities, and the Home Rule powers of municipalities are subordinate to general laws enacted by the Legislature.

    2. No, because the Legislature can delegate power with reasonable safeguards and standards to an agency or commission to administer an enactment, and the Legislature established specific standards for the arbitration panel to follow.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the Home Rule provisions of the New York Constitution allow local governments to regulate the hours of work and compensation of their employees only to the extent that such regulation is not inconsistent with any general law enacted by the Legislature. Because the amendments to Section 209 are “general laws,” applicable to all cities, the local governments must yield to the arbitration panel’s decisions once an impasse is reached. A “general law” is defined as “[a] law which in terms and in effect applies alike to all counties, all counties other than those wholly included within a city, all cities, all towns or all villages.” (NY Const, art IX, § 3, subd [d], par [1].)

    Regarding the delegation of legislative authority, the Court stated, “there is no constitutional prohibition against the legislative delegation of power, with reasonable safeguards and standards, to an agency or commission established to administer an enactment.” The Legislature delegated its authority to PERB and arbitration panels with specific standards that the panels must follow, as outlined in Civil Service Law § 209, subd 4, par [c], cl [v]. Therefore, the delegation was proper and reasonable.

    The Court also addressed the City of Amsterdam’s arguments regarding the power of taxation and the one-man-one-vote principle, finding them to be without merit.

  • Matter of Kerr v. Urstadt, 33 N.Y.2d 137 (1973): State Oversight of Rent Control Stringency

    Matter of Kerr v. Urstadt, 33 N.Y.2d 137 (1973)

    A state law requiring state approval for more stringent local rent control regulations does not violate home rule provisions, nor is it an unlawful delegation of legislative authority if the state commissioner’s discretion is guided by the objective of transitioning to a free housing market.

    Summary

    This case concerns the constitutionality of a New York State law giving the State Housing Commissioner the power to approve any new rent control regulations by New York City that are “more stringent or restrictive” than existing ones. The City passed Amendment 33 to its Rent Regulations, which the Commissioner disapproved. The Court of Appeals held that the state law was constitutional because it was general legislation and did not violate home rule provisions. Further, it found the law did not represent an unlawful delegation of authority because the Commissioner’s discretion was adequately guided by the overall policy of transitioning to a free housing market to encourage investment in housing maintenance.

    Facts

    In 1970, New York City adopted Local Law 30, making major changes to its rent control laws, including the Maximum Base Rent (MBR) system. In 1971, the state legislature enacted Chapter 1012, requiring the State Housing Commissioner’s approval for any new city rent control regulations that were more stringent or restrictive than existing ones. Amendment 33 to the City’s Rent Regulations, effective in 1972, amended the provisions for “hardship” adjustments based on net annual return, but the State Housing Commissioner withheld approval. The amendment stated that “hardship” adjustments shall be apportioned to individual apartments in the same manner as the building-wide MBR is distributed to individual apartments. It further stated that each controlled unit should bear not more than that portion of the increase as is properly attributable to it whether or not the amount so attributed shall be fully collectible.

    Procedural History

    In Matter of Kerr v. Urstadt, Special Term declared chapter 1012 constitutional and vacated the commissioner’s determination as arbitrary. The Appellate Division modified by reversing the part of the judgment that vacated the commissioner’s determination. In Matter of 241 East 22nd Street Corp. v. City Rent Agency, Special Term dismissed a petition to compel the City Rent Agency to process hardship applications under prior regulations. The Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals, and affirmed the Appellate Division decisions in both cases.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether chapter 1012 of the Laws of 1971, giving the State Housing Commissioner approval power over more stringent local rent control regulations, violates the home rule provisions of the State Constitution and constitutes an unlawful delegation of legislative authority.
    2. Whether the State Housing Commissioner’s determination that Amendment 33 was more stringent and restrictive, and his withholding of approval, were reasonable.

    Holding

    1. No, because Chapter 1012 is general legislation applicable to cities of 1,000,000 or more and does not offend the home rule provisions of the State Constitution. Also, the law does not confer unbridled discretion upon the State Housing Commissioner so as to constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative authority.
    2. Yes, because Amendment 33 barred or limited the collectibility of a warranted rent increase without compensating the landlord, making it more restrictive than prior regulations.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court found that Chapter 1012 was general legislation, applicable to any city of the State having a population of one million inhabitants or more, and therefore, did not violate the home rule provisions of the State Constitution. It stated, “By its terms, it is general, even though there might be but one city to which it could apply.” The court also reasoned that rent control is primarily a matter of State concern.

    Regarding the unlawful delegation of authority claim, the court acknowledged that the Local Emergency Rent Control Act states that “the transition from regulation to a normal market of free bargaining between landlord and tenant…[is] the objective of state policy.” The court reasoned that Chapter 1012 facilitates that policy by removing the threat of stricter controls and encouraging owner investment. While recognizing that the standard for guiding the commissioner’s discretion was broad, the court deferred to the strong presumption of constitutionality and the complexity of rent controls.

    The court also determined that the Commissioner acted reasonably in withholding approval of Amendment 33. Since 1951, rent control laws had provided for hardship increases where the property was not earning its statutorily prescribed return, subject to a 15% limitation. Amendment 33 changed this by allowing the hardship increase for any one year to be apportioned only against those apartments that have not yet reached their individual MBR. The court noted, “The effect is, of course, that the owner-landlord may be deprived of an increase, to which he is entitled, without any provision for compensating him for the loss.” Therefore, the Commissioner could reasonably withhold his approval.

  • Syracuse Aggregate Corp. v. Weise, 51 N.Y.2d 278 (1980): State Agencies and Overriding Local Zoning Laws

    Syracuse Aggregate Corp. v. Weise, 51 N.Y.2d 278 (1980)

    When acting pursuant to a state-wide concern, a state agency like the Urban Development Corporation (UDC) can override local zoning ordinances if the legislature has granted them that power, and this power doesn’t violate the home rule provisions of the New York Constitution.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether the New York State Urban Development Corporation (UDC) can disregard local zoning laws when planning and executing projects. The plaintiff, a property owner near a proposed UDC project, argued that the UDC’s actions violated the home rule provision of the New York Constitution. The Court of Appeals held that the UDC, acting under the authority of Article XVIII of the State Constitution related to state housing projects, could override local zoning laws because housing is a matter of state-wide concern and the legislature granted the UDC such power. This power doesn’t violate home rule provisions when applied to general laws affecting all municipalities.

    Facts

    Plaintiff owned property near a 12-acre site (the Banay property) in the Village of Ossining, where the UDC planned a development project. The proposed UDC project included facilities that would violate the village’s zoning ordinance, which prohibited high-rise apartments, multiple dwellings, and residences on lots smaller than 7,500 square feet in the affected area. The plaintiff brought suit, alleging the statute enabling the UDC’s actions was unconstitutional.

    Procedural History

    The Trial Term granted summary judgment in favor of the UDC. The Appellate Division affirmed the Trial Term’s decision. The dissenting justices in the Appellate Division argued that the statute only allowed deviation from local laws regarding materials and processes, not zoning laws. The plaintiff then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the New York State Urban Development Corporation (UDC) may plan and execute projects in disregard of local zoning laws, considering the home rule provisions of the New York Constitution (Article IX) and the provisions regarding state housing projects (Article XVIII).

    Holding

    Yes, because Article IX is expressly subject to other provisions of the State Constitution, and section 3 of article IX provides that “ [e]xcept as expressly provided, nothing in this article shall restrict or impair any power of the legislature in relation to * * * Matters other than the property, affairs or government of a local government.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the legislature intended to allow the UDC to override local zoning laws. The Court pointed to a vetoed bill (Assembly Bill No. 650) that would have required the UDC to comply with local zoning ordinances, and the Governor’s veto message stating that the UDC was created to overcome restrictive local standards that impede urgently needed development. This demonstrated that both the executive and legislative branches believed the UDC was exempt from local zoning. The court emphasized that housing is a matter of state-wide concern. Because the statute is general in nature and affects housing, local laws cannot inhibit the operation of general laws. The UDC’s powers stem from Article XVIII of the State Constitution, which establishes the legislative power to create such an agency to alleviate housing problems. The Court noted, “This grant of power reaffirmed the traditional immunity that instrumentalities of the State have enjoyed when carrying out State purposes.” (N. Y. Legis. Annual, 1972, p. 448.)