Tag: Home Exception

  • People v. Jones, 23 N.Y.3d 55 (2014): Prior Conviction Eliminates Home Exception for Weapon Possession

    People v. Jones, 23 N.Y.3d 55 (2014)

    A prior criminal conviction eliminates the “home or business” exception to the crime of second-degree criminal possession of a weapon under New York Penal Law § 265.03(3).

    Summary

    The defendant, previously convicted of a crime, was charged with second-degree criminal possession of a weapon after a loaded firearm was found in his home. He argued that the “home or business” exception in Penal Law § 265.03(3) should apply, reducing the charge. The Court of Appeals held that the exception does not apply to individuals with prior convictions, affirming the Appellate Division’s reinstatement of the second-degree charge. The Court interpreted the statute’s language and legislative history to conclude that the “except as provided” clause excludes individuals with prior convictions from the home exception. The Court also held that the indictment did not need to allege the prior conviction, as it was not an element of the offense in this specific context.

    Facts

    A loaded gun was found in the bathroom of the defendant’s home. The defendant had a prior conviction for criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree. The indictment charged the defendant with criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, in violation of Penal Law § 265.03(3). The People filed a special information alleging the prior conviction.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court reduced the charge from second-degree to third-degree possession, concluding that possession in the defendant’s home did not constitute second-degree possession. The Appellate Division reversed this decision and reinstated the second-degree charge. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the People’s appeal to the Appellate Division was untimely, thus depriving the Appellate Division of jurisdiction.

    2. Whether the “home or business” exception in Penal Law § 265.03(3) applies to a person previously convicted of a crime.

    3. Whether the indictment was insufficient because it did not allege the defendant’s prior criminal conviction.

    Holding

    1. No, because the 30-day time to appeal begins when the prevailing party serves notice, which did not occur here.

    2. No, because the “except as provided” clause of Penal Law § 265.03(3) excludes individuals with prior convictions from the home or business exception.

    3. No, because when a defendant has a previous conviction, the inapplicability of the exception is not an element of the offense, and the indictment need not allude to it.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court found the appeal to the Appellate Division was timely because the defendant, as the prevailing party at Supreme Court, never served the order on the People, which is required to commence the time for filing a notice of appeal.

    Regarding the “home or business” exception, the Court interpreted the language of Penal Law § 265.03(3) which states that possession of a loaded firearm does not constitute a violation of the statute if it takes place in the person’s home or business, “except as provided in subdivision one … of section 265.02.” Since § 265.02(1) applies to persons previously convicted of any crime, the Court reasoned that the exception to the exception applies, thus removing the home or business exception for convicted felons.

    The Court rejected the defendant’s argument that the “except as provided” phrase merely acknowledges that such cases are covered by the third-degree statute. The Court stated that this reading would “alter[] the plain meaning of the statutory words” and would render the statute nonsensical.

    The Court also addressed the defendant’s argument based on legislative history, finding that the legislature intentionally retained the “except as provided” phrase to increase the penalty for criminal possession of a loaded firearm by a person with a prior conviction, even in their home or place of business. The court cited a Senate Introducer Memorandum stating that the new subdivision was, “intended to increase the penalty for criminal possession of a loaded firearm under the circumstances where … [a] person possesses a loaded firearm in his home or place of business and has previously been convicted of a crime.”

    Finally, the Court held that the indictment was sufficient, even without alleging the prior conviction. The Court distinguished the case from typical second-degree possession cases where the inapplicability of the home or business exception must be alleged. Here, the exception never came into play due to the prior conviction, so its inapplicability was not an element of the offense.