New York Law Review

Tag: Hindering Prosecution

  • People v. Fisher, 27 N.Y.3d 717 (2016): Effect of Acquittal of the Underlying Felony on a Plea of Guilty to Hindering Prosecution

    People v. Fisher, 27 N.Y.3d 717 (2016)

    A guilty plea to hindering prosecution remains valid even if the person assisted is later acquitted of the underlying felony, because the acquittal does not negate the defendant’s admission that the assisted person committed the felony.

    Summary

    Kevin Fisher pleaded guilty to hindering prosecution after providing a gun used in a fatal shooting. The shooter, Clovis Roche, was later acquitted of murder. Fisher sought to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that the prosecutor’s notes, not disclosed before the plea, were exculpatory, and that Roche’s acquittal rendered him innocent. The New York Court of Appeals held that the notes were not exculpatory, would not have materially affected Fisher’s decision to plead guilty, and that Roche’s acquittal did not invalidate Fisher’s guilty plea, as the acquittal did not mean Roche was innocent. A defendant’s admission of guilt is a permissible means of establishing the underlying felony in a hindering prosecution case.

    Facts

    Kevin Fisher was charged with hindering prosecution and weapon possession for helping Clovis Roche, who shot and killed a man. Fisher pleaded guilty to second-degree hindering prosecution, admitting he aided Roche, who committed second-degree murder. Fisher waived his right to appeal as part of the plea agreement. Roche went to trial, where the key witness, the victim’s brother, gave testimony. The prosecution then discovered notes of the brother’s pre-trial interview, which the defense used to impeach the witness. Roche testified that the shooting was accidental. The jury acquitted Roche of the murder charges but convicted him of a weapons charge. Fisher moved to withdraw his guilty plea before sentencing, which was denied, and Fisher was sentenced per the plea agreement.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Fisher’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea and sentenced him. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea based on the prosecutor’s alleged suppression of exculpatory evidence.

    2. Whether the defendant’s guilty plea to hindering prosecution is rendered invalid by the acquittal of the person he assisted.

    Holding

    1. No, because the prosecutor’s notes were not exculpatory and would not have materially affected Fisher’s decision to plead guilty.

    2. No, because Roche’s acquittal does not invalidate Fisher’s admission that Roche committed murder.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court considered the defendant’s claims that the prosecutor’s notes constituted suppressed exculpatory evidence. Applying the principles of Brady v. Maryland, the court determined that the notes, which detailed the victim’s brother’s inconsistent statements, were not exculpatory, but were actually inculpatory to the shooter. The court found that even if they had been exculpatory, they would not have materially affected Fisher’s decision to plead guilty. Turning to the effect of Roche’s acquittal, the court cited People v. Chico, which held that the assisted person’s conviction is not required for a conviction of hindering prosecution. The court reasoned that Fisher’s guilty plea, which included an admission that Roche committed second-degree murder, established the underlying felony. The court emphasized that “an acquittal is only a finding of reasonable doubt, not a finding that [the person tried] is in fact innocent.” The court distinguished this case from scenarios of actual innocence, where the defendant never aided the commission of the felony.

    Practical Implications

    This case provides important guidance for several scenarios in criminal law. First, the court clarifies that a guilty plea generally marks the end of the criminal case and will not be easily withdrawn. Second, it underscores the importance of complete and accurate plea allocutions, especially in cases involving accomplice liability. Specifically, an admission that the assisted person committed the underlying felony satisfies the element of hindering prosecution, even if the assisted person is later acquitted. Third, it clarifies that a subsequent acquittal does not automatically invalidate a valid guilty plea to hindering prosecution. The ruling supports the finality of guilty pleas and discourages defendants from attempting to undermine the system by pleading guilty strategically. Finally, this case highlights that prosecutors must disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense, but the failure to do so is not reversible error unless the evidence is both favorable to the defendant and material to their decision to enter a plea.

  • People v. Brensic, 89 N.Y.2d 579 (1997): Corroboration of Underlying Felony in Hindering Prosecution

    People v. Brensic, 89 N.Y.2d 579 (1997)

    In a prosecution for hindering prosecution, CPL 60.50 requires independent corroborative evidence that the underlying felony occurred, but the threshold for such corroboration is low and can be satisfied by evidence such as the victim’s death, the suspect being a fugitive, and the suspect’s consciousness of guilt.

    Summary

    Brensic was convicted of hindering prosecution for assisting her common-law husband, Rivera, who she knew had committed a class A felony (murder). The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that while CPL 60.50 requires corroboration of the underlying felony in hindering prosecution cases, the prosecution met this requirement. The court emphasized that the corroboration requirement exists to prevent convictions based solely on confessions when no crime has actually occurred. Here, testimony from investigating officers about the victim’s murder, Rivera’s status as a suspect and fugitive, and his violent flight from police provided sufficient corroboration.

    Facts

    Brensic provided a detailed statement to police that her common-law husband, Marcus Rivera, and others planned and carried out the murder of Roberto Corperone. She admitted to twice thwarting police efforts to apprehend Rivera by warning him in advance of their arrival. Detectives eventually apprehended Rivera in Philadelphia without Brensic’s knowledge after he violently resisted arrest and fled. Brensic was subsequently charged and convicted of hindering prosecution in the first degree.

    Procedural History

    Following a non-jury trial, Brensic was convicted of two counts of hindering prosecution in the first degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Brensic appealed to the New York Court of Appeals by permission of an Appellate Division Justice.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to sustain Brensic’s conviction for hindering prosecution in the first degree.
    2. Whether the People provided sufficient corroboration under CPL 60.50 of Brensic’s statement that a class A felony (murder) had occurred.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because Brensic’s detailed statement provided an eyewitness account of the intentional murder of Corperone, and the detectives’ testimony supported the conclusion that Brensic warned Rivera of impending apprehension.
    2. Yes, because CPL 60.50 requires some independent evidence that the underlying felony occurred. Here, the testimony of the investigating officers regarding Corperone’s murder, Rivera’s status as a suspect and fugitive, his indictment, and his violent flight from police provided sufficient corroboration.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that to prove hindering prosecution in the first degree, the People must prove that the assisted person committed a class A felony. While the statute does not require proof of arrest or conviction, it does require proof of each element of the underlying felony. The court stated that the standard of review for legal sufficiency is “whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the People, could lead a rational trier of fact to conclude that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”

    Regarding corroboration, the court explained that CPL 60.50 requires “additional proof that the offense charged has been committed,” but does not mandate independent evidence of every component of the crime. The statute requires “some proof, of whatever weight, that a crime was committed by someone” to avert ” ‘the danger that a crime may have been confessed when no crime in any degree has been committed by anyone.’ ” The court distinguished felony murder cases, where corroboration of the underlying felony is not required, because in those cases, the felony serves as a substitute for malicious intent. In contrast, without the underlying felony in a hindering prosecution case, no crime has been committed at all.

    The court emphasized the relatively low threshold for corroboration under CPL 60.50. Here, the detectives’ testimony that Corperone had been murdered, that Rivera was the immediate suspect, that a fugitive warrant was issued for his arrest, and that Rivera violently resisted arrest and fled from police constituted sufficient corroboration. Specifically, the court pointed to Rivera’s “consciousness of guilt” as crucial corroborating evidence. As the Court stated, “proof of motive or flight, may ‘be held to constitute the essential additional proof.’ ”