2024 NY Slip Op 05131

Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b) provides an exemption from ordinary negligence liability for those “actually engaged in work on a highway”; this exemption does not apply to mere travel between work sites.

Summary

In Orellana v. Town of Carmel, the New York Court of Appeals considered whether a town highway superintendent, who was driving back to his office after inspecting road conditions, was “actually engaged in work on a highway” under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b). The Court held that the superintendent was not engaged in protected work at the time of the accident, as he was merely traveling to his office, and reversed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendants. This decision clarifies the scope of the exemption from liability granted to those performing highway work, emphasizing that the exemption is not applicable when the work is not actively being performed.

Facts

On a snowy day in December 2018, the Superintendent of Highways for the Town of Carmel, Michael J. Simone, drove to a location to inspect road conditions. After observing a quarter inch of snow accumulation, Simone directed his team to salt the roads. He then began driving back to his office. While driving through an intersection, Simone stopped at a stop sign, observed some additional snow accumulation, but did not take any action and proceeded into the intersection, colliding with Ana Orellana’s vehicle. Orellana sued the Town of Carmel and Simone for negligence. The defendants moved for summary judgment, claiming immunity under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b). The trial court granted the motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted the plaintiff leave to appeal.

Procedural History

The plaintiff, Ana Orellana, filed a negligence lawsuit against the Town of Carmel and Michael J. Simone (Superintendent of Highways). The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants based on the Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b). The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted the plaintiff leave to appeal, and ultimately reversed the lower court’s decision.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the Superintendent of Highways was “actually engaged in work on a highway” at the time of the collision, as defined by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b)?

Holding

1. No, because Simone was not actively engaged in work on a highway at the time of the collision, the protections of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b) did not apply.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court reiterated that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b) exempts those “actually engaged in work on a highway” from ordinary negligence liability, but they remain liable for recklessness. The court referenced Riley v. County of Broome, which clarified that the exemption turns on the nature of the work (construction, repair, etc.) being performed, not the vehicle performing the work. The Court emphasized that the exemption applies only when such work is in fact being performed at the time of the accident. In this case, the Court found that Simone was not actively engaged in work on the highway; he had already assessed conditions and dispatched his team. He was merely traveling to his office, and the observation of additional snow just before the accident did not constitute active work. “Because the uncontested evidence demonstrates that Simone was not actually engaged in work on a highway at the time the accident occurred, defendants are not entitled to the protections of section 1103 (b).”

Practical Implications

This case clarifies the scope of the “work on a highway” exemption under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b). It underscores that merely traveling to or from a work site, even for the purpose of inspecting conditions, does not qualify as “actually engaged in work on a highway.” This ruling reinforces the concept that the exemption applies to those actively performing tasks related to highway maintenance or repair at the time of the accident. Attorneys should carefully examine the specific activities being performed at the time of an accident involving municipal vehicles. The Court’s emphasis on the active performance of protected work could lead to more frequent determinations that the exemption does not apply, expanding the potential liability of municipalities and their employees.

2024 NY Slip Op 05131

Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b) exempts parties “actually engaged in work on a highway” from liability for ordinary negligence, but this exemption does not apply to individuals merely traveling between work sites without actively performing a protected task on the road.

Summary

In Orellana v. Town of Carmel, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the scope of the exemption from ordinary negligence liability provided by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b). The court considered whether the Town of Carmel’s Superintendent of Highways, who was involved in a collision while driving to the office after inspecting road conditions, was “actually engaged in work on a highway” at the time of the accident. The Court of Appeals held that because the superintendent was not actively performing any protected work, the exemption did not apply. Therefore, the municipal defendants were not shielded from liability for ordinary negligence, and plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on liability was granted.

Facts

During a snowstorm in December 2018, Michael J. Simone, the Superintendent of Highways for the Town of Carmel, was driving to his office after assessing road conditions and directing his team to salt the roads. While en route, Simone stopped at a stop sign, observed snow accumulation, and proceeded through the intersection. He then collided with Ana Orellana’s vehicle. Orellana sued, claiming negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants, holding they were protected by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b). The Appellate Division affirmed, but the Court of Appeals reversed.

Procedural History

The plaintiff commenced a negligence action. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiff’s cross-motion. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal, ultimately reversing the Appellate Division’s decision, denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and granting plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment on liability.

Issue(s)

Whether the Superintendent of Highways was “actually engaged in work on a highway” at the time of the accident, thereby exempting the municipal defendants from liability for ordinary negligence under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b).

Holding

No, because the Superintendent was not actively performing any protected work at the time of the accident, the defendants were not exempt from liability for ordinary negligence.

Court’s Reasoning

The court relied on Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b), which provides that the rules of the road do not apply to those “actually engaged in work on a highway.” The court cited prior cases like Riley v. County of Broome, which clarified that the focus is on the nature of the work being performed (construction, repair, maintenance) and not just the vehicle performing the work. The court emphasized that the exemption only applies when such work is in fact being performed at the time of the accident. In this case, the superintendent had completed his assessment and directed the salting of the roads. The court found that, at the time of the accident, Simone was merely traveling on the highway, and not actively engaged in road work. The court held that this did not satisfy the requirements for the exemption.

Practical Implications

This decision clarifies the limits of the exemption provided by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b). Attorneys should focus on whether the party was actively engaged in construction, repair, or maintenance, not just whether the vehicle was equipped for such work or traveling on a road. A vehicle traveling between work sites or performing preliminary assessments might not qualify for the exemption. This ruling supports a narrower interpretation of the statute, suggesting that the exemption is reserved for situations involving immediate, active work on the highway. This decision highlights that mere travel or preparation is insufficient; actual performance of highway work is required to invoke the protections of the statute. This is a case that must be considered when assessing liability of municipalities and their employees in cases involving accidents on highways.