Pless v. Town of Royalton, 81 N.Y.2d 1047 (1993)

Estoppel is generally not available against a governmental agency in the exercise of its governmental functions unless an unusual factual situation exists, and a municipality is not estopped from certifying a road as abandoned due to nonuse simply because it previously certified the road as a highway for state funding purposes.

Summary

The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a town was estopped from certifying a road as abandoned due to six years of nonuse, despite including the road in its calculation for state highway funding during that period. Abutting property owners argued estoppel should apply. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that estoppel typically does not apply against governmental agencies performing governmental functions, absent exceptional circumstances, which were not present here. The court reasoned that applying estoppel would require municipalities to speculate about future road abandonment, an obligation not imposed by statute.

Facts

From 1982 to 1987, the Town of Royalton included a particular road in its calculation of town highway miles for the purpose of receiving state highway maintenance funding. On October 20, 1987, the Town issued a certificate of abandonment for the road, asserting it had not been traveled or used as a highway for the preceding six years. Property owners abutting the road challenged the abandonment, arguing that the Town should be estopped from issuing the certificate given its prior representations for funding purposes.

Procedural History

The plaintiffs, abutting property owners, challenged the Town’s certificate of abandonment in court. The Appellate Division modified the trial court’s judgment, ultimately declaring that the road had been abandoned pursuant to Highway Law § 205(1). The property owners appealed this decision to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

Whether a municipality is estopped from certifying a road as abandoned due to nonuse for six years (Highway Law § 205 [1]) because, during the relevant period, it certified that the road was a highway for purposes of obtaining State highway funds.

Holding

No, because estoppel is generally not available against a governmental agency in the exercise of its governmental functions unless an “unusual factual situation” exists, which was not present here.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals reasoned that the property owners failed to demonstrate that the abandonment certification contradicted the prior certifications for state aid. Critically, they failed to allege reliance on the Town’s actions or provide a reason to invoke estoppel against the Town. The court cited the general rule that “estoppel is not available against a governmental agency in the exercise of its governmental functions” (Matter of Daleview Nursing Home v Axelrod, 62 NY2d 30, 33). The court emphasized that an exception to this rule requires an “‘unusual factual situation’” (id., quoting Matter of Hamptons Hosp. & Med. Ctr. v Moore, 52 NY2d 88, 93, 1), which was absent in this case. The court found that applying estoppel would effectively require municipalities to speculate about which highways might be abandoned in the future, a requirement not imposed by Highway Law § 205 (1). The court thus declined to apply estoppel and upheld the abandonment certification.