Saarinen v. Kerr, 84 N.Y.2d 494 (1994)

A police officer’s conduct in pursuing a suspected lawbreaker may not form the basis of civil liability to an injured bystander unless the officer acted in reckless disregard for the safety of others.

Summary

This case clarifies the standard of care applicable to drivers of emergency vehicles under New York Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(e). The Court of Appeals held that an officer engaged in a high-speed pursuit is liable to an injured bystander only if the officer acted with “reckless disregard” for the safety of others, not merely with negligence. The court reasoned that this higher standard is necessary to protect officers’ ability to make quick decisions in emergency situations, furthering the legislative intent behind granting emergency vehicles certain privileges under the law. This standard requires a showing that the officer intentionally committed an act of an unreasonable character, disregarding a known or obvious risk so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow, with conscious indifference to the outcome.

Facts

Officer McGown observed Kerr’s van fish-tailing and squealing its tires, then running a stop sign. McGown activated his emergency lights, but Kerr fled. McGown pursued, activating his siren. Kerr drove into oncoming traffic and ran a red light. McGown intended to radio for help but before he could, Kerr collided with Saarinen, who was seriously injured. Tests revealed Kerr had been drinking.

Procedural History

Saarinen sued Kerr and the Village of Massena, alleging McGown was negligent and the Village had inadequately trained him. The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to the Village, finding no evidence of McGown’s recklessness. The Appellate Division reversed, finding sufficient evidence of recklessness and inadequate training. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, granting the Village’s motion for summary judgment.

Issue(s)

1. What is the standard of care applicable to drivers of emergency vehicles under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(e) for injuries to third parties resulting from a high-speed pursuit?
2. Can the Village of Massena be held liable for negligent training or for adopting a discretionary pursuit policy?

Holding

1. No, because Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(e) requires a showing of “reckless disregard for the safety of others,” which demands more than a showing of a lack of due care under the circumstances.
2. No, because the Village’s choice to adopt a discretionary pursuit policy is a matter of governmental policy that may not be reviewed in a personal injury action founded on negligence without a showing of irrationality, which was absent here.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court reasoned that the plain language of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(e) explicitly refers to “reckless disregard,” indicating a higher standard than ordinary negligence. The Court highlighted that emergency situations demand quick decisions, and applying a standard of ordinary negligence would lead to judicial “second-guessing” of split-second decisions. The possibility of liability for a mere failure of judgment could deter officers from acting decisively to save life or property. The “reckless disregard” test, requiring more than a momentary lapse, better encourages swift action while protecting public safety.

The Court found that McGown’s actions did not meet the “reckless disregard” standard. Exceeding the speed limit was privileged under the statute. Other factors, like wet roads, possible traffic, and McGown’s speed, were insufficient to establish recklessness. McGown’s speed of 60 m.p.h. was not excessive on relatively empty streets. The Court emphasized the officer’s duty to stop Kerr, whose erratic driving posed a threat to public safety.

Regarding the Village’s liability, the Court found no evidence that changes in training would have altered the outcome. The Village’s discretionary pursuit policy was a matter of governmental policy not subject to review in a negligence action absent irrationality, which was not shown here. Citing McCormack v. City of New York, 80 N.Y.2d 808, 811, the court reinforced the principle that policy decisions regarding resource allocation and public safety strategies are generally immune from negligence claims. The Court noted that the Village’s policy, while discretionary, was not inherently irrational and was therefore protected from judicial review in this context.