Thomson Industries, Inc. v. Incorporated Village of Port Washington North, 27 N.Y.2d 537 (1970)

Zoning ordinances, being in derogation of common-law property rights, must be strictly construed; thus, a prohibition against a “heliport” does not necessarily extend to the limited, occasional, purely business-connected use of a helicopter by a private company.

Summary

Thomson Industries sought to use a portion of its property as a landing and takeoff area for its company helicopter. The Village of Port Washington North argued that this constituted a “heliport,” a use prohibited by the village’s zoning ordinance in the industrial zone where Thomson’s property was located. The New York Court of Appeals held that the term “heliport” should be narrowly construed to refer to commercial operations serving the public, not a private company’s occasional business use. Thus, the court affirmed the order against Thomson, but on the alternate ground that the operation was subject to the General Business Law requirements for aviation facilities.

Facts

Thomson Industries, Inc. used a small portion of its parking lot for the landing and takeoff of its own helicopter. This use was limited, occasional, and purely connected to the company’s business. The Village of Port Washington North zoning ordinance prohibited a “heliport” in the industrial “A” district where Thomson’s property was located. The village sought to prevent Thomson from operating the helicopter landing area, arguing it violated the zoning ordinance.

Procedural History

The Appellate Division held that the zoning ordinance, fairly construed, prohibited Thomson’s helicopter operations. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, but on a different ground, also relied upon by the Appellate Division, concerning compliance with the General Business Law.

Issue(s)

Whether the term “heliport” in the Village of Port Washington North’s zoning ordinance, when strictly construed, encompasses a private company’s limited, occasional, business-related use of a helicopter landing area on its own property.

Holding

No, because a strict construction of the term “heliport” requires that it be held to include only a commercial flying operation devoted primarily or exclusively to the carriage of the public and carried on in connection with facilities attendant upon public use. The term is not reasonably applicable to the appellant’s limited, occasional, purely business-connected use of a small portion of its parking lot for the landing and takeoff of its own helicopter.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals emphasized that zoning ordinances, as restrictions on common-law property rights, must be strictly construed. Citing 440 East 102nd St. Corp. v. Murdock, 285 N. Y. 298, 304, the court reiterated this principle of strict construction. It reasoned that the term “heliport” should be interpreted narrowly to apply only to commercial operations serving the public, similar to those used for public transportation in New York City. The court distinguished Thomson’s private, business-related use from such commercial operations. The court determined that the village’s definition was too broad to encompass Thomson’s activity. Although the court affirmed the lower court’s order, it did so on the alternative ground that Thomson’s operation was subject to the requirements of Section 240(4) and 249 of the General Business Law, related to aviation facilities. The ruling was without prejudice to any further action Thomson might take regarding compliance with the amended Section 249 of the General Business Law. The court’s decision reflected a balance between upholding zoning regulations and protecting property owners’ rights to reasonable use of their land.